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Résumé
Ces dernières années ont vu apparaître de nombreux arguments convergents vers la con-
clusions que les probabilités classiques ne pouvaient pas rendre compte, à la fois dans leur
calcul et leur représentation, de l’imprécision ou de l’incomplétude éventuellement présente
dans l’information disponible concernant un système, une variable, un paramètre. Aussi des
théories de l’incertain ayant pour but de prendre explicitement en compte cette imprécision ont
émergé. Les trois principales de ces théories sont, de la plus à la moins générale: la théorie
des probabilités imprécises, la théorie des ensembles aléatoires, la théorie des possibilités.
Avec elles sont également apparues de nouvelles difficultés et de nouvelles questions rel-
atives à la représentation et au traitement des incertitudes: difficultés d’ordre pratique lors
de la manipulation des informations, la prise en compte explicite de l’imprécision posant
de nouveaux problèmes calculatoires ; questions sur l’interprétation de certaines notions (in-
dépendance, conditionnement) pour lesquels il y avait un consensus assez fort dans le cadre
classique des probabilités ; problèmes d’unifications dus au fait que les théories proposent des
calculs, des solutions et des modes de traitement différents. En effet, en choisissant un cadre
alternatif ou plus expressif pour représenter et traiter l’incertitude, des problèmes qui étaient
auparavant "cachés" par le cadre relativement contraignant des probabilités classiques refont
surface.
Dans ce travail, nous apportons des réponses partielles à ces problèmes, à la fois en es-
sayant d’interpréter les différentes notions au sein de cadres unificateurs et en proposant des
méthodes de manipulation pratiques. Nous nous intéressons principalement aux problèmes
suivants:
• L’étude des représentations pratiques d’incertitudes. En particulier, nous situons des
représentations récemment proposées (p-boxes, nuages) par rapport à des représenta-
tions plus anciennes. Cela nous permet de mettre à jour un nombre intéressant de rela-
tions, facilitant de futures maniplations pratiques.
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• La combinaison d’informations provenant de sources multiples. En particulier, nous
nous intéressons aux problèmes de la combinaison d’informations partiellement incon-
sistantes et de la prise en compte de dépendances entre sources. Nous nous intéressons
aussi brièvement au problème de l’évaluation de la qualité de l’information transmise.
• La modélisation de la notion d’indépendance entre variables, cette notion étant essen-
tielle lors de la combinaison de modèle marginaux d’incertitudes en modèles joints.
Nous nous contentons de donner une vue générale de la problématique ainsi que quelques
premiers résultats, vu que l’étude complète de ces notions nécessiterait un travail de
recherche en soi.
Nous considérons aussi brièvement les problèmes de la prise de décision, et détaillons des ap-
plications pratiques mettant en oeuvre quelques unes des méthodes et représentations étudiées
dans ce travail.
Abstract
In these last years, many arguments appeared, converging to the fact that classical probabilities
cannot adequately handle or represent imprecision or incompleteness in the available informa-
tion concerning a system, a variable or a parameter. Hence, alternative theories proposing to
address and solve this issue have emerged. The three main such theories are, from the more to
the less general: imprecise probability theory, random set theory, possibility theory.
With them also appeared new difficulties and questions related to the representation and
treatment of uncertainty: difficulties regarding the practical handling of uncertainties, since
explicitly modeling imprecision often means an higher computational complexity when treat-
ing the information; questions related to the interpretation of some notions (conditioning,
independence) that almost met general consensus in classical probabilities; problems of unifi-
cation due to the fact that uncertainty calculus and treatments are sometimes different between
different theories and interpretations. Actually, by choosing a different or a more expressive
framework to handle uncertainty, issues that were previously "hidden" by the somewhat re-
strictive setting of classical probability theory are no longer hidden in the new setting.
In this work, we bring some partial answers to above issues, first by trying to settle different
problematics in unified settings, second by proposing practical methods allowing to handle
uncertainty in an efficient way. We focus mainly on the following issue:
• The study of practical uncertainty representations. In particular, we situate more re-
cent uncertainty representations (p-boxes and clouds) with respect to older uncertainty
representations. This lead us to expose a number of interesting relations between repre-
sentations, eventually leading to an easier practical handling of such representations.
• The combination of information coming from multiple sources. In particular, we look
at the two problems of combining partially consistent information and of taking account
of potential dependencies between information sources. We also address the issue of
evaluating the quality of the delivered information by the use of past assessments
ix
x• Modeling and interpreting notions of independence between variables, these notions be-
ing essential in the construction of joint uncertainty models from marginal ones. Here,
we simply gives a general picture of the (many) notions existing in the uncertainty the-
ories considered here, and propose some first results eventually leading to an unified
frame. Indeed, a full study of the complex notion of independence would require a
work of its own.
Finally, we briefly look at the problems of decision making, and give some details about two
applications achieved during this work and using some of the methods exposed therein.
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Chapter 1
Résumé Français de la thèse
(French Summary of the thesis)
If you cannot read French (or can also read English and prefer to skip this summary), please
go to p.41.
1.1 Introduction (Chapitre 2)
Ce travail de thèse présente des résultats relatifs à la représentation et au traitement des incer-
titudes entourant la valeur que peut prendre une variable, cette incertitude pouvant provenir
soit de la variabilité intrinsèque des phénomènes influençant la valeur de cette variable, soit
de l’imprécision ou du manque de fiabilité des informations disponibles.
Ici, nous nous intéressons aux cas où l’incertitude est représentée par des modèles numériques
qui ne sont ni des probabilités précises (parce que l’information disponible est trop pauvre),
ni de simples ensembles de valeurs (parce que nous disposons d’informations permettant de
savoir quels éléments sont plus à même d’être observés).
Afin de répondre à ce type de problème, différentes théories de l’incertain ont émergé
ces dernières années. Il s’agit, entre autres, des théories des possibilités [85], des ensembles
aléatoires [151] et des probabilités imprécises [203] (il s’agit là des trois théories principales
sur lesquelles nous allons nous concentrer). Par rapport à ces théories, notre position est
double:
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• d’une part, nous attachons une grande importance aux aspects permettant d’unifier ces
théories et le traitement de l’incertitude qui en découle.
• d’autre part, nous pensons que chacune de ces théories possède son propre intérêt, et est
à même de répondre à des questions pour lesquelles d’autres théories apportent parfois
des réponses insatisfaisantes. Dans ce sens, nous pensons que la question essentielle
n’est pas de savoir de manière absolue quelle théorie est "meilleure" que les autres,
mais plutôt de chercher à savoir quelle théorie s’adapte le mieux à une situation donnée.
A cet effet, nous nous attacherons, tout au long de ce travail, à souligner les points commun
entre les différentes théories, tout en apportant des solutions pratiques, parfois particulières à
l’une ou l’autre théorie, aux problèmes que peut poser le traitement des incertitudes. Nous
nous concentrerons plus particulièrement sur les problèmes courants posés par les études de
sûreté nucléaire.
Par incertitude, nous entendons donc les situations où l’information ne permet pas d’identifier
de manière exacte l’état d’un système ou la valeur d’une variable. Par traitement, nous en-
tendons la manipulation de l’information disponible de manière raisonnée, afin d’en déduire
d’autres informations potentiellement utiles. Nous différencions également deux niveaux
différents d’informations: un niveau générique, qui concerne les connaissances et modèles
généraux; un niveau contingent, regroupant les informations propres à une situation partic-
ulière. Par exemple, un modèle physique d’écoulement de fluide constituera de l’information
générique, tandis que la vitesse d’un fluide dans une expérience donnée sera de l’information
contingente.
Afin de pouvoir décrire facilement les traitements auxquels nous nous intéresserons durant
ce travail, nous considérons le modèle simplifié, donné par la figure suivante:
Variables
sources
Variables
d’intérêt
Modèle
Information contingente
Information générique
Traitement de l’incertitude: cadre général
Les variables sources sont celles à propos desquelles nous possédons de l’information. Le
modèle décrit les liens (génériques) qui existent entre variables sources et variables d’intérêt,
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et permet d’obtenir de l’information sur ces dernières à partir d’information sur les variables
sources. Enfin, les variables d’intérêt sont les variables sur lesquels nous voulons obtenir
une(des) information(s) utile(s) permettant de résoudre un probème donné.
A partir de cette figure, nous pouvons définir un certain nombre de problèmes relatifs au
traitement de l’incertitude:
• Modélisation: construction d’un modèle générique à partir d’informations contingentes
(observations particulières). Il s’agit d’un procédé de type inductif, souvent appelé ap-
prentissage dans le domaine de l’intelligence artificielle (IA) ou inférence paramétrique
dans le domaine des statistiques.
• Inférence: tirer des conclusions plausibles à partir d’informations disponibles. Il s’agit
d’un procédé déductif et impersonnel, qui consiste ici à tirer des conclusions sur les
variables d’intérêt à partir d’informations sur les variables sources, par le biais d’un
modèle générique. En statistique, ce type d’opération est souvent associée au problème
de prédiction. Les problèmes d’inférences comprennent:
– propagation directe à travers un modèle déterministe: propager les incerti-
tudes sur les entrées (variables sources) d’un modèle déterministe (i.e. fonction)
pour estimer les incertitudes sur les sorties (variables d’intérêt). Il s’agit du type
d’inférence le plus souvent fait en analyse de risque et en études de sûreté. Notons
que cette inférence est monotone, dans le sens où plus l’incertitude sur les entrées
est petite, plus celle sur les sorties l’est également.
– propagation inverse à travers un modèle déterministe: similaire à la propaga-
tion directe, excepté que les variables sources sont maintenant les sorties, et qu’il
faut estimer l’incertitude sur les entrées. La difficulté pour ce genre d’inférence est
que le modèle est très rarement inversible, et que les dépendances entre les entrées
sont généralement mal connues. Comme la propagation directe, cette opération est
monotone.
– propagation/conditionnement sur un modèle stochastique: à partir d’une ob-
servation sur les variables sources, inférer les valeurs plausibles des variables
d’intérêt en propageant cette information à travers un modèle générique stochas-
tique (i.e. chaîne de Markov, réseaux de Bayes). Dans ce cas, l’incertitude con-
cerne le modèle, et non plus les variables. Ce type d’inférence se rencontre plus
souvent dans le domaine de l’IA. Notons également que cette opération n’est pas
forcément monotone, et qu’une information plus précise sur les variables sources
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peut augmenter l’incertitude sur les variables d’intérêt. Ce phénomène est plus
connu sous le nom de dilation.
• Fusion d’informations: action de synthétiser l’information provenant de plusieurs sources
en un message simple et interprétable, tout en prenant en compte l’inconsistence entre
les informations et les éventuelles dépendances entre les sources. La fusion d’information
s’opère entre informations de même niveau de généricité.
• Prise de décision: action de déterminer l’ensemble des actions optimales à prendre
dans une situation donnée et en fonction des informations disponibles. Au contraire de
l’inférence, c’est un procédé personnel (le sens d’optimal peut dépendre de la personne
prenant la décision) et qui a un impact sur le monde environnant une fois la décision
prise. Néanmoins, inférence et prise de décisions, même si elles sont différentes, sont
souvent liées par le fait que les résultats d’une inférence sont souvent utilisés pour pren-
dre une décision.
• Révision: action de modifier nos croyances ou connaissances avec l’arrivée de nouvelles
informations, pas forcément cohérentes avec les croyances ou connaissances initiales.
De même que la fusion d’information, réviser se fait entre informations de même niveau
de généricité.
Bien entendu, il est difficile de rendre compte avec cette figure et ces descriptions relativement
simples de la complexité présente dans des applications réelles. En pratique, il peut être diffi-
cile de déterminer quelle est la meilleure réponse à apporter à un problème, ou encore quel est
le niveau de généricité de tel ou tel type d’information. Néanmoins, de telles figures simpli-
fiées peuvent servir de point de départ aux réflexions qui détermineront ensuite le traitement
le plus adéquat à appliquer à une situation.
Dans ce travail, nous ne nous intéresserons qu’à certains des problèmes évoqués plus
haut. Plus particulièrement, nous nous concentrerons sur des problèmes souvent rencontrés en
études de sûreté ou en analyse de risques.
Le chapitre 3 s’intéresse au problème de représenter l’incertitude entourant la valeur d’une
variable. Une attention toute particulière est réservée aux représentations simples et pratiques,
qui sont les plus souvent utilisées dans les applications. En particulier, nous étudions les rela-
tions entre les représentations suivantes : distributions de possibilités, distributions imprécises
de probabilités, p-boxes, nuages et ensembles aléatoires. Afin de faciliter leur comparaison,
nous introduisons un modèle dit de p-boxes généralisées.
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Le chapitre 4 concerne le cas où de multiples sources fournissent des informations à pro-
pos d’une même variable. Nous étudions d’abord comment cette information peut être syn-
thétisée en un message simple, en donnant une attention particulière aux problèmes du traite-
ment de l’inconsistence entre les informations et de la prise en compte de dépendances entre
les sources. Dans la seconde partie du chapitre, nous discutons d’une méthode permettant
d’évaluer la qualité de l’information fournie par les sources et donc, dans un certain sens, leur
fiabilité.
Dans le chapitre 5, nous étudions les notions d’indépendance qui peuvent exister entre dif-
férentes variables. En effet, si dans les probabilités classiques toutes les notions d’indépendance
sont formellement équivalentes à la définition de l’indépendance stochastique, indépendem-
ment de leur interprétation, ce n’est plus vrai lorsque des modèles probabilistes imprécis sont
utilisés. Dans ce dernier cas, il existe autant de définitions formelles que d’interprétations.
Puisque la notion d’indépendance est centrale dans la construction de modèles joint d’incertitude
à partir de modèles marginaux (une situation qui arrive souvent en analyse de risque), nous
étudions et esquissons un premier cadre général dans lequel situer les différentes notions
d’indépendances rencontrées en probabilité imprécise. La question de relier ces notions aux
arbres d’événements est brièvement abordée.
Le chapitre 6 est consacré au problème de la prise de décision. Après un bref compte-
rendu des différents critères étendant aux probabilités imprécises le critère classique de la
maximisation de l’espérance mathématique, nous donnons quelques résultats pratiques relatifs
aux calculs de ces espérances lorsque l’incertitude est modélisée par une p-box définie sur les
réels.
Finalement, le chapitre 7 expose deux applications réalisées dans le cadre de la thèse au
moyen du logiciel de traitement des incertitudes SUNSET développé par l’IRSN. La pre-
mière concerne l’application des méthodes présentées au chapitre 4 aux résultats d’études
d’incertitude réalisées sur des codes de calculs simulant la rupture d’un système de refrodisse-
ment dans un réacteur nucléaire. La seconde concerne l’application à un cas d’étude d’une
méthode numérique de propagation des incertitudes, dénommée RaFu et actuellement utilisée
par l’IRSN. Nous décrivons d’abord la méthode, puis les résultats obtenus sur le cas d’étude.
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1.2 Représentations pratiques d’incertitude (Chapitre 3)
Dans ce chapitre, nous nous intéressons aux représentations simples et pratiques qui permet-
tent de modéliser notre incertitude à propos de la valeur que peut prendre une variable X dans
un espace X . Parmi ces représentations simples, on trouve: les ensembles classiques, les
distributions de probabilité [108] et de possibilités [85], les distributions imprécises de proba-
bilités [42], les ensembles aléatoires [151], les boîtes de probabilités (communément appelées
p-boxes) [104], les variables aléatoires floues [34] et, plus récemment, les nuages [159].
Ces représentations, du fait de leur simplicité, facilitent souvent la manipulation des in-
certitudes, notamment en termes calculatoires. Elles sont également utiles pour résumer des
résultats complexes, ou pour éliciter1 des informations. Néanmoins, afin de manipuler cor-
rectement ces représentations, il est nécessaire de les comparer et d’établir des liens entre
elles, ces liens pouvant également montrer comment des outils de différentes théories peuvent
être appliqués à une même représentation.
Débuter cette comparaison et établir de tels liens sont les objets de ce chapitre. Comme
toutes les représentations étudiées ici peuvent s’interpréter comme des cas particuliers d’ensembles
convexes de distributions de probabilités, nous utiliserons ce langage pour pouvoir relier et
comparer les différentes représentations2.
Nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement aux deux représentations plus récentes que
sont les p-boxes et les nuages, et dont les liens avec les autres représentations pratiques
d’incertitude ont été peu explorés jusqu’ici.
1.2.1 Mesures non-additives et représentations connues
Nous introduisons d’abord les outils mathématiques et représentations connus permettant de
modéliser explicitement l’imprécision présente dans l’information. Contrairement aux proba-
bilités classiques, où une seule mesure est utilisée, ces représentations modélisent l’incertitude
au moyen de deux mesures conjuguées, l’une représentant l’idée de certitude, l’autre de plau-
sibilité. L’importance de l’imprécision peut ensuite être mesurée par la différence entre ces
deux mesures (les probabilités étant retrouvées lorsque les deux mesures coincident).
1On appelle élicitation la procédure qui consiste à demandé une évaluation de son incertitude à un expert
2notons néanmoins que l’interpretation en termes d’ensembles de probabilités n’est pas la seule possible,
comme le montre l’Appendice A
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1.2.1.1 Capacités
Les fonctions d’ensembles que sont les capacités [25] sont utiles pour représenter l’incertitude.
Definition 1.1. Etant donné un ensemble fini X , une capacité sur X est une fonction µ ,
définie sur les sous-ensembles℘(X ) de X , telle que:
• µ( /0) = 0,µ(X ) = 1 (conditions aux bornes)
• A⊆ B⇒ µ(A)≤ µ(B) (monotonicité)
Une capacité vérifiant
∀A,B⊆X ,A∩B = /0,µ(A∪B)≥ µ(A)+ µ(B) (1.1)
est dite super-additive. La notion duale, appelée sous-additivité, est obtenue en renversant
l’inégalité dans l’équation ci-dessus.
Etant donné une capacité µ sur X , sa capacité conjuguée µc est définie par µc(E) =
µ(X)− µ(Ec) = 1− µ(Ec) pour tout ensemble E ⊂ X avec Ec le complément de E. Une
capacité est dite additive si l’inégalité de l’équation (1.1) devient une égalité. Une capacité
additive est sa propre conjuguée (µ = µc), et est une mesure de probabilité P.
Quand elles sont utilisées pour représenter l’incertitude, les valeurs d’une capacité mesurent
le degré de confiance dans le fait qu’un événement va être observé. Dans ce cadre, les capac-
ités super-additives modélisent l’idée de certitude (puisque µ(E)+ µ(Ec)≤ 1), tandis que les
sous-additives modélisent l’idée de plausibilité (µ(E)+ µ(Ec)≥ 1).
Le noyau Pµ d’une capacité super-additive µ définie sur X est l’ensemble (convexe) des
mesures de probabilités qui la domine:
Pµ = {P ∈ PX |∀E ⊆X , µ(E)≤ P(E)}.
avec PX l’ensemble des mesures de probabilité définies sur X . Par dualité, le noyau est
également l’ensemble des mesures de probabilités dominées par la capacité conjuguée µc
(sous-additive), ce qui veut dire que, par la suite, l’on se concentrera exclusivement sur l’une
ou l’autre de ces capacités (typiquement, la super-additive). Notons que le noyau peut être
vide, et un moyen de s’assurer qu’il ne l’est pas consiste à faire appel à des propriétés des
capacités modélisant l’incertitude, telle la n-monotonie:
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Definition 1.2. Une capacité µ super-additive sur X est n−monotone, avec n > 0 et n ∈ N,
si et si seulement si pour toute collection A = {Ai ⊆X |i ∈ N,0< i≤ n} d’événements Ai,
l’équation
µ(
⋃
Ai∈A
Ai)≥ ∑
I⊆A
(−1)|I|+1µ(
⋂
Ai∈I
Ai)
est vérifiée.
Si une capacité est n-monotone, alors elle est assurée d’être (n− 1)-monotone, mais pas
forcément (n+1)-monotone. Une capacité est dite ∞-monotone si elle est monotone pour tout
n. Une condition suffisante (mais pas nécessaire) pour qu’une capacité ait un noyau non-vide
soit qu’elle soit 2-monotone. A partir d’une capacité, il est possible de définir de nombreuses
transformations bijectives [115], notamment la transformée de Möbius:
Definition 1.3. Etant donné une capacité µ sur X , sa transformée de Möbius est la fonction
m :℘(X)→ R des sous-ensemble de X vers les réels, qui associe à chaque sous-ensemble E
de X la valeur
m(E) = ∑
B⊂E
(−1)|E\B|µ(B)
Notons que la fonctionm est non-négative si et seulement si la capacité µ est∞-monotone [178,
Ch.2.7]. Dans ce dernier cas, nous l’appelons distribution de masse. La transformée de
Möbius d’une mesure de probabilité est sa distribution de probabilité (m est positive et non-
nulle uniquement sur les singletons).
1.2.1.2 Ensembles de probabilités
Walley [203] considère une représentation encore plus générale de l’incertitude par des paires
de bornes duales (inférieures/supérieures). Au lieu de se restreindre à des événements (sous-
ensembles), il étend ses mesures à des bornes sur les espérances mathématiques de fonctions
réelles et bornées de X (les événement correspondant alors à des fonctions indicatrices). Il
montre que ce langage est équivalent (en terme d’expressivité) à celui consistant à modéliser
l’incertitude par des ensembles convexes de mesures de probabilités, dénotés ici P [136].
Ce langage étant très général, nous nous en servirons pour comparer les représentations
pratiques que nous considérons, et nous adoptons la terminologie suivante:
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Definition 1.4. Soit F1 et F2 deux cadres généraux de représentation d’incertitude, a et b deux
instances particulières de ces cadres, et Pa,Pb les ensembles de probabilités induits par a et
b. Alors:
• Nous disons que le cadre F1 généralise cadre F2 si et seulement si pour tout b ∈ F2,
∃a ∈ F1 tel que Pa = Pb (ou, également, que F2 est un cas particulier de F1).
• Nous disons que le cadre F1 et F2 sont équivalents si et seulement si pour tout b ∈ F2,
∃a ∈ F1 tel que Pa = Pb et inversément.
• Nous disons que le cadre F2 est représentable par le cadre F1 si et seulement si pour
tout b ∈ F2, il existe une collection {a1, . . . ,ak|ai ∈ F1} telle que Pb = Pa1 ∩ . . .∩Pak
• Nous disons qu’un élément a∈F1 approche extérieurement (intérieurement) un élément
b ∈ F2 si et seulement si Pb ⊆Pa (Pa ⊆Pb)
Dans ce travail, nous pouvons nous restreindre aux ensembles induits par des bornes de
probabilités sur les événements.
Nous définissons une probabilité inférieure P comme une capacité super-additive. L’ensemble
de probabilités PP lui correspondant est alors le noyau de cette capacité. Nous considérons
ici des probabilités inférieures dites cohérentes, c’est-à-dire des probabilités inférieures qui
sont les enveloppes de l’ensemble de probabilités induit (i.e. pour tout ensemble A ⊆ X ,
nous avons P(A) = minP∈PP(P(A))). En d’autres termes, les bornes fournies pour modéliser
l’incertitude sont atteintes par PP et sont optimales (i.e. elles ne peuvent être réduites sans ré-
duire PP). Néanmoins, ces ensembles, même s’ils constituent des cas particuliers de modèles
plus généraux, peuvent rester difficile à manipuler du fait de leur complexité. Deux exemples
de modèles moins généraux introduits par leurs auteurs avec l’intention de fournir des outils
pratiques de manipulation d’incertitude sont les boîtes de probabilités (P-boxes) ainsi que les
distributions imprécises de probabilités.
P-boxes Une p-box [F ,F ] est définie comme une paire de distributions cumulées définies sur
les réels, telles que F ≤F (F domine stochastiquement F). Une p-box [F ,F ] induit l’ensemble
de probabilités P[F ,F ] = {P ∈ PR|∀r ∈ R, F(r)≤ P((−∞,r])≤ F(r)}, et il est utile de noter
qu’une p-box consiste à donner des bornes de confiance sur des intervalles emboîtés (−∞,r].
Contrairement aux distributions cumulées uniques [28], les p-boxes permettent aux ex-
perts d’exprimer leur opinion sur la valeur de percentiles de manière imprécise (en fournissant
10
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des intervalles au lieu de valeurs uniques). Il existe également des outils numériques ef-
ficaces [209] permettant de manipuler les p-boxes pour faire rapidement des propagations
conservatrices d’incertitude.
Distributions imprécises de probabilité Une distribution imprécise de probabilité consiste
en un ensemble L d’intervalles L = {[l(x),u(x)]|x ∈X } tels que l(x)≤ p(x)≤ u(x) pour tout
x. Cet ensemble L décrit notre connaissance imprécise sur les probabilités des singletons, et in-
duit l’ensemble de probabilités PL = {P ∈ PX |∀x ∈X , l(x)≤ p(x)≤ u(x)}. Comme l’ont
montré De Campos et al. [42], se restreindre à un tel ensemble de contraintes a de nombreux
avantages calculatoires. C’est également une représentation très utile dans le cas de données
multinomiales, ou pour la modélisation d’histogrammes imprécis.
1.2.1.3 Ensembles aléatoires
Ici, nous définissons un ensembles aléatoire (discret), noté (m,F ), comme une fonction, ap-
pelée distribution de masse, m :℘(X ) → [0,1] des sous-ensembles de X dans l’intervalle
unité, non-négative et normée (∑E⊆X m(E) = 1). Un sous-ensemble E ayant une masse posi-
tive est appelé ensemble focal, et nous notons F l’ensemble des éléments focaux d’un ensem-
ble aléatoire. A partir de cette fonction, Shafer [178] définit trois fonctions, respectivement de
croyance, plausibilité et commonalité:
Bel(A) = ∑
E,E⊆A
m(E) (Belief).
Pl(A) = 1−Bel(Ac) = ∑
E,E∩A 6= /0
m(E) (Plausibility).
Q(A) = ∑
E,E⊇A
m(E) (Commonality).
La fonction de croyance Bel ainsi définie est une capacité ∞-monotone, etm est sa transformée
de Möbius. Nous pouvons définir l’ensemble de probabilité
P(m,F ) = {P ∈ PX |∀A⊆X , Bel(A)≤ P(A)≤ Pl(A)}
induit par un ensemble aléatoire.
Les ensembles aléatoires constituent donc des cas particuliers de probabilités inférieures.
A l’inverse, ils généralisent les p-boxes [132]. Il n’existe pas de lien précis entre ensembles
aléatoires et distributions imprécises de probabilité, dans le sens ou l’un ne généralise pas
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l’autre, et inversement. Cependant, de nombreux auteurs ont étudié comment une représenta-
tion pouvait être approchée par l’autre [135, 60, 42]
Un des intérêt applicatif majeur des ensembles aléatoires est qu’ils peuvent être vus comme
des distributions de probabilité portant sur des ensembles, ce qui implique que les méth-
odes de simulations du type Monte-Carlo peuvent facilement leur être appliquées. Quand
ils sont définis sur les réels, il est courant de restreindre les ensembles focaux à un nombre
fini d’intervalles, ce qui permet d’étendre les résultats de l’analyse d’intervalles [152] aux
intervalles aléatoires [91].
1.2.1.4 Distributions de possibilités
Une distribution de possibilité est une fonction pi :X → [0,1] de l’espace X dans l’intervalle
unité, telle que pi(x) = 1 pour au moins un élément de X . A partir de cette distribution
sont définies plusieurs mesures [79], parmi lesquelles les mesures de possibilité, nécessité et
suffisance:
Π(A) = sup
x∈A
pi(x)
N(A) = 1−Π(Ac)
∆(A) = inf
x∈A
pi(x).
Leur propriétés caractéristiques sontN(A∩B)=min(N(A),N(B)) etΠ(A∪B)=max(Π(A),Π(B))
pour toute paire d’événements A,B de X . Etant donné un degré α ∈ [0,1], les α-coupes
strictes et régulières Aα et Aα sont les ensembles Aα = {x ∈X |pi(x) > α} et Aα = {x ∈X |pi(x)≥ α}.
Nous notons α0 = 0< α1 < .. . < αM = 1 l’ensemble fini des valeurs distinctes prises par pi .
La mesure de nécessité étant une capacité ∞-monotone, une distribution de possibilité pi
constitue un cas particulier d’ensemble aléatoire, et définit l’ensemble aléatoire (m,F )pi dont
les ensembles focaux Ei de masse m(Ei) sont, pour i = 1, . . . ,M [82]: Ei = {x ∈X |pi(x)≥ αi}= Aαim(Ei) = αi−αi−1 (1.2)
Une distribution de possibilité pi induit donc également un ensemble de probabilités Ppi tel
que
Ppi = {P ∈ PX |∀A⊆X , N(A)≤ P(A)≤Π(A)}.
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Les distributions de possibilité sont les modèles les plus simples pouvant modéliser ex-
plicitement l’imprécision. Cette simplicité fait qu’elles sont très faciles à manipuler, mais
aussi peu expressives par rapport à d’autres modèles. Cependant, il existe de nombreux cas où
elles sont utiles; Par exemple, le fait qu’elles puissent se voir comme des bornes de confiance
inférieures d’ensembles emboîtés les rend très pratiques pour éliciter de l’information, ou pour
représenter des intervalles de confiance centrés autour d’une valeur [11] (représentation très
souvent utilisée en statistique).
1.2.2 P-boxes généralisées
Les représentations précédentes sont connues depuis un certain temps et ont donc déjà été
étudiées par de nombreux auteurs. Nous proposons et étudions maintenant une nouvelle
représentation consistant en une généralisation des p-boxes à des espaces X discrets arbi-
traires. Il y a (au moins) deux bonnes raisons pour étudier une telle généralisation: première-
ment, les p-boxes étant déjà très utiles lorsque définies sur l’espace des réels, il semble normal
de vouloir les généraliser; deuxièmement, nous verrons que les p-boxes généralisées sont très
utiles pour étudier les nuages proposés par Neumaier [159]. Ces derniers ayant été proposés
récemment pour représenter l’imprécision présente dans l’information, il est nécessaire de les
positionner par rapport à d’autres représentations, travail que nous réalisons ici.
Rappelons d’abord que deux fonctions f et f ′ sont comonotones si et seulement si pour
toute paire d’éléments x,y∈X , nous avons f (x)< f (y)⇒ f ′(x)≤ f ′(y). En d’autres termes,
il existe une permutation σ de {1,2, . . . ,n} telle que f (xσ(1)) ≥ f (xσ(2)) ≥ ·· · ≥ f (xσ(n)) et
f ′(xσ(1))≥ f ′(xσ(2))≥ ·· · ≥ f ′(xσ(n)). Nous définissons alors une p-box généralisée comme:
Definition 1.5. Une p-box généralisée [F ,F ] sur un espace X est une paire de fonctions
comonotones F ,F , F : X → [0,1] et F : X → [0,1] de X vers [0,1] telles que F est plus
petite que F (i.e. F ≤ F) et il existe au moins un élément x deX pour lequel F(x) = F(x) = 1.
Et, à partir d’une p-box généralisée [F ,F ], nous pouvons définir un pré-ordre complet
≤[F ,F ] sur X tel que x≤[F ,F ]y si F(x)≤ F(y) et F(x)≤ F(y), grâce à la condition de comono-
tonicité. Pour simplifier les notations, nous considérons que les éléments de X sont indicés
tels que i < j implique xi≤[F ,F ]x j, et que |X | = n. Nous définissons ensuite l’ensemble de
probabilités induit par la p-box généralisée comme
P[F ,F ] = {P ∈ PX |i = 1, . . . ,n, F(xi)≤ P({x1, . . . ,xi})≤ F(xi)}.
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Notons que si X est l’ensemble réel, et ≤[F ,F ] l’ordre naturel entre les nombres, nous retrou-
vons les p-boxes classiques.
La proposition suivante montre que l’incertitude décrite par les p-boxes généralisées peut
être décrite par des paires de distributions de possibilités comonotones:
Proposition 1.1. Toute p-box généralisée [F ,F ] sur X est représentable ( voir Définition 1.4)
par une paire de distributions de possibilités piF ,piF , c’est-à-dire P[F ,F ] = PpiF ∩PpiF , avec:
piF(xi) = βi et piF(xi) = 1−max{α j| j = 0, . . . , i α j < αi}
pour i = 1, . . . ,n, avec α0 = 0.
A l’inverse, toute distribution de possibilité peut-être vue comme une p-boxe généralisée
réduite à sa seule distribution supérieure ou inférieure, ce qui veut dire que les distributions de
possibilité sont des cas particuliers de p-boxes généralisées.
La proposition suivante indique que les p-boxes généralisées sont des cas particuliers
d’ensembles aléatoires:
Proposition 1.2. Les p-boxes généralisées sont des cas particuliers d’ensembles aléatoires,
c’est-à-dire que pour toute p-box généralisée [F ,F ] définie sur X , il existe toujours un en-
semble aléatoire (m,F )[F ,F ] tel que P[F ,F ] = P(m,F )[F ,F ] .
et, si nous notons 0 = γ0 < γ1 < .. . < γM = 1 les valeurs distinctes prises par les fonctions
F ,F de la p-box sur les éléments de X , cet ensemble aléatoire est défini, pour j = 1, . . . ,M,
comme suit:  E j = {xi ∈X |(piF(xi)≥ γ j)∧ (1−piF(xi) < γ j)}m(E j) = γ j− γ j−1 (1.3)
Le lien entre p-boxes généralisées et distributions imprécises de probabilités est moins
direct, puisqu’aucune des deux représentations ne généralise l’autre. Considérons d’abord
un ensemble L et une indexation (arbitraire) des éléments de X . Pour i = 1, . . . ,n, notons
l(xi) = li et u(xi) = ui. Une p-box généralisée approchant extérieurement L peut alors être
14
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construite grâce aux équations suivantes:
F ′(xi) = P(Ai) = α ′i = max( ∑
xi∈Ai
li,1− ∑
xi /∈Ai
ui) (1.4)
F
′
(xi) = P(Ai) = β
′
i = min( ∑
xi∈Ai
ui,1− ∑
xi /∈Ai
li)
avec P,P les probabilités inférieures et supérieures induites par l’ensemble L. Chaque permu-
tation des éléments de X donne alors une p-box généralisée différente. Maintenant, consid-
érons l’ensemble Σσ des permutations σ deX et [F ,F ]
′
σ une p-box généralisée correspondant
à une permutation particulière. La proposition suivante montre que les distributions imprécises
de probabilités sont représentables par des p-boxes:
Proposition 1.3. Soit un ensemble L décrivant une distribution imprécise de probabilité, et
[F ,F ]
′
σ la p-box généralisée obtenue avec la permutation σ à partir de L et des équations
(1.4). Alors, nos avons la relation suivante:
PL =
⋂
σ∈Σσ
P
[F ,F ]
′
σ
(1.5)
ce qui nous permet de relier les distributions imprécises de probabilité aux p-boxes général-
isées. Maintenant que nous avons positionné cette représentation par rapport aux autres, nous
pouvons étudier les nuages de Neumaier [159], qui comme nous allons le voir ont de fortes
connections avec les p-boxes généralisées.
1.2.3 Nuages
Definition 1.6. Un nuage est défini par une paire de distributions δ : X → [0,1] et pi : X →
[0,1] de l’espace X vers [0,1], telles que δ est inférieure à pi (i.e. δ ≤ pi), avec pi(x) = 1 pour
au moins un élément x dans X , et δ (y) = 0 pour au moins un élément y dans X . δ et pi sont
respectivement les distributions inférieure et supérieure du nuage.
Notons que, d’un point de vue mathématique, ces nuages sont équivalents à des ensembles
flous valués par intervalles assortis de contraintes aux bornes. Plus précisément, le nuage est
mathématiquement équivalent à un ensemble flou dont la fonction d’appartenance à comme
valeur, pour l’élément x, l’intervalle [δ (x),pi(x)]. Etudier les nuages en tant que représen-
tation de l’incertitude sur X permet donc également d’apporter un nouvel éclairage sur les
interprétations possible à donner à un ensemble flou valué par intervalles.
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Neumaier [159] définit un ensemble de probabilitésP[pi,δ ] correspondant à un nuage [pi,δ ]
comme
P[pi,δ ] = {P ∈ PX |P({x ∈X |δ (x)≥ α})≤ 1−α ≤ P({x ∈X |pi(x) > α})}
.
Etant donné l’ensemble fini desM valeurs prises par les distributions δ et pi sur X , notées
0 = γ0 < γ1 < .. . < γM = 1, les coupes strictes et régulières sont définies comme
Bγi = {x ∈X |pi(x) > γi} et Bγi = {x ∈X |pi(x)≥ γi} (1.6)
pour la distribution supérieure pi et
Cγi = {x ∈X |δ (x) > γi} etCγi = {x ∈X |δ (x)≥ γi} (1.7)
pour la distribution inférieure δ .
De même que pour les p-boxes généralisées, la proposition suivante montre que les nuages
sont représentables par des paires de distributions de possibilité
Proposition 1.4. Un nuage [pi,δ ] est représentable par une paire de distributions de possibil-
ité 1−δ et pi , c’est-à-dire:
P[pi,δ ] = Ppi ∩P1−δ
La proposition suivante formalise plus en avant le lien existant entre nuages et p-boxes
généralisées:
Proposition 1.5. Soit [pi,δ ] un nuage sur X . Alors, les trois assertions suivantes sont équiv-
alentes:
(i) Le nuage [pi,δ ] peut être encodé comme une p-box généralisée [F ,F ] telle que P[pi,δ ] =
P[F ,F ]
(ii) δ et pi sont comonotones (δ (x) < δ (y)⇒ pi(x)≤ pi(y))
(iii) les ensembles {Bγi,Cγ j |i, j = 0, . . . ,M} définis par les equations (1.6) et (1.7) forment
une séquence d’ensembles emboîtés (i.e. ils sont complètement (pré)-ordonnés par la
relation d’inclusion).
16
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Cette proposition indique que les p-boxes généralisées constituent des cas particuliers de
nuages, puisqu’elles sont équivalentes aux nuages pour lesquels les distributions δ et pi sont
comonotones. A partir de maintenant, nous appellerons de tels nuages comonotones. Ce
résultat indique entre autres choses que les nuages comonotones sont des cas particuliers
d’ensembles aléatoires, et induisent donc des probabilités inférieures ∞-monotones.
Nous montrons dans ce travail qu’il n’en va pas de même pour la plupart des nuages
non-comonotones, qui induisent en général des probabilités inférieures qui ne sont pas 2-
monotones (sans pour autant que l’ensemble de probabilité induit soit vide). Ces résultats
indiquent que, d’un point de vue purement pratique, les nuages non-comonotones apparaissent
comme moins intéressants que leur contre-partie comonotone.
A l’instar des p-boxes généralisées, il n’y a pas de lien direct entre nuages et distributions
imprécises de probabilité. Il est cependant possible de reprendre les résultats concernant les
p-boxes généralisées (ces dernières étant des cas particuliers de nuages), et notamment la
Proposition 1.3. Il est également possible de reprendre et d’étendre d’autres transformations
proposées pour approcher extérieurement des distributions imprécises de probabilité par des
distributions de possibilité [141] .
Notons également que la plupart des résultats obtenus ici et reliant les p-boxes généralisées
et les nuages à d’autres représentations d’incertitude s’étendent facilement au cas de représen-
tations continues définies sur les réels. Les résultats obtenus concernant les représentations
pratiques d’incertitude sont résumés par la figure 1.1.
Deux autres problèmes qui sont brièvement considérés dans le chapitre concernent d’une
part l’utilisation des modèles hiérarchiques de second ordre (Section 3.5), et plus particulière-
ment le cas des variables aléatoires floues [32, 217], d’autre part la propagation des p-boxes
généralisées à travers un modèle déterministe (Section 3.2.5), ce qui nous permet, entre autre,
de mettre en évidence l’utilité potentielle des relations exhibées dans le chapitre.
1.3 Traitement de sources multiples d’informations (Chapitre 4)
En pratique, lorsque la valeur d’une variable ou d’un paramètre X est mal connue, il arrive
souvent que plusieurs sources (e.g. experts, capteurs, modèles physiques différents) four-
nissent des informations concernant cette variable ou ce paramètre. Dans cette situation, deux
problèmes différents mais corrélés sont (i) la construction d’une représentation synthétique et
interprétable, plus facile à manipuler que des informations éparses et (ii) l’évaluation de la
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Ens. de probabilités
Probabilités inférieures cohérentes
Capacités 2-monotones
Ens. aléatoires (∞-monotone)
Nuages comonotones
P-boxes généralisées
P-boxes
Probabilités
Dist. Imp. de Proba.
Nuages généraux
Possibilités
Ensembles
Elément singulier
Figure 1.1: Relations entre représentations pratiques: résume A −→ B: B est un cas
particulier de A. A 99K B: B est représentable par A
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qualité de l’information fournie par les sources.
Dans ce chapitre, nous nous penchons sur chacun de ces deux problèmes. Concernant
le premier, dénommé en général problème de fusion d’information, nous rappelons d’abord
les méthodes de synthèse de base pour chacune des théories considérées ici, pour ensuite
nous pencher plus spécifiquement sur les problèmes de traitement des inconsistances dans
l’information et des dépendances pouvant exister entre les sources d’information. Pour ré-
soudre le problème des inconsistances, nous proposons l’utilisation de la notion de sous-
ensembles maximaux cohérents comme une solution générale et attractive à la fois d’un point
de vue théorique et conceptuel. Concernant les dépendances, nous proposons l’utilisation
d’une règle prudente basée sur la théorie des fonctions de croyances et du principe du moindre
engagement.
1.3.1 Opérations de fusion d’information basiques
Soit F un cadre de traitement des incertitudes (i.e., possibilités, ensembles aléatoires ou ensem-
bles de probabilités), FX l’ensemble des représentations du cadre F définie sur l’ensemble fini
X . L’information donnée par N sources étant modélisée par une représentation appartenant à
F, une opération de fusion ϕ est une fonction ϕ : (FX )N → FX qui résume les informations
données par les sources en une représentation unique.
Supposons une notion d’inclusion, notée ⊂FX , définie entre les éléménts de FX . Etant
donné de l’information provenant de sources multiples et représentée par des modèles ai ∈
FX , i= 1, . . . ,N, la fusion d’information peut suivre trois comportements principaux [18, 93]:
• conjonctif: un comportement conjonctif est le pendant d’une intersection d’ensembles.
Le résultat ϕ(a1, . . . ,aN) d’une telle opération est tel que ϕ(a1, . . . ,aN) ⊂FX ai pour
i = 1, . . . ,N. Un opérateur conjonctif réduit donc l’incertitude globale, et fournit un
résultat plus précis que chacune des sources prise séparément. Il suppose que toute
les sources sont fiables, et peut fournir un résultat très peu fiable, voire vide, en cas
d’inconsistances dans l’information fournie par les sources.
• disjonctif: un comportement disjonctif est le pendant d’une union d’ensembles. Le
résultat ϕ(a1, . . . ,aN) d’une telle opération est tel que ϕ(a1, . . . ,aN) ⊃FX ai pour i =
1, . . . ,N. Un opérateur disjonctif augmente donc l’incertitude globale, et fournit un ré-
sultat moins précis que chacune des sources prise séparément. Il fait la supposition
qu’au moins une des sources est fiable. Le résultat d’une telle opération est générale-
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ment très fiable, mais peut être très (trop) imprécis, ce qui réduit son utilité.
• compromis: le résultat d’un comportement de compromis se situe entre la disjonction
et la conjonction. De tels comportements sont généralement utilisés quand les infor-
mations fournies par les sources sont partiellement inconsistantes. L’objectif d’un tel
comportement est d’obtenir un résultat qui ait un bon équilibre entre informativité et
fiabilité. Nous distinguons deux types de compromis:
– adaptatifs: un comportement de compromis sera appelé adaptatif si le résultat
dépend du contexte. Le but est de passer d’un comportement conjonctif à un com-
portement disjonctif au fur et à mesure que l’inconsistance entre les informations
augmente. On retrouve alors la disjonction (conjonction) en cas d’inconsistance
totale (consistance totale) entre les sources. Entre ces deux situations, le comporte-
ment est de compromis. Les méthodes utilisant les sous-ensembles maximaux
cohérents, que nous considérons plus tard, en sont de bons représentants.
– non-adaptifs: un comportement de compromis est non-adaptatif quand il se com-
porte toujours de la même manière, quelque soit le contexte. Les moyennes arith-
métiques pondérées (ou combinaisons convexes) constituent un exemple typique
et populaire de tels opérateurs, et sont de loin les opérateurs de fusion les plus
utilisés en pratique.
Nous rappelons ensuite comment les opérateurs de base (conjonctions, disjonctions, com-
binaison convexe), ceux qui sont le plus souvent utilisés pour en construire de plus complexes,
se déclinent dans chacune des théories considérées ici (probabilités imprécises, ensembles
aléatoires, possibilités).
Probabilités imprécises soit N sources dont les informations concernant X sont modélisées
par les ensembles de probabilitésP1, . . . ,PN . Les opérateurs principaux de fusion d’information
se définissent alors comme suit [202]:
• conjonction: la conjonction P∩(1:N) des ensembles P1, . . . ,PN se définit comme
P∩(1:N) =
N⋂
i=1
Pi
20
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• disjonction: la disjonction P∩(1:N) des ensembles P1, . . . ,PN se définit comme
P∪(1:N) =
N⋃
i=1
Pi
et, en pratique, c’est souvent l’enveloppe convexe H (P∪(1:N)) de P∪(1:N) qui est con-
sidérée, étant plus facile à manipuler et équivalente d’un point de vue comportemen-
tal [202].
• combinaison convexe: la combinaison convexe P∩(1:N) des ensembles P1, . . . ,PN ,
auxquels sont associés les poids non-négatifs et de somme unitaire λ1, . . . ,λN se définit
comme
P∑(1:N) = ∑
i∈JNK
λiPi
Ensembles aléatoires soit N sources dont les informations concernant X sont modélisées
par les ensembles aléatoires (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N . A partir de ces N ensembles aléatoires,
nous définissons une distribution de masse jointe m(1:N), définie sur le produit Cartésien X
N
comme une distribution ayant les distributions mi, i = 1, . . . ,N pour marginales. c’est-à-dire,
pour tout j ∈ 1, . . . ,N et i j ∈ {1, . . . , |℘(X )|}, m(1:N) est telle que:
m(1:N)(·×Ei j) := ∑
i1,...,i j−1∈{1,...,|℘(X )|}
i j+1,...,iN∈{1,...,|℘(X )|}
m(1:N)(Ei1× . . .×Ei j × . . .×EiN ) = m j(Ei j) (1.8)
et m(1:N) ne reÁoit une masse positive que si Ei j ∈ F j, l’ensemble des ensembles focaux
de (m,F ) j, et ce pour j = 1, . . . ,N. Les opérateurs principaux de fusion d’information se
définissent alors comme suit:
• conjonction: une conjonction des ensembles aléatoires (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N se définit
en deux étapes
1. la construction d’une distribution jointe satisfaisant (1.8)
2. allouer chaque masse jointe m(1:N)(×Nj=1E j) à l’ensemble ∩Nj=1E j, avec E j ∈F j
for j = 1, . . . ,N.
Notons qu’en prenant le produit des masses, on retrouve la règle bien connue de combi-
naison du Modèle des Croyances Transférables (i.e. la règle de combinaison de Demp-
ster non-normalisée).
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• disjonction: une disjonction des ensembles aléatoires (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N se définit
en deux étapes
1. la construction d’une distribution jointe satisfaisant (1.8)
2. allouer chaque masse jointe m(1:N)(×Nj=1E j) à l’ensemble ∪Nj=1E j, avec E j ∈F j
for j = 1, . . . ,N.
• combinaison convexe: des ensembles aléatoires (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N se définit comme
l’ensemble aléatoire (m,F )
∑(1:N)
ayant une distribution de masse telle que, pour chaque
ensemble E ⊆X :
m∑(1:N)(E) =
N
∑
i=1
λimi(E). (1.9)
Possibilités soit N sources dont les informations concernant X sont modélisées par les dis-
tributions pi1, . . . ,piN . Les opérateurs principaux de fusion d’information se définissent alors
comme suit:
• conjonction: la conjonction pi⊤(1:N) des distributions pi1, . . . ,piN se définit pour tout x ∈
X comme
pi⊤(1:N)(x) =⊤i=1,...,Npii(x)
avec ⊤ une norme triangulaire, couramment appelée t-norme3. Les plus souvent util-
isées sont l’opération minimum, qui peut être associée à une hypothèse de dépendance
entre sources (puisque c’est la seule t-norme idempotente), et le produit (hypothèse
d’indépendance).
• disjonction: la disjonction pi⊥(1:N) des distributions pi1, . . . ,piN se définit pour tout x ∈X
comme
pi⊥(1:N)(x) =⊥i=1,...,Npii(x)
avec ⊥ une conorme triangulaire ou t-conorme, qui sont les opérateurs duaux4 des t-
normes. La t-conorme la plus souvent utilisée est le maximum (t-conorme la moins
pénalisante).
• combinaison convexe: la combinaison convexe pi∑(1:N) des distributions pi1, . . . ,piN , auxquelles
sont associés les poids non-négatifs et de somme unitaire λ1, . . . ,λN pour tout x ∈X se
3Une t-norme est une fonction⊤ : [0,1]× [0,1]→ [0,1] associative, commutative, non-décroissante en chaque
membre et ayant 1 comme élément neutre
4Dans le sense où pour tout (x,y) ∈ [0,1]2, ⊥(x,y) = 1−⊤(1− x,1− y)
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définit comme
pi∑(1:N)(x) =
N
∑
i=1
λipii(x)
Les propriétés et liens existants entre les opérateurs des différentes théories sont égale-
ment étudiés. Pour chacun de ces opérateurs, nous proposons également des contreparties
s’appliquant aux nuages de Neumaier, dont nous étudions les propriétés et les liens avec les
opérations des autres théories.
Nuages soit N sources dont les informations concernant X sont modélisées par les nuages
[pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N . Alors, nous proposons les opérateurs principaux suivants:
• conjonction: nous définissons la conjonction [pi,δ ]∩ des nuages [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N
comme
[pi,δ ]∩(1:N) = [pi∩(1:N),δ∩(1:N)] = [
N
min
i=1
(pii),
N
max
i=1
(δi)] (1.10)
.
• disjonction: nous définissons la disjonction [pi,δ ]∪ des nuages [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N comme
[pi,δ ]∪(1:N) = [pi∪(1:N),δ∪(1:N)] = [
N
max
i=1
(pii),
N
min
i=1
(δi)] (1.11)
.
• combinaison convexe: etant donné les poids de somme unitaire λ1, . . . ,λN associés
aux nuages [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N , nous définissons la combinaison convexe de nuages
[pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N comme
[pi,δ ]
∑(1:N)
= [pi∑(1:N),δ∑(1:N)] = [
N
∑
i=1
λipii,
N
∑
i=1
λiδi] (1.12)
Bien que ces opérateurs (conjonctions, disjonctions, combinaisons convexes) soient suff-
isants pour traiter les problèmes où les informations sont soit très inconsistantes, soit très
consistantes entre elles, ils ne sont pas assez flexibles pour obtenir un modèle utile dans le cas
où les informations sont partiellement inconsistantes. Dans ce dernier cas, nous proposons
l’utilisation des sous-ensembles maximaux cohérents comme une réponse générale attractive
à la fois d’un point de vue conceptuel et théorique.
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1.3.2 Utilisation des sous-ensembles maximaux cohérents (SMC)
Les méthodes basées sur les SMC [173] consistent à utiliser une opération conjonctive au sein
des sous-groupes de sources dont les informations sont consistantes, pour ensuite synthétiser
les différents résultats par une opération de fusion disjonctive. Le résultat obtenu est donc
proche d’une conjonction pure si les informations montrent une grande consistance, et proche
d’une disjonction si les informations sont fortement inconsistantes. Cette approche permet de
répondre de manière adaptative et simple au double objectif (parfois difficile à atteindre) qui
consiste à gagner un maximum d’informativité tout en restant consistant avec l’information
donnée par chaque source.
Nous revoyons d’abord comment les SMC peuvent s’appliquer de manière générale, avant
d’étudier un cas plus précis s’appliquant à la théorie des possibilités.
1.3.2.1 Application générale
Probabilités imprécises l’information étant donnée parN ensembles de probabilitésP1, . . . ,PN ,
un sous ensemble5 K ⊂ JNK est maximal cohérent (dit SMC) si ∩i∈KPi 6= /0 et s’il est maximal
avec cette propriété (tout ajout d’une source à K conduit à une conjonction vide). Le résultat
de la fusion par SMC est alors:
PMCS(1:N) = H
 k⋃
j=1
⋂
i∈K j
Pi
 (1.13)
avec k le nombre de SMC, K j les SMC et H l’enveloppe convexe de l’ensemble.
Ensembles aléatoires l’information étant donnée parN ensembles aléatoires (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N ,
un ensemble résultant d’une fusion par SMC est construit en trois étapes
1. la construction d’une distribution jointe satisfaisant (1.8)
2. pour chaque masse jointe m(1:N)(×Nj=1E j), K ⊂ JNK est un SMC si ∩i∈KEi 6= /0 et si il
est maximal avec cette propriété. Soit K1, . . . ,Kk les SMC pour cette masse jointe.
3. allouer la masse m(1:N)(×Ni=1Ei) à l’ensemble
⋃k
j=1
⋂
i∈K j Ei, avec Ei ∈ Fi pour i =
1, . . . ,N.
5Rappelons que nous notons JNK := {1, . . . ,N} l’ensemble des N premiers naturels
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Possibilités l’information étant donnée par N distributions de possibilités pi1, . . . ,piN , un
sous-ensemble K ⊂ JNK est un SMC si mini∈K pii 6= /0 et est maximum avec cette propriété.
Dans ce cas, le résultat d’une fusion par SMC est
piMCS(1:N) =
k
max
j=1
min
i∈K j
pii. (1.14)
Les règles de fusion ci-dessus ont l’avantage qu’elles permettent de traiter l’inconsistance
de manière flexible, tout en requérant un minimum d’information (dans le cas des probabil-
ités imprécises et distributions de possibilités, seuls les modèles représentant les informations
fournies sont nécessaires). De plus, elles satisfont nombre de propriétés qui apparaissent
comme désirables dans un processus de fusion d’information.
Si ces règles sont séduisantes d’un point de vue théorique et conceptuel, les appliquer peut
poser des problèmes calculatoires importants, puisqu’extraire les sous-ensembles maximaux
cohérents est, en général, un problème de complexité NP-complète [140]. Néanmoins, il existe
des cadres où extraire les SMC ne présente pas une telle complexité, et c’est notamment le cas
lorsque les ensembles sont des intervalles définis sur les réels. Pour cette raison, nous étudions
une méthode SMC s’appliquant aux intervalles flous (distributions de possibilités dont les α-
coupes sont des intervalles) et travaillant à α-coupes constantes. Cette méthode, qui étend
l’équation (1.14) et est un cas particulier des SMC appliqués aux ensembles aléatoires, reste,
globalement, de complexité linéaire par rapport au nombre de sources, et est donc facilement
applicable.
1.3.2.2 SMC appliqué aux distributions de possibilité sur les réels.
Nous considérons donc le cas où X prend sa valeur sur l’espace des réels, et où l’information
est modélisée par N distributions de possibilités pii, i = 1, . . . ,N. Cela peut être, par exemple,
des experts donnant leurs avis en terme d’intervalles de confiance emboîtés.
Nous proposons donc d’utiliser la méthodeMCS α-coupe par α-coupe (inspirée de travaux
précédents [77]). Etant donné les distributions pi1, . . . ,piN , à chaque niveau α ∈ [0,1] corre-
spond une série de N intervalles Ei,α , avec Ei,α l’α-coupe de la distribution pii. Soit K j,α
les sous-ensembles maximaux d’α-coupes tels que
⋂
i∈K j,α Ei,α 6= /0 (Pour chaque niveau,
l’extraction de ces sous-intervalles est de complexité globalement linéaire). Nous définissons
ensuite l’ensemble EMCS,α comme l’union des intersections associées aux sous-ensembles
Résumé Français de la thèse
(French Summary of the thesis) 25
K j,α , c’est-à-dire
EMCS,α =
⋃
j=1,..., f (α)
⋂
i∈K j,α
Ei,α (1.15)
avec f (α) le nombre de sous-ensembles maximaux cohérents distincts au niveau α . Notons
qu’en général, EMCS,α est une union d’intervalles disjoints, et ne constituent pas une distri-
bution de possibilité, puisque la relation EMCS,α ⊃ EMCS,β n’est pas vraie pour toute paire de
valeur β ,α ∈ [0,1] telles que β > α , et les ensembles ne sont donc pas emboîtés.
Néanmoins, en pratique, il y aura un nombre fini de p+ 1 valeurs 0 = β1 ≤ . . . ≤ βp ≤
βp+1 = 1 telles que les ensembles EMCS,α seront emboîtés pour toute valeur α ∈ (βk,βk+1], et
cela pour k = 1, . . . , p. Etant donné les distributions pi1, . . . ,piN , ces valeurs sont assez faciles
à extraire.
En appliquant l’équation (1.15) aux niveaux α ∈ (βk,βk+1], nous obtenons donc un ensem-
ble flou Fk non-normalisé, dont le degré d’appartenance varie dans (βk,βk+1] (les ensembles
EMCS,α étant emboîtés entre ces valeurs). Il est ensuite possible de renormaliser cet ensem-
ble flou de manière proportionnelle pour obtenir un ensemble flou F˜k et de lui affecter une
masse m(F˜k) = βk+1−βk. Le résultat est alors formellement équivalent à un ensemble flou
aléatoire (ou encore à une fonction de croyance floue), c’est-à-dire un ensemble aléatoire où
les éléments focaux sont des ensembles flous. Le procédé est illustré par la figure 1.2.
Nous proposons ensuite une série d’outils pratiques permettant de manipuler plus facile-
ment l’information résumée contenue dans cette variable aléatoire floue. Nous proposons
également des variantes permettant de prendre en compte, dans la procédure de fusion pro-
posée ci-dessus, des informations supplémentaires (e.g. nombre de sources fiables, facteurs
de fiabilité des sources, distance entre les informations). Entre-autres choses, nous proposons
de prendre la distribution de possibilité pic correspondant à la fonction de contour, c’est-à-dire,
∀x ∈X , pic(x) =
p
∑
i=1
miνF˜i
(x), (1.16)
comme résumé essentiel de l’information. Cette distribution est ensuite plus facile à manip-
uler, et d’un point de vue axiomatique satisfait la plupart des propriétés requises par d’autres
auteurs.
Dans la suite du chapitre concernant la fusion d’information, nous étudions également de
plus près la prise en compte de dépendances entre sources au sein de la théorie des ensembles
aléatoires dans la fusion conjonctive (Section 4.3). Cette théorie semble particulièrement bien
26
Résumé Français de la thèse
(French Summary of the thesis)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4
β1 = 0.4
β2 = 0.66
β3 = 0.91
0
3 6 9 12
1
m(F˜1) = 0.4
0
3 6 9 12
1
m(F˜2) = 0.26
0
3 6 9 12
1
m(F˜3) = 0.25
0
3 6 9 12
1
m(F˜4) = 0.09
Figure 1.2: Sous-ensembles maximaux cohérents: illustration
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adaptée pour prendre en compte de telles dépendances, qui peuvent s’exprimer par le biais de
la construction de la distribution de masse jointe (première étape des différents opérateurs de
fusion définis plus haut pour les ensembles aléatoires). En particulier, nous donnons quelques
premiers résultats permettant d’utiliser le principe de moindre engagement pour fusionner
prudemment plusieurs sources d’informations. Un des intérêts théorique (et pratique) de ces
résultats est qu’ils indiquent que lorsque les ensembles aléatoires sont équivalents à des distri-
butions de possibilités (i.e. éléments focaux emboîtés), nous retrouvons la fusion par t-norme
minimum, c’est-à-dire le mode de fusion conjonctif le plus prudent en théorie des possibilités.
1.3.2.3 Evaluation de l’information
Comme nous l’avons vu plus haut, certains opérateurs de fusion (e.g. la moyenne arithmétique
pondérée) requièrent d’affecter des poids aux différentes sources d’informations, ce qui revient
à leur affecter des importances, ou une fiabilité différente à chacune. Déterminer ces poids de
manière rationnelle n’est pas toujours chose aisée. De plus, dans des activités scientifiques
telles que l’analyse de risque ou les études de s˚reté, il est important que ces poids, s’ils
doivent être déterminés, le soient de la manière la plus objective possible.
C’est pourquoi nous proposons une méthode générale (Section 4.4), inspirée de travaux
précédents [28, 174] et applicable à l’ensemble des théories explorées ici, permettant d’évaluer
la qualité de l’information délivrée par les différentes sources, en se basant sur des perfor-
mances passées. Afin d’expliciter notre approche sur un exemple dégénéré, nous consid-
érerons une source ayant donné pour information concernant la valeur de la variable X un
sous-ensemble A⊆X .
La méthode consiste à affecter à chaque source un score, basé sur un ensemble de variables
témoins6 et sur deux critères qui sont:
• Informativité: mesure la précision de l’information fournie par une source pour une
variable témoin donnée. Plus précise a été la source, plus élevée est son informativité.
Selon le cadre de travail, nous proposons une mesure d’informativité qui généralise la
valeur suivante:
In f = 1− |A||X |
valeur qui reflète bien la précision de l’intervalle A par rapport à l’ignorance (l’ensemble
X )
6une variable témoin est une variable pour laquelle la source a précédemment donné des informations impré-
cises, et dont la valeur réelle a été observée ultérieurement
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• Calibration: mesure la cohérence entre l’information fournie par la source et les valeurs
observées pour une variable témoin. En gardant à l’esprit que notre source a considéré
que la valeur se trouvait dans l’ensemble A, nous différencions deux cas: le cas où la
valeur précise prise par X est observée, et celui où l’observation est elle-même entourée
d’incertitudes. Dans le cas où la valeur précise x∗ est observée, alors la calibration est
simplement la mesure de confiance supérieure que la source accordait à cette valeur
(dans le cas d’un intervalle, 1 si x∗ ∈ A, 0 sinon). Dans le cas où l’observation permet
simplement de conclure X ∈ B, nous considérons la mesure de calibration
Cal =
|A∩B|
|B|
et nous proposons aux différents cadre considérés dans ce travail. Cette mesure d’inclusion
de B dans A permet en effet de mesurer combien la source jugeait B plausible.
Une source de bonne qualité est donc une source recevant un haut score, c’est-à-dire une
source informative et bien calibrée. Les formules proposées dans le manuscrit répondent à un
certain nombre de critère rationnels:
1. les mesures doivent récompenser les sources à la fois informatives et bien calibrées,
2. la calibration ne devrait être influencée que par nos observations ou nos connaissances
concernant les variables témoins,
3. les mesures devraient être comparables entre-elles, quelque soit la nature et le nombre
de variables témoins (en d’autres termes, elles devraient avoir une métrique commune).
1.4 Incertitudes et (In)dépendance (Chapitre 5)
Nous nous intéressons ensuite aux notions d’indépendance entre variables. En effet, si la défi-
nition formelle d’indépendance stochastique en probabilité classique fait l’unanimité une fois
que l’on s’affranchit du problème de l’interprétation, ce n’est plus le cas lorsque l’on con-
sidère des modèles imprécis. Dans ce dernier cas, à différentes interprétations correspondent
différentes définitions formelles d’indépendance, et il est donc nécessaire de les étudier de
plus près pour bien les maîtriser, et savoir quand chacune peut s’appliquer.
Nous proposons donc une première taxonomie qui nous permet de classer les types d’indépendance
selon la nature des relations qu’elles décrivent, basée sur différents travaux [203, Ch.9], [144], [216], [6].
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Cette taxonomie distingue parmi les notions d’indépendance celles qui sont:
• Non-Informative (nInf.) ou Informative (Inf.): par non-informative, nous entendons ces
notions d’indépendance qui traduisent l’absence de connaissance sur les relations entre
variables, et qui suppose donc que toute relation est possible. Par informative, nous
entendons les notions qui traduisent la connaissance d’une absence de relation, et qui
permettent de modéliser cette absence.
• Subjective (Sub.) ou Objective (Obj.): une notion d’indépendance est dite subjective si
elle concerne nos croyances à propos des valeurs que peuvent prendre des variables, et
objective si elle cherche à décrire des propriétés intrinsèques au phénomène observé
• Symétrique (Sym) or Asymétrique (Asym.): Une notion est symétrique si dire que X1 est
indépendant de X2 implique automatiquement que X2 est indépendant de X1. Ce type
d’indépendance rend souvent plus facile la construction de modèles d’incertitude joints
à partir de modèles locaux ou marginaux, et permet donc de stocker l’information sous
cette forme. Cette propriété est souvent appelée factorisation. Ces notions symétriques
ne permettent pas de modéliser des notions d’indépendance qui concerne des relations
asymétriques.
Il faut alors utiliser des notions d’indépendances asymétriques, certes moins pratiques
mais qui permettent d’exprimer de telles notions. Une notion d’indépendance est asymétrique
si dire que X1 est indépendant de X2 n’est pas équivalent à dire que X2 est indépendant
de X1. Ces relations asymétriques sont souvent de types évidentiels ou causals
– les relations d’indépendance causales expriment l’idée que deux variables ne sont
pas causalement reliées. Par exemple, elles permettent d’exprimer qu’une habitude
de vie n’est pas la (une) cause d’une maladie.
– les relations d’indépendance évidentielles expriment l’idée qu’apprendre la valeur
d’une variable ne va pas changer nos croyances à propos d’une autre variable, ce
qui n’implique pas qu’apprendre la valeur de cette dernière ne changera pas nos
croyances à propos de la première.
Nous rappelons et classons ensuite les principales notions d’indépendances rencontrées
dans les théories de l’incertain, c’est-à-dire les notions d’interactions inconnues; d’indépendance
forte; d’indépendance de répétition; de non-pertinence et d’indépendance épistémique; d’indépendance
d’ensembles aléatoires; de non-interaction possibilistes. Pour simplifier les définitions, nous
considérons des relations entre deux variables X1 et X2 prenant leurs valeurs dans X1,X2.
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Nous notons X(1:2) = X1×X2 le produit cartésien des deux espaces, et X(1:2) une variable
prenant ses valeurs sur X(1:2).
Definition 1.7. Soit deux ensembles marginaux de probabilités PX1,PX2 représentant notre
incertitude sur les variables X1,X2 prenant leurs valeurs dans X1,X2. La notion d’interaction
inconnue entre X1,X2 est la donnée de l’ensemble de probabilités jointes PUI,X(1:2) tel que
PUI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|PX1 ∈PX1 ,Px2 ∈PX2}
avec PX1,PX2 les probabilités marginales de PX(1:2) sur les domaines X1,X2 et PX l’ensemble
des probabilités sur X .
La notion d’interaction exprime l’idée que nos informations ne nous permettent pas de
connaître les relations qui peuvent lier X1 et X2, et revient donc à toutes les considérer.
Definition 1.8. Soit deux ensembles marginaux de probabilités PX1,PX2 représentant notre
incertitude sur les variables X1,X2 prenant leurs valeurs dansX1,X2. La notion d’indépendance
forte [33] entre X1,X2 est la donnée de l’ensemble de probabilités jointes PSI,X(1:2) tel que
PSI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|PX(1:2) = PX1⊗PX2, PX1 ∈PX1,PX2 ∈PX2}
avec ⊗ le produit de mesure usuel.
La notion d’indépendance forte exprime l’idée que X1 et X2 prennent leurs valeurs suivant
deux processus aléatoires stochastiquement indépendants.
Definition 1.9. Soit deux ensembles marginaux PX1 = PX2 = PX identiques représentant
notre incertitude sur deux variables X1,X2 prenant leurs valeurs dansX1,X2, avecX1 =X2 =
X . La notion d’indépendance de répétition [33] entre X1,X2 est la donnée de l’ensemble de
probabilités jointes PRI,X(1:2) tel que
PRI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|PX(1:2) = PX ⊗PX , PX ∈PX}
avec ⊗ le produit de mesure usuel.
La notion d’indépendance de répétition revient à considérer que X1 et X2 suivent deux
processus aléatoires identiques et indépendants. Cette notion correspond à la notion statistique
usuelle d’échantillons indépendants et identiquement distribués.
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Definition 1.10. Soit deux ensembles marginaux PX1,PX2 représentant notre incertitude sur
X1,X2 prenant leur valeur dans X1,X2. Alors, la notion de non-pertinence épistémique [33]
de X1 envers X2 est la donnée de l’ensemble de probabilités jointes PEIrr1→2,X(1:2) tel que
PEIrr1→2,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)| ∀x(1:2) ∈X(1:2), pX(1:2)(x(1:2)) = pX1(x1)pX2(x2|x1),
PX1 ∈PX1,PX2(·|x1) ∈PX2}
avec PX2(·|x1) les probabilités conditionnelles potentielles sur X2 étant donné x1.
La notion de non-pertinence épistémique exprime l’idée qu’apprendre la valeur d’une vari-
able (ici X1) ne changera pas nos croyances actuelles quand à la valeur possible de X2. C’est
une notion asymétrique, et la notion symétrique correspondante (indépendance épistémique)
est obtenue en utilisant la notion de non-pertinence dans les deux sense (i.e. X1 non-pertinent
envers X2, et inversément).
Definition 1.11. Soit (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 deux ensembles aléatoires représentant l’incertitude
sur les variables X1,X2 prenant leur valeur dans X1,X2, et PX1,PX2 les ensembles de prob-
abilités induits. La notion d’indépendance d’ensembles aléatoires [57, 207] entre X1,X2 est la
donnée de l’ensemble de probabilités jointes
PRSI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|∀A⊆X(1:2),PX(1:2)(A)≤ ∑
(EX1×EX2)∩A6= /0
EXi∈FXi
mX1(EX1)mX2(EX2)}
avec mXi(EXi) la masse donnée à l’ensemble focal EXi dans (m,F )Xi
Cette notion traduit l’indépendance entre les distributions de masses dans la théorie des
ensembles aléatoires. Elle est plus difficile à interpréter au sein de la théorie des probabil-
ités imprécises, mais dans ce dernier cas, elle peut servir d’approximation à d’autres notions
d’indépendance, plus difficiles à manipuler. Une autre notion d’indépendance relative aux en-
sembles aléatoire, dénommée indépendance cognitive, est également brièvement décrite dans
le chapitre, mais moins discutée, du fait de l’existence de peu de résultats la concernant.
Definition 1.12. Soit deux distributions marginales piX1,piX2 représentant l’incertitude sur les
variables X1,X2 prenant leur valeur dans X1,X2. Alors, la notion de non-interaction possi-
biliste [218] entre X1,X2 est la donnée de la distribution jointe piPI,X(1:2) telle que, pour tout
x(1:2) in X(1:2)
piPI,X(1:2)(x(1:2)) = min(piX1(x1),piX1(x2))
à laquelle peut ensuite être associée l’ensemble de probabilités jointes PPI,X(1:2) .
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Notion Inf./nInf. Obj./Sub. Sym/Asym. Expressible in
IP RS P
Int. inconnue nInf. Sub. Sym
√ √ ×
Non-int. possibiliste Inf./nInf. Sub. Sym
√ √ √
Ind. cognitive Inf. Sub. Asym. ?
√ ×
Ind. d’ens. aléatoires Inf. Sub. Sym
√ √ ×
Non-pert. épistémique Inf. Sub. Asym.
√
? ×
Ind. de Kuznetsov Inf. Sub. Sym
√
? ×
Ind. forte Inf. Obj. Sym
√ √ ×
Ind. de répétition Inf. Obj. Sym
√
? ×
Table 1.1: Notions d’indépendance et de non-pertinence dans l’incertain: résumé (?:
question à résoudre)
La non-interaction possibiliste peut traduire deux notions. D’une part, elle peut s’interpréter
comme une hypothèse de dépendance totale entre niveaux de confiance, et d’autre part, on
peut la voir comme la réduction de la notion d’interaction inconnue à un cadre purement
possibiliste (la possibilité jointe correspondant à la non-interaction possibiliste est alors vue
comme la "trace" partielle d’un jugement d’interaction inconnue).
Le tableau 1.1 résume comment les différentes notions évoquées plus haut se situent par
rapport à notre classification. La notion d’indépendance développée par Kuznetsov [134, 36]
et qui se base sur les bornes des espérances mathématiques y figure également, ainsi que
l’indépendance cognitive [178, Ch.7.5], afin que le tableau soit complet. La figure 1.3, quant
à elle, montre les relations d’inclusions qui existent entre les modèles joints résultant des
différentes notions. A nouveau, nous utilisons le langage des ensembles de probabilités pour
faciliter la comparaison.
Dans la suite, nous nous intéressons au problème d’interpréter la notion de non-pertinence
épistémique par le biais d’arbres d’événements et de la théorie probabiliste développée par
Shafer [179] autour de ces derniers. Comme l’ont montré des recherches récentes [47, 48],
il existe en effet de forts liens entre ce cadre et la théorie des probabilités imprécises. Nous
montrons donc que la notion de non-pertinence entre de multiples variables est équivalente à
la notion d’indépendance dans des arbres d’événements particuliers, que nous appelons arbres
standards (Section 5.2).
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PSI,X(1:2) ⊆PKI,X(1:2)⊆PEInd,X(1:2)⊆
{
PEIrr,X1→2
PEIrr,X2→1
}
⊆PRSI,X(1:2)⊆PCI,X(1:2)⊆PUI,X(1:2)
⊆ ⊆
PRI,X(1:2) PPI,X(1:2)
Figure 1.3: Relations d’inclusion des modèles joints à partir de modèles marginaux
PX1,PX2
Nous explorons ensuite comment certaines notions d’indépendances, plus facile à ma-
nipuler et calculatoirement plus avantageuses, peuvent en approcher d’autres. En particulier,
nous étendons des résultats précédemment obtenus pour le cas bi-dimensionnel [89] à un cadre
général (n dimensions, n étant un nombre quelconque), et permettant d’approcher de manière
conservative l’indépendance entre ensembles aléatoires (dont la structure jointe présente une
complexité croissant exponentiellement avec le nombre de dimensions) par la notion de non-
interaction possibiliste (dont la complexité de structure jointe ne croit pas avec le nombre de
dimensions). Nous discutons ensuite de l’utilité d’une telle approche dans un cadre pratique
(Section 5.3).
1.5 Prise de décision dans l’incertain (Chapitre 6)
Dans ce chapitre, nous nous intéressons brièvement au problème de prise de décision dans
l’incertain. Même si ce problème ne concerne pas à proprement parlé le traitement de l’incertitude,
il est difficile de le dissocier totalement de tels traitements, puisque ces derniers sont (presque)
toujours utilisés en vue de prendre une décision. En particulier, les études de risques et de
sûreté sont souvent associées à des décisions recouvrant à la fois un aspect économique et
humain.
La prise de décision consiste (du moins en traitement de l’incertitude) à choisir, parmi un
ensemble fini A de choix possibles, les actions optimales (du point de vue du décideur). Dans
ce travail, nous considérons un cadre relativement restreint de prise de décision, puisque nous
considérons:
i qu’à chaque choix a∈A peut être associé un gain (utilité) de valeur réelle et précise, noté
ua :X →R, et que ua(x) représente l’intérêt de choisir l’action a quand X prend la valeur
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x ∈X .
ii que les choix ne peuvent pas être combinés entre-eux (i.e., pas de mélanges convexes de
choix)
iii que nous sommes dans un environnement statique. Nous ne considérons donc pas le prob-
lème de déterminer des séquences optimales de choix
iv qu’un choix a∈A ne modifie pas l’incertitude sur X , i.e., nous supposons l’indépendance
entre choix et état de la variable.
Lorsque l’incertitude sur X est modélisée par une probabilité précise, le choix optimal est
souvent celui qui maximise l’espérance mathématique de l’utilité. Pourvu que l’incertitude
soit représentable fidèlement par une distribution de probabilité, ce critère semble être un
bon choix et a été justifié théoriquement par de nombreux auteurs. Dit autrement, il consiste
a établir un (pré-)ordre complet entre les différents choix, construit à partir des espérances
mathématiques.
Cependant l’information disponible ne permet pas toujours de représenter l’incertitude
par une probabilité unique, et dans ce dernier cas, comme pour l’indépendance, il existe de
nombreux moyens d’étendre le critère de maximisation de l’espérance mathématique au cadre
des probabilités imprécises [195], ensembles aléatoires ou distributions de possibilité. Ces
extensions (critères) suivent globalement deux principes [198] : soit elles cherchent à toujours
établir un ordre complet entre les actions, en travaillant sur des probabilités particulières des
ensembles ou sur les bornes d’espérances, soit elles relâchent la condition de complétude dans
l’ordre induit, et autorise à déterminer un ensemble d’actions optimales non-comparables,
plutôt qu’une seule.
Parmi les critères qui suivent la première voie se trouve le Γ-maximin [114], le Γ-maximax,
le critère d’Hurwicz [122], la probabilité pignistique7 BetP [187]. Parmi les critères suivant la
seconde voie se trouvent la Maximalité, la dominance par Intervalles et l’E-admissibilité. La
figure ci-dessous montre les implications qui existe entre ces critères (A→ B indiquant qu’une
action optimale au sens de A le sera aussi au sens de B).
7Néologisme dérivé du mot latin pignus, signifiant décision
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Pignistique Γ-maximax Γ-maximin
E-admissibilité Maximalité
Dominance par Intervalles
Ces critères requièrent souvent de calculer des bornes d’espérances mathématiques sur
des ensembles de probabilités. Si cela s’avère relativement aisé lorsque X est un ensemble
fini [198], il en va tout autrement lorsqu’il est continu. Nous étudions donc ensuite le cas
particulier où X est un sous-ensemble des réels, où l’incertitude est modélisée par une p-box
[F ,F ] et où ua est une fonction continue surX . Nous proposons des premiers résultats perme-
ttant d’obtenir les formules analytiques des fonctions cumulées qui vont permettre d’atteindre
les bornes d’espérances.
1.6 Applications illustratives (Chapitre 7)
Nous donnons ensuite quelques détails relatifs à deux applications réalisées durant ce travail
de thèse, au moyen du logiciel SUNSET développé à l’IRSN.
1.6.1 Evaluation et synthèse d’informations appliquées à des codes de
calculs nucléaires
La première application concerne l’application des méthodes développées dans le chapitre 4
aux résultats d’analyses d’incertitude effectuées avec des codes de calculs nucléaires différents
au cours d’un programme OCDE appelé BEMUSE [160]. Ce programme, regroupant 10 par-
ticipants, avait pour but de comparer les méthodologies d’analyse d’incertitude en les appli-
quant à un cas d’accident de perte de réfrigérant du circuit primaire d’une centrale nucléaire
par grosse brèche.
Ce type d’accident, qui provoque une diminution du flux de réfrigérant, est en effet cri-
tique. Une centrale nucléaire produisant de l’énergie et de la chaleur interne, c’est le rôle du
système réfrigérant que de garder la température a un niveau acceptable. Quand une grosse
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brèche dans ce circuit survient, le système est immédiatement arrêté d’urgence, cependant
il est nécessaire, même après cet arrêt, de s’assurer que la température ne dépasse pas un
niveau critique pouvant engendrer une catastrophe (e.g. fuite de radio-éléments). En effet,
d’importantes quantités de chaleur peuvent encore être émises après arrêt du réacteur, du fait
des réactions résiduelles.
Lors du projet BEMUSE, 10 participants ont donc appliqué leurs méthodes d’analyses
d’incertitude sur un cas expérimental réalisé sur une installation de taille réduite. Chacun
d’entre eux a eu à déterminer ses incertitudes sources, ses variables d’entrée et a pu utiliser
des codes de calculs différents. Bien que les résultats de l’ensemble des participants aient tous
été assez proches des valeurs expérimentales observées, ils présentaient néanmoins quelques
différences, et étaient assez difficiles à comparer à première vue. Il nous a donc semblé utile
d’appliquer aux résultats du programme les méthodes développées au chapitre 4. Nous nous
sommes restreints aux théories des probabilités classiques et des possibilités, ce qui était suff-
isant pour mettre en exergue les points de convergence et de divergence entre les approches
basées sur les probabilités classiques et celles utilisant d’autres théories de l’incertain, ainsi
que les avantages présentés par chacune.
1.6.1.1 Evaluation des sources
Puisque les valeurs expérimentales d’un certain nombre de variables étaient disponibles, nous
avons pu réaliser une évaluation de la qualité des informations obtenues par les différentes
études d’incertitude.
D’un point de vue méthodologique, les résultats nous ont permis de montrer que les deux
approches utilisées (probabiliste et possibiliste) conduisaient à des résultats similaires, du fait
qu’elles étaient bâties sur les mêmes concepts, mais que des différences étaient cependant
observées, ces différences étant dues aux différences de formalismes. En particulier, puisque
peu de variables témoins étaient utilisées (4), nous avons pu mettre en exergue les problèmes
rencontrés par la méthode probabiliste dans de tel cas (i.e. pouvoir discriminant diminué).
Rappelons qu’en pratique, il est recommandé d’utiliser un minimum de 10 variables témoins
pour utiliser l’approche probabiliste.
D’un point de vue plus pratique, les observations suivantes ont pu être faites:
• rang par rapport au code utilisé : lors de l’évaluation, il a pu être observé que le rang
(la qualité) donnée à un participant était peu dépendant du code de calcul qu’avait utilisé
par ce participant. Ce résultat montre que l’influence de l’utilisateur sur les résultats
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produits par le code peut être très grande, et souligne l’importance de posséder une
bonne expérience d’utilisation et de bonnes connaissances des processus en jeux.
• validation/evaluation du code : un aspect important encore matière à débat dans la
modélisation de phénomènes physiques complexes est la manière de valider un code de
calcul (i.e. de certifier que ses résultats sont conformes à l’expérience). Les résultats
des méthodes d’évaluations étant significatifs par eux même, ils pourraient être utilisés
dans les procédures de validation de codes.
• validation des observations informelles : les méthodes utilisées ont également permis
de donner une base solide et rationnelle à des observations jusqu’ici faites de manière
informelle. Elles sont donc également un moyen d’appuyer des conclusions et de les
conforter.
1.6.1.2 Synthèse de l’information apportée par les sources
La synthèse de l’information nous a permis de mettre en évidence deux avantages des méth-
odes utilisées:
1. Utilité des évaluations : à la fois pour l’approche probabiliste et possibiliste, l’utilisation
des poids déterminés par l’étape précédente (section 1.6.1.1) nous a permis d’améliorer
le résultat de la synthèse d’information (à la fois en informativité et calibration), soit
en les utilisant directement dans une combinaison convexe, soit en se restreignant aux
informations fournies par des sous-groupes de "meilleures" sources.
2. Quantification du conflit : l’utilisation des méthodes de fusion possibiliste, et no-
tamment de l’opération conjonctive, nous ont permis de fournir une valeur quantifiée
et visuelle du conflit pouvant exister entre certains groupes de sources (utilisateurs du
même code, . . . ), quantification jusqu’ici peu (ou pas) réalisée.
Les informations fournies par les sources étant assez consistantes entre-elles, nous n’avons
pas cru bon appliquer les méthodes SMC aux données du cas BEMUSE.
1.6.2 Application de la méthode RaFu à un cas d’étude
Laméthode de propagation hybride [9, 12] propose de différencier, parmiN variables X1, . . . ,XN
entourées d’incertitudes les variables dont la valeur est gouvernée par un aléa intrinsèque (in-
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certitude aléatoire) des variables dont la valeur est fixe, mais mal connue du fait de manque
d’informations (incertitude épistémique). Dans la méthode de propagation hybride, les pre-
mières sont modélisées par des probabilités et propagées au moyen de méthodes de simulation
classiques (e.g. Monte-Carlo), tandis que les secondes sont modélisées par des distributions
de possibilités et propagées au moyen du principe d’extension, qui suppose la non-interaction
possibiliste entre les variables. Le résultat de cette propagation est une variable aléatoire floue
qui est ensuite post-traitée en fonction du résultat voulu.
Deux des problèmes d’ordre pratique de la méthode hybride de propagation sont qu’elle
requiert de nombreux calculs et ne fournit pas d’évaluation de l’erreur due à l’approximation
numérique réalisée durant la propagation. Si ce problème est mineur lorsque le modèle à
travers lequel on propage est simple et que beaucoup de calculs peuvent être réalisés sans
coûts élevés, il ne l’est plus lors de propagations à travers des codes de calculs complexes,
pour lesquels le nombre de simulations (calculs) à pouvoir réaliser est généralement limité, du
fait de leur coût élevé, à la fois en temps et en argent.
Nous proposons donc une méthode numérique pratique, appelée RaFu et développée dans
le logiciel SUNSET, qui reprend les bases théoriques de la propagation hybride tout en se pro-
posant d’optimiser le nombre de simulations à réaliser (d’échantillons à considérer) pour at-
teindre un objectif donné. Elle se base sur le fait qu’en pratique, le décideur désirera rarement
obtenir la variable aléatoire floue dans son entièreté, mais seulement quelques une de ses car-
actéristiques.
La méthode RaFu consiste donc à demander au décideur, avant d’effectuer la propaga-
tion, de spécifier la nature d’un triplet de paramètres (γS,γE ,γA) correspondant à la réponse
désirée: γS correspond aux aspects statistiques de la réponse désirée; γE concerne les aspects
épistémiques, c’est-à-dire concernant les distributions de possibilité; γA sert à spécifier la pré-
cision numérique qui veut être atteinte, et permet un contrôle de l’erreur numérique.
Nous appliquons ensuite la méthode RaFu à un cas d’étude simplifié afin de l’illustrer. Ce
cas d’étude consiste à évaluer le niveau de couronnement d’un barrage afin de le dimensionner.
Ce cas d’étude, bien que simple, nous permet de mettre en évidence l’effet de l’approximation
numérique, et l’importance de prendre en compte cette erreur numérique dans les calculs.
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1.7 Conclusions et perspectives (Chapitre 8)
Dans ce travail, nous avons étudié plusieurs aspects du traitement des incertitudes en présence
d’imprécision, progressant à la fois vers une unification des différentes théories et vers des
outils pratiques permettant de facilement manipuler l’information.
Du chapitre 3, dans lequel nous avons étudié les représentations pratiques d’incertitude,
à la fois anciennes et plus récentes, nous pouvons conclure que les p-boxes généralisées (ou,
de façon équivalente, les nuages comonotones) sont des représentations aux propriétés in-
téressantes qui permettent de faire le lien entre p-box classiques, possibilités et nuages. Leur
interprétation en terme de bornes de confiance sur des intervalles emboîtés les rend également
intéressantes du point de vue de l’élicitation experte.
Les perspectives données dans ce chapitre sont principalement l’étude de la manipula-
tion pratique des p-boxes généralisées et des nuages (définir et étudier le conditionnement, la
propagation, la fusion, la marginalisation, . . . ) ainsi que l’extension des résultats obtenus à
des domaines de définition plus généraux. Ces perspectives ont été déjà abordées, bien que de
façon incomplète, dans le présent travail. Des optiques de recherche moins directes mais qui
pourraient s’avérer intéressantes consisteraient à explorer les connections qui pourraient exis-
ter entre ces représentations et la notion de bipolarité ou encore avec la théorie des ensembles
flous valués par intervalles.
Le chapitre 4 se conclut avec quelques recommandations concernant l’utilisation des opéra-
teurs de fusion d’informations au sein des théories de l’incertain: les opérateurs disjonctifs et
conjonctifs devraient être réservés aux cas où les sources sont respectivement totalement in-
consistantes et consistantes, et les opérateurs de compromis devraient être utilisés dans les
situations intermédiaires. Concernant ces derniers, nous avons étudié de plus près les opéra-
teurs s’appuyant sur la notion de sous-ensembles maximaux cohérents, qui nous apparaissent
comme les mieux adaptés au traitement des informations partiellement consistantes, à la fois
théoriquement et conceptuellement. Néanmoins, leur application peut poser quelques prob-
lèmes calculatoires, et il est nécessaire de chercher des méthodes efficaces permettant de les
mettre en oeuvre, soit en utilisant des cadres simplifiés, soit en développant des heuristiques
efficaces. En nous restreignant aux distributions de possibilités définies sur les réels, nous
avons opté pour la première solution. Nous avons également commencé l’étude de la prise en
compte de dépendances mal connues dans le cadre des ensembles aléatoires.
En ce qui concerne la méthode SMC appliquées aux distributions de possibilité, elle de-
mande surtout à être validée à un niveau pratique, tout comme l’approche que nous avons
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proposée pour évaluer les sources d’information à partir de performances passées. L’approche
proposée pour prendre en compte les dépendances entre sources demande quant à elle à être
étudiée de plus près, pour l’étayer d’un point de vue théorique et la rendre plus accessible d’un
point de vue pratique.
Le chapitre 5 concernant l’indépendance à engendré plus de questions qu’il n’a fourni de
réponses, la modélisation et l’interprétation de l’indépendance lorsque l’imprécision est prise
en compte requérant un long travail de recherche. Néanmoins, nous avons apporté quelques
éléments de réponse en proposant un début de taxonomie permettant de classifier les notions
d’indépendance, et en débutant l’étude consistant à interpréter ces notions d’indépendance au
travers d’arbres d’événements. Les perspectives incluent, entre autres choses, la clarification
des points d’interrogations laissés dans le tableau 1.1, ainsi que la poursuite de l’étude des
notions d’indépendance dans les arbres d’événements.
Dans les chapitres 6 et 7, nous avons surtout abordé des problèmes d’ordre pratique liés
à l’utilisation de modèles représentant explicitement l’imprécision. Les perspectives pour
ces deux chapitres consistent principalement à poursuivre l’effort d’analyse et à proposer des
solutions plus générales ou plus efficaces aux problèmes posés, notamment en ce qui concerne
le calcul de bornes d’espérances pour des représentations définies sur les réels (e.g. en étendant
nos résultats à d’autres cas et représentations) et la propagation numérique d’incertitude à
travers des modèles complexes (e.g. par l’utilisation de surfaces de réponses ou de techniques
du type MCMC).
Chapter 2
Introduction
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler”
—Albert Einstein (1879–1955)
This work presents results related to the treatment of uncertainty bearing on variables
whose exact value is not perfectly known, this lack of knowledge being due either to the
aleatory nature of some phenomena influencing this value or to a lack of precise and fully
reliable information concerning this value. More precisely, we interest ourselves to the case
where uncertainty is modeled by numerical (quantitative) representations, which are neither
(precise) probability distributions (because we do not have sufficient information) nor sets
(because we do have information about which elements of the space are more likely to be
observed).
In recent decades, different uncertainty theories have emerged to address properly this
kind of situations. In this work, we restrict ourselves to the three main such theories: possi-
bility theory, random set theory and imprecise probability theory (see Appendix A). We could
say that the position we have with respect to uncertainty treatment is somewhat dual, in the
following sense:
• We attach a great importance to unification of uncertainty handling, in the sense that
we think it essential to make bridges and to emphasize convergence points between
different theories, rather than confining ourselves to one exclusive theory.
• We consider each uncertainty theory as potentially useful per se, as long as it is suffi-
ciently theoretically justified. Indeed, we see the absolute statement that one is "better"
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than the other as overrated: some theories are more general than others, some are more
fitted to a given situation than others, some are more mature than others, some have
interpretations better fitted to a particular situation or problem, some dispose of more
convenient tools than others. To us, the main question is not "which is the best?" but
rather "when, where, why and how each theory should be used?"
2.1 Reasoning under uncertainty (with quantitative mod-
els): a general view
By reasoning, we mean manipulating information in a sensible and, as far as possible, rational
way, in order to derive plausible and useful conclusions.
By under uncertainty, we mean that the available information does not allow to perfectly
know all component of considered systems, and that we are uncertain about their exact current
state or value.
We also make a distinction between two levels of information: generic information cor-
responding to background knowledge and general beliefs about the world, and contingent
information corresponding to information, belief or knowledge concerning a peculiar situa-
tion. For example, that birds fly in general is a generic information, while any information
concerning my next-door neighbor bird is peculiar. A computer code or an analytical function
modeling the evolution of the temperature in a nuclear reactor core during an accident are
generic information, while the values observed during a particular accident are contingent.
Algorithms encoded in a robot constitute its generic information, while information received
by it through sensors or other devices is contingent.
We define the following general simplified frame, pictured in Figure 2.1 which will be
instrumental to define problems considered in the sequel:
• Source variables are variables about which we have some information, that is we have
an idea about the value they assume.
• Variables of interest are those variables on which we want to have information, because
knowing their value will help in further decisions, but for which we do not have direct
information.
• Amodelmodels generic information about the relationship existing between source vari-
ables and variables of interest. It allows to use information concerning source variables
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Figure 2.1: Uncertainty treatment: general frame
in order to have information about variables of interest
Depending on the situation, the uncertainty can bear on source variables (e.g. input variables in
risk analysis) or on the models (e.g. Markov chains, Bayes networks). There can be multiple
source variables, variables of interest or models. Also, this frame can be chained, in the
sense that some variables that were of interest for one system can become source variables for
another system (e.g. experts use source variables and internal models to provide knowledge
on some variables of interest, which will become source variables in a subsequent propagation
through another model).
The following problems, commonly encountered in uncertainty treatments, all fit in Fig-
ure 2.1:
• Model choice/design: the process of choosing and designing a model of the system on
which further treatments are to be done. This step requires careful thinking, as many
models can compete as good candidate for a particular system. For instance, fuzzy rule
bases, neural networks or SVM can all be used as universal approximators of functions,
and it is not always clear which one should be used in which situation. Statistical tests
procedures can be seen as tools to check that a particular model is fitted to the considered
system.
• Model Identification/validation: once the model is chosen, it remains to identify its
features for the particular problem at hand. This process consists in using available
knowledge in order to build or identify a model. It is principally an inductive process,
since it mainly consists of using contingent knowledge to build a generic model within
the chosen framework, which can then be used to make inferences. In AI, this process
can be associated to learning, while in statistics it corresponds more to inductive or
parametric inference, whose aim are to identify a generic model (e.g. parameters) from
the data.
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• Inference: inference is defined as the process of drawing (plausible) conclusions from
premises or evidence. It is primarily a deductive, theoretical and rather impersonal pro-
cess. In this work, we interpret inference as the act of drawing conclusions on variables
of interest from observations on source variables, with the help of a (fixed) generic
model. It thus consists of using generic information to draw plausible conclusions from
contingent information. Note that, in classical statistics, what we consider here as infer-
ence is often called prediction.Typical inference processes encompass
– (direct) propagation through deterministic model: propagating uncertainty on
source variables through a deterministic model (e.g. a computer code, an analytical
model, . . . ) to evaluate the uncertainty on variables of interest. By deterministic
model, we mean a model such that to one precise input correspond one precise
output. This kind of inference is the most usual in industrial risk analysis, where
most of the time, models are analytical formulas or computer codes simulating
complex physical phenomena. Such inference processes are monotonic with re-
spect to uncertainty in our knowledge, in the sense that reducing uncertainty on
source variables will reduce uncertainty on variables of interest once propagation
is done.
– inverse propagation: similar to direct propagation, except that this time, source
variables on which information are available are the output of the (deterministic)
model and interest variables are (unknown) parameters or inputs of the models,
and the aim is to infer the most plausible values of these inputs or parameters.
The difficulty is that most of the time the model is not invertible and dependencies
between inputs, outputs and parameters are not known. Note that this inference
process remains monotonic in the same sense as in above: the more we know
about source variables, the less the resulting uncertainty on variables of interest.
– propagation through/conditioning on uncertain models: Given some observa-
tions on source variables and a so-called stochastic model (i.e. Markov Chain,
Bayes Net, Probability tree), infer plausible value of the variable of interest. This
type of inference is more commonly encountered in Artificial Intelligence. It can
be associated to the act of focusing our generic beliefs (or information) on a sub-
class corresponding to our observations. We assume here that the model is uncer-
tain, but that our observations are not. In this case, it is well know that monotonic-
ity with respect to uncertainty about singular information do not hold, since it can
happen that a more precise observation can give us less decisive inferences. This
phenomenon is often referred as dilation within uncertainty theories.
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• Information fusion: If multiple sources provide information about the same source
variables, variables of interest or potential models, information fusion consists in merg-
ing all these information items into a reliable and informative summary, while coping
with possible dependencies between sources and inconsistencies in information. Infor-
mation fusion only makes sense with information of an equivalent level of generality, i.e.
merging contingent information with contingent information, and generic information
with generic information.
• Decision making: the process of determining optimal actions, given the current evi-
dence on variables of interest. Decision have consequences, in the sense that, once op-
timal actions are determined, applying one of them changes the environment. Decision
is also more personal, since an action that is optimal for a subject1 will not necessarily
be so for another subject (e.g. employees and shareholders of same company do not
generally share the same objectives). Determining an optimal act for a given subject is
typically done by eliciting utilities or preferences from the subject on a set of different
feasible actions. In our opinion, processes of inference and of decision making should
be considered separately, since even if they’re closely related (inference is often used to
make decisions), their respective purposes are different.
• Revision: the process of revision consists in modifying our current knowledge or beliefs
in minimal way, given the arrival of new information which are not necessarily coherent
with our current knowledge or beliefs. As for information fusion, revising only makes
sense with information having a similar level of generality.
Of course, our picture does not encompass all the complexity encountered in real appli-
cations nor the variety of frameworks dealing with uncertainty, and in practice distinguish-
ing between different processes and between information levels of generality is not an easy
task. . . Nevertheless, such a picture (and other similar representations) is a good starting point,
and can serve as a useful guideline to answer the questions "when, where, why and how use
particular tools?".
2.2 About the present work
This work studies some of the problems we have just mentioned, and more specifically those
commonly encountered in industrial risk analysis or in safety studies. For each of these prob-
1Subject is taken here in a wide sense: it can be an organization, a whole country, or a single person
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lems, and in accordance with our view about uncertainty treatment, we. . .
• . . . position the general problematic, make a partial review of solutions proposed by
uncertainty theories, and as much as possible, recall or show the links existing between
these solutions.
• . . . propose methodologies bringing solution to the considered problem, some of them
being set in the frame of a particular theory of uncertainty. Our first objective while
developing these methodologies was to keep them tractable and easily applicable.
In Chapter 3, we study the problem of representing uncertainty about the value assumed
by a variable X on a finite domain X . We give special attention to practical uncertainty
models allowing for an easier handling of uncertainty in applications. In particular, we study
extensively the relations between the following models: possibility distributions, imprecise
probability assignments, p-boxes, clouds and random sets. To be able to relate more efficiently
these models, we introduce the notion of generalized p-boxes, which will be instrumental
to relate possibility distributions, p-boxes and clouds together. Some attention is given to
continuous models defined on the real line and to so-called hierarchical models, that is models
defined on multiple levels.
Chapter 4 concerns the treatment of uncertainty when multiple sources all provide infor-
mation about the value that a single variable X that may assume on a finite domain X , this
information being modeled by representations introduced in Chapter 3.
In the first part of this chapter, we study the means to summarize the information provided
by the sources in a synthetic, operational and interpretable message. We give some special
attention to two different problems encountered by such synthesis:
• dealing with inconsistencies present between the pieces of information provided by the
different sources. We propose the use of the logical notion of maximally coherent sub-
sets as a way to cope with such inconsistencies. We fully study an extension of this
notion to possibility distributions defined on the real line, and propose practical tools to
make the method easier to use in practice.
• dealing, in the frame of random set theory, with sources whose (in)dependencies are
not well known. With this respect, we give first results eventually leading to a practical
cautious merging rule.
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The second part is devoted to the problem of evaluating the quality of the information deliv-
ered by the sources. Since most of the time every source do not have the same reliability, it
is desirable, when possible, to know which ones are more reliables than others. Here, we are
concerned with those cases in which sources have previously given information about vari-
ables whose true value is now known. For these cases, we propose a general methodology
allowing to evaluate sources on the basis of their previous assessments, that aims at being as
objective as possible in its evaluation.
Chapter 5 concentrates on the (many) notions of independence that can link multiple input
variables X1, . . . ,XN assuming values on finite domains X1, . . . ,XN .
In classical probability theory, all notions of independence formally reduce to the stochas-
tic independence, irrespectively of their interpretation. This is no longer the case when using
imprecise probabilistic models, for which there are as many distinct formal definitions of in-
dependence as there are distinct interpretations. Since the notion of independence is central in
the construction of joint uncertainty models from marginal ones (a situation that often happens
in risk analysis), we review and attempt to browse a general picture of independence notions in
imprecise probability theories. We then give first results indicating that event trees framework
is a promising framework when it comes down to interpret and use independence assessments.
Chapter 6 then briefly addresses the problem of decision making under uncertainty. In this
chapter, we quickly review different usual criteria used to determine optimal actions from a
set of possible actions (we assume that actions can be associated to a utility function), and we
then give some results about the practical computation of (lower and upper) expected utilities
when uncertainty models are lower and upper cumulative distributions (i.e., p-boxes) defined
on the real line. The peculiar problem of decision making in industrial risk analyses or safety
studies is then adressed.
Finally, Chapter 7 shows two illustrative applications developed with the help of SUNSET,
the software for uncertainty treatment developed at the Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté
Nucléaire (IRSN). The first concerns the application of methods developed in Chapter 4 to
results of uncertainty studies performed with nuclear computer codes simulating an accident
in a nuclear reactor core. The second concerns a numerical propagation technique developed
in the SUNSET software and called RaFu. The method is first described, before being applied
to a case-study concerning the design of a dam.
Some concluding words are then provided in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 3
Practical uncertainty representations
“Knowing ignorance is strength. Ignoring knowledge is sickness”
— Lao Tse (∼ 500 B.C.)
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When we are not certain about the value assumed by a variable X in a space X , there
exist several practical representations that can model this uncertainty. Such simple represen-
tations include, but are not limited to: sets, probability distributions [108], possibility dis-
tributions [85], imprecise probability assignments [42], random sets [151], probability boxes
(p-boxes for short) [104], random fuzzy variables [34] and, more recently, clouds [159].
Mathematically, all these representations can be interpreted as closed convex sets of (finitely)
additive probabilities, and are therefore less general than this latter representation. Although
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less generality implies less expressiveness, it also often allows for a more efficient handling
of uncertainty. Simplified representations are thus of importance when we have to trade ex-
pressiveness (possibly losing some information) against computational efficiency. They are
also instrumental in elicitation tasks and in the interpretation or representation of complex re-
sults. Moreover, in a number of cases, they will be sufficient to faithfully model the available
information.
With such a bunch of simplified representations, it seems natural to study their links as well
as to compare their respective expressive power. Such a study is the purpose of the present
chapter, in which we explore the relationships between various representations. Laying bare
relationships facilitates a unified handling and treatment of uncertainty, and suggests how tools
used for one theory can eventually be useful in the setting of other theories.
The main contribution of this chapter is to propose a generalised version of p-boxes and
to show that it constitutes the missing link between possibility distributions, usual p-boxes
and clouds. We first present and briefly recall the basic settings to represent uncertainty, the
representation studied in the sequel and the known links between them (Section 3.1). We then
introduce and study a generalised version of p-boxes, subsequently used to link between pos-
sibility distributions, p-boxes and clouds (Section 3.2). We then explore the recent formalism
of clouds and its link with other representations (Section 3.3). We also study the extension of
some of our results to representations defined on the continuous real line (Section 3.4), before
considering the combination of uncertainty representations into so-called hierarchical models
(Section 3.5).
3.1 Non-additive measures and representations of uncertainty
As argued in Appendix A, single probability distributions, as uncertainty models, cannot ad-
equately account for scarceness, imprecision or unreliability in the available information or
knowledge.
Alternative representations and theories considered in this work (i.e., imprecise probability
theory [203], random (disjunctive) sets [151], possibility theory [85]) have the potential to
lay bare the existing imprecision or incompleteness in the information. This imprecision is
expressed by the means of a pair of (conjugate) lower and upper confidence measures on
events rather than by a single one.
In this section, we recall the main mathematical tools used to characterize these repre-
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sentations, before reviewing the main practical numerical representation tools available as of
to-date and the known links between them.
3.1.1 Capacities and transformations of capacities
Set-functions called capacities [25] are handy tools to represent uncertainty.
Definition 3.1 (Capacity). Given a finite space X , a capacity on X is a function µ , defined
on the power set℘(X ) of X , such that:
• µ( /0) = 0,µ(X ) = 1 (boundary conditions)
• A⊆ B⇒ µ(A)≤ µ(B) (monotonicity)
A capacity such that
∀A,B⊆X ,A∩B = /0,µ(A∪B)≥ µ(A)+ µ(B) (3.1)
is said to be super-additive. The dual notion, called sub-additivity, is obtained by reversing
the inequality in Equation (3.1).
A capacity is said to be additive if the inequality in Equation (3.1) is turned into an equality.
An additive capacity is formally equivalent to a probability measure, denoted P. When X is
finite, a probability P can also be expressed by its probability distribution p defined on X
such that p(x) = P({x}). Then ∀x ∈X , p(x)≥ 0, ∑x∈X p(x) = 1 and P(A) = ∑x∈A p(x). We
note by PX the set of all probability distributions on X .
Given a capacity µ on X , its conjugate capacity µc is defined by µc(E) = µ(X )−
µ(Ec) = 1− µ(Ec) for any subset E ⊂X with Ec the complement of E. We call cautious
the super-additive capacities, since µ(E)+ µ(Ec) ≤ 1 for any subset E ⊆ X , and bold the
sub-additive capacities, since µ(E)+ µ(Ec) ≥ 1 for any subset E ⊆ X . Note that additive
capacities (i.e., probability measures) are both cautious and bold.
When used to represent and model uncertainty (which is the case in this work), the value of
a capacity on a subset evaluates the degree of confidence in the corresponding event. Cautious
capacities are tailored for modeling the idea of certainty. Bold capacities may account for the
weaker notion of plausibility.
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A probability measure P in PX is said to dominate a capacity µ on X if and only if, we
have µ(E)≤ P(E) for every subset E ⊆X . The core Pµ of a capacity µ on X is the (closed
convex) set of probability measures dominating it, that is
Pµ = {P ∈ PX |∀E ⊆X , µ(E)≤ P(E)}. (3.2)
Note that the core of a cautious capacity can be empty, since cautiousness is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for a capacity to have a non-empty core. Necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for non-emptiness are provided by Walley [203, Ch.2], but checking these conditions
often involve to check an high number of inequalities, making them hard to use in practice.
An alternative to check the non-emptiness of the core is the use of specific characteristics of
capacities, such as n-monotonicity.
3.1.1.1 n-monotonicity
Choquet [25] defines n-monotonicity as follows:
Definition 3.2 (n-monotonicity). A super-additive (cautious) capacity µ onX is n−monotone,
where n > 0 and n ∈ N, if and only if for any set A = {Ai ⊆X |i ∈ N,0< i≤ n} of events
Ai, it holds that
µ(
⋃
Ai∈A
Ai)≥ ∑
I⊆A
(−1)|I|+1µ(
⋂
Ai∈I
Ai) (3.3)
The conjugate capacity µc of a n-monotone capacity is called n-alternating. If a capacity
is n-monotone, then it is also (n− 1)-monotone, but not necessarily (n+ 1)-monotone. An
∞-monotone capacity is a capacity that is n-monotone for every n > 0. On a finite space, a
capacity is ∞-monotone if it is n-monotone with n = |X |. A n-monotone capacity or its dual
are also often called Choquet capacities of order n.
The two particular cases of 2-monotone (also called convex) capacities and ∞-monotone
capacities have deserved special attention in the literature [22, 203, 145]. Indeed, 2-monotone
capacities always have a non-empty core and ∞-monotone capacities have interesting math-
ematical properties that greatly increase computational efficiency when manipulating them.
Most of the representations studied in this chapter have such properties.
It must be noticed that Choquet’s initial definition of n-monotonicity is very general and is
not restricted to events, contrary to what Definition 3.2 could suggests. De Cooman et al. [51]
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consider a generalization of Definition 3.2 on lattices of bounded real-valued functions on
X , and study yet a more generalized version of n-monotonicity in a subsequent work [52],
essentially by dropping the normalization condition (µ(X ) = 1) of Definition 3.1. Neverthe-
less, Definition 3.2 will be sufficient in most parts of this work (n-monotonicity on lattices
of bounded real-valued functions is used in Appendix F to study p-boxes defined on totally
ordered spaces).
3.1.1.2 Möbius inverse
Given a capacity µ on X , one can obtain multiple equivalent representations by applying
various (bijective) transformations to it [115]. Using such transformations can be of practical
usefulness when manipulating capacities. One such transformation, useful in this work, is the
Möbius inverse:
Definition 3.3 (Möbius inverse). Given a capacity µ onX , its Möbius transform is a mapping
m :℘(X)→ R from the power set of X to the real line, which associates to any subset E of
X the value
m(E) = ∑
B⊂E
(−1)|E\B|µ(B)
And we have ∑E∈X m(E) = 1, m( /0) = 0 , due to the boundary conditions on capacities.
Moreover, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3.1. [22] Let µ be a capacity on X . Then, its Möbius transform m is non-
negative if and only if µ is ∞-monotone.
Otherwise, there are some events E for which m(E) is negative. The set-function m is
actually the unique solution [178, Ch.2.7] to the set of 2n equations
∀A⊆X ,µ(A) = ∑
E⊆A
m(E),
given any capacity µ . The Möbius transform of a probability measure P coincides with its
distribution p, assigning positive masses to singletons only.
Remark 3.1. Möbius inverse can be applied to any mapping f :℘(X )→ R such that to this
mapping f is associated the mass function m f taking, for any event E ⊂X , the value
m f (E) = ∑
B⊂E
(−1)|E\B| f (B)
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and this transformation remains bijective, since for any event E ⊂X we can retrieve f (E) by
computing
f (E) = ∑
B⊆E
m f (B)
3.1.2 Practical representations in imprecise probability
We begin this section by general considerations about credal sets, before introducing the un-
certainty representations we’re going to study and relate together.
In Walley’s [203] theory of imprecise probabilities, uncertainty is represented by lower
bounds given over real-valued function of X (i.e. so-called lower previsions, see Appendix A
for details). Such lower bounds have an expressive power equivalent to closed convex sets P
of (finitely additive) probability measures P, and constitute one of the most general existing
uncertainty model (although not the most general [206]). Such sets are commonly called
credal sets [136], and will be so in the present work.
As imprecise probability theory is very general, we can express all representations consid-
ered in this work in terms of credal sets, making the comparison between uncertainty repre-
sentations easier. To clarify this comparison, we adopt the following terminology:
Definition 3.4 (Representations relations). Let F1 and F2 denote two uncertainty represen-
tation frameworks, a and b particular representatives of such frameworks, and Pa,Pb the
credal sets induced by these representatives a and b. Then:
• Framework F1 is said to generalize framework F2 if and only if for all b ∈ F2, ∃a ∈ F1
such that Pa = Pb (we also say that F2 is a special case of F1).
• Frameworks F1 and F2 are said to be equivalent if and only if for all b ∈ F2, ∃a ∈ F1
such that Pa = Pb and conversely.
• Framework F2 is said to be representable in terms of framework F1 if and only if for all
b ∈ F2, there exists a subset {a1, . . . ,ak|ai ∈ F1} such that Pb = Pa1 ∩ . . .∩Pak
• A representative a ∈ F1 is said to outer-approximate (inner-approximate) a representa-
tive b ∈ F2 if and only if Pb ⊆Pa (Pa ⊆Pb)
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3.1.2.1 Lower/upper probabilities
In this paper, uncertainty described by lower probabilities (lower previsions assigned to events)
are sufficient to our purpose. We define a lower probability P as a super-additive capacity on
X . The conjugate capacity noted P is the dual upper probability. This duality allows us to
work only on the lower (or the upper) bound. The credal setPP induced by a lower probability
P is its core:
PP = {P ∈ PX |∀A⊆X ,P(A)≥ P(A)} (3.4)
Conversely, given a credal set P , its lower envelope P∗ on events is defined for every event
A ⊆ X as P∗(A) = minP∈P P(A). As a lower envelope is a super-additive capacity, it is a
lower probability. The upper envelope P∗(A) = maxP∈P P(A) is the conjugate of P∗. In this
work, we consider so-called coherent lower probabilities P, that is, lower probabilities that
coincide with the lower envelopes of their core, i.e. for all events A of X ,
P(A) = min
P∈PP
P(A).
In general, the credal set PP induced by the lower envelope P of an original credal set P
is such that P ⊆PP, since PP is a projection of P on events. To characterize general credal
sets, we need the more powerful language of lower bounds on expected values of bounded-
real valued functions, which are enough to completely characterize any credal set P (see
Appendix A and Walley [203]). Nevertheless, as we will see, restricting to lower probabilities
is sufficient in many practical cases.
Describing PP by the values of P on every elements of the power set ℘(X ) can be
very tedious and computationally expensive. Other means that can be useful to describe PP
include:
• The set extPP of extreme points of the convex set PP (See Walley [203, Ch.3.] for
general considerations and, among others, Quaeghebeur and de Cooman [169], Wall-
ner [208] for practical considerations)
• The set of constraints on sums of probability assignments on elements of X :
∀A⊆X , P(A)≤ ∑
x∈A
p(x)≤ P(A). (3.5)
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And we say that these constraints are consistent if the credal set PP is non-empty (i.e., there
exist a solution to the set of constraints (3.5)), and that they are tight if P is a coherent lower
probability (i.e., bounds of constraints (3.5) cannot be reduced without ruling out some solu-
tions). Although both these descriptions can have a complexity as high as storing every value
of P, they can be useful to illustrate some points. Most practical representations do not exhibit
such a complexity. We now introduce those representations.
3.1.2.2 Probability boxes (p-boxes)
Recall that a cumulative distribution F1 is said to stochastically dominate another cumulative
distribution F2 if only if F1 is point-wise lower than F2: F1 ≤ F2.
A probability box [104] (p-box for short) is defined as a pair [F ,F ] of (discrete) cumulative
distributions on R, such that F stochastically dominates F (F ≤ F). A p-box [F ,F ] induces
the following credal set P[F ,F ]:
P[F ,F ] = {P ∈ PR|∀r ∈ R, F(r)≤ P((−∞,r])≤ F(r)} (3.6)
It is useful to notice at this point that sets (−∞,r] are nested, thus P[F ,F ] can be described
by lower and upper bounds on a collection of nested sets (already mentioned by Kozine and
Utkin [130]). This characteristic will be central in the study of generalized p-boxes. Con-
straints induced by a p-box are consistent and tight as soon as F ≤ F .
Outer approximation Given a credal setP defined onR, it is always possible to extract the
corresponding p-box by considering its lower envelope restricted to events of the type (−∞,r],
letting F(r) = P((−∞,r]), F(r) = P((−∞,r]), with P,P the lower and upper probabilities of
P . By definition, the credal set P[F ,F ] induced by this p-box is an outer approximation of P
(i.e., P ⊆P[F ,F ]), and P[F ,F ] is the tightest outer approximation of P induced by a p-box.
Practical aspects Cumulative distributions are often used in elicitation processes to extract
(precise) probabilistic knowledge from experts [28]: p-boxes can directly benefit from such
methods and elicitation tools, with the advantages of allowing some imprecision in the repre-
sentation (e.g., allowing experts to give imprecise percentiles). So-called probabilistic arith-
metic [209] also provides a very efficient numerical framework for particular statistical calcu-
lations with p-boxes. Finally, p-boxes are sufficient to represent and summarize final results
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when only the violation of a threshold has to be checked (a usual situation in risk and safety
studies).
3.1.2.3 Imprecise probability assignments
Imprecise probability assignments are another simple uncertainty representation. An impre-
cise probability assignment on X is defined as a set of lower and upper bounds on elements
x of X . It can be represented and identified by a set L of intervals L = {[l(x),u(x)]|x ∈X }
such that l(x)≤ p(x)≤ u(x) for all x ∈X , with p(x) = P({x}). Imprecise probability assign-
ments are studied extensively by De Campos et al. [42], who call them probability intervals.
An imprecise probability assignment L induces the credal set
PL = {P ∈ PX |∀x ∈X , l(x)≤ p(x)≤ u(x)} (3.7)
PL is thus defined by a set of |X | constraints bearing only on probability assignments. De
Campos et al. [42] have studied necessary and sufficient conditions for these constraints to be
consistent and tight (they call it respectively non-emptiness and reachability). These condi-
tions correspond, for all x ∈X , to:
∑
x∈X
l(x)≤ 1≤ ∑
x∈X
u(x) consistency (non-emptiness) (3.8)
u(x)+ ∑
y∈X \{x}
l(y)≤ 1 and l(x)+ ∑
y∈X \{x}
u(y)≥ 1 tightness (reachability) (3.9)
and any set L of non-tight (but consistent) constraints can easily be transformed in a set L′ of
tight constraints, by letting l′(x) = infP∈PL(p(x)) and u
′(x) = supP∈PL(p(x)). From now on,
we will always consider consistent and tight sets L, since others have little interest.
Given a imprecise probability assignment L, coherent lower and upper probabilities in-
duced by PL on all events A⊂X are easily calculated by the following expressions
P(A) = max(∑
x∈A
l(x),1− ∑
x∈Ac
u(x)), P(A) = min(∑
x∈A
u(x),1− ∑
x∈Ac
l(x)). (3.10)
De Campos et al. [42] have shown that these lower and upper probabilities are Choquet ca-
pacities of order 2.
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Outer-approximation Similarly to p-boxes, given a credal set P on X , it is always possi-
ble to extract the corresponding imprecise probability assignment L by considering its lower
envelope restricted to elements, letting l(x) = infP∈PL(p(x)) and u(x) = supP∈PL(p(x)) for
all x ∈ X . Anew, the induced credal set PL is an outer approximation of P , and it is the
tightest outer approximation induced by an imprecise probability assignment.
Practical aspects Imprecise probability assignments are very convenient tools to model or
represent uncertainty on multinomial data, where they can express lower and upper confidence
probability bounds. They are particularly fitted to the case where only a small size sample
is available [141]. On the real line, discrete probability intervals correspond to imprecisely
known histograms. Computational advantages offered by imprecise probability assignments
have been discussed at length by De Campos et al. [42] (some of them will be recalled in
subsequent chapters).
3.1.2.4 Random (disjunctive) sets
A discrete random set (see Appendix A for more details), noted (m,F ), over a space X is
defined as a mapping m :℘(X )→ [0,1] from the power set of X to the unit interval, with
∑E⊆X m(E) = 1 and m( /0) = 0. m is often called a basic probability assignment (bpa), and
we will sometimes use this terminology in this work. A set E receiving a positive mass is
called a focal element, and we note F the set of focal elements. From this mass assignment ,
Shafer [178] defines three set functions, called belief, plausibility and commonality functions,
such that for every event A⊆X :
Bel(A) = ∑
E,E⊆A
m(E) (Belief).
Pl(A) = 1−Bel(Ac) = ∑
E,E∩A6= /0
m(E) (Plausibility).
Q(A) = ∑
E,E⊇A
m(E) (Commonality).
It can be checked [178, Ch.2.3] that the belief function of a random set is an ∞-monotone
capacity, and that the associated mass assignment is its Möbius transform. Conversely, any
∞-monotone capacity is induced by one and only one random set.
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Links with previous representations The belief function induced by a random set (m,F )
being an ∞-monotone capacity, it can be interpreted as a special case of a coherent lower
probability. In this case, a random set (m,F ) induces the credal set
P(m,F ) = {P ∈ PX |∀A⊆X , Bel(A)≤ P(A)≤ Pl(A)} (3.11)
We are not aware of any practical and general solution allowing to build, from a given
credal set P , a random set (m,F ) such that the associated credal set P(m,F ) is a tight outer
approximation of P (tight in the sense that any random set (m,F )′ such that P(m,F )′ ⊆
P(m,F ) would no longer induce an outer approximation of P). Due to the potential com-
plexity of the random set representation, this problem is far from obvious in the general case.
Solutions for particular cases can nevertheless be proposed.
Practical aspects In general, |℘(X )| − 2 values are still needed to completely specify a
random set, thus not necessarily reducing the complexity of the model representation with
respect to capacities. However, belief functions used in practice are often defined by only
a few positive focal elements, and do not exhibit such a complexity. Such simpler belief
functions can result from expert judgments or from statistical experiments, m(A) becoming
the probability of an observation or testimony of the form x ∈ A.
As practical models of uncertainty, random sets have many advantages. First, as they
can be seen as probability distributions over subsets of X , they can be easily simulated by
classical methods such as Monte-Carlo sampling, which is not the case for Choquet capacities
that are not ∞-monotone. On the real line, a discrete random set is often restricted to a finite
collection of closed intervals with associated weights, and one can then easily extend results
from interval analysis [152] to random intervals [91, 118].
3.1.2.5 Possibility distributions
Possibility distributions are the primary mathematical tools of possibility theory (see Ap-
pendix A). A possibility distribution is a mapping pi : X → [0,1] from a space X to the
unit interval such that pi(x) = 1 for at least one element x in X .
From a possibility distribution pi can be defined several set-functions [79], among which
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the possibility, necessity and sufficiency measures:
Π(A) = sup
x∈A
pi(x) (Possibility measures). (3.12)
N(A) = 1−Π(Ac) (Necessity measures). (3.13)
∆(A) = inf
x∈A
pi(x) (Sufficiency measures). (3.14)
Their characteristic properties are: N(A∩B)=min(N(A),N(B)) andΠ(A∪B)=max(Π(A),Π(B))
for any pair of events A,B of X . A possibility measure is usually said to be maxitive.
Given a degree α ∈ [0,1] the strong (Aα ) and regular (Aα ) α-cuts of a distribution pi are
subsets respectively defined as
Aα = {x ∈X |pi(x) > α} (3.15)
Aα = {x ∈X |pi(x)≥ α} (3.16)
These α-cuts are nested, since if α > β , then Aα ⊆ Aβ . On finite spaces, the set of values
{pi(x),x ∈X } is of the form α0 = 0< α1 < .. . < αM = 1, meaning that in this case there is
only M distinct α-cuts.
Links with previous representations A necessity measure (resp. a possibility measure)
can be viewed as a belief function (resp. a plausibility function), whose associated random set
has nested focal elements (Already noticed by Shafer [178, Ch.10], who calls such random
sets consonant). A possibility distribution pi , defines a random set (m,F )pi having, for i =
1, . . . ,M, the following focal sets Ei with masses m(Ei) [82]: Ei = {x ∈X |pi(x)≥ αi}= Aαim(Ei) = αi−αi−1 (3.17)
In this nested situation, the same amount of information is contained in the mass function
m and the possibility distribution pi(x) = Pl({x}). In this case, the plausibility, belief and
commonality measures are respectively equivalent to the possibility, necessity and sufficiency
measure of the associated possibility measure.
Since the necessity measure is a particular belief function it is also an ∞-monotone ca-
pacity, hence a particular coherent lower probability. If the necessity measure is viewed as a
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coherent lower probability, its possibility distribution induces the credal set
Ppi = {P ∈ PX |∀A⊆X , N(A)≤ P(A)≤Π(A)} (3.18)
.
It is useful to recall here a result proved by Dubois et al. [78], and by Couso et al. [31] in
a much more general setting, which links probabilities P that are in Ppi with constraints on
α-cuts:
Proposition 3.2. Given a possibility distribution pi and the induced convex set Ppi , then P ∈
Ppi if and only if we have, for all α in (0,1]:
1−α ≤ P({x ∈X |pi(x) > α})
This result means that the probabilities P in the credal set Ppi can also be described in
terms of constraints on strong α-cuts of pi (i.e. 1−α ≤ P(Aα)). When X is finite, this comes
down to characterize Ppi with M constraints that are lower probabilities on nested sets.
Outer approximation As for p-boxes and imprecise probability assignments, given a credal
set P , it is relatively easy to extract a possibility distribution pi from P such that the induced
credal set Ppi is an outer approximation of P . The procedure to build such a distribution
is given by Algorithm 1. This algorithm obviously depends on the rankings of elements of
X . There are |X |! ways of choosing this ranking, potentially resulting in |X |! possibility
distributions. Thus, unlike the case of p-boxes and imprecise probability assignments, there is
not a unique tightest distribution pi extractable from P such that P ⊆Ppi . Nevertheless, the
possibility distribution pi built through Algorithm 1 is the tightest such that P ⊆Ppi , given a
specific ranking of elements of X . Up to now, we are not aware of existing efficient methods
to determine the ranking giving one of the most specific possibility distribution covering P .
We can nevertheless mention the work of Dubois and Prade [89], who consider the problem
of building outer and inner consonant approximations (i.e., possibility distributions) to a given
random set. In this work, outer approximations are built by an algorithm similar to Algorithm 1
(but restricted to random sets), and an algorithm to find the covering possibility distribution
having the minimal expected cardinality1 is given.
1For a random set (m,F ), the expected cardinality |C|((m,F )) is |C|((m,F )) = ∑E∈F |E|m(E)
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Algorithm 1: Extraction from P of a possibility distribution pi such that P ⊆Ppi
Input: Credal Set P on X with |X |= n
Output: Possibility distribution pi such that P ⊆Ppi
Take an (arbitrary) ranking {x1, . . . ,xn} of the n elements x of X
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
Build sets Ai = {x1, . . . ,xi} forming a nested collection (i.e., A1 ⊂ . . .⊂ An = X )
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
compute P(Ai)
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
take pi(xi) = P(Ai)
Practical aspects |X |−1 values are needed to fully assess a possibility distribution, which
makes it the simplest numerical uncertainty representation explicitly coping with imprecise or
incomplete knowledge. This simplicity makes this representation very easy to handle. This
also implies less expressive power, in the sense that, for any event A , either Π(A) = 1 or
N(A) = 0 (i.e. intervals [N(A),Π(A)] are of the form [0,α] or [β ,1]). This means that, in
several situations, possibility distributions will be insufficient to exactly reflect the available
information.
Nevertheless, the expressive power of possibility distributions fits various practical situa-
tions. Indeed, they can be interpreted as a set of nested sets with different confidence degrees
(the bigger the set, the highest the confidence degree). Moreover, a recent psychological
study [170] shows that possibility distributions are convenient in elicitation procedures. On
the real line [78], possibility distributions can model, for example, an expert opinion concern-
ing the value of a badly known parameter by means of a finite collection of nested confidence
intervals. Similarly, it is natural to view nested confidence intervals coming from statistics as
a possibility distribution. Another practical case where uncertainty can be modeled by possi-
bility distributions is the case of vague linguistic assessments concerning probabilities [45].
3.1.3 Sketching a first summary of relationships
Now that we have reviewed the main numerical simplified representations of uncertainty, it
is time to sketch a first drawing of the relationships between them. In the next sections, we
will complete this first summary, to finish with a figure encompassing generalised p-boxes and
clouds.
To sketch this first summary, we must first say a word about how imprecise probability as-
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signments and p-boxes relate to other models, that is random sets and possibility distributions.
3.1.3.1 P-boxes in the landscape of uncertainty representations
There is no direct relationship between p-boxes and possibility distributions (in the sense that
none can be seen as a special case of the other). Baudrit and Dubois [11] study in detail the
relation between the credal set Ppi induced by a possibility distribution pi and the credal set
P[F ,F ]pi
induced by the p-box [F ,F ]pi extracted from Ppi .
Kriegler and Held [132] have recently shown that any p-box [F ,F ] can be represented by an
equivalent random set (m,F )[F ,F ], and provide an efficient algorithm to build such a random
set. However, as noticed by Kriegler and Held [132] (and before that by Ferson et al. [103]),
different random sets can induce the same p-box (i.e., random sets whose associated credal
sets have the same projections on events of the type (−∞,r]). This means that p-boxes are
special cases of random sets.
3.1.3.2 Imprecise probability assignments in the landscape of uncertainty representa-
tions
There is no direct relationship between imprecise probability assignments, random sets and
possibility distributions. Indeed, upper and lower probabilities induced by tight imprecise
probability assignments are only ensured to be order 2 Choquet capacities (i.e., they are not
necessarily order 3 Choquet capacities, although some of them are), while belief functions
and necessity measures are ∞-monotone capacities. In general, one can only approximate one
representation by the other.
Transforming an imprecise probability assignments L into a possibility distribution piL such
that PL ⊆ PpiL or, conversely, transforming a possibility distribution pi into an imprecise
probability assignments Lpi such that Ppi ⊆ PLpi can easily be done through the methods
respectively described in Section 3.1.2.5 (Algorithm 1) and Section 3.1.2.3.
Similarly, it is simple to transform a random set (m,F ) into the tightest set L(m,F ) of
imprecise probability assignments such that P(m,F ) ⊆ PL(m,F ) (i.e. L(m,F ) is an outer ap-
proximation of the random set). The method consists of taking for all x ∈X :
l(x) = Bel(x) and u(x) = Pl(x) (3.19)
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and since belief and plausibility functions are the lower envelope of the induced credal set
P(m,F ), we are sure that the so-built imprecise probability assignment L is tight.
The converse problem, i.e. to transform a set L of imprecise probability assignments into a
random set is studied by Lemmer and Kyburg [135]. They concentrate on transforming the set
L into a random set (m,F ) inner approximating L (i.e., P(m,F ) ⊆PL). On the contrary, De-
noeux [60] extensively studies the problem of transforming a set L of probability intervals into
a random set (m,F ) that is an outer approximation (i.e., PL ⊆P(m,F )), providing efficient
methods to achieve such a transformation.
3.1.3.3 Preliminary summary
The main relations existing between imprecise probabilities, lower/upper probabilities, ran-
dom sets, imprecise probability assignments, p-boxes and possibility distributions, are pic-
tured on Figure 3.1. From top to bottom, it goes from the more general, expressive and
complex theories to the less general, less expressive but simpler representations. An arrow
is directed from a general representation to a less general one.
To make the picture more complete, we add sets and single elements to it. A set X repre-
sents the fact that all we know is that variable X will take its value in X , and nothing more.
In other word, except for the fact that it will be in the set X , we are totally ignorant about
which values are more likely to occur than others. Such a state of ignorance can be modeled
by possibility distributions (pi(x) = 1 if x ∈X , zero otherwise) and imprecise probability as-
signments (l(x) = 0,u(x) = 1 if x ∈X , u(x) = l(x) = 0 otherwise), and therefore by all the
other uncertainty representations mentioned above, except for single probability distributions.
More generally, it is modeled by the lower capacity that takes value 1 on X , and zero on all
other events. A single value xmodels a state of complete certainty, since we’re sure that X = x.
It is equivalent to a set reduced to this single value (X = {x}), and can be modeled by the
Dirac probability distribution P({x}) = p(x) = 1.
3.2 Introduction and study of generalised p-boxes
As recalled in Section 3.1.2.2, p-boxes are useful and practical representations of uncertainty
used in many applications. So far, they only make sense on the (discretized) real line and
their definition requires the natural ordering of numbers. This is a bit restrictive, and since the
model is already quite useful in this restrictive setting, extending the model to more general
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Credal sets
Coherent Lower/upper probabilities
2-monotone capacities
Random sets (∞-monotone)
P-boxes
Probabilities
Imp. Prob. Assignments
Possibilities
Sets
Single element
Figure 3.1: Representation relationships: summary A→ B: B is a special case of A
settings is potentially interesting. Moreover, as we will see, such extensions can give a better
understanding of characteristic proper to such representations (e.g. the use of an implicit order
on X ).
In this section, we study such an extension to arbitrary and completely pre-ordered finite
spaces. We first define the extension of p-boxes to such spaces, before exploring its links with
possibility distributions, random sets and imprecise probability assignments.
3.2.1 Definition of generalized p-boxes
First recall that two mappings f and f ′ from a finite ranked-set X = {x1, . . . ,xn} to the real
line R are said to be comonotonic if there is a common permutation σ of {1,2, . . . ,n} such
that f (xσ(1))≥ f (xσ(2))≥ ·· · ≥ f (xσ(n)) and f ′(xσ(1))≥ f ′(xσ(2))≥ ·· · ≥ f ′(xσ(n)). In other
words, f and f ′ are comonotonic if and only if for any pair of elements x,y ∈ X , we have
f (x) < f (y)⇒ f ′(x)≤ f ′(y). We define a generalized p-box as follows:
Definition 3.5 (Generalized p-box). A generalized p-box [F ,F ] over a finite space X is a pair
of comonotonic mappings F ,F , F :X → [0,1] and F :X → [0,1] from X to [0,1] such that
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F is pointwise lower than F (i.e. F ≤ F) and there is at least one element x in X for which
F(x) = F(x) = 1.
Since each distribution F ,F is fully specified by |X |−1 values, it follows that 2|X |−2
values completely determine a generalized p-box. Note that, given a generalized p-box [F ,F ],
we can always define a complete pre-ordering ≤[F ,F ] on X such that x≤[F ,F ]y if F(x)≤ F(y)
and F(x) ≤ F(y), due to the comonotonicity condition. If X is the (discretized) real line
and if ≤[F ,F ] is the natural ordering of numbers, then we retrieve usual p-boxes, showing
that Definition 3.5 is indeed a generalization of the usual notion of p-box. Potential useful
cases encompassed by this generalization are multidimensional (discrete) models defined on
Rd with d > 1 (provided an appropriate pre-ordering on elements of Rd is given).
To simplify notations, we will consider that, given a generalized p-box [F ,F ], elements x
of X are indexed such that i< j implies that xi≤[F ,F ]x j, and that |X |= n. A [F ,F ]-downset,
denoted (x][F ,F ], will be of the form {xi ∈X |xi≤[F ,F ]x}.
The credal set induced by a generalized p-box [F ,F ] can now be defined as
P[F ,F ] = {P ∈ PX |i = 1, . . . ,n, F(xi)≤ P((xi][F ,F ])≤ F(xi)}.
It induces coherent upper and lower probabilities such that F(xi) = P((xi][F ,F ]) and F(xi) =
P((xi][F ,F ]). Again, if we consider real numbers R and the natural ordering on them, then
∀r ∈ R, (r][F ,F ] = (−∞,r], and the above equation coincides with Equation (3.6).
Let us denote by Ai the sets (xi][F ,F ], for all i = 1, . . . ,n. These sets are nested, since
/0 ⊂ A1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ An = X 2. For all i = 1, . . . ,n, let F(xi) = αi and F(xi) = βi. With these
conventions, the credal set P[F ,F ] can now be described by the following constraints bearing
on probabilities of nested sets Ai:
i = 1, . . . ,n αi ≤ P(Ai)≤ βi (3.20)
with 0 = α0 ≤ α1 ≤ . . .≤ αn = 1, 0 = β0 < β1 ≤ β2 ≤ . . .≤ βn = 1 and αi ≤ βi.
As a consequence, a generalized p-box can be generated in two different ways:
• Either we start from two comonotone functions F ,F on the space X , and the order on
X is then induced by the values of F ,F ,
2Since there is a complete pre-order on X , we can have xi =[F ,F ] xi+1 and Ai = Ai+1, which explains the
non-strict inclusions. They would be strict if <[F ,F ] were a linear order.
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Figure 3.2: Generalized p-box [F ,F ] of Example 3.1
• or a generalized p-box is built by assigning upper and lower bounds on probabilities
of nested sets, (i.e. sets Ai built or not from a complete ordering on X ), for instance
intervals.
The second approach is likely to be more useful in practical assessments of generalized p-
boxes.
Example 3.1. All along this section, we will use this example to illustrate results on general-
ized p-boxes. Consider a space X made of six elements {x1, . . . ,x6}. These elements could
be, for instance, successive components on a production line. For various reasons (cost, pro-
duction constraints, . . . ), when a component breaks down, the safety system only informs us
whether the broken component is in the set A1 = {x1,x2}, A2 = {x1,x2,x3}, A3 = {x1, . . . ,x5},
or the whole X (= A4). Asking an expert to evaluate the probability of breakdowns, he can
only give us lower and upper probability bounds for each of these sets:
P(A1) ∈ [0,0.3] P(A2) ∈ [0.2,0.7] P(A3) ∈ [0.5,0.9]
Since these sets are nested, the uncertainty can be modeled by the generalized p-box pictured
on Figure 3.2:
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
F 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 1
F 0 0 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.
Outer approximation From Equations 3.20, we can easily derive a method that builds, from
any credal set P , a generalized p-box [F ,F ] inducing a credal set P[F ,F ] outer-approximating
P . This method is given by Algorithm 2. This algorithm shares many similarities with Algo-
rithm 1: It depends on the chosen ranking of elements of X , and provide the tightest gener-
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alized p-boxes outer-approximating a given credal set, given a specific ranking of elements.
Also note that, in the case of generalized p-boxes, there is only |X |!/2 potential different
results, since choosing a ranking and the reverse ranking result in the same Constraints (3.20),
due to the duality between lower and upper probabilities.
Algorithm 2: Extracting from P a generalized p-box [F ,F ] such that P ⊆P[F ,F ]
Input: Credal Set P on X with |X |= n
Output: Generalized p-box [F ,F ] such that P ⊆P[F ,F ]
Take an (arbitrary) ranking {x1, . . . ,xn} of the n elements x of X
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
Build sets Ai = {x1, . . . ,xi} forming a nested collection (i.e., A1 ⊂ . . .⊂ An = X )
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
compute P(Ai) and P(Ai)
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
take F(xi) = P(Ai) and F(xi) = P(Ai)
3.2.2 Connecting generalized p-boxes with possibility distributions
As mentioned earlier, Kozine and Utkin [130] discussed the problem of building p-boxes from
partial information. They already noticed that, for usual p-boxes, sets Ai can be interpreted
as nested confidence intervals with upper and lower bounds. It is therefore natural to search
a connection with possibility theory, since possibility distributions can be interpreted as a
collection of nested sets with lower probability bounds. Given a generalized p-box [F ,F ], the
following proposition holds:
Proposition 3.3. Any generalized p-box [F ,F ] on a finite set X is representable (see Def-
inition 3.4) by a pair of possibility distributions piF ,piF , in the sense P[F ,F ] = PpiF ∩PpiF ,
where:
piF(xi) = βi and piF(xi) = 1−max{α j| j = 0, . . . , i α j < αi}
for i = 1, . . . ,n, with α0 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Consider the set of constraints given by Equation (3.20) and de-
scribing the convex set P[F ,F ]. These constraints can be split into two distinct sets: (P(Ai)≤
βi)i=1,n and (P(Aci ) ≤ 1−αi)i=1,n. Now, rewrite constraints of Proposition 3.2, in the form
∀α ∈ (0,1]: P ∈Ppi if and only if P({x ∈X |pi(x)≤ α})≤ α .
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The first set of constraints (P(Ai)≤ βi)i=1,n defines a credal set PpiF that is induced by the
possibility distribution piF , while the second set of constraints (P(A
c
i ) ≤ 1−αi)i=1,n defines
a credal set PpiF that is induced by the possibility distribution piF , since A
c
i = {xk, . . .xn},
where k = max{ j|α j < αi}. The credal set of the generalized p-box [F ,F ], resulting from
the merging of the two sets of constraints, namely i = 1, . . . ,n, βi ≤ P(Ai) ≤ αi, is thus
PpiF
∩PpiF .
If F is injective, it induces a complete order <[F ,F ], and then piF(xi) = 1−αi−1.
Example 3.2. The possibility distributions piF ,piF , for the generalized p-box defined in Exam-
ple 3.1 are:
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
piF 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 1
piF 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.5
So, generalized p-boxes allow to model uncertainty in terms of pairs of possibility distri-
butions. In this case, contrary to the case of only one possibility distribution, the two bounds
describing uncertainty on a particular event A can be tighter, i.e. no longer restricted to the
form [0,α] or [β ,1], since the corresponding interval containing P(A) will be contained in the
intersection of intervals of this form.
An interesting case is the one where, for all i = 1, . . . ,n− 1, F(xi) = 0 and F(xn) = 1.
Then, piF = 1 and PpiF ∩PpiF = PpiF and we retrieve the single distribution PpiF . We recover
PpiF if we take for all i = 1, . . . ,n, F(xi) = 1. This means that any possibility distribution can
be viewed as a generalized cumulative distribution function F (it can be understood either as
an upper or a lower function of a generalized p-box) associated to the specific ordering the
possibility degrees induce on X , and therefore that possibility distributions are special cases
of generalized p-boxes.
3.2.3 Connecting Generalized p-boxes and random sets
We mentioned before that p-boxes were special cases of random sets, in the sense that any
p-boxes could be mapped into an equivalent random set. The next proposition shows that this
result can be extended to generalized p-boxes:
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Proposition 3.4. Generalized p-boxes are special cases of random sets, in the sense that for
any generalized p-box [F ,F ] defined on X , there always exist a random set (m,F )[F ,F ] such
that P[F ,F ] = P(m,F )[F ,F ] .
Proof. See Section D.1 in Appendix D
In order to prove Proposition 3.4, we show that the lower probabilities on events induced
by a generalized p-box are the same as the belief function given by Algorithm 3. To do
that, we first build the partition of the space X induced by sets Ai, and we formulate lower
probabilities on events by means of elements of this partition. We then calculate lower bounds
of these lower probabilities on all events, and show that these bounds are reached. We then
check that the lower probabilities on all events coincide with the belief function induced by
the algorithm.
Algorithm 3 below provides an easy way to build the random set encoding a given general-
ized p-box. It is similar to existing algorithms [132, 171] for usual p-boxes, and extends them
to more general spaces. The main idea of the algorithm is to use the fact that a generalized p-
box can be seen as a random set whose focal sets are obtained by thresholding the cumulative
distributions. Since the sets Ai are nested, they induce a partition of X whose elements are of
the form Gi = Ai \Ai−1. The focal sets of the random set equivalent to the generalized p-box
are made of unions of consecutive elements of this partition. Basically, the procedure comes
down to considering a threshold θ ∈ [0,1]. When αi+1 > θ ≥ αi and β j+1 > θ ≥ β j, then, the
corresponding focal set is Ai+1 \A j, with mass
m(Ai+1 \A j) = min(αi+1,β j+1)−max(αi,β j). (3.21)
Example 3.3 illustrates the application of Algorithm 3.
Example 3.3. Consider again the generalized p-box given in Example 3.1 and let us build the
associated random set by applying Algorithm 3. We have:
G1 = {x1,x2} G2 = {x3} G3 = {x4,x5} G4 = {x6}
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Algorithm 3: R-P-box→ random set transformation
Input: Generalized p-box [F ,F ] and corresponding nested sets /0 = A0,A1, . . . ,An = X ,
lower bounds αi and upper bounds βi
Output: Equivalent random set
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
Build partition Gi = Ai \Ai−1
Build set of values {γl|l = 1, . . . ,2n−1}= {αi|i = 1, . . . ,n}∪{βi|i = 1, . . . ,n}
With γl indexed such that γ1 ≤ . . .≤ γl ≤ . . .≤ γ2n−1 = βn = αn = 1
Set α0 = β0 = γ0 = 0
Set focal set E0 = /0
for k = 1, . . . ,2n−1 do
if γk−1 = αi then
Ek = Ek−1 ∪ Gi+1
if γk−1 = βi then
Ek = Ek−1 \ Gi
Set m(Ek) = γk− γk−1
and
0≤ 0≤ 0.2≤ 0.3≤ 0.5≤ 0.7≤ 0.9≤ 1
α0 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 ≤ β1 ≤ α3 ≤ β2 ≤ β3 ≤ α4
γ0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ3 ≤ γ4 ≤ γ5 ≤ γ6 ≤ γ7
which finally yields the following random set
m(E1) = m(G1) = 0 m(E2) = m(G1∪G2) = 0.2
m(E3) = m(G1∪G2∪G3) = 0.1 m(E4) = m(G2∪G3) = 0.2
m(E5) = m(G2∪G3∪G4) = 0.2 m(E6) = m(G3∪G4) = 0.2
m(E7) = m(G4) = 0.1
This random set can then be used as an alternative representation of the provided information.
This representation lays bare the high imprecision of the information. This imprecision can
only be alleviated by seeking more information.
Proposition 3.4 shows that generalized p-boxes are special cases of general random sets.
Generalized p-boxes are thus more expressive than single possibility distributions and less
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expressive than random sets, but, as emphasized in the introduction, less expressive (and, in
this sense, simpler) models are often easier to handle in practice. As shown by the following
remark, we can expect it to be the case for generalized p-boxes.
Remark 3.2. Let [F ,F ] be a generalized p-box over X , and Gi be the elements of the partition
induced by nested subsets Ai, for i = 1, . . . ,n. Let us call a subset E of X full if it can be
expressed as an union of consecutive elements Gk, i.e. E =
⋃ j
k=iGk, with 0< i< j≤ n. Then,
we have an explicit expression for the induced lower probability of any full subset E:
P(E) = max(0,α j−βi−1). (3.22)
Now, for any event A, let A∗ =
⋃
E⊆AE be the lower approximation of A by union of elements
of the partition, with E all maximal full subsets included in A. We know that P(A) = P(A∗).
Then, the explicit expression for P(A) is
P(A∗) = ∑
E⊆A
P(E),
which remains simple to compute and just becomes a sum of lower probabilities of those
subsets formed of unions of consecutive Gk included in A.
This simple remark shows the potential advantages of using generalized p-boxes rather
than general random sets, since the computation of lower probabilities is faster than checking
which focal elements Ei are included in a given event A. Other computational aspects of
generalized p-boxes related to other problems will be studied in subsequent chapters.
So far, results in this section mainly exploit the fact that a collection of nested subsets
on a space X induces a partition on this space, useful when computing lower probabilites
of events. In the following we explain the links between this partition and the complete pre-
ordering ≤[F ,F ] as well as the two possibility distributions piF ,piF . First notice that Equation
(3.22) can be restated in terms of the two possibility distributions piF ,piF , rewriting P(A∗) as
P(A∗) = max(0,NpiF (
j⋃
k=1
Gk)−ΠpiF (
i−1⋃
k=1
Gk)),
where Npii(A),Πpii(A) are respectively the necessity and possibility degree of event A (given
by Equations (3.13)) with respect to pii. It makes P(A∗) even easier to compute.
We can also directly derive the random set equivalent to a given generalized p-box [F ,F ]:
let us note 0= γ0 < γ1 < .. . < γM = 1 the distinct values taken by F ,F over elements xi of X
74 Practical uncertainty representations
(note that M is finite and M < 2n). Then, for j = 1, . . . ,M, the random set defined as: E j = {xi ∈X |(piF(xi)≥ γ j)∧ (1−piF(xi) < γ j)}m(E j) = γ j− γ j−1 (3.23)
is the same as the one built by using Algorithm 3, but this formulation lays bare the link
between Equation (3.17) and the possibility distributions piF ,piF .
3.2.4 Generalized p-boxes and imprecise probability assignments
As in the case of random sets, there is no direct relationship between imprecise probability
assignments and generalized p-boxes, in the sense that none of them generalizes the other.
The two representations have comparable complexities, but do not involve the same kind of
events (singletons for imprecise probability assignments, and nested collection of sets for gen-
eralized p-boxes). Nevertheless, given previous results, we can state how a set L of imprecise
probability assignments can be approximated into a generalized p-box [F ,F ], and vice-versa.
We can also study more complex links between the two.
3.2.4.1 Approximations between the two representations
Let us first consider a set L of imprecise probability assignments on a space X and some in-
dexing of elements in X . For all i= 1, . . . ,n, let l(xi) = li and u(xi) = ui. A generalized p-box
[F ,F ]
′
outer-approximating the set L of imprecise probability assignments can be computed
by means of Equations (3.10) of Section 3.1.2.3 in the following way:
F ′(xi) = P(Ai) = α ′i = max( ∑
xi∈Ai
li,1− ∑
xi /∈Ai
ui) (3.24)
F
′
(xi) = P(Ai) = β
′
i = min( ∑
xi∈Ai
ui,1− ∑
xi /∈Ai
li)
where P,P are respectively the lower and upper probabilities of PL for events Ai, given by
Equations (3.10). Each permutation of elements ofX would provide a different generalized p-
box. There is no tightest outer approximation among them, although Equations (3.24) do give
the tightest generalized p-box for a given permutation. Note that Equations (3.24) correspond
to the application of Algorithm 2 for the specific case of imprecise probability assignments.
Now we consider a generalized p-box [F ,F ] with nested sets A1 ⊆ . . .⊆ An. The set L′ of
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probability intervals on elements xi outer-approximating [F ,F ] is given by:
P(xi) = l
′
i = max(0,αi−βi−1) (3.25)
P(xi) = u
′
i = βi−αi−1
where P,P are the lower and upper probabilities of P[F ,F ], given by Equation (3.22), with
β0 = α0 = 0. This is the tightest set of imprecise probability assignments induced by the
generalized p-box and outer-approximating it.
Of course, transforming a set L of imprecise probability assignments into a generalized
p-box [F ,F ] and vice-versa generally induces a loss of information, as already noticed in
Sections 3.1.2.3 and 3.2.1 for the general problem of finding an outer approximation in term of
generalized p-boxes or of imprecise probability assignments. The two following propositions
quantify this loss.
Proposition 3.5. Given an initial set L of imprecise probability assignments over a space X ,
and given the two consecutive transformations
Imp. prob. ass. L →(3.24) p-box [F ,F ]′ →(3.25) Imp. prob. ass. L′′ (3.26)
we have PL ⊆PL′′ , and the differences between bounds of intervals in the sets L′′ and L are
given, for i = 1, . . . ,n, by
li− l′′i = min(li,0+ ∑
xi∈Ai−1
(ui− li),0+ ∑
xi∈Aci
(ui− li),(li + ∑
x j 6=xi
x j∈X
u j)−1,1− ∑
xi∈X
li) (3.27)
u′′i −ui = min(0+ ∑
xi∈Ai−1
(ui− li),0+ ∑
xi∈Aci
(ui− li),1− (ui + ∑
x j 6=xi
x j∈X
l j), ∑
xi∈X
ui−1)
with A0 = /0. Under the assumptions that set L is consistent and tight, these differences are
positive.
Proof. See Section D.1 in Appendix D
Proposition 3.6. Given an initial generalized p-box [F ,F ] over a space X , and given the two
consecutive transformations
p-box [F ,F ] →(3.25) Imp. prob. ass. L′ →(3.24) p-box [F ,F ]′′ (3.28)
we have that P[F ,F ] ⊆P[F ,F ]′′ , and the differences between values of [F ,F ] and [F ,F ]
′′
are,
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for i = 1, . . . ,n
F(xi)−F ′′(xi) = min(
i−1
∑
j=1
(α j−β j),
n−1
∑
j=i+1
(α j−β j)) (3.29)
F
′′
(xi)−F(xi) = min(
i−1
∑
j=1
(α j−β j),
n−1
∑
j=i+1
(α j−β j))
Proof. See Section D.1 in Appendix D
Example 3.4 illustrates both the transformation procedure and the fact that this procedure
implies an information loss.
Example 3.4. Let us take the same four imprecise probability assignments as in the example
given by Masson and Denoeux [141], on the space X = {w,x,y,z}, and summarized in the
following table
w x y z
l 0.10 0.34 0.25 0
u 0.28 0.56 0.46 0.08
we then consider the order R such that w <R x <R y <R z. After application of Equations
(3.24), we obtain the following generalized p-box
F ′ F ′
A1 = {w} 0.10 0.28
A2 = {w,x} 0.46 0.75
A3 = {w,x,y} 0.92 1
A4 = X 1 1
and if we generate imprecise probability assignments from this generalized p-box by ap-
plying Equations (3.25), we obtain the set L′′
w x y z
l′′ 0.10 0.18 0.17 0
u′′ 0.28 0.65 0.54 0.08
a result which is less informative than the first imprecise probability assignments.
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When no natural order exists on X , as many as |X |!/2 different generalized p-boxes can
be generated from an imprecise probability assignment L. As in the case of Algorithm 1, the
problem of picking a ranking on elements x of X such that the generalized p-box generated
L is one of the most precise (in the sense of expected cardinality or of other information
measures [128]) is not trivial, and remains an open problem.
3.2.4.2 Linking the two representations
We’re now going to relate an imprecise probability assignment with the |X |! generalized p-
boxes that can be generated from it. Let Σσ the set of all possible permutations σ of elements
ofX , each defining a linear order. A generalized p-box according to permutation σ is denoted
[F ,F ]
′
σ and called a σ -p-box. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.7. Let L be a set of imprecise probability assignments, and let [F ,F ]
′
σ be the
σ -p-box obtained from L by applying Equations (3.24). Moreover, let L′′σ denote the set of
imprecise probability assignments obtained from the σ -p-box [F ,F ]
′
σ by applying Equations
(3.25). Then, the various credal sets thus defined satisfy the following property:
PL =
⋂
σ∈Σσ
P
[F ,F ]
′
σ
=
⋂
σ∈Σσ
PL′′σ (3.30)
Proof. See Section D.1 in Appendix D
Concretely, Proposition 3.7 means that, given initial information modeled by a set L of
imprecise probability assignments, this information can be entirely recovered by considering
the set of all σ -p-boxes, varying all permutations. In other words, imprecise probability as-
signments are representable by generalized p-boxes. Since there are |X |! such permutations,
representing a set of imprecise probability assignments L by a set of generalized p-boxes
does not look very interesting at first glance. In practice, L can be exactly recovered if a re-
duced set S of |X |/2 permutations is used to generate the generalized p-boxes, provided that
{xσ(1),σ ∈S }∪{xσ(n),σ ∈S } = X in , that is the set of first and last elements of permu-
tations in S covers the whole domain X . Since P[F ,F ] = PpiF ∩PpiF (Proposition 3.3), the
following corollary directly follows from Proposition 3.7:
Corollary 3.8. Let L be a set of imprecise probability assignments, and let [F ,F ]
′
σ be the
σ -p-box obtained from L by applying Equations (3.24), then we have:
PL =
⋂
σ∈Σσ
(
PpiFσ
∩PpiFσ
)
,
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Credal sets
Coherent Lower/upper probabilities
2-monotone capacities
Random sets (∞-monotone)
Generalized p-boxes
P-boxes
Probabilities
Imp. Prob. Assignments
Possibilities
Sets
Single element
Figure 3.3: Representation relationships: summary with generalized p-boxes A −→
B: B is a special case of A. A 99K B: B is representable by A.
where PpiFσ ,PpiFσ are respectively the possibility distributions corresponding to Fσ and Fσ
(by Proposition 3.3).
And this corollary allows us to model the information of an imprecise probability assign-
ment by means of a set of possibility distributions. Also note that, since generalized p-boxes
are special cases of random sets, Proposition 3.7 also provides a means to characterize impre-
cise probability assignments by a set of random sets (although perhaps not in an optimal way,
in the sense that there could be other sets of random sets characterizing imprecise probability
assignments, with a smaller cardinality).
Figure 3.3 summarizes the results obtained for generalized p-boxes by introducing them
into the first summary given by Figure 3.1. New results related to the study of generalized
p-boxes and to our findings are in bold.
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3.2.5 Computing with generalized p-boxes: first results on propagation
In this section, we provide some first results investigating computational aspects of generalized
p-boxes. In particular, we study the problem of propagating a p-box defined on X through
a model (here a function) T : X → Y with X an input variable and Y = T (X) the output
variable. First recall that a generalized p-box [F ,F ] can be represented in three different ways:
• By a set of n constraints (3.20) such that
i = 1, . . . ,n αi ≤ P(Ai)≤ βi
with 0 = α0 ≤ α1 ≤ . . .≤ αn = 1, 0 = β0 < β1 ≤ β2 ≤ . . .≤ βn = 1 and αi ≤ βi.
• By an equivalent random set that can be built by considering a threshold θ ∈ [0,1] and
such that when αi+1> θ ≥αi and β j+1> θ ≥ β j the corresponding focal set is Ai+1\A j,
with weight
m(Ai+1 \A j) = min(αi+1,β j+1)−max(αi,β j).
• By two possibility distributions piF ,piF respectively modeled by random sets (m,F )piF ,(m,F )piF
such that, for i = 0, . . . ,n−1,
mpiF (Ai+1) = αi+1−αi and mpiF (Aci+1) = βi+1−βi
and each of these three different representations suggests a different propagation technique.
The first solution, propagating the nested sets and their confidence bounds consists of
computing for each set Ai the propagated sets T (Ai), and to consider the generalized p-box
induced by the constraints:
∀i = 1, . . . ,n, αi ≤ P(T (Ai))≤ βi (3.31)
where αi,βi are the confidence bounds originally related to the set Ai. Given this propagated
generalized p-box (it is still a generalized p-box, since sets T (Ai) are also nested), we can
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build the counterpart of the random set given by equation (3.21), which is here:
θ ∈ [0,1]
αi+1 > θ ≥ αi
β j+1 > θ ≥ β j

m(T (Ai+1)\T (A j)) =
min(αi+1,β j+1)−max(αi,β j)
and we note this random set (m,F )T ([F ,F ]).
The second solution, directly propagating the focal elements of the random set given by
equation (3.21), gives the following random set:
θ ∈ [0,1]
αi+1 > θ ≥ αi
β j+1 > θ ≥ β j

m(T (Ai+1 \A j)) =
min(αi+1,β j+1)−max(αi,β j)
that is potentially different from the one given by the first propagation. We note this second
random set (m,F )T ((m,F )).
The third solution consists of propagating both possibility distributions by the so-called
extension principle [80]. This is equivalent to propagate the respective focal elements of
each distribution through T , which gives us the random sets (m,F )T (piF ) and (m,F )T (piF )
respectively having, for i = 0, . . . ,n−1, the following masses and focal elements
mT (piF )(T (A
c
i )) = βi+1−βi and mT (piF )(T (Ai+1)) = αi+1−αi
and, if we take from these two random sets the counterpart of the random set given by equation
(3.21), we end up with the following random set:
θ ∈ [0,1]
αi+1 > θ ≥ αi
β j+1 > θ ≥ β j

m(T (Ai+1)\T (Acj)c) =
min(αi+1,β j+1)−max(αi,β j)
that we note (m,F )T (piF ,piF ).
We can already note that the three random sets (m,F )T (piF ,piF ),(m,F )T ((m,F )),(m,F )T ([F ,F ])
have the same bpa and that only focal elements differ. To compare the results of the three prop-
agations, we thus have to compare the informative content of their respective focal elements.
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In this perspective, the following proposition is helpful:
Proposition 3.9. Let A and B be two subsets of a space X such that A ⊂ B, and let f be a
function from X to another space Y . Then, we have the following inclusion relations:
f (B)\ f (A)⊆ f (B\A)⊆ f (B)\ f (Ac)c
and inclusion relationships become equalities if f is injective
Proof. We will first prove the first inclusion relationship, then the second one, each time
showing that we have equality if f is injective.
Let us first prove that any element of f (B)\ f (A) is in f (B\A). Let us consider an element
y in f (B)\ f (A). This implies:
y ∈ f (B)
y 6∈ f (A)
⇒∃x ∈X
 f (x) ∈ f (B)f (x) 6∈ f (A)
and this x is in B and not in A (i.e. in B\A), which implies that y = f (x) is in f (B\A). This
means that f (B)\ f (A)⊆ f (B\A), and we still have to show that this inclusion can be strict.
To see it, consider the case where one of the element x in B\A is such that f (x) takes the same
value as f (x′), where x′ is in A, thus this particular f (x) is in f (B\A) and not in f (B)\ f (A)
(since by assumption it is in f (A)), showing that the inclusion can be strict. This case does not
happen if f is injective (since if f is injective f (x) = f (x′) if and only if x = x′).
To prove the second inclusion relation, first note that f (B\A) = f (B∩Ac) and that ( f (B)\
f (Ac)c) = ( f (B)∩ f (Ac)). Known results immediately give f (B∩Ac)⊆ f (B)∩ f (Ac). Strict
inclusion happens in the case where we have an element x of X in B and in A, and another
element x′ not in A and not in B (i.e. x′ is in Ac) for which f (x) = f (x′), thus we have that x and
x′ are not in B∩Ac, but are respectively in B and Ac, and thus f (x) is in f (B)∩ f (Ac). Again,
this case cannot happen when f is injective (since in this case, x 6= x′ implies f (x) 6= f (x′)).
The above proposition tells us that, when f is not injective, we have in general
(m,F )T ([F ,F ]) ⊆ (m,F )T ((m,F )) ⊆ (m,F )T (piF ,piF )
thus showing that (m,F )T ([F ,F ]) is more optimistic than (m,F )T ((m,F )), which is itself more
optimistic than (m,F )T (piF ,piF ). And in the case where T is injective, all these propagations
are equivalent. However, restricting ourselves to injective functions can be very limiting. For
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instance, if X and Y are subset of R, requiring injectivity of T is equivalent to limiting
ourselves to strictly monotone functions from R to R.
The question is then, if f is not injective, why should we choose one propagation rather
than the other?
From a purely theoretical standpoint, computing (m,F )T ((m,F )), the result of an exact
propagation, is of course the best course of action. However, computing (m,F )T ((m,F ))
can be difficult, since a maximal number of (n+1)n/2 non-nested sets have to be propagated.
(m,F )T (piF ,piF )
appears more attractive from a computational standpoint, since it requires to
propagate only 2n sets at most, whose nestedness can be used advantageously. Indeed, let
T : RN → R be a (non-linear) function from RN to the real line. Given the sets A0 ⊂ A1 ⊆
. . . ⊆ An, assume the global minimum and maximum of T are respectively in Ai \Ai−1, and
in A j \A j−1, and their respective values are known. In the propagation, we no longer have
to compute the lower bounds of all T (Ak),T (Acl ) such that k > i > l nor the upper bounds
of all T (Ak′),T (A
c
l′) such that k
′ > j > l′. That is, by reusing function evaluations, we can
avoid additional computations. However, (m,F )T (piF ,piF ) only provides an outer approxima-
tion of (m,F )T ((m,F )). (m,F )T ([F ,F ]) provides an inner approximation of (m,F )T ((m,F ))
and is even easier to compute, since at most n nested sets have to be propagated to com-
pute it. Nevertheless, (m,F )T ([F ,F ]) can give a non-null weight to the empty set, and thus be
incoherent.
Eventually, if faced with a practical problem, the best solution is to compute (m,F )T ((m,F ))
if possible. If not possible, computing (m,F )T (piF ,piF ), yields (m,F )T ([F ,F ]) for free (since for
computing the former we need to propagate sets Ai). So, another solution is to bracket the in-
formation contained in (m,F )T ((m,F )) using (m,F )T (piF ,piF ) and (m,F )T ([F ,F ]). Computing
(m,F )T ([F ,F ]) only is not cautious.
The above results give us some first insights about how generalized p-boxes can be compu-
tationally handled. It also highlights the potential interests of the results relating generalized
p-boxes with other uncertainty representations. As we shall see, those results related to p-
boxes can also be used for particular instances of Neumaier’s clouds [159].
3.3 Clouds
Clouds have been recently introduced and studied by Neumaier [159] as practical uncer-
tainty models. He proposes clouds as a convenient tool to model and treat uncertainty in
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high-dimensional problems where information is scarce and imprecise. In his original pa-
per [159], Neumaier study very briefly the relationships with other models, simply mentioning
that clouds seem to have, in general, poor relationships with other uncertainty representations
(such as credal sets and random sets). We will show in this section that such a statement
is debatable, since clouds do have strong links with previously studied representations. In
particular, we will show that generalized p-boxes are equivalent to a specific sub-family of
clouds.
We begin by recalling the definition of clouds, and undertake a study similar to the one
achieved for generalized p-boxes.
3.3.1 Definition of clouds
Definition 3.6 (Cloud). A cloud is defined as a pair of mappings δ :X → [0,1] and pi :X →
[0,1] from the space X to [0,1], such that δ is point-wise lower than pi (i.e. δ ≤ pi), with
pi(x) = 1 for at least one element x in X , and δ (y) = 0 for at least one element y in X . δ and
pi are respectively the lower and upper distributions of a cloud.
Mappings δ ,pi forming the cloud [pi,δ ] are mathematically equivalent to fuzzy member-
ship functions. A cloud [pi,δ ] is thus mathematically equivalent to an interval-valued fuzzy
set (IVF for short) with boundary conditions (pi(x) = 1 and δ (y) = 0)3. More precisely, it is
mathematically equivalent to an interval-valued membership function whereby the member-
ship value of each element x of X is [δ (x),pi(x)]. Since a cloud is equivalent to a pair of fuzzy
membership functions, at most 2|X |− 2 values (notwithstanding boundary constraints on δ
and pi) are needed to fully determine a cloud on a finite set. Two subcases of clouds considered
by Neumaier [159] are the thin and fuzzy clouds. A thin cloud is defined as a cloud for which
δ = pi , while a so-called fuzzy cloud is a cloud for which δ = 0.
Given a cloud [pi,δ ], Neumaier [159] defines the credal set P[pi,δ ] induced by this cloud
on X as:
P[pi,δ ] = {P ∈ PX |P({x ∈X |δ (x)≥ α})≤ 1−α ≤ P({x ∈X |pi(x) > α})} (3.32)
And, interestingly enough, this definition gives a mean to interpret IVF sets in terms of credal
sets, or in terms of imprecise probabilities, eventually ending up with a behavioral interpreta-
3In general, IVF do not have to have elements x,y such that pi(x) = 1 and δ (y) = 0. Neither does a cloud, but
a cloud not satisfying them would result in an empty credal set
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tion of IVF.
When X is finite, let 0 = γ0 < γ1 < .. . < γM = 1 be the ordered distinct values taken by
both δ and pi on elements of X , then denote the strong and regular cuts as
Bγi = {x ∈X |pi(x) > γi} and Bγi = {x ∈X |pi(x)≥ γi} (3.33)
for the upper distribution pi and
Cγi = {x ∈X |δ (x) > γi} andCγi = {x ∈X |δ (x)≥ γi} (3.34)
for the lower distribution δ . Note that in the finite case, Bγi = Bγi+1 and Cγi = Cγi+1 , with
γM+1 = 1, and also
/0 = BγM ⊂ BγM−1 ⊆ . . .⊆ Bγ0 = X ;
/0 =CγM ⊆CγM−1 ⊆ . . .⊆Cγ0 = X
and since δ ≤ pi , this implies that Cγi ⊆ Bγi , hence Cγi ⊆ Bγi−1 , for all i = 1, . . . ,M. In such a
finite case, a cloud is said to be discrete. In terms of constraints bearing on probabilities, the
credal set P[pi,δ ] of a finite cloud is described by the finite set ofM inequalities:
i = 0, . . . ,M, P(Cγi)≤ 1− γi ≤ P(Bγi) (3.35)
under the above inclusion constraints.
Note that some conditions must hold for P[pi,δ ] to be non-empty in the finite case. In
particular, distribution δ must not be equal to pi everywhere (i.e. δ 6= pi). Otherwise, consider
the case whereCγi = Bγi−1(= Bγi), that is pi and δ have the same γi-cut. There is no probability
distribution satisfying the constraint 1−γi−1≤P(Cγi)≤ 1−γi since γi−1 < γi. So, finite clouds
cannot be thin. Example 3.5 illustrates the notion of cloud and will be used in the next sections
to illustrate various results.
Example 3.5. Let us consider a space X = {u,v,w,x,y,z} and the following cloud [pi,δ ],
pictured in Figure 3.4, defined on this space:
u v w x y z
pi 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.5
δ 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0 0
(3.36)
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Figure 3.4: Cloud [pi,δ ] of Example 3.5
The values γi corresponding to this cloud are
0≤ 0.5≤ 0.75≤ 1
γ0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ3
and the constraints associated to this cloud and corresponding to Equation (3.35) are
P(Cγ3 = /0)≤ 1−1≤ P(Bγ3 = /0)
P(Cγ2 = {w})≤ 1−0.75≤ P(Bγ2 = {v,w})
P(Cγ1 = {u,v,w,x})≤ 1−0.5≤ P(Bγ1 = {u,v,w,x,y})
P(Cγ0 = X )≤ 1−0≤ P(Bγ0 = X )
3.3.2 Clouds in the setting of possibility theory
As for generalized p-boxes, we first relate clouds with possibility distributions. To do it, we
first consider the case of fuzzy clouds [pi,δ ]. In this case, δ = 0 and, Cγi = /0 for i = 1, . . . ,M,
which means that constraints given by Equations (3.35) reduce to
i = 0, . . . ,M 1− γi ≤ P(Bγi)
which induces a credal set equivalent to Ppi (direct from Proposition 3.2). This shows that
fuzzy clouds are equivalent to possibility distributions.
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3.3.2.1 General clouds and possibility distributions
The following proposition is a direct consequence of the preceeding observation:
Proposition 3.10. A cloud [pi,δ ] is representable by the pair of possibility distributions 1−δ
and pi , in the following sense:
P[pi,δ ] = Ppi ∩P1−δ
Proof of Proposition 3.10. Consider a cloud [pi,δ ] and the constraints (3.35) inducing the
credal set P[pi,δ ]. As for generalized p-boxes, these constraints can be split into two sets of
constraints, namely, for i = 0, . . . ,M, P(Cγi)≤ 1− γi and 1− γi ≤ P(Bγi). Since Bγi are strong
cuts of pi , then by Proposition 3.2 we know that these constraints define a credal set equivalent
to Ppi .
Note then that P(Cγi)≤ 1−γi is equivalent to P(Cγic)≥ γi (whereCcγi = {x ∈X |1−δ (x) > 1− γi}).
By construction, 1−δ is a normalized possibility distribution. By interpreting these inequali-
ties in the light of Proposition 3.2, we can see that they define the credal setP1−δ . By merging
the two sets of constraints, we get P[pi,δ ] = Ppi ∩P1−δ .
This proposition shows that, as for generalized p-boxes, a cloud is representable by a pair
of possibility distributions [96]. This similarity between clouds and generalized p-boxes is
explored in Section 3.3.3. This result also confirms that a cloud [pi,δ ] is equivalent to its
mirror cloud [1−pi,1−δ ] (where 1−pi becomes the lower distribution, and 1−δ the upper
one), as already mentioned by Neumaier [159]. Example 3.6 pursues Example 3.5 and shows
the two possibility distributions induced from the cloud.
Example 3.6. We consider the same space X and the same cloud as in Example 3.5. Then,
possibility distributions pi,1−δ are:
u v w x y z
pi 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.5
1−δ 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 1
3.3.2.2 Using possibility distributions to check non-emptiness of P[pi,δ ]
Since not all clouds induce non-empty credal sets (e.g., a thin finite clouds), it is natural to
search conditions under which a cloud [pi,δ ] induces a non-empty credal set P[pi,δ ]. Such
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conditions can be derived by using the links between clouds and possibility distributions.
Chateauneuf [21] has found a characteristic condition under which the credal sets associ-
ated to two belief functions have a non-empty intersection. We can thus apply this result to a
pair of possibility distributions and get the following necessary and sufficient condition for a
cloud [pi,δ ] to have an non-empty credal set:
Proposition 3.11. A cloud [pi,δ ] has a non-empty credal set if and only if
∀A⊆X ,max
x∈A
pi(x)≥min
y6∈A
δ (y)
Proof of Proposition 3.11. Chateauneuf’s condition applied to possibility distributions pi1 and
pi2 reads ∀A⊆ X ,Π1(A)+Π2(Ac)≥ 1. Choose pi1 = pi and pi2 = 1−δ . In particular Π2(Ac) =
1−miny 6∈A δ (y).
Note that a naive test for non-emptiness based on this characterization would have expo-
nential complexity. In the case of clouds, it can be simplified as follows: suppose the space
X = {x1, . . . ,xn} is indexed such that pi(x1) ≤ pi(x2) · · · ≤ pi(xn) = 1 and consider an event
A such that maxx∈Api(x) = pi(xi). The tightest constraint of the form maxx∈Api(x) = pi(xi) ≥
miny6∈A δ (y) is when choosing A = {x1, . . .xi}. Hence, in the case of clouds, Chateauneuf
condition comes down to the following set of n−1 inequalities to be checked:
j = 1, . . . ,n−1 pi(xi)≥min
j>i
δ (x j). (3.37)
This gives us an efficient tool to check the non-emptiness of a given cloud, or to build a non-
empty cloud from the knowledge of either δ or pi . For instance, knowing δ , the cloud [pi,δ ]
such that pi(xi) = min j>i δ (x j), j = 1, . . . ,n− 1 is the most restrictive non-empty cloud that
we can build, assuming the ordering pi(x1)≤ pi(x2) · · · ≤ pi(xn) = 1 (changing this assumption
yields another non-empty cloud).
Now, consider the extreme case of a cloud for whichCγi = Bγi for all i = 1, . . . ,M in Equa-
tion (3.35). In this case, P(Bγi) = P(Cγi) = 1− γi for all i = 1, . . . ,M. Suppose distribution
pi takes distinct values on all elements of X . Rank-ordering X in increasing values of pi(x)
(∀i,pi(xi) > pi(xi−1)) enforces δ (xi) = pi(xi−1), with δ (x1) = 0. Let δpi be this lower distribu-
tion. The (almost thin) cloud [δpi ,pi] satisfies Equations (3.37), and since P(Bγi) = 1− γi,
the induced credal set P[pi,δ ] contains the single probability measure P with distribution
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p(xi) = pi(xi)− pi(xi−1) for all xi ∈ X , with pi(x0) = 0. So if a finite cloud [pi,δ ] is such
that if δ > δpi , it has empty credal set; and if δ ≤ δpi , then the credal set is not empty.
Conditions given by Equations (3.37) can be easily extended to the case of any two pos-
sibility distributions pi1,pi2 for which we want to check whether Ppi1 ∩Ppi2 is ensured to be
empty or not. Such an extension is meaningful only if the setting of clouds does not cover all
the cases where Ppi1 ∩Ppi2 6= /0. To check that this is the case, we first recall that given any
two possibility distributions pi1,pi2, we do have Pmin(pi1,pi2) ⊆Ppi1 ∩Ppi2 , but in general not
the converse inclusion [88]. From this remark, we can conclude that
• Ppi1 ∩Ppi2 6= /0 as soon as min(pi1,pi2) is a normalized possibility distribution.
• Not all pairs of possibility distributions such that Ppi1 ∩Ppi2 6= /0 derive from a cloud
[1−pi2,pi1]. Indeed the normalization of min(pi1,pi2) does not imply that 1−pi2 ≤ pi1.
Another example is given by the two possibility distributions pi1,pi2 defined onX = {w,x,y,z}
such that pi1(w) = 0.5, pi1(x) = 1, pi1(y) = 0.5, pi1(z) = 0.3 and pi2(w) = 0.3, pi2(x) = 0.5,
pi2(y) = 1, pi2(z) = 0.5. Ppi1 ∩Ppi2 is not empty (distribution p(x) = 0.5, p(y) = 0.5 is inside
both credal sets), and neither [1−pi2,pi1] nor [pi2,1−pi1] is a cloud.
Note that there may exist clouds [pi,δ ] with non-empty credal set while δ (x) = pi(x) for
some element x of X . For instance, if for all x ∈X , δ (x) = pi(x) if pi(x) < 1 and δ (x) = 0 if
pi(x) = 1, it defines a non-empty credal set since supx∈X min(pi(x),1−δ (x)) = 1.
3.3.3 Generalized p-boxes as a special kind of clouds
Previous results show that, similarly to generalized p-boxes, clouds correspond to pairs of
possibility distributions. Moreover, the constraints defining a finite cloud are similar to the
ones defining a generalized p-box on a finite set, as per Equations (3.20). The lemma below
lays bare the nature of the relationship between the two representations:
Proposition 3.12. Let [pi,δ ] be a cloud defined on X . Then, the three following statements
are equivalent:
(i) The cloud [pi,δ ] can be encoded as a p-box [F ,F ] such that P[pi,δ ] = P[F ,F ]
(ii) δ and pi are comonotonic (δ (x) < δ (y)⇒ pi(x)≤ pi(y))
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(iii) Sets {Bγi,Cγ j |i, j = 0, . . . ,M} defined from Equations (3.33) and (3.34) form a nested
sequence (i.e. these sets are completely (pre-)ordered with respect to inclusion).
Proof of Proposition 3.12. We use a cyclic proof to show that statements (i), (ii), (iii) are
equivalent.
(i)⇒(ii) Since p-boxes and clouds are both representable by pairs of possibility distribu-
tions, then if (i) holds, we have P[pi,δ ] = P1−δ ∩Ppi = PpiF ∩PpiF = P[F ,F ] with [F ,F ]
the p-box equivalent to the cloud [pi,δ ]. Using the Proposition 3.3 and the definition of a
generalized p-box, 1−piF = δ and piF = pi must be comonotone, hence (i)⇒(ii).
(ii)⇒(iii) we will show that if (iii) does not hold, then (ii) does not hold either. Assume
sets {Bγi,Cγ j |i, j = 0, . . . ,M} do not form a nested sequence, meaning that there exists two sets
Cγ j ,Bγi with j < i s.t. Cγ j 6⊂ Bγi and Bγi 6⊂Cγ j . This is equivalent to asserting ∃x,y ∈X such
that δ (x)≥ γ j, pi(x)≤ γi, δ (y)< γ j and pi(y)> γi. This implies δ (y)< δ (x) and pi(x)< pi(y),
and that δ ,pi are not comonotonic.
(iii)⇒(i) Assume the sets Bγi and Cγ j form a globally nested sequence whose current
element is Ak. Then the set of constraints defining a cloud can be rewritten in the form
αk ≤ P(Ak) ≤ βk, where αk = 1− γi and βk = min{1− γ j|Bγi ⊆Cγ j} if Ak = Bγi; βk = 1− γi
and αk = max{1− γ j|Bγ j ⊆Cγi} if Ak =Cγi . This ends the proof
Proposition 3.12 indicates that only those clouds for which δ and pi are comonotonic can
be encoded by generalized p-boxes, and from now on, we shall call such clouds comonotonic.
To completely relate comonotonic clouds and generalized p-boxes, it remains to express a
given comonotonic cloud [pi,δ ] as a generalized p-box [F ,F ]. As both clouds and generalized
p-boxes correspond to pairs of possibility distribution, we can define pi = piF and δ = 1−piF ,
where δ ,pi are the distributions of the cloud and piF ,1− piF are the possibility distributions
describing the generalized p-box equivalent to the cloud [pi,δ ]. By using Proposition 3.3, F ,F
can then be computed for all x in X :
F(x) = pi(x) and F(x) = min{δ (y)|y ∈X ,δ (y) > δ (x)} (3.38)
Conversely, note that any generalized p-box [F ,F ] can be encoded by a comonotonic cloud,
simply taking δ = 1− piF and pi = piF (See Proposition 3.3), meaning that generalized p-
boxes are special cases of clouds and are equivalent to comonotonic clouds. Also note that
a comonotonic cloud [pi,δ ] and the corresponding generalized p-box [F ,F ] induce the same
complete pre-orders on elements of X , that we will note ≤[F ,F ] to remain coherent with
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previous notations. We will consider that elements x of X are indexed accordingly, as already
specified.
In practice, this relation between comonotonic clouds and generalized p-boxes means that
all the results that hold for generalized p-boxes also hold for comonotonic clouds, and con-
versely. In particular, a comonotonic cloud [pi,δ ] can be encoded as an equivalent random
set, and if we adapt Equations (3.21) to the case of the comonotonic cloud [pi,δ ], we get the
random set (m,F ) with focal elements E j such that for j = 1, . . . ,M E j = {x ∈X |(pi(x)≥ γ j)∧ (δ (x) < γ j)}m(E j) = γ j− γ j−1 (3.39)
Note that in the formalism of clouds this random set can be expressed in terms of the sets
{Bγi,Cγi|i = 0, . . . ,M}. Namely, for j = 1, . . . ,M: E j = Bγ j−1 \Cγ j = Bγ j \Cγ jm(E j) = γ j− γ j−1 (3.40)
Example 3.7 illustrates the above relations on the cloud [pi,δ ] used in Example 3.5, which
is comonotonic.
Example 3.7. From the cloud of Example 3.5, Cγ3 ⊂ Cγ2 ⊂ Bγ2 ⊂ Cγ1 ⊂ Bγ1 ⊂ Bγ0 , and the
constraints defining P[pi,δ ] can be transformed into
0≤P(Cγ2 = {w})≤ 0.25
0.25≤P(Bγ2 = {v,w})≤ 0.5
0.25≤P(Cγ1 = {u,v,w,x})≤ 0.5
0.5≤P(Bγ1 = {u,v,w,x,y})≤ 1.
They are equivalent to the generalized p-box [F ,F ] pictured on Figure 3.5:
u v w x y z
F 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.5
F 0.5 0.75 1 0.5 0.5 0
(3.41)
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Figure 3.5: Generalized p-box [F ,F ] corresponding to cloud of Example 3.5
.
The following ranking of elements of X is compatible with the two distributions (see
Figure 3.5):
z<[F ,F ] y<[F ,F ] x =[F ,F ] u<[F ,F ] v<[F ,F ] w
The corresponding random set, given by Equations (3.40) or (3.39), is:
m({x5,x6}) = 0.25
m({x2,x3,x4,x5}) = 0.25
m({x1,x2}) = 0.5
These results provide insight in uncertainty representations based on pairs of comonotonic
possibility distributions. They emphasize different views of the same tool. Comonotonic
clouds being special cases of clouds, it is then natural to wonder if some of the results pre-
sented in this section extend to clouds that are not comonotonic (and consequently called
non-comonotonic). In particular, can uncertainty modeled by a non-comonotonic cloud be
exactly modeled by an equivalent random set?
3.3.4 The Nature of Non-comonotonic Clouds
We will now study the case of non-comonotonic clouds. For this kind of clouds, Proposi-
tion 3.10 linking clouds and possibility distributions still holds, but non-comonotonic clouds
are no longer equivalent to generalized p-boxes, thus results valid for comonotonic clouds can-
not be used anymore. As we shall see, non-comonotonic clouds appear to be less interesting,
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at least from a practical point of view, than comonotonic ones.
3.3.4.1 Characterization
One way of characterizing an uncertainty model is to find the maximal natural number n such
that the lower measure induced by this uncertainty model is always n-monotone. This is how
we will proceed with non-comonotonic clouds. Let [pi,δ ] be a non-comonotonic cloud, and
P[pi,δ ] the induced credal set. The question is: what is the (ensured) n-monotonicity of the
associated lower probability P ofP[pi,δ ]? To address this question, let us start with an example:
Example 3.8. Consider a spaceX of five elements {v,w,x,y,z} and the following non-comonotonic
cloud [pi,δ ] pictured on Figure 3.6:
v w x y z
pi 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.25
δ 0 0.5 0.25 0 0
(3.42)
This cloud is non-comonotonic, since pi(v) > pi(x) and δ (v) < δ (x). The credal set P[pi,δ ]
can also be defined by the following constraints:
P(Cγ2 = {w})≤ 1−0.5≤ P(Bγ2 = {v,w})
P(Cγ1 = {w,x})≤ 1−0.25≤ P(Bγ1 = {v,w,x,y})
with γ2 = 0.5 and γ1 = 0.25. Now, consider the events Bγ2,Cγ1
c,Bγ2 ∩Cγ1c, Bγ2 ∪Cγ1c. We can
check that
P(Bγ2) = 0.5 P(C
c
γ1
) = 0.25
P(Bγ2 ∩Ccγ1 = {v}) = 0 P(Bγ2 ∪Ccγ1 = {v,w,y,z}) = 0.5
since at most a 0.5 probability mass can be assigned to x. Then the inequality P(Bγ2 ∩Ccγ1)+
P(Bγ2 ∪Ccγ1) < P(Bγ2)+P(Ccγ1) holds, which shows that the lower probability induced by the
cloud is not 2-monotone.
This example is sufficient to show that at least some non-comonotonic clouds induce lower
probability measures that are not 2-monotone. The following proposition gives a general
characterization of such non-comonotonic clouds:
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Figure 3.6: Cloud [pi,δ ] of Example 3.8
Proposition 3.13. Let [pi,δ ] be a non-comonotonic cloud and assume there is a pair of events
Bγi,Cγ j in the cloud s.t. Bγi ∩Cγ j 6∈ {Bγi,Cγ j , /0} and Bγi ∪Cγ j 6= X (i.e., Bγi,Cγ j are just over-
lapping and do not cover the whole space X ) . Then, the lower probability measure of the
credal set P[pi,δ ] is not 2−monotone.
Proof. See Section D.2 in Appendix D
The proof comes down to showing that for any non-comonotonic cloud with a pair Bγi,Cγ j
of events such that Bγi ∩Cγ j 6= {Bγi,Cγ j , /0} and Bγi ∪Cγ j 6= X the situation exhibited in the
above example always occurs, namely the existence of two subsets of the form Bγi and Cγ j
c
for which 2-monotonicity fails. Proposition 3.13 also shows that non-comonotonic clouds sat-
isfying this proposition cannot be viewed as random sets. Note that, although comonotonic
clouds and clouds described by Proposition 3.13 cover a large number of possible discrete
clouds, there remain "small" subfamilies of non- comonotonic clouds not covered by Propo-
sition 3.13. That is, clouds such that, for any pair of events Bγi,Cγ j we have Bγi ∩Cγ j ∈
{Bγi,Cγ j , /0} or Bγi ∪Cγ j 6= X . Since such subfamilies are very peculiar and present poor in-
terest, we will not explore them further here. Some considerations about the clouds satisfying
Bγi ∩Cγ j ∈ {Bγi,Cγ j , /0}, that we call nested-disjoint, are given in Appendix E
Since non-comonotonic clouds appear less tractable than comonotonic ones, it is desirable
to provide tools that would make themmore convenient to use. Such tools are given in the next
two sections, in the form of guaranteed outer and inner approximations of the exact probability
bounds induced by a non-comonotonic cloud. To this aim, we rely on previous results.
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3.3.4.2 Outer approximation of a non-monotonic cloud
Given a cloud [pi,δ ], we have proven that P[pi,δ ] = Ppi ∩P1−δ , where pi and 1− δ are
possibility distributions. As a consequence, the upper and lower probabilities of P[pi,δ ] on any
event can be bounded from above (resp. from below), using the possibility measures and the
necessity measures induced by pi and pi = 1−δ . The following bounds, originally considered
by Neumaier [159], provide, for all event A of X , an outer approximation of the range of
P(A):
max(Npi(A),N1−δ (A))≤ P(A)≤ P(A)≤ P(A)≤min(Πpi(A),Π1−δ (A)), (3.43)
where P(A),P(A) are the lower and upper probabilities induced by P[pi,δ ]. Remember that
probability bounds generated by possibility distributions alone are of the form [0,β ] or [α,1].
Using a cloud and applying Equation (3.43) lead to tighter bounds of the form [α,β ]⊆ [0,1],
and thus to more precise information, while remaining simple to compute. Nevertheless,
these bounds are not, in general, the infinimum and the supremum of P(A) over P[pi,δ ] (i.e.,
max(Npi ,N1−δ ) is not the lower envelope of P[pi,δ ]). To see this, consider the following ex-
ample:
Example 3.9. Let [pi,δ ] be a cloud defined on a space X , such that distributions δ and pi takes
up to four different values on elements x of X (including 0 and 1). These values are such that
0 = γ0 < γ1 < γ2 < γ3 = 1, and the distributions δ ,pi are such that
pi(x) = 1 if x ∈ Bγ2;
= γ2 if x ∈ Bγ1 \Bγ2;
= γ1 if x 6∈ Bγ1 .
δ (x) = γ2 if x ∈Cγ2;
= γ1 if x ∈Cγ1 \Cγ2;
= 0 if x 6∈Cγ1.
Since P(Bγ1)≥ 1− γ1 and P(Cγ2)≤ 1− γ2, from Equations (3.35), we can check that P(Bγ1 \
Cγ2) = P(Bγ1 ∩Cγ2c) = γ2− γ1. Now, by definition of a necessity measure, Npi(Bγ1 ∩Cγ2c) =
min(Npi(Bγ1),Npi(Cγ2
c)) = 0 since Πpi(Cγ2) = 1 because Cγ2 ⊆ Bγ1 and Πpi(Bγ1) = 1. Consid-
ering distribution δ , we can have N1−δ (Bγ1 ∩Cγ2c) = min(N1−δ (Bγ1),N1−δ (Cγ2c)) = 0 since
N1−δ (Bγ1) = ∆δ (Bγ1
c) = 0 and Cγ1 ⊆ Bγ1 (which means that the elements x of X that are in
Bγ1
c are such that δ (x) = 0). Equation (3.43) can thus result in a trivial lower bound (i.e. equal
to 0), different from P(Bγ1 ∩Cγ2c).
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Bounds given by Equation (3.43), are the main motivation for clouds, after Neumaier [159].
Since these bounds are, in general, not the infinimum and supremum of P(A) on P[pi,δ ], Neu-
maier’s claim that they’re only vaguely related to Walley’s previsions or to random sets is
not surprising. If a cloud is comonotonic, Equation (3.43) remains valid but becomes less
useful. Indeed, since comonotonic clouds are equivalent to generalized p-boxes, we can eas-
ily compute exact values of lower and upper probabilities of P[pi,δ ], e.g. via the random set
representation (see Remark 3.2).
3.3.4.3 Inner approximation of a non-comonotonic cloud
The previous outer approximation is easy to compute and allows to make some of Neumaier’s
claims clearer. Nevertheless, it is still unclear how to practically use these outer bounds in
subsequent treatments (e.g., propagation, fusion). The inner approximation of a cloud [pi,δ ]
proposed now is a random set, which is easy to exploit in practice. This inner approximation
is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.14. Let [pi,δ ] be a non-comonotonic cloud defined on a space X . Let us then
define, for j = 1, . . . ,M, the following random set (m,F ): E j = {x ∈X |(pi(x)≥ γ j)∧ (δ (x) < γ j)}m(E j) = γ j− γ j−1 (3.44)
where 0 = γ0 < .. .γ j < .. . < γM = 1 are the distinct values taken by δ ,pi on elements of X ,
E j are the focal elements with masses m(E j) of the random set. This random set is an inner
approximation of [pi,δ ], in the sense that the credal set P(m,F ) induced by this random set is
such that P(m,F ) ⊆P[pi,δ ].
Proof. See Section D.2 in Appendix D
In the case of non-comonotonic clouds satisfying Proposition 3.13, the inclusion is strict.
This inner approximation appears to be a natural candidate, since on events of the type
{Bγi,Cγi,Bγi \Cγ j |i = 0, . . . ,M; j = 0, . . . ,M; i≤ j} it gives exact bounds, and is exact when
the cloud [pi,δ ] is comonotonic. This finishes our study of non-monotonic clouds. It remains
to study the links existing between clouds and imprecise probability assignments.
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3.3.5 Clouds and imprecise probability assignments
Since in many cases a cloud is either equivalent to a random set or does not lead to 2-monotone
capacites, there is no direct relationship between clouds and imprecise probability assign-
ments. Nevertheless, we can study how to transform a set of imprecise probability assign-
ments into a cloud. Such a transformation can be useful when one wishes to work with clouds
even if information is obtained in terms of sets of imprecise probability assignments.
There are mainly two paths that can be followed to do this transformation:
• the first one is to use the fact that clouds are equivalent to pairs of possibility distribu-
tions, and to extend existing transformations that transform a set of imprecise probability
assignments into a single possibility distribution.
• The second uses the correspondence between generalized p-boxes and comonotonic
clouds, and simply apply the results obtained for generalized p-boxes.
Section 3.3.5.1 proposes a transformation following the first path, while Section 3.3.5.2 ex-
plores the second one and compares the two approaches.
3.3.5.1 Exploiting probability-possibility transformations
The problem of transforming a probability distribution into a quantitative possibility distri-
bution has been addressed by many authors (see Dubois and Prade [94] for an extended dis-
cussion). A consistency principle between (precise) probabilities and possibility distributions
was first informally stated by Zadeh [219]: what is probable should be possible. It was later
translated by Dubois and Prade [81, 98] as a mathematical constraint. Given a possibility dis-
tribution pi obtained by the transformation of a probability measure P, one should have, for all
events A of X :
P(A)≤Π(A) (3.45)
In this case, the possibility measure Π is said to dominate P, and the transformation from
probability to possibility then consists of choosing a possibility distribution amongst the ones
inducing a possibility measure dominating P. Dubois and Prade [78, 98] propose to add the
following ordinal equivalence constraint, such that for two elements x,y in X
p(x)≤ p(y) ⇐⇒ pi(x)≤ pi(y) (3.46)
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and to choose the least specific possibility distribution (pi ′ is more specific than pi if pi ′ ≤ pi)
respecting these two constraints.
Dubois and Prade [81] showed that the solution exists and is unique. Let us consider proba-
bility masses such that the order on probability masses is p1≤ . . .≤ pn with p j = p(x j). When
all probability masses are different, Dubois and Prade probability-possibility transformation
can be formulated as
pii =
i
∑
j=1
p j (3.47)
with pii = pi(xi). When some elements have equal probability, the above equation must be
used on the ordered partition induced by the probability weights, using uniform probabilities
inside each element of the partition. Note that the above transformation is equivalent to apply
Algorithm 1 with elements ranked accordingly to the increasing order of their probability
masses.
Reversing the ordering of the pi’s in the above formula yields another possibility distribu-
tion pi i = ∑nj=i p j, with pi i = pi(xi). Letting δ = 1−pi , distribution δ is of the form δpi intro-
duced in Section 3.3.2.2, that is, [pi,δ ] is a cloud such that δi = pii−1 for all i> 1, with δ1 = 0
and δi = δ (xi). It is the tightest cloud containing P, in the sense that P(pi)∩P(pi) = {P}.
This shows that, at least when probability masses are precise, transformation into possibil-
ity distributions can be extended to get a second possibility distribution such that this pair of
comonotonic distributions is equivalent to a cloud. Moreover, the fact that P(pi)∩P(pi) =
{P} shows that the cloud models exactly the same information as the (precise) probability
distribution. δ corresponds to the application of Algorithm 1, this time with a ranking corre-
sponding to the decreasing order of probability masses. The generalized p-box [F ,F ] associ-
ated to the cloud [δpi ,pi] is the one built through Algorithm 2 with a ranking corresponding to
the increasing order of their probability masses.
When working with imprecise probability assignments, i.e. with a set L of imprecise
probability assignments, the order induced by probability weights on X is a partial order ≤L
(actually, an interval order) defined by:
x≤L y ⇐⇒ u(x)≤ l(y) (3.48)
and two elements x,y are incomparable if intervals [l(x),u(x)], [l(y),u(y)] intersect. The prob-
lem of transforming a set L of imprecise probability assignments into a possibility distribution
piL such that PL ⊆PpiL by extending Dubois and Prade transformation is studied in detail by
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Masson and Denoeux [141]. We first recall their method, before proposing its extension to
clouds.
Let CL be the set of linear extensions of the partial order ≤L: a linear extension <l∈ CL
is a ranking of X compatible with the partial order ≤L. Let σl be the permutation such that
σl(x) is the rank of element x in the linear extension <l . Given this partial order, Masson and
Denoeux [141] propose the following procedure transforming the set of imprecise probability
assignments into a possibility distribution:
1. For each linear order <l∈ CL and each element x, solve
pi l(x) = max
{P(y)|y∈X } ∑σl(y)≤σl(x)
P(y) (3.49)
under the constraints
∑
x∈X
P(x) = 1
∀x ∈X , l(x)≤ P(x)≤ u(x)
P(σ−1l (1))≤ p(σ−1l (2))≤ . . .≤ P(σ−1l (n))
(3.50)
2. The most informative distribution pi dominating all distributions pi l is:
pi(x) = max
<l∈C
pi l(x). (3.51)
This procedure ensures that the resulting possibility distribution pi dominates every probability
distribution contained in PL. In other words, the convex set Ppi is such that PL ⊆Ppi .
To extend this transformation to a pair of possibility distributions equivalent to a cloud, we
consider that the possibility distribution pi given by Equation (3.51) is the upper distribution of
a cloud [pi,δ ]. To build the lower distribution δ of a cloud containing PL, we need to build a
second possibility distribution piδ such thatPL⊆Ppiδ and such that the pair [1−piδ ,pi] defines
a cloud (with 1−piδ = δ ). To achieve this, we propose to use the same method as Masson and
Denoeux [141], simply reversing the inequality under the summation sign in Equation (3.49).
The procedure to build piδ then becomes
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1. For each order <l∈ CL and each element x, solve
pi lδ (x) = max{p(y)|y∈X } ∑σl(x)≤σl(y)
p(y) (3.52)
= 1− min
{p(y)|y∈X } ∑
σl(y)<σl(x)
p(y) = 1−δ l(x) (3.53)
with the same constraints as in the first transformation.
2. The most informative distribution dominating all distributions pi l
δ
(x) is:
piδ (x) = 1−δ (x) = max
<l∈C
pi lδ (x) (3.54)
Example 3.10 illustrates this procedure.
Example 3.10. Let us take the same four imprecise probability assignments as in the example
given by Masson and Denoeux [141], on the space X = {w,x,y,z}, and summarized in the
following table
w x y z
l 0.10 0.34 0.25 0
u 0.28 0.56 0.46 0.08
The partial order is given by Ly < Lx;Lz < {Lx,Lw,Ly}. There are three possible linear
extensions <l∈ CL
<1l = (Lz,Lw,Ly,Lx)
<2l = (Lz,Lw,Lx,Ly)
<3l = (Lz,Ly,Lw,Lx)
corresponding to the following piδ ’s:
<il piδ (w) piδ (x) piδ (y) piδ (z)
1 1 0.16 0.63 1
2 1 0.9 0.46 1
3 0.75 0.5 1 1
max 1 0.9 1 1
and, finally, the obtained cloud is:
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w x y z
pi 0.64 1 1 0.08
δ 0 0.1 0 0
where pi is the possibility distribution obtained by Masson and Denoeux [141] for the
same example by applying the first transformation. Note that the cloud is only a little more
informative than the upper distribution taken alone (indeed, the only added constraint is that
p(x)≤ 0.9).
We can verify the following property:
Proposition 3.15. Given a set L of imprecise probability assignments, the cloud [1−piδ ,pi]
built from the two possibility distributions piδ ,pi obtained via the above procedures is such that
the induced credal set P[1−piδ ,pi] contains PL. In the degenerate case of a precise probability
distribution, this cloud contains this distribution only.
Proof of Proposition 3.15. The two possibility distributions pi,piδ are such that PL ⊂ Ppi
and PL ⊂Ppiδ by construction, so PL ⊂ (Ppi ∩Ppiδ ). The final result is thus more precise
than a single possibility distribution dominating PL. When L reduces to precise masses {p},
the transformations give the following possibility distributions (elements of X are ordered in
accordance with the order of probability masses):
pi(xi) = ∑
j≤i
p j (3.55)
and
piδ (xi) = ∑
j≥i
p j = 1−∑
j<i
p j = 1−δ (xi) = 1−pi(xi−1). (3.56)
Hence, the only probability distribution in the cloud [pi,δ ] is given by pi = pi(xi)−pi(xi−1).
This method allows to get a cloud encompassing the information contained in any set
of imprecise probability assignments. It directly extends known methods used in possibility
theory, and can benefits from the efficient algorithm provided by Masson and Denoeux [141].
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3.3.5.2 Using generalized p-boxes
We have previously shown that generalized p-boxes and comonotonic clouds were equivalent
representations. Thus, another method consists of directly using transformations from impre-
cise probability assignments to generalized p-boxes and get an approximation as a comono-
tonic cloud, simply by applying Algorithm 2.
Consider the following example:
Example 3.11. Let us consider the same probability intervals as in example 3.10 and the fol-
lowing order relationship R on the elements: z<R w<R y<R x. We can then build the general-
ized p-box [F ,F ] associated to this order (using Equations (3.24)), and then take the comono-
tonic cloud [pi,δ ] associated to this p-box (by using transformations in Proposition 3.3). The
following table summarizes the obtained distributions
w x y z
F = pi 0.36 1 0.66 0.08
F 0.1 1 0.44 0
δ 0 0.44 0.1 0
And, by Proposition 3.5 and results related to generalized p-boxes, we know that the credal
set P[pi,δ ] induced by this cloud is such that PL ⊆P[pi,δ ] and that we can recover the infor-
mation modeled by a set L of imprecise probability assignments by means of at least |X |/2
clouds built by this method.
Both methods transform a set L of imprecise probability assignments into a cloud [pi,δ ]
such that PL ⊂P[pi,δ ], thus guaranteeing that no extra information is added in the transfor-
mation.
In general, since finite clouds can model precise probability distributions without any loss
of information, the cloud resulting from any transformation of a discrete probability distri-
bution should contain this probability distribution only. Both methods proposed here satisfy
these requirements in the finite case.
However, if we compare the clouds resulting from Examples 3.10 and 3.11, it is clear
that the cloud resulting from the second method (Example 3.11) is more precise than the one
resulting from the first one (Example 3.10). Moreover, using the first method, it is in general
impossible to recover the information provided by the original set L of imprecise probability
assignments. This shows that the first method can be very conservative. This is mainly due to
the fact that even if the method considers every possible ranking of elements, it is only based
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Figure 3.7: Representation relationships: summary with clouds A −→ B: B is a
special case of A. A 99K B: B is representable by A
on the partial order induced by imprecise probability assignments. Also, it is not based on the
use of upper probabilities, as Algorithm 2 is.
If a ranking of elements is naturally present in a considered problem, then the second
method seems to be the best solution. If no natural order is present, it is hard to justify the
fact of considering one particular order rather than another one, and the first method should
be applied. In this case, one has to be aware that a lot of information can be lost in the
process. One may also use the ranking inducing one of the most precise comonotonic clouds,
but we already mentioned that this question remains open. Also, it is not sure than the second
method can always produce a more informative result than the first one. Figure 3.7 completes
Figure 3.3 by inserting both general clouds and comonotonic clouds into it. As for the previous
figures, new relationships resulting from the present work are in bold.
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3.4 A word on continuous representations on the real line
In many applications, the available information concerning some parameters is defined on the
(continuous) real line. Even if in practice the computational processing of such models will
require sooner or later a discretization of the real line, thus coming back to the finite case, the
continuous representation is in many cases mathematically convenient and often highlights
interesting properties. Analytical formulations and closed forms can also be useful to build
efficient numerical methods or algorithms.
Thus, although the major part of this work deals with discretized models or with models
defined on finite spaces, we think that it is both interesting and important to devote some atten-
tion to models defined on the continuous real line. We restrict ourselves to the study of models
defined on measurable spaces, because non-measurable sets are unlikely to occur in applica-
tions, and to avoid mathematical subtleties arising with the consideration of countably additive
probabilities on infinite spaces (Countable additivity for generalized p-boxes is considered in
Appendix F). Whether countable additivity should be considered or not by uncertainty theo-
ries remains a matter of debate, which is far beyond the scope of this work (see Miranda [144]
for a short discussion).
3.4.1 Practical continuous representations on the real line
In this section, we briefly review how some of the models defined in Section 3.1 can be defined
on the real line.
P-boxes The definition of p-boxes essentially remains the same, instead that the cumulative
distributions F ,F are allowed to be continuous distributions defined over the real line. The
credal set P[F ,F ] associated to such a p-box is then the set of probability densities p whose
cumulative distributions F are between F ,F (i.e. F(r)≤ F(r)≤ F(r) for all r ∈ R).
Imprecise probability assignments When defined on the continuous real line, imprecise
probability assignment L become lower and upper density functions l and u, such that
∀x ∈ R l(x)≤ u(x)∫
R
l(x)dx≤ 1≤
∫
R
u(x)dx
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and the credal set PL associated to this imprecise probability assignment is the set of all
(normalized) density functions that lie between l and u. Other models defined in terms of
lower/upper density functions and based on ratio of probability densities are considered by
Walley [203, Ch.4.6.]
Random sets As in Section 3.1.2.4, random sets will be noted (m,F ), the only difference
being that m is now a probability density defined on [0,1] and that to each value α ∈ [0,1]
is associated a focal element Eα . Equations for belief and plausibility measures of an event
A⊆ R simply become
Pl(A) =
∫ 1
0
1(A∩Eα 6= /0) m(α)dα
Bel(A) =
∫ 1
0
1(A⊂Eα ) m(α)dα
with 1(A) the indicator function which has value one if A is true, zero otherwise. If m is a
uniform density over [0,1], above equations simply become:
Pl(A) =
∫ 1
0
1(A∩Eα 6= /0) dα
Bel(A) =
∫ 1
0
1(A⊂Eα ) dα.
Smets [186] considers a more peculiar case, where focal elements Eα are restricted to closed
intervals of R. The interest of only considering closed intervals is the possibility to derive an-
alytical formulas that extend various notions of finite random sets while remaining tractable.
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 3.1.2.4, in practical applications random sets defined over
the reals are often restricted to closed intervals. Continuous random sets still induce corre-
sponding credal sets.
Possibility distributions We define a possibility distribution on the real line as a lower semi-
continuous mapping pi :R→ [0,1] such that pi(x) = 1 for at least one value x∈R. In this case,
relationships between possibility distributions, random sets and credal sets continue to hold.
In particular, a possibility distribution pi can be represented by a continuous random set with a
uniform mass density m over [0,1] and the multi-valued mapping α → piα , with α ∈ [0,1] and
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piα the α-cut of pi . Similarly, the credal set Ppi induced by the possibility distribution pi can
still be described through its α-cuts. In particular, Proposition 3.2 still holds. Also, when pi is
such that every α-cut is a closed interval, it can be embedded straightforwardly in Smets [186]
framework.
In the next section, we show that the main results of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 extend to models
defined on the continuous real line.
3.4.2 Continuous clouds on the real line
We consider clouds defined on a bounded interval [r,r] of the real line. First, let us recall that,
as in the discrete case, a cloud [pi,δ ] defined on the real line is a pair of distributions such that,
for any element r ∈R, [δ (r),pi(r)] is an interval and there is an element r for which δ (r) = 0,
and another r′ for which pi(r′) = 1. Thin clouds (pi = δ ) and Fuzzy clouds (δ = 0) have the
same definition as in the case of finite spaces. The credal set P[pi,δ ] induced by a cloud on the
real line is such that:
P[pi,δ ] = {P ∈ PR|P({r ∈ R|δ (r)≥ α})≤ 1−α ≤ P({r ∈ R|pi(r) > α})}, (3.57)
where P is a σ -additive probability distribution.
As Proposition 3.2 has been proven for possibility distributions pi defined on very general
spaces [31], and since the proof of Proposition 3.12 extends directly to continuous models on
the real line, results whose proof is based on these propositions also hold on the real line. In
particular, the following statements still hold:
• if [pi,δ ] is a cloud, 1−δ ,pi are possibility distributions, and P[pi,δ ] = Pδ ∩Ppi ,
• if [F ,F ] is a generalized p-box defined on the reals, then P[F ,F ] = PpiF ∩PpiF with, for
all r ∈ R:
piF(r) = F(r)
and
piF(r) = 1− sup{F(r′)|r′ ∈ R;F(r′) < F(r)}
with piF(r) = 0.
• generalized p-boxes and comonotonic clouds are equivalent representations.
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Fig. 3.8.A: Comonotonic cloud
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δ
1
Fig. 3.8.B: Non-comonotonic cloud
pi
δ
rr′
1
Fig. 3.8.C: Weakly comonotonic cloud
Figure 3.8: Illustration of (weakly) comonotonic and non-comonotonic clouds on the
real line.
Note that, for clouds on the real line, we can define a weaker notion of comonotonicity:
a (continuous) cloud [pi,δ ] is said to be weakly comonotonic if the sign of the derivative of
distributions δ ,pi is the same in every point r of the real line R. Being weakly comonotonic
is not sufficient to be equivalent to a generalized p-box, since if pi and δ are weakly comono-
tonic, then it is possible to find two values r and r′ such that δ (r) < δ (r′) and pi(r) > pi(r′).
In this case, the (pre-)ordering jointly induced by the two distributions is not complete, and
the definition of comonotonicity given in section 3.2 is not satisfied. Figures 3.8.A, 3.8.B
and 3.8.C respectively illustrate the notion of comonotonic, non-comonotonic and weakly
comonotonic cloud on the reals. Figure 3.8.A illustrates a comonotonic cloud (and, conse-
quently, a generalized p-box) for which elements are ordered according to their distance to the
mode m (i.e., for this particular cloud, two values x,y in R are such that x<[F ,F ] y if and only
if |m− x|> |m− y|).
We can now extend the propositions linking clouds and generalized p-boxes with random
sets. In particular, the following result extends Proposition 3.13 to the continuous case:
Proposition 3.16. Let the distributions [pi,δ ] describe a continuous cloud on the reals and
P[pi,δ ] be the induced credal set. Then, the random set defined by the Lebesgue measure on
the unit interval α ∈ [0,1] and the multimapping α −→ Eα such that
Eα = {r ∈ R|(pi(r)≥ α)∧ (δ (r) < α)} (3.58)
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describe a credal set P(m,F )[pi,δ ] which is an inner approximation of Ppi,δ (P(m,F )[pi,δ ] ⊆
Ppi,δ ).
Proof. See Section D.2 in Appendix D
The proof comes down to using sequences of discrete clouds outer- and inner-approximating
[δ ,pi] and converging to it, and then to consider inner-approximations of those discrete clouds
given by Proposition3.14. This proposition has two corollaries:
Corollary 3.17. Let [pi,δ ] be a comonotonic cloud with continuous distributions on the real
line. Then the credal set P[pi,δ ] induced by [pi,δ ] is equivalent to the credal set induced by
a continuous random set with uniform mass density, whose focal sets are of the form, for
α ∈ [0,1]:
Eα = {r ∈ R|(pi(r)≥ α)∧ (δ (r) < α)} (3.59)
To obtain the result, simply observe that the inner-approximation of Proposition 3.14 be-
comes exact for discrete comonotonic clouds, which are special cases of random sets. In
particular, this is true for the sequences of discrete comonotonic clouds outer- and inner-
approximating [pi,δ ] and converging to it. So, this sequence of random sets converge to a
continuous random set at the limit. Another interesting particular case is the one of uniformly
continuous p-boxes.
Corollary 3.18. The credal set P[F ,F ] described by two continuous cumulative distribu-
tions F ,F forming a regular p-box on the reals is equivalent to the credal set described by
the continuous random set with uniform mass density, whose focal sets are sets of the form
[x(α),y(α)] where x(α) = sup{x ∈ R|F(x) < α} and y(α) = inf{x ∈ R|F(x) > α}.
This is because strictly increasing continuous p-boxes are special cases of comonotonic
clouds (or, equivalently, of generalized p-boxes). To check that, in this case, Eα = [x(α),y(α)],
it suffices to consider the possibility distributions piF ,piF and to see that infr∈R(piF(r)≥ α) =
x(α) and supr∈R(1−piF(r) < α) = y(α). The strict increasingness property can be relaxed to
intervals where the cumulative functions are constant, provided one consider pseudo-inverses
when building the continuous random set.
From a practical and computational perspective, these results are appealing. For example,
they can facilitate the computation of lower and upper expectations over continuous general-
ized p-boxes (see, for examples, results of Section 6.2). Another interesting point is that all
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the framework developed by Smets [186] concerning belief functions on reals can be applied
to comonotonic clouds (generalized p-boxes). Results given in this section extend and give
alternative proofs to some results given by Alvarez [5] concerning continuous p-boxes. A the-
oretical study of generalized p-boxes defined on a complete chain and of the associated set of
finitely additive probabilities is given in Appendix F. Among other things, this study checks to
which extent the results presented above extend to this more general setting. The main results
of this study are that:
• such generalized p-boxes still induce lower probabilities (and previsions) that are ∞-
monotone, and can therefore be expressed through particular Choquet Integrals,
• they can be approximated by sequences of finite discrete degenerate p-boxes (somehow
extending proposition 3.17),
• equivalence with random sets only hold for some practical subcases. This is mainly due
to the fact that such extensions also consider confidence measures on non-measurable
sets.
3.4.3 Thin continuous clouds
In the case of thin clouds, constraints defining the credal set, given by Equation (3.35), re-
duce to P(pi(x) ≥ α) = P(pi(x) > α) = 1−α for all α ∈ (0,1). Recall that on a finite space
X these constraints are generally conflicting, because for some α , P({x ∈X |pi(x)≥ α}) >
P({x ∈X |pi(x) > α})will hold. When the thin cloud is a distribution defined on the real line,
this is no longer a difficulty, and the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3.19. If pi is a continuous possibility distribution on the real line, then its credal
set Ppi ∩P1−pi is not empty.
Proof of Proposition 3.19. Let F(x) = Π((−∞,x]), with x ∈ R. F is the distribution function
of a probability measure Ppi such that for all α ∈ [0,1], Ppi({x ∈ R|pi(x) > α}) = 1−α , where
the sets {x ∈ R|pi(x) > α} form a continuous nested sequence (see [78] p. 285). Such a
probability lies in Ppi . Moreover,
Ppi({x ∈ R|pi(x) > α}) = Ppi({x ∈ R|pi(x)≥ α})
due to uniform continuity of pi . We also have
Ppi({x ∈ R|pi(x) > α}) = 1−Π({x ∈ R|pi(x)≥ α}c) = 1−∆({x ∈ R|pi(x)≥ α}) again due to
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uniform continuity. Since
1−∆({x ∈ R|pi(x)≥ α}) = sup{x|pi(x)≥α} 1−pi(x), this means Ppi ∈P(1−pi).
A thin cloud is a particular case of comonotonic cloud. It induces a complete pre-ordering
on the reals. If there are no ties, meaning that this pre-order is linear, it means that for any
α ∈ [0,1], there is only one value r ∈ R for which pi(r) = α , and that Ppi ∩P1−pi contains
only one probability measure. In particular, if the order is the natural order of real numbers,
this thin cloud reduces to a usual cumulative distribution.
When the pre-order has ties, it means that for some α ∈ [0,1], there are several values in
r ∈ R such that pi(r) = α . Using Corollary 3.17, we can model the credal set Ppi ∈P(1−pi)
by the random set with uniform mass density, whose focal sets are of the form
Eα = {r ∈ R|pi(r) = α} (3.60)
In this case, we can check that the belief measure of this random set is in accordance with
Equation (3.35), since Bel({r ∈ R|pi(r)≥ α}) = 1−α for any α ∈ [0,1].
Finally, consider the specific case of a thin cloud modeled by an unimodal distribution pi
(formally, a fuzzy interval). In this case, each focal set associated to a value α is a doubleton
{x(α),y(α)} where {x|pi(x)≥ α} = [x(α),y(α)]. Noticeable probability distributions that
are inside the credal set modeled by such a thin cloud are the cumulative distributions F+
and F− such that for all α in [0,1], F−1+ (α) = x(α) and 1−F−1− (α) = y(α) (they respectively
correspond to the case where the mass density of the random set is concentrated on values x(α)
and y(α)). All probability measures with cumulative functions of the form λ ·F++(1−λ ) ·F−
also belong to the credal set (for λ = 12 , this distribution corresponds to the case where mass
density is evenly divided between elements x(α) and y(α)). Other distributions inside this set
are considered by Dubois et al. [78].
3.5 Combinations of uncertainty representations into higher
order models
In the preceding sections, we have presented, studied and linked a number of uncertainty
representations: sets, possibility distributions, probability distributions, generalized p-boxes,
clouds, probability intervals, random sets, credal sets.
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In applications, it is common to encounter combinations of uncertainty representations
studied in this work. For example, a random set can be seen as a probability distribution
bearing over sets (i.e., as a combination of probability distributions and sets). In this section,
we give a brief review of the literature about such models. We then give more attention to
fuzzy random variables and recall their basics.
3.5.1 A quick review of the literature
The combinations mentioned above are often referred as hierarchical models in the literature.
Such hierarchical models arise when there is a ’correct’ or ’ideal’ uncertainty model on some
variable X , but there is some uncertainty concerning what this ’ideal’ first order model actually
is. This uncertainty is itself modeled by a so-called 2nd order model. It is not difficult to
conceive how 3rd,4th, . . . order models can be defined likewise. However, in practice, 2nd
order models are by far the most often used, and the higher the level of a model, the more
difficult it is to give it a meaningful interpretation. In this section, we only do a short and non-
exhaustive review of existing hierarchical models related to representations studied in previous
sections:
• Bayesian 2nd order models are for sure the most commonly encountered hierarchical
models. In this case, both the 1st and 2nd order models are precise probabilities. Ro-
bustness studies [16] or combination of expert opinions [28] are two practical examples
where Bayesian hierarchical models are often used. A common example of such a model
consists in a random variable following a normal distribution whose uncertainties on the
mean and variance are themselves modeled by normal distributions.
• Desirability functions, introduced by de Cooman [44] and based on Walley’s [203] the-
ory of imprecise probabilities, constitute a very general 2nd order model where both
the 1st and 2nd order models are allowed to be credal sets. This model encompasses,
among other representations, fuzzy random variables, type-2 fuzzy sets, Bayesian mod-
els, imprecise probabilities. Note that this model is less general then the one defined
by Walley [203, CH.5.], since desirability functions only allows credal sets induced by
coherent lower probabilities at the 2nd level.
• Fuzzy random variables [221, 168, 32, 45] , which are formally equivalent to (normal-
ized) fuzzy belief structures [214, 217, 83], also consitute popular models. Although
they’ve been originally interpreted as a 1st order model by Puri and Ralescu [168], they
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can also be given a 2nd order interpretation [32]. This 2nd order model is, for example,
used in so-called hybrid uncertainty propagation techniques, studied in Section 7.2.1
(see Baudrit et al. [12] and Cooper et al. [29]). They also come up as the result of
an information fusion process studied in Section 4.2. They can also be instrumental in
statistical inferences [20]
• Sets of random sets are considered by Augustin [7], who call them generalized ba-
sic probability assignment, and by Miranda et al. [146], who link this model to Wal-
ley’s [203] lower previsions by giving them a behavioral interpretation. Instead of con-
sidering a precise basic probability assignment over sets, this model considers (closed
convex) sets of precise basic probability assignments. Although Augustin [7] shows
that, formally, it is mainly equivalent to 1st order credal sets, this model is of practical
importance, as assigning imprecise weights to subsets can be a convenient way to elicit
and represent beliefs. Denoeux [58] studies, under the TBM interpretation (see Ap-
pendix A), interval-valued probability basic assignments over random sets, which can
be seen as a special case of the model considered by Augustin [7].
• Type-2 fuzzy sets [218, 143] are other examples of 2nd order models, where the 2nd
order models are fuzzy sets and the 1st order models are interval-valued fuzzy sets.
Note that, if we interpret the 2nd order model as a possibility distribution and the 1st
order model as a cloud, then previous sections indicate us how Type-2 fuzzy sets could
be interpreted in terms of imprecise probabilities. Evaluating the potential of Type-2
fuzzy sets as imprecise probabilistic models is an open question, and is out of the scope
of this work.
• Denoeux [59] also studies, under the TBM interpretation, the case of fuzzy-valued im-
precise fuzzy belief structures, where uncertainty on the basic probability assignments,
bearing themselves on fuzzy sets, is described by means of fuzzy sets. To each levels
α ∈ [0,1] of the fuzzy sets describing the uncertainty on the basic probability assign-
ments, he associates a set of random (fuzzy) sets described by interval-valued probabil-
ity basic assignments.
In the next section, we give more details about the basics of a hierarchical model that will
be used in the sequels of this work and, as noticed above, appears in practical treatments of
uncertainty, namely so-called fuzzy random variables or fuzzy belief structures.
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3.5.2 Fuzzy random variables
Let X be the space4 on which variable X can take its values. A random fuzzy variable on
X is here defined as a (discrete) mapping m :℘(F˜X )→ [0,1] where ℘(F˜X ) is the set of
all fuzzy sets F˜ that can be defined on X and such that ∑
F˜∈℘(F˜X )m(F˜) = 1. We assume
here the number of fuzzy focal elements to be finite. This definition is equivalent to a basic
probability assignment assigned over fuzzy sets rather than on simple sets. For this reason, we
denote (m,F˜ ) a random fuzzy variable, with F˜ = {F˜ ∈℘(F˜X )|m(F˜) > 0} the set of fuzzy
sets having a (strictly) positive mass, and call elements of this set focal elements of the random
fuzzy variable.
3.5.2.1 Interpretation as a 1st order model
We consider a fuzzy random variable (m,F˜ ) of n focal elements defined on a finite space X
and an (arbitrary) indexing F˜i of focal elements (i= 1, . . . ,n). Let {γ0 = 0< γ1< .. . < γM = 1}
be the range {F˜i(x)|x ∈X , i = 1, . . . ,n} of distinct values taken by the focal elements. The
1st order model corresponding to this fuzzy random variables is the random set which, for
i = 1, . . . ,n and j = 1, . . . ,M, have the following focal sets Ei,γ j Ei,γ j = {x ∈X |F˜i(x)≥ γ j}m(Ei,γ j) = m(F˜i)(γ j− γ j−1) (3.61)
Plausibility and belief measures on any event A⊆X are then given by:
Pl
(m,F˜ )1
(A) = ∑
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,M
m(Ei,γ j)1(Ei,γ j∩A 6= /0) = ∑
i=1,...,n
m(F˜i) ∑
j=1,...,M
(γ j− γ j−1)1(Ei,γ j∩A6= /0)
Bel
(m,F˜ )1
(A) = ∑
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,M
m(Ei,γ j)1(Ei,γ j⊂A) = ∑
i=1,...,n
m(F˜i) ∑
j=1,...,M
(γ j− γ j−1)1(Ei,γ j⊂A)
or, equivalently, by
Pl
(m,F˜ )1
(A) = ∑
i=1,...,n
m(F˜i)
∫ 1
0
1(Ei,γ∩A6= /0) dγ = ∑
i=1,...,n
m(F˜i)sup
x∈A
F˜i(x) (3.62)
Bel
(m,F˜ )1
(A) = ∑
i=1,...,n
m(F˜i)
∫ 1
0
1(Ei,γ j⊂A) dγ = ∑
i=1,...,n
m(F˜i) sup
x∈Ac
F˜i(x) (3.63)
4We assume this space is finite or measurable
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with P
F˜i
and P
F˜i
the upper and lower probabilities of the credal set P
F˜i
induced by the focal
element F˜i.
We can also link a fuzzy random variable to a continuous random set. In order to do this,
let us define, for all i= 1, . . . ,n, the value αi as αi = ∑ij=1m j, with α0 = 0. Let us now consider
a fuzzy random variable (m,F˜ ) and the associated continuous random set (m,F˜ )c defined by
a uniform density m over [0,1] and the mapping
∀α ∈ (αi,αi+1], i = 1, . . . ,n, α → Eα = Ei,φi(α) (3.64)
where φi(α) =
α−αi
mi
is a linear function mapping (αi,αi+1] to (0,1], and Ei,φi(α) is the set
given by Equation (3.59) of Corollary 3.17, for the focal element F˜i of (m,F˜ ) and for level
φi(α). We can then formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 3.20. Let (m,F˜ ) be a fuzzy random variable and (m,F˜ )c the associated contin-
uous random set (m,F˜ )c on X . Then (m,F˜ )c is equivalent to the 1
st order interpretation of
(m,F˜ ), and we have, For all events A⊆X :
Bel
(m,F˜ )c
(A) = Bel
(m,F˜ )1
(A) and Pl
(m,F˜ )c
(A) = Pl
(m,F˜ )1
(A)
where Bel
(m,F˜ )c
,Pl
(m,F˜ )c
are the belief and plausibility measures of (m,F˜ )c, and Bel(m,F˜ )1
,Pl
(m,F˜ )1
are the belief and plausibility measures given by Equations (3.63) and (3.62).
Proof. Let us note βi = φi(α) and notice that dα = mi dβi for all i = 1, . . . ,n. Then,
Pl
(m,F˜ )c
(A) =
∫ 1
0
1(A∩Eα 6= /0) dα =
n
∑
i=1
∫ αi
αi−1
1(A∩Ei,φi(α) 6= /0) dα
=
n
∑
i=1
mi
∫ 1
0
1(A∩Ei,βi 6= /0) dβi = ∑
i=1,...,n
m(F˜i)PF˜i(A)
= ∑
i=1,...,n
m(F˜i) sup
x∈Ac
F˜i(x)
which is equivalent to Equation (3.62). Since plausibility and belief measures are dual mea-
sures, the proof is finished.
The above discussion shows that, as a 1st order level, a fuzzy random variable can be
viewed as:
• a regular random set, either finite (Equation (3.61)), or continuous (see Mapping (3.64))
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• a convex combination of the focal elements F˜i with their associated weights mi (Equa-
tions (3.63) and (3.62)).
Conversely, Proposition 3.20 indicates that any random set can, in principle, be mapped into
a corresponding fuzzy random variable (eventually degenerated into a classical random set
when no focal elements are nested).
Equations (3.62) and (3.63) coincide with Yen’s [217] definition of the plausibility and
belief measures for fuzzy belief structures (Note that Yen’s proposition is based on optimiza-
tion criteria, and not on some imprecise probabilistic derivation). We can also notice that
they’re coherent with Smets definition of a fuzzy event [182] (they reduce to Smets definition
when focal sets are crisp). The above generalizations of plausibility and belief measures to
fuzzy random variables (or to fuzzy belief structures) have thus strong theoretical justifications
and appear to us as the best choice. Nevertheless, other choices are possible: Denoeux [59],
following Zadeh [220], prefers a generalization of plausibility and belief measures based on
min−max operators, on the basis that this generalization is less sensible to small changes in
the fuzzy focal elements5. Yager [212] also proposes to replace the min−max operators by
any combination of t-norms and t-conorms.
This 1st order interpretation of fuzzy random variables corresponds to the interpretation
of Puri and Ralescu [168]. We now briefly describe other interpretations of fuzzy random
variables as 2nd order models, and explore the links between such interpretations and the 1st
order interpretation of this section.
3.5.2.2 Interpretations as a 2nd order model
A fuzzy random variable (m,F˜ ) defined on X is equivalent to a basic probability assignment
over a set of fuzzy sets. There are two ways of interpreting it as a 2nd order model: either
we consider that the basic probability assignment is the 2nd order level model, and the 1st
order level model is then a fuzzy set known with uncertainty, or we consider that our 2nd
order level model is a fuzzy set, describing our uncertainty about what could be the 1st order
representation.
First interpretation Let us consider an arbitrary indexing F˜i, i = 1, . . . ,n of the focal el-
ements in F˜ and mi = m(F˜i) the associated basic probability assignments. Then, the first
5This is not surprising, since the generalization proposed here is based on linear operators, which are more
sensible than maxitive ones
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interpretation of (m,F˜ ) as a 2nd order model means that we consider that there is a prob-
ability mi that our first order model describing uncertainty on a variable X assuming values
in X is F˜i (nothing more, nothing less), inducing the corresponding credal set PF˜i . In this
case, equations (3.63) and (3.62) indicate that the lower and upper probabilities of the 1st or-
der model can be seen as the mean over m of the lower probabilities induced by the 1st order
models of this interpretation. In the case of random sets, the first order model reduce to a
classical set.
Second interpretation The second interpretation means that the nested sets on which is
defined a fuzzy set become credal sets rather than sets of values. If the first order model is
defined over X , the second order fuzzy set consists in lower (or, equivalently, upper) con-
fidence bounds given to collection of nested credal sets. We then retrieve the usual notion
of 2nd order possibility distribution defined over credal sets. Given a fuzzy random variable
(m,F˜ ), to a cut of level α of this 2nd order possibility distribution then corresponds the credal
set P
(m,F˜ )α
, to which is given a confidence degree 1−α and that is induced by the following
random set (see also Equation (3.61): Ei,α = {x ∈X |F˜i(x)≥ α}m(Ei,α) = m(F˜i)
This interpretation of fuzzy random variables has recently received a lot of attention from
various authors, and we refer to De cooman [45], Walley [205], De Cooman and Walley [53],
Couso and Sanchez [34], Baudrit et al. [10] for theoretical discussions of this model, and
Ferson and Ginzburg [102] and Baudrit et al. [12] for more practical considerations.
3.6 Conclusions and perspectives
We’ve seen above that there exists a whole range of uncertainty representations, going from
very general models (e.g. credal sets) to more specific ones (e.g. possibility distributions).
More general models (random sets, credal sets), by their higher expressiveness and generality,
have a unifying power that is used here to relate the different models. Less general models
have the advantages of being easier to handle than more general ones and are of great practical
importance for elicitation tasks and to make uncertainty treatments more tractable (and thus
applicable to more problems). At the very least, when resources are limited, they can provide
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quick gross approximation that can, in some cases, be sufficient to provide satisfying answers.
It also often happens that available information can be modeled by simpler representations,
and in these cases there is no need to use more complex models. This is why we think that the
study and evaluation of such simpler models is of great importance, especially in applications.
With respect to this objective, the main results of this section can be summarized as follows:
• The introduction and study of a generalized form of p-box that bridges the gap between
possibility distributions and p-boxes, while remaining a special case of random sets.
This model looks promising for two reasons: first, its interpretation in terms of lower
and upper confidence bounds on nested sets makes it attractive for elicitation procedures,
and second, it can be a good compromise between possibility distributions and random
sets, offering more expressiveness than the former and having an higher computational
tractability than the latter.
• The study of clouds, that have been related to other uncertainty representations, a study
that was only partially done by Neumaier [159]. In particular, we have shown that
comonotonic clouds are equivalent to generalized p-boxes, and that non-comonotonic
clouds are likely to be less interesting representations, at least from a practical point of
view.
As practical perspectives to this section, we can cite:
• the potential usefulness of clouds and of generalized p-boxes still largely remains to
be evaluated, however promising these models may look. In particular, computational
aspects have to be explored, similarly to what De campos et al. [42] have done for impre-
cise probabilistic assignments. Section 3.2.5 provides first results of such an exploration,
for the specific problem of uncertainty propagation. Investigating other computational
aspects (i.e. information fusion) is partially done in subsequent chapters, and is part of
our on-going research.
• The instrumentality of clouds and generalized p-boxes in elicitation procedures also has
to be evaluated, possibly using some previous studies done with possibility distribu-
tions [170].
• Practical applications of clouds and generalized p-boxes. In this perspective, a first
application is done by Fuchs and Neumaier [111], where they use multi-dimensional
comonotonic clouds in a robustness study.
More theoretical perspectives include, but are not restricted to:
Practical uncertainty representations 117
• The evaluation of type-2 fuzzy sets as (2nd order) imprecise probabilistic models, by
using results related to clouds, which are formally equivalent to interval-valued fuzzy
sets.
• The study of clouds and generalized p-boxes in more general settings, for instance by
interpreting them through Walley’s [203] lower previsions and by considering finitely
additive probabilities on infinite spaces. Appendix D, where generalized p-boxes de-
fined on complete chains are studied, shows that results holding on finite spaces do not
always extend to more general cases. The extension of such results is also the topic
of on-going research work, done in collaboration with Enrique Miranda and Matthias
Troffaes.
• The study of an "imprecise possibility theory", where sets of possibility distributions
dominating an uncertainty measure are considered rather than single possibility distri-
butions. Such a study seems natural to us, and in the spirit of Augustin’s [7] generalized
basic probability assignments (sets of random sets) and of Walley’s [203] lower previ-
sions (sets of probabilities). Moreover, some of the results of this chapter (for example,
Propositions 3.10, 3.3 and Corollary 3.8) suggest that such a study could be useful.
• The general characterization of non-empty credal sets representable by pairs of pos-
sibility distributions. We have seen that clouds do not cover all such cases, and that
some subcases of clouds remain unexplored. In particular, it would be useful to check
under which conditions such credal sets induce ∞-monotone lower probabilities (i.e.
random sets), and when it is not the case, if the induced lower probability is always not
2-monotone (as it is in Proposition 3.13)
Material contained in this chapters can be found in papers [67, 74, 70, 71, 69, 68, 64]
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Treating multiple sources of information
“When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be
the truth”
—Conan Doyle (1859–1930)
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In practical applications, it often happens that multiple sources (experts, sensors, databases,. . . )
provide information about the value that could assume a variable X (e.g. model parameter,
physical quantity, . . . ). In such a situation, two different but correlated problems are (i) the
construction of a synthetic interpretable model or message from these multiple pieces of infor-
mation, and (ii) the evaluation of the information quality. In this work, we restrict ourselves
to cases where uncertainty is represented numerically, and where it bears on "objective" vari-
ables, that is variables whose value is, at least in principle, observable (i.e., we do not consider
the problems of reaching a subjective consensus or of aggregating preferences)
The construction of a synthetic model is commonly referred to as information fusion. It
consists in aggregating information coming from different sources into a single representation.
This representation is then easier to use or analyze in subsequent treatments than scattered in-
formation. In general, this representation is required to be both informative and more reliable
than information taken from a single source. If these two goals are relatively easy to achieve
when information brought by the sources is consistent, this is not the case when inconsis-
tencies between sources occur. Moreover, the fact that sources can be dependent (e.g. two
experts having common backgrounds), more or less reliable, biased,. . . added to the fact that
information can come in a great variety of shapes makes the problem even more difficult to
solve. Two of the most important problems encountered in information fusion are to cope with
conflicting information and to deal with potentially dependent sources. After a brief reminder
of basics of information fusion in uncertainty theories (Section 4.1), we provide in this chapter
some results regarding these two problems. To deal with inconsistencies in the information,
we propose to use the logical notion of maximal coherent subsets (MCS) [173] (Section 4.2).
This notion appears as a very natural way to conciliate the two objectives of gaining infor-
mation and of remaining in agreement with all sources. Regarding the problem of dependent
sources, we study, inside random set theory, the merging of sources whose dependencies are
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badly known. Some preliminary results are given, that should eventually lead to a practical
cautious merging rule (Section 4.3).
Assessing the quality of the information delivered by a source is another recurrent problem
when receiving information from multiple sources. When multiple sources provide informa-
tion, it is natural to wonder which are the more reliable among them. If subjective assessments
of reliability are admissible in some situations, they are not in industrial risk analysis or safety
studies. We thus propose in this chapter methods to assess sources reliability from previous
situations where the same sources have given information about some other variables (Sec-
tion 4.4). These methods are inspired from probabilistic and possibilistic evaluation methods
respectively proposed and discussed by Cooke [28] and Sandri et al. [174]. Once the sources
reliability is known, it can serves various purposes (be used in information fusion process, in
code validation procedures [196], . . . ).
4.1 Basics of Information fusion in uncertainty
There are mainly two ways to characterize a fusion operator: by its behavior or by the proper-
ties it satisfies. In Section 4.1.1, we introduce a classification of fusion operators which draws
from previous works of Bloch [18] and of Dubois and Prade [93, 86]. In Section 4.1.2, the
main properties that a fusion operator can satisfy are recalled. Section 4.1.3 studies the main
operators used in the different imprecise probability theories considered in this work (i.e., pos-
sibility theory, random sets, imprecise probabilities), and gives a brief account of their links.
All along this section, ϕ will denote a general fusion operator, and we assume sources
provide their information about a variable X taking its values on a domain X . We also note
JNK the subset {1, . . . ,N} of natural numbers from 1 to N.
Since the formal definitions of fusion rules and properties differs between uncertainty the-
ories, we start by informal formulations of such behaviors and properties, and then to provide
formal definitions within each of the uncertainty theories considered in this work (i.e. possi-
bility theory, random set theory, imprecise probability theory).
4.1.1 A classification of fusion operators
Fusion operators can follow three main kinds of behaviors:
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• conjunctive: a conjunctive operator is the counterpart to a set intersection. The uncer-
tainty in the information resulting from a conjunction is less than the uncertainty of each
source alone. A conjunctive operator makes the assumption that all sources are reliable,
and usually results in very precise information. If there is some conflict in the informa-
tion (i.e. at least one source is not fully reliable), then the result of the conjunction can
be poorly reliable, or even empty.
• disjunctive: a disjunctive operator is the counterpart to a set union. The uncertainty in
the information resulting from a disjunction is higher than the uncertainty of all sources
together. A disjunctive operator makes the assumption that at least one source is reli-
able. The result of a disjunctive operator can be considered as very reliable, but is also
often (too) poorly informative.
• Trade-off: the result of a trade-off operator lies between conjunctive and disjunctive
behaviors. Trade-off operators are typically used when sources are partially conflicting.
As its name indicates, It tries to make a trade-off between disjunction and conjunction so
as to achieve a good balance between informativeness and reliability. In the following,
we will distinguish two compromise operators:
– adaptive: an operator will be called adaptive if the fusion result depends on the
context (Bloch [18] calls them context-dependent). The aim of such an opera-
tor is to go from a conjunctive behavior to a disjunctive behavior as the conflict
(disagreement) among sources increases. Adaptive operators reduce to disjunction
(conjunction) in case of total conflict (agreement) between sources. In-between,
they act as trade-off operators. Methods using maximal coherent subsets studied
in Section 4.2 are good representatives of adaptive operators.
– non-adaptive: a compromise operator is non-adaptive when it always acts the
same way, irrespectively to the context. Arithmetic weighted mean (or convex
combination) is a popular and typical example of such operators, and is undoubt-
edly the most widely used compromise operator in practice.
4.1.2 Mathematical properties of fusion operators
It is common to require a fusion operator ϕ or the result of the fusion process to satisfies
some mathematical properties, considered as desirable by the analyst. In this section, we sub-
sume and discuss the main properties encountered in the literature. The proposed list heavily
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draws on the works of Walley [202] in the framework of imprecise probabilities and of Ous-
salah [161] in the framework of possibility theory. We will thus use their terminologies in the
sequel. To fix ideas, letO1, . . . ,ON be the N uncertainty models representing sources opinions,
indexed in an arbitrary way and withOi representing the information provided by source i. We
denote O(i: j) := ϕ(Oi, . . . ,O j) the result of applying the fusion operator to representations i to
j. Concepts of empty result; inclusion; convexity and convex hull; total and partial conflict;
total and partial consistency that we use to define some properties will then be declined for
each uncertainty theory.
Property I ) Total Consistency (Cons.): this property is satisfied when the core (Equa-
tion 3.2) of the lower uncertainty measure induced by the result O(1:N) is non-
empty. Total Consistency comes down to eliminate any conflict in the result,
either by the fusion process itself or by removing it by post-processing. This
property is commonly required when subsequent inferences or decisions have
to be made. As total consistency comes down to eliminate the existing con-
flict in the information, this property is not desirable if we want to keep track
of it (this is the case, for example, with the Transferable Belief Model [189]).
Property II ) Associativity / Aggregation of aggregates [202] (Ass.): ϕ is associative if
ϕ(O1, . . . ,ON) = ϕ(ϕ(O1, . . . ,ON−1),ON). Associativity allows information
to be fused step-wise (first O1 with O2, then the result with O3, etc.). This
property is important, for instance, if sources provide information at different
times and individual pieces of information cannot be stored while waiting
for all sources to have delivered information. Otherwise, we do not regard
associativity as important, not to say appealing, as it can drastically limits the
range of possible fusion operators (see Walley [202]). Note that associativity
is also convenient in computations.
Property III ) Commutativity / Symmetry [202] (Comm.): ϕ is commutative if ϕ(O1, . . . ,ON)=
ϕ(Oσ(1), . . . ,Oσ(N)), with σ a permutation of JNK. We regard commutativity
as essential when there is no information allowing to distinguish the sources
between them.
Property IV ) Idempotence (Idem.) : ϕ is idempotent if ϕ(O,O) = O. The property of
idempotence can be regarded as a cautious attitude with respect to the poten-
tial dependency between sources. If all sources provide the same informa-
tion, then idempotence ensures that there will be no reinforcement effect, that
is the likelihood of values that sources consider more likely to occur is not
reinforced.
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Property V ) Weak zero preservation [161] / Unanimity [202] (W-Z-P): ϕ satisfies this
property if an element is considered impossible by the fusion result when
it is so by all sources. This property ensures that the fusion operator only
accounts for sources information and do not add implicit information in the
result, making some values suddenly possible without any source supporting
this opinion. This property seems compelling to us, and should be required.
This property is called strong zero preservation by Oussalah [161] 1, but we
choose to call it weak, since it puts less constraints on the result than its (here)
strong counterpart.
Property VI ) Strong zero preservation [161] / Conjunction [202] (S-Z-P): ϕ satisfies this
property if an element is considered impossible by the fusion result when it
is so by at least one source. Requiring this property enforces ϕ to have a
conjunctive behavior, and only makes sense when sources agree together. It
can be considered as dictatorial, as one source can make a value impossible.
Property VII ) Weak maximal plausibility [161] / Indeterminacy [202] (W-M-P): ϕ verifies
this property if an element considered possible by all sources is also con-
sidered possible by the fusion result. This property is trivially satisfied if
sources are totally conflicting (as there is no elements considered possible by
all sources). In other cases, this property ensures a minimal consistency with
the information given by the sources, and we thus consider it as desirable.
Property VIII ) Strong maximal plausibility [161] / Total reconciliation [202] (S-M-P): ϕ sat-
isfies this property if an element considered possible by at least one source
must also be considered possible by the fusion result. Requiring strong max-
imal plausibility enforces ϕ to have a disjunctive behavior, and the fusion
result to be fully consistent with the information delivered by every source. It
is very strong, and not desirable if we want to have the possibility to reduce
uncertainty via the fusion process.
Property IX ) Information relevance [163] / Reconciliation and Strong Reconciliation [202]
(Recon.): ϕ satisfies reconciliation property if the conjunction of O(1:N) with
any representation Oi, i ∈ JNK is non-empty (i.e. if O(1:N) is partially consis-
tent with every sources). It satisfies strong reconciliation property if, for any
subset I ⊂ JNK such that the conjunction of representations Oi, i ∈ I (whose
result is denoted OI) is non-empty, the conjunction of O(1:N) with OI is not
1Delmotte [55] also requires this property in the framework of possibility theory, and formulates it in terms
of supports of possibility distributions
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empty. Strong reconciliation requires the fusion result to be partially consis-
tent with all partially consistent subsets of sources. Unless there are some
reasons to discard some sources, strong reconciliation appears as a natural
requirement.
Property X ) Insensitivity to complete and relative ignorance [202] (InsIgn.): Consider
O(1:N) and a N+1
th source supplying information. ϕ satisfies insensitivity to
complete ignorance if ϕ(O(1:N),ON+1) = O(1:N) when ON+1 represents com-
plete ignorance. ϕ satisfies insensitivity to relative ignorance if ON+1 is less
informative than all the other sources taken together (i.e. if it includes the
disjunction of O1, . . . ,ON).
Property XI ) Convexity (Conv.): this property is satisfied ifO(1:N) is convex whenO1, . . . ,ON
are. In general, satisfying convexity increases computational tractability, but
there are no obvious reasons to always require it. Note that if the final result
of the fusion is not convex, it is always possible to take its convex hull (losing
some information in the process, but gaining computational tractability).
Property XII ) Robustness / Continuity [202] (Robus.) : ϕ satisfy robustness or continuity
if a small change in the opinion of one source only causes a small change in
O(1:N), a small change being usually defined with respect to a distance func-
tion d. Since a model of the available information can often be regarded as
approximative, robustness is often considered as desirable, particularly when
the fusion procedure is some part of an automatic process. Nevertheless, there
is no obvious reasons to always require this property.
These properties are rather general and can be formulated for each uncertainty theory con-
sidered here, but other (more ad hoc) properties that generalize less easily can be consid-
ered with respect to a particular theory (e.g. sensitivity to the core in possibility theory [55],
strong Pareto in imprecise probabilitiy theory [202], insensitivity to refinement in evidence
theory [188]).
When building or choosing a fusion operator, a natural thing to do is to determine which
properties it should follow. As the importance of properties can vary with the problem to solve,
we can only provide some guidelines about which properties should or should not be satisfied.
Our opinion is that satisfying Weak Zero Preservation (Property V, W-Z-P) and Weak Max-
imal Plausibility (Property VII, W-M-P) is a minimal requirement to ensure that the fusion
operator do not add some extra information and that it does not discard values supported by all
sources. If no information about the sources (e.g. reliability) allows to differentiate them, then
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satisfying the properties of Commutativity (Property III, Comm.) and of Strong Reconcilia-
tion (Property IX, Recon.) should be required. We consider Insensibility to relative ignorance
(Property X, InsIgn.) as strongly desirable, since if it is not verified, the fusion result is likely
to quickly become too imprecise to be really useful. Strong zero preservation (Property VI,
S-Z-P) is desirable only when all sources are partially consistent with each others. Conversely,
Strong maximal plausibility (Property VIII, S-M-P) is desirable when all sources are totally
conflicting, and that none can be discarded. Total consistency (Property I, Cons.) should be
required when some inferences or decision must be drawn from information, but regarding
it as a general minimal requirement is debatable, since it may be interesting to keep track of
inconsistencies in the information. Idempotence (Property IV, Idem.) is desirable when no
reinforcement effects are wanted (e.g., when sources cannot be considered independent). The
main advantage of Associativity (Property II,Ass.) and of convexity (Property XI, Conv.) is to
alleviate the computational burden, but we do not regard them as always desirable for a fusion
operator. Although Robustness (Property XII, Robus.) is often required, we do not regard it as
desirable, except in automatic procedures, where it is important to ensure a certain robustness.
The above argumentation is based on the rational basis that a fusion operator should aim at
gaining information (Properties W-Z-P V, S-Z-P VI, InsIgn. X) while remaining coherent with
the sources (Properties Recon. IX, W-M-P VII ) and with the information we have (or do not
have) about their relations (Properties Comm. III, Idem. IV). We consider that inconsistency
is an information in itself, and thus should not be automatically removed (Property Cons. I),
and that practical considerations only comes after rational ones (Properties Ass. II, Conv. XI,
Robus. XII).
However, there is no real consensus among researchers about which properties should be
regarded as essential, desirable, optional or not desirable, and in which context they should be
so. For instance, Walley [202] regards total consistency (Property I) as fundamental, as it is
central in his behavioral theory, while it is central in the Transferable Belief Model developed
by Smets [189] to consider total consistency as optional as long as no decisions have to be
taken. Denoeux [61] and Smets [188] often regard associativity (Property II) as strongly de-
sirable, if not essential. In possibility theory, Oussalah et al. [163] and Delmotte [55] consider
robustness (Property XII) as critical.
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4.1.3 Basic fusion operators in uncertainty theories
In this section, we review the main basic fusion operators in the various imprecise probability
theories considered in this work. We also give a word about their links and about basic fusion
operators with generalized p-boxes, pursuing our study of this representation.
First, let us relate in a general way our classification of fusion operators given in Sec-
tion 4.1.1 with properties of Section 4.1.2.
As said in the previous section, conjunctive operators are retrieved by requiring Strong
Zero preservation VI. Such operators are sensible choices only when the result of conjunction
is non-empty (i.e. all sources are partially consistent with each others). Conjunctive operators
usually satisfy the properties of Convexity XI, Insensibility to Ignorance X, Weak Maximal
Plausibility VII, Strong Reconciliation IX and obviously Weak Zero Preservation V. Total
consistency I and Robustness XII are in general not satisfied (Total consistency when there is
no conflict at all among sources). In any cases, they do not satisfy Strong Maximal Plausi-
bility VIII. As said above, conjunctive operators should be chosen when sources are strongly
consistent.
Disjunctive operators are retrieved by requiring Strong Maximal Plausibility VIII. They
satisfy properties of Strong Reconciliation IX, Total Consistency I, Robustness XII and force-
fully Weak Maximal Plausibility VII. They do not satisfy Properties of Insensibility to partial
Ignorance X, Strong Zero Preservation VI andWeak Zero preservation V. In general, they also
do not satisfy Convexity XI. Given the argumentation of Section 4.1.2 about the desirability
of properties, disjunctive operators are, in general, to be discarded, except when all sources
are totally conflicting with each others.
Adaptive trade-off operators generally satisfy properties of Total Consistency I, Insensi-
bility to partial Ignorance X, Weak Zero Preservation V, Weak Maximal Plausibility VII and
Strong Reconciliation IX. They do not, in general, satisfy Properties of Maximal Plausibil-
ity VIII, Strong Zero Preservation VI , Convexity XI and Robustness XII, and are very difficult
to conciliate with Associativity II. They represent good solutions to the fusion problem, but
can be limited by the potential computational burden associated to them.
Non-adaptive compromise operators generally satisfy properties of Total Consistency I,
Weak Zero Preservation V, Weak Maximal Plausibility VII, Convexity XI, Robustness XII
and Strong Reconciliation IX. They do not, in general, satisfy Properties of Strong Maximal
Plausibility VIII, Strong Zero Preservation VI and Insensitivity to partial Ignorance X. The
mean, a representative of non-adaptive compromise operators, is undoubtedly the most widely
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and commonly used fusion operator. Given two numbers x,y and associated weights λx,λy,
the general form of a mean2 ϕ is given by the functional equation
ϕ(x,y,λx,λy) = f
−1
(
λx f (x)+λy f (y)
λx +λy
)
(4.1)
where f (x) is a continuous and strictly monotonic function, with f−1 its inverse. See Aczel [4,
Sec.5.3.2] for a full characterization. Although mean operators can be convenient to aggregate
subjective opinions or preferences of a group, we will argue in the sequel that they are not well
fitted to the case when information concern a variable whose true value is not well known.
In the next sections, we review how are defined the main operators in probability theory,
imprecise probability, random set theory and possibility theory, and how properties defined in
Section 4.1.2 are particularized for each theory.
4.1.3.1 Probability theory
Let X be the space of interest. In probability theory, N probability distributions p1, . . . , pN
are built from the sources information, and the fusion result P(1:N) = ϕ(P1, . . . ,PN) must be
another probability distribution on X . Two main approaches exist to solve the problem: the
first concerns direct aggregation methods, using most of the time mean operators satisfying
Equation (4.1), while the second uses a Bayesian approach to fuse probabilities. Cooke [28]
provides a long and critical survey of the various methods. Shorter and critical reviews are
provided by French [110], Genest and Zidek [113] and more recently by Clemen and Win-
kler [26]. Bayesian methods will not be considered here, since we regard them as more re-
lated to prior information revision and updating problems than to fusion problems. Examples
of Bayesian methods are given by Winkler [211], who considers the use of natural-conjugate
distributions3, Morris [155], Mosleh and Apostolakis [156], who mainly considers normal
models, and Lindley [137].
For direct aggregation methods, Cooke [28, Ch.11] considers a family of operators that he
calls r-norm, and which constitutes a subfamily of the general equation (4.1) where f (x) = xr.
Inside this family, only the arithmetic weighted mean (r = 1), often called linear pooling,
and the geometric weighted mean (r = 0), often called logarithmic pooling, have appealing
properties. If λ1, . . . ,λN are non-negative weights summing to one, they respectively reads,
2In the sense that the result is between x and y
3Natural-conjugate distributions are families of likelihood and prior distributions such that the prior and
posterior densities belongs to the same family, thus making calculations easier
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for all x ∈X ,
P(1:N)(x) =
N
∑
i=1
λipi(x) (4.2)
and
P(1:N)(x) = k
N
∏
i=1
pi(x)
λi (4.3)
with k a normalization constant. The main arguments for using logarithmic pooling is that
it is more coherent with Bayesian methods and it is the only operator having the so-called
independence preservation property, an argument which has been criticized by many au-
thors [28, 110] (See Genest et al. [112] for a study of logarithmic pooling). Linear opin-
ion pooling is the only operator to possess the marginalization property, meaning that it does
not matter whether we apply it to the distributions pi or to the induced measures Pi (i.e.,
P(1:N)(A) = ∑x∈A p(1:N)(x) = ∑ni=1λiPi(A)). This means that the fused probability of an event
depends only on the source probabilities for this event, and is not influenced by the probabili-
ties of other events. See McConway [142] and Cooke [28] for more details. Walley [202] also
shows that, inside a behavioral theory of (precise) probability, the arithmetic weighted mean is
the only fusion procedure (including Bayesian ones) that satisfies the property of Weak Zero
Preservation V. All these arguments show that, inside a probabilistic approach, the arithmetic
weighted mean appears as the most appealing and sensible operator to fuse probabilities.
There are no disjunctive or conjunctive operators in probability theory, only trade-off op-
erators, although some authors [191] consider the arithmetic mean as disjunctive and the nor-
malized product as conjunctive. However, neither the arithmetic mean nor the normalized
product do respectively satisfy Strong Maximal Plausibility VIII and Strong Zero Preserva-
tion VI. Moreover, if µ1,µ2 denote two additive probabilities over X , we have min(µ1,µ2)≤
ϕ(µ1,µ2)≤max(µ1,µ2), whether ϕ is the arithmetic mean or the normalized product.
Potential shortcomings of using the arithmetic mean (which is by far the best option inside
probability theory) is given by the following example: consider two experts giving their opin-
ion about the potential value of a real-valued variable X . Suppose the first gives an opinion
centered around small values, and the other around high values. Aggregating their opinion by
the arithmetic mean would give a distribution whose mean would be between the two values, a
value none of the expert considers as possible. There is no means with probabilistic modeling
to convey the idea that either the opinion that X is small or that it is high is right, and that
both cannot be right at the same time. This is not the case for other theories that allow for
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imprecision in their representations. We will now give a review of the main operators used in
each of them.
4.1.3.2 Imprecise probability theory
We consider that information delivered by theN sources is modeled by the credal setsP1, . . . ,PN
on a domain X . Again, we will often limit ourselves to credal sets PP defined by coherent
lower probability measures P, as they are more tractable in practice. Given a set of probabil-
ities P (convex or not), we will denote by H (P) its convex hull (i.e., the set of all convex
combinations of its extreme points extP )
Conjunction Given credal sets P1, . . . ,PN , their conjunction P∩(1:N) is defined as
P∩(1:N) =
N⋂
i=1
Pi (4.4)
and we say that the credal sets P1, . . . ,PN (and associated sources) are conflicting if P∩(1:N)
is empty. Credal sets whose intersection is not empty are said to be non-conflicting. If
credal sets PP1, . . . ,PPN are induced by coherent lower probabilities P1, . . . ,PN and are non-
conflicting, then the credal set PPmax(1:N)
induced by Pmax(1:N) = max(P1, . . . ,PN) only gives
an outer approximation of PP∩(1:N)
=
⋂N
i=1PPi , and we have PPmax(1:N)
⊇PP∩(1:N) . Although
PP∩(1:N)
is still induced by a coherent lower probability P∩(1:N) on events, exactly computing
this lower probability usually requires the resolution of℘(X ) linear programs [40, 42].
If the credal sets PL1, . . . ,PLN are given by imprecise probability assignments, then de
Campos et al. [42] have shown that the conjunction PL∩(1:N) =
⋂N
i=1PLi again corresponds to
a credal set induced by an imprecise probability assignment, and that this imprecise probability
assignment is given, for every element x ∈X , by:
lL∩(1:N)
(x) = {max
i∈JNK
(li(x)) ,1− ∑
y∈X \x
min
i∈JNK
(ui(y))}
uL∩(1:N)
(x) = {min
i∈JNK
(ui(x)) ,1− ∑
y∈X \x
max
i∈JNK
(li(y))}
where lL∩(1:N) and uL∩(1:N) are the lower and upper bounds of the imprecise probability assign-
ment inducing PL∩(1:N) .
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Disjunction Given credal sets P1, . . . ,PN , their disjunction P∪(1:N) is defined as
P∪(1:N) =
N⋃
i=1
Pi (4.5)
in practice, it is mathematically convenient (and equivalent from a behavioral point of view [202])
to consider the convex hull H (P∪(1:N)) of P∪(1:N) . When the credal sets PP1, . . . ,PPN are
induced by coherent lower probabilities, their disjunctionH (PP∪(1:N)
) = H ((
⋃N
i=1PPi)will
not, in general, be induced by a coherent lower probability. Nevertheless, we can easily com-
pute the tightest lower probability inducing a credal set outer approximating H (PP∪(1:N)
).
It is given by Pmin(1:N) = min(P1, . . . ,PN) and the induced credal set PPmin(1:N)
is such that
PPmin(1:N)
⊇ H (PP∪(1:N) ). Similarly, if the credal sets PL1, . . . ,PLN are induced by im-
precise probability assignments, then H (PL∪(1:N) ) = H (
⋃N
i=1PLi) will not, in general, be
induced by an imprecise probability assignment. However, the tightest imprecise probability
assignment Lout inducing a credal set PLout outer approximating H (PL∪(1:N) ) is simple to
compute, and is given, for every x ∈X , by
lout(x) = min
i∈JNK
(li(x))
uout(x) = max
i∈JNK
(ui(x))
where li,ui are the bounds of the imprecise probability assignment Li.
Convex combination Given the credal sets P1, . . . ,PN , their respective sets of extreme
points ext1, . . . ,extN , and non-negative weights λ1, . . . ,λN summing up to one and associated
to the credal sets, their convex combination is defined as
P∑(1:N) = ∑
i∈JNK
λiPi (4.6)
andP∑(1:N) is equivalent to the credal set associated to the set ext∑(1:N) = {∑i∈JNK λipi|pi ∈ exti}
of extreme points built from the convex combination of extreme points of P1, . . . ,PN . If
credal sets PP1, . . . ,PPN are induced by coherent lower probabilities, then their convex com-
binationPP∑(1:N)
is easy to compute and is induced by the coherent lower probability P∑(1:N) =
∑i∈JNK λiPi, with Pi the coherent lower probability inducing PPi . Similarly, if the credal sets
PL1, . . . ,PLN are induced by imprecise probability assignments, then their convex combina-
tion PL∑(1:N) is still induced by an imprecise probability assignment L∑(1:N) such that, for every
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Property Formulation Property Formulation
I Cons. Pϕ(1:N) 6= /0 VII W-M-P Pϕ(1:N) ⊇P∩(1:N)
II Ass. Pϕ(1:N) = ϕ(Pϕ(1:N−1),PN) VIII S-M-P Pϕ(1:N) ⊇H (P∪(1:N))
III Comm. Pϕ(1:N) = ϕ(Pσ(1), .,Pσ(N)) IX Recon. ∀K,
(
Pϕ(1:N) ∩
⋂
i∈K Pi
)
6= /0
IV Idem. ϕ(P,P) = P X InsIgn. ϕ(Pϕ(1:N),PN+1) = Pϕ(1:N)
if PN+1 ⊇P∩(1:N)
V W-Z-P Pϕ(1:N) ⊆H (P∪(1:N)) XI Conv. Pϕ(1:N) = H (Pϕ(1:N))
VI S-Z-P Pϕ(1:N) ⊆P∩(1:N) XII Robus. d(Pϕ(1:N),P ′ϕ(1:N))→ 0 as
d(Pi,P
′
i )→ 0
with P ′ϕ(1:N) = ϕ(P
′
1, .,P
′
N)
Table 4.1: Properties of Section 4.1.2 for credal sets P1, . . . ,PN with ϕ the fu-
sion operator, Pϕ(1:i) = ϕ(P1, . . . ,Pi) ,K ⊆ JNK any maximal subset such that
(∩i∈KPi) 6= /0 and d the supremum norm between credal sets.
x ∈X
l∑(1:N)(x) = ∑
i∈JNK
λi(li(x))
u∑(1:N)(x) = ∑
i∈JNK
λi(ui(x))
Table 4.1 summarizes how properties of Section 4.1 particularize to the case of credal sets
(most formulations are equivalent to those given by Walley [202]). Recall that, given two
credal sets P1,P2, the supremum norm reads
d(P1,P2) = max{ sup
P1∈P1
inf
P2∈P2
‖P1−P2‖, sup
P2∈P1
inf
P1∈P2
‖P1−P2‖}
with ‖P1−P2‖ = supE⊆X |P1(E)− P2(E)|. Conjunction is found back if we require both
properties VII and VI, while requiring properties V and VIII enforces to take the convex hull
of the disjunction.
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4.1.3.3 Random set theory
We consider now that information is given by N random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N defined on
X . In order to define usual fusion operators on random sets and to relate them to properties
of Section 4.1.2, we must first choose a particular relation of inclusion between random sets,
with respect to which will be defined the fusion operators. We choose here to concentrate
on the s−ordering and on the associated notions of inclusion and of specialization, because
this ordering has a unifying characteristic when compared to the others, and seems the more
"natural" ordering within random set theory. See appendix C for more details about orderings
and inclusion notions of random sets. If the notion of convex sets on X makes sense, given
a random set (m,F ), we define its convex hull H ((m,F )) as the random set which have the
same bpa m, but where every focal element E ∈F is replaced by its convex hull H (E).
Given N random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N , we define a joint basic probability assignment
(bpa) m(1:N) defined on X
N as a joint distribution having mi, i = 1, . . . ,N for marginals, with
mi the bpa of the random set (m,F )i. That is, for all j ∈ 1, . . . ,N and i j ∈ {1, . . . , |℘(X )|},
m(1:N) is such that:
m(1:N)(·×Ei j) := ∑
i1,...,i j−1∈{1,...,|℘(X )|}
i j+1,...,iN∈{1,...,|℘(X )|}
m(1:N)(Ei1× . . .×Ei j × . . .×EiN ) = m j(Ei j) (4.7)
note that m(1:N) can receive positive mass only if Ei j is in F j for j = 1, . . . ,N.
Conjunction Given N random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N , a conjunction can be obtained by
the following procedure:
1. Build a joint bpa m(1:N) satisfying Equation (4.7).
2. Allocate each joint mass m(1:N)(×Nj=1E j) to the set ∩Nj=1E j, with E j ∈ F j for j =
1, . . . ,N.
Note that, in the above procedure, the empty set can have a non-null mass (when it is the case,
Property I of total consistency is not satisfied). The empty set is thus equivalent to a random
set where the empty set has a mass equal to one.
We noteM∩(1:N) the set of all possible bpa resulting from a conjunction of the marginal ran-
dom sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N , and (m,F )∩(1:N) a particular random set of M∩(1:N) . M∩(1:N)
can be characterized by four different situations:
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1. M∩(1:N) contains only normalized random sets, that is, for every (m,F )∩(1:N) ∈M∩(1:N) ,
m∩(1:N)( /0) = 0. It means that for all sets {E j| j = 1, . . . ,N, E j ∈F j}, we have ∩Nj=1E j 6=
/0. The random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N are then said to be logically consistent or
totally consistent
2. M∩(1:N) contains both subnormalized and normalized random sets. It means that there
are sets {E j| j = 1, . . . ,N, E j ∈F j} such that ∩Nj=1E j = /0, but that there are also some
random sets (m,F )∩(1:N) ∈M∩(1:N) such that m∩(1:N)( /0) = 0. In this case, Random sets
(m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N are said to be non-conflicting.
3. M∩(1:N) contains only subnormalized random sets. It means that all random sets (m,F )∩(1:N) ∈
M∩(1:N) are such that m∩(1:N)( /0) > 0. Random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N are then said
to be conflicting.
4. All random sets (m,F )∩(1:N) in M∩(1:N) are such that m∩(1:N)( /0) = 1. Random sets
(m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N are then said to be totally conflicting, and the associated setM∩(1:N)
is said to be empty.
We also say of conflicting and non-conflicting random sets that they are partially consistent, in
the sense that the result of a conjunctive combination of these random sets does not necessarily
satisfies the property of total consistency, but the joint bpa mass can be assigned to other sets
than the empty one.
If random sets are interpreted as hierarchical uncertainty representations where the 1st
order level models are credal sets modeling ignorance on focal sets and the 2nd order models
are precise probabilities, then a random set conjunction defined above comes down to build
a precise joint probability as 2nd order model while conjunctively merging the corresponding
1st order models with Equation (4.4). In this case, the joint precise probability at the 2nd level
is often interpreted as a convenient means to model the dependencies between sources.
If random sets are interpreted as 1st order imprecise probabilistic models, then the con-
junction defined above appears less justified, and using Equation (4.4) seems to be a better
choice (However, we’ll see in Section 4.1.3.5 that we can link this equation to M∩(1:N)).
One of the commonest combination rule used with random sets is obtained when bpa’s
m1, . . . ,mN are judged to be independent. We note by (m,F )⊙(1:N) the specific conjunc-
tive random set obtained with this assumption. We then have, for any collection of sets
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{E j| j = 1, . . . ,N, E j ∈F j}
m⊙(1:N)(∩Nj=1E j) =
N
∏
j=1
m j(E j). (4.8)
Where m⊙(1:N) is the bpa of (m,F )⊙(1:N) . The well known Dempster [57] combination rule can
then be retrieved by uniformly redistributing the mass m⊙(1:N)( /0) among focal sets E ∈F⊙(1:N)
of (m,F )⊙(1:N) , thus normalizing the conjunction result. We note (m,F )⊗(1:N) the random
set resulting from such a normalization. This makes the fusion result totally consistent, but if
m⊙(1:N)( /0)> 0, the belief measure associated to (m,F )⊗(1:N) no longer verifies Bel(m,F )⊗(1:N)
≥
maxi=1,...,N{Bel(m,F )i}, similarly to what happens in probability theory for the product aggre-
gation rule. Evenly distributing the mass m⊙(1:N)( /0) among focal sets is not the only way
of making the conjunction result totally consistent, and other authors have argued that other
normalization operators appear more reasonable in some cases (see Smets [188] for a recent
and critical survey). Most of the conjunctive combination rules proposed in the literature con-
sist in choosing a particular random set in M∩(1:N) , based on different rational arguments (for
example, Cattaneo [19] proposes to minimize first the conflict, that is the mass allocated to
the empty set, and then to maximize the imprecision, while Denoeux [61] uses a cautious
approach based on Smets [184] canonical decomposition).
Disjunction Given N random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N , a disjunction can be obtained by
the following procedure:
1. Build a joint bpa m(1:N) satisfying Equation 4.7.
2. Allocate each joint mass m(1:N)(×Nj=1E j) to the set ∪Nj=1E j, with E j ∈ F j for j =
1, . . . ,N.
We note M∪(1:N) the set of all possible bpa resulting from a disjunction of the marginal random
sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N , and (m,F )∪(1:N) a particular random set of M∪(1:N) .
Augustin [7] considers another possible disjunctive combination of random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N :
he proposes to take the convex hull of the union of all marginal bpas m1, . . . ,mN , and to con-
sider the resulting set of bpas as the result of the disjunction. This is equivalent to apply
Equation (4.5) to the credal sets induced by random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N .
Convex combination GivenN random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N and associated non-negative
weights λ1, . . . ,λN summing to one, the random set (m,F )∑(1:N) resulting from their convex
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Property Formulation Property Formulation
I Cons. mϕ(1:N)( /0) = 0 VII W-M-P (m,F )ϕ∩(1:N)
⊑s (m,F )ϕ(1:N)
II Ass. (m,F )ϕ(1:N)=ϕ((m,F )ϕ(1:N−1) ,(m,F )N) VIII S-M-P (m,F )ϕ∪(1:N)
⊑s (m,F )ϕ(1:N)
III Comm. (m,F )ϕ(1:N)=ϕ((m,F )σ(1),.,(m,F )σ(N)) IX Recon. {(m,F )ϕ(1:N)}∪{(m,F )i|i ∈ K}
are not tot. conflict. ∀K
IV Idem. ϕ((m,F ),(m,F )) = (m,F ) X InsIgn. ϕ((m,F )ϕ(1:N) ,(m,F )N+1)=(m,F )ϕ(1:N)
if (m,F )ϕ∩(1:N)
⊑s (m,F )N+1
V W-Z-P (m,F )ϕ(1:N) ⊑s (m,F )ϕ∪(1:N) XI Conv. (m,F )ϕ(1:N) = H ((m,F )ϕ(1:N))
VI S-Z-P (m,F )ϕ(1:N) ⊑s (m,F )ϕ∩(1:N) XII Robus. d((m,F )ϕ(1:N),(m,F )
′
ϕ(1:N)
)→ 0
as d((m,F )i,(m,F )
′
i)→ 0
with (m,F )′ϕ(1:N)=ϕ((m,F )
′
1,.,(m,F )
′
N)
Table 4.2: Properties of Section 4.1.2 for random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N with
ϕ the fusion operator, (m,F )ϕ(1:i) = ϕ((m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )i), mϕ(1:i) and Fϕ(1:i) the
associated bpa and focal sets (ϕ∩ and ϕ∪ denote the conjunction and disjunction as-
sociated to mϕ(1:i)). K ⊆ JNK denote any maximal subset such that M∩K is non-empty
(i.e., random sets {(m,F )i|i ∈ I} are not totally conflicting), and d a distance measure
between random sets [125].
combination has a bpa m∑(1:N) which, for every subset E ⊆X , has value
m∑(1:N)(E) =
N
∑
i=1
λimi(E). (4.9)
Table 4.2 summarizes how properties of Section 4.2 particularize to the case of random sets
and the notion of inclusion associated to s-ordering. ϕ consists here of building a joint bpa
m(1:N) and then to distribute the mass m(1:N)(×Nj=1E j) among combinations of conjunctions
and disjunctions of sets E j, with E j ∈F j for j = 1, . . . ,N. ϕ∩ and ϕ∪ denote the conjunction
and disjunction associated to the joint bpa obtained by the ϕ operator.
4.1.3.4 Possibility theory
We consider that information delivered by theN sources is modeled by possibility distributions
pi1, . . . ,piN on a domain X . Recall that a distribution pi1 is said to be included in another
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distribution pi2 (pi1 ⊆ pi2) if pi2 ≥ pi1. Given a possibility distribution pi and its α-cuts piα , its
convex hull H (pi) is obtained by taking the convex hull of each α-cut, that is H (pi)α =
H (piα) for any α ∈ [0,1] (provided the convex hull of an α-cut is defined). The empty set
is here equivalent to pi(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X . Given a set of possibility distributions, their
respective cores (i.e. level 1 α-cut) and supports (i.e. level 0 α-cut), they are said to be:
totally conflicting if the intersection of their supports is empty; partially conflicting or partially
consistent if the intersection of their supports and cores are respectively non-empty and empty;
totally consistent if the intersection of their cores is non-empty.
Conjunction Given N possibility distributions pi1, . . . ,piN , their usual conjunction is given,
for all x ∈X , by
pi⊤(1:N)(x) =⊤i=1,...,Npii(x) (4.10)
where ⊤ is a triangular norm [127], or t-norm for short. A t-norm is a function ⊤ : [0,1]×
[0,1] → [0,1] that is associative, commutative, non-decreasing in each variable and has 1
as identity element (i.e., ⊤(x,1) = x). The most commonly used t-norms are the minimum
and the product. The minimum is the largest point-wise t-norm and the only one to possess
the idempotence property, making it the most conservative (and, therefore, cautious) con-
junctive operator in possibility theory. The product is often associated to an assumption of
independence between sources. Note that distributions pi1, . . . ,piN are totally conflict, par-
tially consistent and totally consistent when and only when pimin(1:N) is respectively such that:
pimin(1:N)(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X ; pimin(1:N) < 1 and is positive for at least one element x ∈ X ;
pimin(1:N)(x) = 1 for at least one element x ∈X .
Disjunction Given N possibility distributions pi1, . . . ,piN , their usual disjunction is given, for
all x ∈X , by
pi⊥(1:N)(x) =⊥i=1,...,Npii(x) (4.11)
where ⊥ is a triangular conorm, or t-conorm for short. A t-conorm is a function ⊥ : [0,1]×
[0,1]→ [0,1] that is associative, commutative, non-decreasing in each variable and has 0 as
identity element (i.e., ⊥(x,0) = x). T-conorms are dual to t-norms, in the sense that, to any
t-norm ⊤ can be associated its complementary t-conorm ⊥ such that
⊥(x,y) = 1−⊤(1− x,1− y) (4.12)
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and conversely, to any t-conorm is associated its dual t-norm. The most commonly used t-
conorm is the maximum t-conorm, which is the smallest point-wise t-conorm, the dual of the
minimum t-norm and the only t-conorm to possess the idempotence property.
Convex Combination GivenN possibility distributions pi1, . . . ,piN and associated non-negative
weights λ1, . . . ,λN summing up to one, the possibility distribution pi∑(1:N) resulting from their
convex combination is given, for every value x⊆X by
pi∑(1:N)(x) =
N
∑
i=1
λipii(x). (4.13)
Table 4.3 summarizes how properties of Section 4.1.2 particularize to the case of possi-
bility distributions (most formulations are equivalent to those given by Oussalah [161]). For
the robustness property, we consider the distance between two possibility distributions pi1,pi2
given by
1− ∑x∈X min(pi1(x),pi2(x))
∑x∈X max(pi1(x),pi2(x))
(4.14)
and, when X is continuous, sums simply become integrals. Note that this distance is based
on a similarity measure considered by Pappis and Karacapilidis [164] for fuzzy sets, and also
reduce to the Jacquard index when possibility distributions model classical sets.
4.1.3.5 Links between basic rules
In this section, we recall some of the links existing between the basic fusion rules of each
uncertainty theories.
Possibility distributions and random set theory First, recall that, given a random set
(m,F ) defined over a space X , its contour function is given by the values Pl({x}) for all
elements x ∈X . This contour function is formally equivalent to a fuzzy set, which is normal-
ized if and only if there is an element x ∈X that is in every focal set of (m,F ).
Now, if pi1,pi2 are two possibility distributions, and (m,F )pi1,(m,F )pi2 the corresponding
random sets with nested focal sets, then Dubois and Yager [101] show that the random sets
(m,F )pimin and (m,F )pimax with nested focal sets corresponding to the possibility distributions
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Property Formulation Property Formulation
I Cons. ∃x ∈X s.t. piϕ(1:N) = 1 VII W-M-P piϕ(1:N) ≥ pimin(1:N)
II Ass. piϕ(1:N) = ϕ(piϕ(1:N−1),piN) VIII S-M-P piϕ(1:N) ≥ pimax(1:N)
III Comm. piϕ(1:N) = ϕ(piσ(1), .,piσ(N)) IX Recon. ∀K, min(piϕ(1:N),mini∈K pii) 6= /0
IV Idem. ϕ(pi,pi) = pi X InsIgn. ϕ(piϕ(1:N),piN+1) = piϕ(1:N)
if piN+1 ≥ piϕ(1:N)
V W-Z-P piϕ(1:N) ≤ pimax(1:N) XI Conv. piϕ(1:N) = H (piϕ(1:N))
VI S-Z-P piϕ(1:N) ≤ pimin(1:N) XII Robus. d(piϕ(1:N),pi ′ϕ(1:N))→ 0 as d(pii,pi ′i )→ 0
with pi ′ϕ(1:N) = ϕ(pi
′
1, .,pi
′
N)
Table 4.3: Properties of Section 4.1.2 for possibility distributions pi1, . . . ,piN with ϕ
the fusion operator, piϕ(1:i) = ϕ(pi1, . . . ,pii). K ⊆ JNK denote any maximal subset such
that mini∈K pii 6= /0, and d the distance measure between possibility distributions given
by Equation (4.14).
pimin(1:2) and pimax(1:2) can be obtained in the following way:
• Let {0 = γ0 < γ1 < .. . < γM} be the set of all distinct values taken by pi1,pi2 over X .
• Build a joint bpa mpi(1:2) such that m(Eγ i,pi1 ×Eγ i,pi2) = γi+1− γi for all i = 0, . . . ,M−1,
with Eγ i,pi j the strong γi-cut of distribution pi j.
• To get pimin(1:2) ,pimax(1:2) , consider respectively the conjunctive and disjunctive allocation
of mpi(1:2) .
In other words, the minimum t-norm and maximum t-conorm in possibility theory are equiv-
alent to consider random set conjunctions and disjunctions with a complete (positive) correla-
tion between α-cuts. The extension toN possibility distributions follows from the associativity
and commutativity of t-norms and t-conorms. Note that it is generally possible to find a con-
junctively fused random set (m,F )∩(1:2) built from (m,F )pi1,(m,F )pi2 that is different from
(m,F )pimin and still has pimin(1:2) as its contour function. In this latter case, (m,F )∩(1:2) is not
equivalent to the nested random set induced by pimin, and we have (m,F )pimin ⊑Pl (m,F )∩(1:2)
Dubois and Yager [101] also relate different specific joint bpa whose conjunctive or dis-
junctive allocations allow to retrieve a contour function having the same values as the applica-
tion of other t-norms or t-conorms. In this latter case, some information is lost when restricting
to the contour function. For instance, the contour function of the random set (m,F )⊙(1:N) cor-
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responding to the product of marginal bpas is the same as the possibility distribution pi∏(1:N) ob-
tained with the product t-norm, but we have (m,F )pi∏(1:N)
⊑Pl (m,F )⊙(1:N) , with (m,F )pi∏(1:N)
the random set with nested focal sets induced by pi∏(1:N) . See Dubois and Yager [101] for an
ampler discussion. A similar result holds for the convex combination: given N random sets
(m,F )pi1, . . . ,(m,F )piN induced by N possibility distributions pi1, . . . ,piN and non-negative
weights λ1, . . . ,λN , the contour function of the random set (m,F )∑(1:N) is equal to the possi-
bility distribution pi∑(1:N) (this is simply due to the fact that Pl∑(1:N)({x}) = ∑Ni=1λiPli({x}) for
every x ∈X ), and we still have (m,F )pi∑(1:N) ⊑Pl (m,F )∑(1:N) , with (m,F )pi∑(1:N) the random
set with nested focal sets induced by pi∑(1:N) .
Possibility distributions and credal sets Recall that, given two possibility distributions
pi1,pi2 defined on a space X , the induced credal sets Ppi1,Ppi2 are such that Ppi1 ⊆Ppi2 if
and only if pi1 ≤ pi2.
Some elements of comparison between possibilistic conjunction and credal sets conjunc-
tion are already given in Section 3.3.2.2. Given N possibility distributions pi1, . . . ,piN and the
respective induced credal sets Ppi1, . . . ,PpiN , we have Ppimin(1:N) ⊆
⋂N
i=1Ppii [88]. This is
also true if min is replaced by any other t-norms, since min is the largest possible t-norm. A
sufficient condition to have Ppimin(1:N) =
⋂N
i=1Ppii will be given in Section 4.1.3.6.
Regarding disjunction, the credal set Ppimax(1:N) induced by the possibility distribution
pimax(1:N) is the tightest credal set induced by a lower coherent probability such thatH (
⋃N
i=1Ppii)⊆
Ppimax(1:N)
. This is due to the maxitivity property of possibility measures. As for random sets,
one could relate a credal set resulting from disjunction, conjunction and convex combination
to the contour function induced by this credal set, which would be given by the values P({x})
for all x ∈X . Studying those relations remains an open problem.
Random sets and credal sets We consider N random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N defined
over the space X and the induced credal sets P(m,F )1, . . . ,P(m,F )N . It has been showed by
Chateauneuf [21] that, in general, the conjunction of credal sets P∩(m,F )(1:N) =
⋂N
i=1P(m,F )i
is no longer representable by a random set, and does not coincide with a conjunctively fused
random set built from (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N . Chateauneuf [21] also shows that the credal
set P∩(m,F )(1:N) is equivalent to the set of all normalized random sets (m( /0) = 0) that are in
M∩(1:N) .
Relating random set disjunction with the credal set P∪(m,F )(1:N) = H (
⋃N
i=1P(m,F )i
) cor-
responding to the convex hull of the disjunction of credal sets P(m,F )1, . . . ,P(m,F )N is more
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difficult. On the one hand, it is known that the coherent lower probability of P∪(m,F )(1:N) is
not in general an ∞-monotone capacity, and thus will not be induced by an equivalent ran-
dom set. On the other hand, the set M∪(1:N) of all disjunctively fused random sets does not
seem to be related to P∪(m,F )(1:N) . To see this, simply consider the case where X = {x1,x2}
and where two sources provide the uniform probability as their opinion: P∪(m,F )(1:2) will be
the uniform probability, while the random set such that m(X ) = 1 will be in M∪(1:2) (i.e.
ignorance on X ). Credal set disjunction can nevertheless be related to Augustin [7] proposi-
tion recalled in Section 4.1.3.3, since considering the convex hull H (
⋃N
i=1mi) of all bpas of
(m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N is equivalent to P∪(m,F )(1:N) .
The relation between the convex combinations of random sets (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N and
of the induced credal sets P(m,F )1, . . . ,P(m,F )N is more direct. If λ1, . . . ,λN are the non-
negative weights summing to one associated to the sources, then the random set (m,F )
∑(1:N)
resulting from the convex combination is the random set inducing the credal set P∑(1:N) .
These relations and the previous sections show that, although there exist some congru-
encies between basic fusion rules of each uncertainty theories, results will in general not be
directly related.
4.1.3.6 Fusion rules for clouds
Let [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N be N clouds defined over a space X and modeling sources uncertainty.
Due to their relationships with possibility distributions (Property 3.10), it seems natural to
define their basic fusion rules as follows:
• Conjunction: we define the conjunction [pi,δ ]∩ of the clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N as
[pi,δ ]∩(1:N) = [pi∩(1:N),δ∩(1:N)] = [
N
min
i=1
(pii),
N
max
i=1
(δi)]. (4.15)
Note that this conjunction is different from the one usually considered for Interval-
Valued Fuzzy Sets. Nevertheless, it is coherent with the fact that conjunctive fusion
operators should reduce uncertainty (in the sense that P[pi,δ ]∩(1:N)
⊆P[pi,δ ]i for any i ∈
JNK), and also with the notion of conjunction used with bipolar information [15].
• Disjunction: we define the disjunction [pi,δ ]∪ of the clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N as
[pi,δ ]∪(1:N) = [pi∪(1:N),δ∪(1:N)] = [
N
max
i=1
(pii),
N
min
i=1
(δi)] (4.16)
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• Convex combination: given non-negative weights λ1, . . . ,λN summing up to one and
associated to sources, we define the convex combination of the clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N
as
[pi,δ ]
∑(1:N)
= [pi∑(1:N),δ∑(1:N)] = [
N
∑
i=1
λipii,
N
∑
i=1
λiδi] (4.17)
These operations still result in clouds, even if conjunction and convex combination may re-
sult in clouds that do not satisfy the boundary conditions usually associated to clouds (i.e.,
the existence of elements x and y in X such that δ (x) = 0 and pi(y) = 1, see Section 3.3).
Satisfying these boundary conditions corresponds to satisfying coherence (Property I of Sec-
tion 4.1.2). The conjunction is said to be empty if the resulting cloud [pi,δ ]∩(1:N) is such that,
for at least one element x ∈X , we have pi∩(1:N)(x) < δ∩(1:N)(x). Note that, even if all clouds
[pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N are comonotonic (see Section 3.3.3), then there is no guarantee that the
clouds resulting from one of the above operations will still be comonotonic. The next propo-
sition indicates a sufficient condition for the resulting clouds to be comonotonic.
Proposition 4.1. Consider N clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N whose mappings {δi,pii|i = 1, . . . ,N}
are all comonotonic. Let≤[F ,F ](1:N) be the coarsest pre-order on X refining all the pre-orders
≤[F ,F ]1, . . . ,≤[F ,F ]N respectively induced by clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N . Then, the following
clouds:
[pi,δ ]∩(1:N) = [pi∩(1:N),δ∩(1:N)] = [
N
min
i=1
(pii),
N
max
i=1
(δi)] (4.18)
[pi,δ ]∪(1:N) = [pi∪(1:N),δ∪(1:N)] = [
N
max
i=1
(pii),
N
min
i=1
(δi)] (4.19)
[pi,δ ]
∑(1:N)
= [pi∑(1:N),δ∑(1:N)] = [
N
∑
i=1
λipii,
N
∑
i=1
λiδi] (4.20)
are comonotonic and induce the pre-order ≤[F ,F ](1:N) on X .
Proof. The fact that all mappings {δi,pii|i = 1, . . . ,N} are comonotonic ensures that there exist
a coarsest pre-order ≤[F ,F ](1:N) on X refining all the pre-orders ≤[F ,F ]1, . . . ,≤[F ,F ]N .
Now, let us consider the pre-order ≤[F ,F ](1:N) and any pair of elements x and y in X such
that x≤[F ,F ](1:N)y. This means that δi(x)≤ δi(y) and pii(x)≤ pii(y) for all i = 1, . . . ,N.
Due to the monotonic property of t-norms and t-conorms, and in particular of minimum
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and maximum, we have the following inequalities:
N
min
i=1
(pii(x))≤
N
min
i=1
(pii(y))
N
max
i=1
(δi(x))≤ Nmax
i=1
(δi(y))
N
max
i=1
(pii(x))≤ Nmax
i=1
(pii(y))
N
min
i=1
(δi(x))≤
N
min
i=1
(δi(y))
therefore, the respective pre-orders ≤[F ,F ]∩(1:N) and ≤[F ,F ]∪(1:N) induced by clouds [pi,δ ]∩(1:N)
and [pi,δ ]∪(1:N) are also such that x≤[F ,F ]∩(1:N)y and x≤[F ,F ]∪(1:N)y. Since this is true for every
possible pair of elements x,y ∈X , it follows that ≤[F ,F ](1:N), ≤[F ,F ]∩(1:N) and ≤[F ,F ]∪(1:N) are
the same pre-orders. The same holds for the cloud [pi,δ ]
∑(1:N)
, since the arithmetic weighted
mean is also a monotone operation.
We now study relationships between basic fusion rules for clouds and the other uncertainty
theories.
Relations with possibility theory. Clouds conjunctions, disjunctions and convex combina-
tion are respectively equivalent to applying the minimum t-norm, maximum t-conorm and
arithmetic weighted mean separately to possibility distributions pi1, . . . ,piN and 1−δ1, . . . ,1−
δN and then to consider the associated cloud.
In this spirit, an obvious generalization of the conjunction and disjunction of clouds would
be to consider a t-norm ⊤ and its dual t-conorm ⊥ and then to respectively define the associ-
ated conjunctively and disjunctively fused clouds [pi,δ ]⊤(1:N), [pi,δ ]⊥(1:N) as:
[pi,δ ]⊤(1:N) = [pi⊤(1:N),δ⊤(1:N)] = [⊤
N
i=1(pii),⊥Ni=1(δi)] (4.21)
[pi,δ ]⊥(1:N) = [pi⊥(1:N),δ⊥(1:N)] = [⊥
N
i=1(pii),⊤Ni=1(δi)] (4.22)
and, by Equation (4.12), above conjunction and disjunction are respectively equivalent to ap-
ply ⊤ and ⊥ separately to possibility distributions pi1, . . . ,piN and 1−δ1, . . . ,1−δN , and then
to consider the associated cloud. Note that such operations are totally consistent with possi-
bility theory, since when clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N are fuzzy (δi = 0, i = 1, . . . ,N), then we
retrieve the usual conjunctions, disjunctions and convex combinations of possibility distri-
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butions pi1, . . . ,piN . The above equations are still coherent with fusion operators defined in
bipolar possibility theory [15]. Also, since t-norms and t-conorms are monotonic operators,
Property 4.1 still holds for any [pi,δ ]⊤(1:N), [pi,δ ]⊥(1:N) .
Relations with random set theory. Recall that if all clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N are comono-
tone but induce non-compatible orderings ≤[F ,F ]1, . . . ,≤[F ,F ]N (i.e., each pair of mappings
[pi,δ ]i, i = 1, . . . ,N is comonotone, but two mappings pii,pi j, j 6= i can be non-comonotone),
the clouds [pi,δ ]∩(1:N), [pi,δ ]∪(1:N), [pi,δ ]∑(1:N) resulting from conjunction, disjunction and con-
vex combination will not forcefully be comonotone. Since most non-comonotonic clouds
cannot be represented by an equivalent random set (Proposition 3.13), there is no direct re-
lationships between clouds fusion rules and random set fusion rules that always hold. Nev-
ertheless, when comonotonic clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N satisfy Proposition 4.1, we have the
following relation
Proposition 4.2. Consider N clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N satisfying the conditions of Proposi-
tion 4.1, and≤[F ,F ](1:N) the pre-order induced from [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N . Let 0= γ0< γ1< .. . <
γM = 1 be the distinct values taken by [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N , and Ei, j the set given by Equation
(3.39) for cloud [pi,δ ]i. We note (m,F )[pi,δ ]i
,(m,F )[pi,δ ]∩(1:N)
and (m,F )[pi,δ ]∪(1:N)
the ran-
dom sets respectively induced by the clouds [pi,δ ]i, [pi,δ ]∩(1:N) and [pi,δ ]∪(1:N) . Then, clouds
[pi,δ ]∩(1:N) and [pi,δ ]∪(1:N) can be built in the following way:
• Build a joint bpa m[pi,δ ](1:N) such that m(E1, j× . . .×EN, j) = γ j−γ j−1 for all j = 1, . . . ,M
• The random sets (m,F )[pi,δ ]∩(1:N) , (m,F )[pi,δ ]∪(1:N) induced by [pi,δ ]∩(1:N) , [pi,δ ]∪(1:N)
can respectively be retrieved by taking the conjunctive and disjunctive allocation of
m[pi,δ ](1:N) .
Proof. Given the cloud [pi,δ ]i, we note pi i the distribution 1− δi. We also note (m,F )pii and
(m,F )pi i the following random sets: Epii, j = {x ∈X |pii(x)≥ γ j}m(Epii, j) = γ j− γ j−1
 Epi i, j = {x ∈X |pi i(x)≥ 1− γ j−1}m(Epi i, j) = γ j− γ j−1
Note that (m,F )pii , (m,F )pi i are the random sets induced by the possibility distributions pii,pi i
and are given by Equation (3.17).
We will only provide the proof for the conjunction, the proof for the disjunction being
similar. First, let us consider the cloud [pi,δ ]∩(1:N) resulting from the conjunction. The random
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set (m,F )[pi,δ ]∩(1:N)
induced by this cloud (which is comonotonic, by Proposition 4.1) reads,
for j = 1, . . . ,M: E[pi,δ ]∩, j = {x ∈X |(mini=1,...,N pii(x))≥ γ j∧ (maxi=1,...,N δi(x)) < γ j}m(E[pi,δ ]∩, j) = γ j− γ j−1
with E[pi,δ ]∩, j the focal sets and m(E[pi,δ ]∩, j) its mass. Given an index j, we have the following
equalities:
E[pi,δ ]∩, j = {x ∈X |
(
min
i=1,...,N
(pii(x))
)
≥ γ j∧
(
max
i=1,...,N
(δi(x))
)
< γ j}
= {x ∈X |
(
min
i=1,...,N
(pii(x))
)
≥ γ j}∩{x ∈X |
(
max
i=1,...,N
(δi(x))
)
≤ γ j−1}
= {x ∈X |
(
min
i=1,...,N
(pii(x))
)
≥ γ j}∩{x ∈X |
(
min
i=1,...,N
(pi i(x))
)
≥ 1− γ j−1}
and by using the relation between the minimum in possibility theory and random sets (see
Section 4.1.3.5),
=
( ⋂
i=1,...,N
{x ∈X |pii(x)≥ γ j}
)
∩
( ⋂
i=1,...,N
{x ∈X |pi i(x)≥ 1− γ j−1}
)
=
⋂
i=1,...,N
({x ∈X |pii(x)≥ γ j}∩{x ∈X |1−δi(x) > 1− γ j})
=
⋂
i=1,...,N
{x ∈X |pii(x)≥ γ j∧δi(x) < γ j}
and, since Ei, j = {x ∈X |pii(x)≥ γ j∧δi(x) < γ j}, this finishes the proof.
Proposition 4.2 is similar to the link between possibilistic conjunction and random set con-
junction. It also comes down to consider random set conjunctive and disjunctive allocations,
while assuming a complete correlation between α-cuts, and in the case of fuzzy clouds, we re-
trieve the result of Dubois and Yager [101]. Note that, if clouds do not satisfy Proposition 4.1,
then the procedure described in Proposition 4.2 give the random sets inner approximating
[pi,δ ]∩(1:N) , [pi,δ ]∪(1:N) (see Proposition 3.14).
Relations with credal sets. As for possibility theory, clouds resulting from the conjunction
and disjunction generally induce respectively smaller and larger credal sets than the credal set
conjunction and disjunction. This is formalized by the next proposition
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Proposition 4.3. LetP[pi,δ ]1 , . . . ,P[pi,δ ]N be the credal sets induced by the clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N ,
we then have the following relationships with clouds [pi,δ ]∩(1:N) , [pi,δ ]∪(1:N):
P[pi,δ ]∩(1:N)
⊆
N⋂
i=1
P[pi,δ ]i
P[pi,δ ]∪(1:N)
⊇H
(
N⋃
i=1
P[pi,δ ]i
)
and the first inclusion is turned into an equality if clouds [pi,δ ]1, . . . , [pi,δ ]N satisfy Proposi-
tion 4.1
Proof. By Proposition 3.10, we have P[pi,δ ]∩(1:N)
= Ppimin(1:N)
∩Ppimin(1:N) , with pi i = 1− δi.
Since Ppimin(1:N) ⊆
⋂N
i=1Ppii , and likewise for possibility distributions pi i, this gives
(
P[pi,δ ]∩(1:N)
)
=
(
Ppimin(1:N)
∩Ppimin(1:N)
)
⊆
(
N⋂
i=1
Ppii ∩
N⋂
i=1
Ppi i
)
=
(
N⋂
i=1
P[pi,δ ]i
)
and we have the inclusion relationship between conjunction. The inclusion between disjunc-
tions can be proved likewise, since Ppimax(1:N) ⊇H (
⋃N
i=1Ppii).
Now let’s turn to the case where all mappings {δi,pii|i = 1, . . . ,N} are comonotonic (clouds
satisfying the conditions of Proposition 4.1). In this case, this means that every cloud [pi,δ ]i
can be mapped into an equivalent generalized p-box inducing the pre-order ≤[F ,F ](1:N) and
defined on a same collection /0⊂A1⊆ . . .⊆A|X | = X of nested sets, with |X | the cardinality
of X . These N generalized p-boxes correspond to N collection of constraints corresponding
to Equations (3.20):
i = 1, . . . , |X | j = 1, . . . ,N αi, j ≤ P(Ai)≤ βi, j
with αi, j,βi, j respectively the lower and upper bounds on the probability of Ai induced by the
cloud [pi,δ ] j. Since all the constraints are defined on the same collection of nested subsets,
their conjunction is given by the |X | constraints:
i = 1, . . . , |X | max
j=1,...,N
(αi, j)≤ P(Ai)≤ min
j=1,...,N
(βi, j)
which are equivalent to the cloud [pi,δ ]∩(1:N) , and also to
⋂N
i=1P[pi,δ ]i
. This shows the equality.
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And from this proposition, we can derive the following corollaries, of practical importance:
Corollary 4.4. Let pi1, . . . ,piN be N possibility distributions defined on X such that pi1, . . . ,piN
are comonotone. Then, we have
Ppimin(1:N)
=
N⋂
i=1
Ppii
Corollary 4.5. Let [F ,F ]1, . . . , [F ,F ]N be N usual p-boxes defined on the real line R. Let
[F ,F ]∩(1:N) denote the p-box [maxi=1,...,N(F i),mini=1,...,N(F i)] Then, we have
P[F ,F ]∩(1:N)
=
N⋂
i=1
P[F ,F ]i
The above corollaries and propositions confirm that the comonotonicity property is very
appealing, both for theoretical and practical reasons. It reinforces the idea that comonotonic
clouds are likely to be more useful that their non-comonotonic counterparts. Above properties
also suggest that multiple clouds should be elicited by considering a common ordering on the
space X , and that when extracting clouds from credal sets (for instance, by Algorithm 2), one
should preferably always consider the same ordering of elements.
4.2 Treating the conflict by adaptive rules using maximal
coherent subsets
In this section, we address the problem of dealing with partially conflicting information. In
such cases, neither conjunctive nor disjunctive fusion operators will provide satisfactory re-
sults, the former resulting in poorly reliable representations, and the latter in very imprecise
results.
As said in Section 4.1.1, trade-off operators can be used to provide a result between the
conjunction and the disjunction, with the aim to balance gain and reliability of information.
In most cases, the classical convex combination is used. However, it is in general not easy
to determine meaningful weights λ1, . . . ,λN (we will suggest some methods to do so in Sec-
tion 4.4). Moreover, when sources provide information concerning an observable parameter
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or a variable whose exact value is unknown, convex combinations can be criticized on the
basis that they are voting-like procedures, and that their result could promote values that none
sources judged plausible at first, an undesirable feature when modelling uncertainty about
physical variables. Thus, convex combination seems more fitted to the cases where sources
express preferences or utilities, and when a consensus has to be reached (in which case previ-
ous criticisms are no longer relevant).
There are other non-adaptive trade-off operators representing alternatives to convex com-
bination: they include (among others) mean operators satisfying Equation (4.1)) and ordered
weighted averaging operators introduced by Yager [213, 215]. Yet, such operators and convex
combination often suffer from the same defects. Also, it is not always clear when to choose
one operator rather than another one (when an important amount of data is available, it is
possible to choose the operator by some training process, so that it best-fits the situation).
Also, these operators always behave in the same way, irrespectively of the amount of conflict
between information.
Adaptive rules are other trade-off operators, whose behavior depend on the amount of
conflict in the information. They range from a conjunctive behavior (total consistency) to a
disjunctive behavior (total conflict). In-between, they act as trade-off operators. They often
consist in combination of disjunctive and conjunctive operators. Adaptive rules are particu-
larly well suited when no specific knowledge is available about the sources (e.g., reliability)
and when choosing a particular non-adaptive operator appears difficult. A typical example
is when multiple experts whose reliability is unknown provide opinions about the value of a
variable. Although conceptually attractive, such rules often require more computational effort
than the other operators. Also, since their behavior depends on the global amount of inconsis-
tency in the information, they usually do not satisfy Associativity (Property II), which means
that all the sources have to be considered at once, and that no step-by-step computations are
possible.
So far, trade-off operators other than classical convex combination have mainly been stud-
ied in the framework of possibility theory [162, 56, 215, 93]. Only few works study such
operators in the framework of imprecise probability theory [154, 202], in which propositions
to cope with partially conflicting information often considers second-order models [157, 194,
129]. Similarly, using trade-off operators outside convex combination to deal with partially
conflicting information is seldom considered in random set theory, where most propositions
to deal with partially consistent information consist in normalization procedures redistribut-
ing the mass associated to the empty set among other sets after a conjunctive fusion (see
Smets [188] for a thorough and critical review). Note that although the Dubois and Prade [84]
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rule is often seen as such a redistribution, it can also be interpreted as an adaptive trade-off op-
erator, where pairs of focal sets are conjunctively allocated if their intersection is non-empty,
and disjunctively allocated otherwise. In short, there exist a lot of rules that tries to cope with
conflict, and it is often not clear which one should be chosen in a particular application. In
this work, we propose to use fusion rules based on the notion of maximal coherent subsets,
originating from logic [173]. As we shall see, this notion is conceptually simple, attractive and
has many interesting properties, but can be limited by the computational burden associated to
it.
4.2.1 Maximal coherent subsets (MCS) rule: basic methodology
Using MCS to fuse information is an attractive concept, since using MCS precisely aims at
gaining a maximal amount of information while remaining coherent with all the information
sources. It is a natural way to cope with the (somewhat "opposed") main objectives pursued
by the general problem of information fusion. Given N sources, fusion rule based on MCS
consist in applying conjunctive operator(s) inside subsets of sources that are consistent and
then disjunctive operator(s) across these subgroups. It is thus an adaptive rule, since conjunc-
tive and disjunctive behaviors are retrieved respectively when the N sources are all consistent
or totally conflicting with each others.
4.2.1.1 MCS in imprecise probability theories.
We first study generic fusion rules applying the notion of maximal coherent subset in the
different theories of uncertainty.
MCS with credal sets Let P1, . . . ,PN be N credal sets modeling the source information.
K ⊂ JNK is a MCS if it is such that ∩i∈KPi 6= /0 and if it is maximal with this property. Let
K1, . . . ,Kk be the MCS of the N credal sets. The MCS fusion rule resulting in the credal set
PMCS(1:N) is defined as:
PMCS(1:N) = H
 k⋃
j=1
⋂
i∈K j
Pi
 (4.23)
the credal set PMCS(1:N) generally fails Properties of associativity II, strong zero preserva-
tion VI, strong maximal plausibility VIII and robustness XII and satisfies all the other prop-
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erties of Section 4.1.2 (see Table 4.1). The MCS rule giving PMCS(1:N) , as well as some vari-
ations have been studied by Walley [202]. It satisfies all the properties that he regards as de-
sirable, but he points out the fact that, in some situations, the failing of robustness (Prop. XII)
for this particular rule can be problematic.
The notion of maximal coherent subsets is also used in other works done in the framework
of imprecise probabilities, although it is not mentioned explicitly: the result of the aggrega-
tion procedure proposed by Troffaes [194] can be seen as a convex combination of maximal
coherent subsets of credal sets, and Moral and Sagrado [154] use maximal coherent subsets as
a step in their fusion procedure.
MCS with random sets Let (m,F )1, . . . ,(m,F )N be N random sets modeling the source
information. A random set (m,F )MCS(1:N) resulting from the application of the MCS rule is
given by the following steps:
1. Build a joint bpa m(1:N) satisfying Equation (4.7).
2. For each joint mass m(1:N)(×Ni=1Ei), K ⊂ JNK is a MCS if it such that ∩i∈KEi 6= /0 and if
it is maximal with this property. Let K1, . . . ,Kk be the MCS for this joint mass.
3. Allocate the joint mass m(1:N)(×Ni=1Ei) to the set
⋃k
j=1
⋂
i∈K j Ei, with Ei ∈ Fi for i =
1, . . . ,N.
Again, it can be checked that (m,F )MCS(1:N) generally fails Properties of associativity II,
strong zero preservation VI, strong maximal plausibility VIII, robustness XII and convex-
ity XI (which can be satisfied by taking the convex hull of (m,F )MCS(1:N)). That it satisfies
Property of idempotence IV depends on how the joint bpa is built, and it satisfies all the other
properties of Section 4.1.2 (see Table 4.2). If m(1:N)(×Ni=1Ei) = ∏Ni=1mi(Ei) and N = 2, then
we retrieve Dubois and Prade rule of combination [84].
As an application of the notion of maximal coherent subset in random set theory, we can
mention the work of Ayoun and Smets [8], who considers MCS not on focal elements, but
on sources (i.e., they divide sources in consistent subgroups, since in the application sources
potentially consider different objects).
MCS with possibility distributions Let pi1, . . . ,piN be the N possibility distributions mod-
eling the source information. K ⊂ JNK is a MCS if it is such that mini∈K pii 6= /0 and if it is
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maximal with this property. The possibility distribution piMCS(1:N) resulting from the applica-
tion of the MCS fusion rule is:
piMCS(1:N) =
k
max
j=1
min
i∈K j
pii (4.24)
With K j the different MCS. Again, it can be checked that piMCS(1:N) generally fails Properties of
associativity II, strong zero preservation VI, strong maximal plausibility VIII , robustness XII
and convexity XI (which can be satisfied by taking the convex hull of piMCS(1:N)). It satisfies
all the other properties of Section 4.1.2 (see Table 4.3). In the above rule, operators min
and max can be replaced respectively by any t-norm and its dual t-conorm, but Property of
idempotence IV would not be satisfied anymore.
4.2.1.2 Maximal coherent subsets (MCS) in practice.
The above rules have the advantages that they try to gain a maximal amount of information
while taking account of all sources. They also need a minimal amount of information about
these sources: in possibility theory and imprecise probability theory, both Equations (4.24)
and (4.23) are parameters free, and can be applied with only the source information.
Within random set theory, applying theMCS fusion rule requires to build a joint bpa, which
implies making some assumptions on the interactions existing between sources. In absence
of such information, a cautious approach following the least-commitment principle (LCP) can
be adopted.
As conceptually attractive and elegant as it may be, applying a fusion rule based on MCS
usually requires an important computational effort, which is an important drawback in practi-
cal applications where calculation time is a critical issue or where information is provided by
a lot of sources. Similarly to logic, extracting coherent subsets from arbitrary spaces is of ex-
ponential complexity (actually, the problem is NP-complete, see for example Malouf [140]),
and this complexity adds up to the complexity of applying conjunctive and disjunctive fusion
rules in the considered theory.
To reduce this complexity and increase the tractability of MCS based methods, one can ei-
ther build algorithms providing approximate solutions that converge to the true solution (e.g.
by using MCMC like methods [210]), or use MCS methods in a restricted framework in which
computations are easier to achieve. In the next section, we adopt the second solution, by study-
ing a MCS method that applies to information modeled by convex possibility distributions on
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the real line. Although restrictive, this framework is likely to be useful in many real-life ap-
plications, where variables and parameters take real values and where possibility distributions
model a limited amount of information.
4.2.2 Level-wise MCS on the real line with possibility distributions
In this section, we consider the case where the information provided by the N sources concerns
a variable X taking its value on the real line R and can be modeled by N convex possibility
distributions pii, i = 1, . . . ,N. It can be, for instance, N experts providing nested intervals with
their confidence levels.
We propose to summarize or fusion the information by applying a level-wise MCS method
to the N distributions. That is, for each level α ∈ [0,1], we apply an MCS method to the N α-
cuts, from which we retrieve a fuzzy random variable, or fuzzy belief structure (m,F˜ ). Such
a method can be seen as an extension of Equation (4.24) or as a particular case of the MCS
method in random set theory, where a complete correlation is assumed between α-cuts. This
makes the method consistent with the relation (recalled in Section 4.1.3.5) existing between
conjunctive and disjunctive rules of possibility theory and of random set theory. Moreover, this
particular setting allows for fast and easy computations. In the sequel, we use the following
example to illustrate the proposed MCS fusion rule:
Example 4.1. Four sources (experts, computer code, sensor, . . . ) provide information in term
of a best-estimate and a conservative interval, and the possibility distributions are supposed
to have trapezoidal shapes. The information, represented in Figure 4.1, is summarized in
Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Information of Example 4.1 sources
Source Conservative interval Best estimate
1 [1,5] [2,4]
2 [1,13] [3,6]
3 [3,11] [7]
4 [5,13] [10,12]
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Figure 4.1: Example 4.1 distributions
4.2.2.1 Extracting MCS of intervals
We first recall results found by Dubois et al. [76, 77] and concerning the case where sources
supply N intervals Ii = [ai,bi], i = 1, . . . ,N. In this case, the MCS are the subsets K j ⊂ JNK of
sources such that ∩i∈K jIi 6= /0, and applying the MCS method to such intervals is equivalent to
find IMCS = ∪ j ∩i∈K j Ii, which is usually a union of disjoint intervals. Dubois et al. [76, 77]
show that Algorithm 4, described below, allows to extract subsets K j of coherent sources from
the N intervals Ii.
Algorithm 4: Maximal coherent subsets of intervals
Input: N intervals
Output: List of m maximal coherent subsets K j
List = /0 ;
j=1 ;
K = /0 ;
Order in an increasing order {ai|i = 1, . . . ,N}∪{bi|i = 1, . . . ,N} ;
Rename them {ci|i = 1, . . . ,2N} with type(i) = a if ci = ak and type(i) = b if ci = bk ;
for i = 1, . . . ,2N−1 do
if type(i) = a then
Add Source k to K s.t. ci = ak ;
if type(i+1) = b then
Add K to List (K j = K) ;
j = j+1 ;
else
Remove Source k from K s.t. ci = bk ;
Algorithm 4 is based on increasingly sorting the interval end-points into a sequence (ci)i=1,...,2N
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Figure 4.2: Maximal coherent subsets on Intervals (0.5-cuts of Example 4.1)
that is scanned in this order. Each time (and only then) it meets an element ci of type a, (i.e.
the lower bound of an interval) followed by an element ci+1 of type b (i.e. the upper bound
of another interval), a maximally coherent set of intervals is obtained. Once end-points of
intervals Ii, i= 1, . . . ,N have been sorted, Algorithm 4 complexity is linear in the number N of
sources, whereas extracting maximal coherent subsets is generally of exponential complexity.
This greater efficiency is due to the facts that there is a natural ordering between real numbers
and that we consider intervals. Algorithm 4 could thus be easily adapted to any similar sit-
uation (i.e. ordered space X where we consider sets Ii containing all elements respectively
higher and lower than their lowest and greatest elements).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the situation for α-cuts of level 0.5 of Example 4.1. Using Algo-
rithm 4, we find two maximal coherent subsets : K1 = {I1, I2} and K2 = {I2, I3, I4}. Af-
ter applying the maximal coherent subset method, the result is (I1 ∩ I2)∪ (I2 ∩ I3 ∩ I4) =
[2,4.5]∪ [7.5,9], as pictured in bold lines on the figure. They can be thought of as the most
likely intervals where the unknown value may lie.
4.2.2.2 Level-wise MCS on possibility distributions
We now consider that sources provide N possibility distributions pii, i= 1, . . . ,N whose α-cuts
are intervals (i.e. possibility distributions pii are formally equivalent to fuzzy intervals). This
means that, for each level α ∈ [0,1], their α-cuts form a set of N intervals Ei,α , with Ei,α
the α-cut of pii. It is then possible to apply Algorithm 4 to them : Let K j,α be the maximal
subsets of coherent intervals such that
⋂
i∈K j,α Ei,α 6= /0. Define EMCS,α as the union of the
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partial results associated to K j,α , as suggested by Dubois and Prade [93] :
EMCS,α =
⋃
j=1,..., f (α)
⋂
i∈K j,α
Ei,α (4.25)
where f (α) is the number of distinct maximal subsets K j,α of coherent intervals at level α . In
general, EMCS,α is a union of disjoint intervals, and it does not hold that EMCS,α ⊃ EMCS,β for
any two values β ,α ∈ [0,1] such that β > α . So, the result is not a possibility distribution,
since the sets EMCS,α are not nested.
In practice, for a finite collection of distributions pii, there is a finite set of p+ 1 values
0= β1≤ . . .≤ βp≤ βp+1 = 1 such that the sets EMCS,α will be nested for values α ∈ (βk,βk+1],
k = 1, . . . , p. Algorithm 5 gives a simple method to compute these threshold values βk. It
simply computes the height of min(pii,pi j) for every pair of possibility distributions pii,pi j.
This value is the threshold above which pii and pi j do not belong to the same coherent subset
anymore.
Algorithm 5: Values βk of fuzzy belief structure
Input: N possibility distributions pii
Output: List of values βk
List = /0 ;
i=1 ;
for k = 1, . . . ,N do
for l = k+1, . . . ,N do
βi = max(min(pik,pil)) ;
i=i+1 ;
if βi not in List then
Add βi to List ;
Order List by increasing order ;
By applying Equation (4.25) for all levels α ∈ (βk,βk+1], we retrieve a non-normalized
fuzzy set Fk with membership range (βk,βk+1], since sets EMCS,α are nested in that range. We
note F˜k the normalized fuzzy set obtained by changing, for all x ∈R, the membership function
νFk(x) of Fk into
ν
F˜k
(x) =
max(νFk(x)−βk,0)
βk+1−βk
that is, we expand the range (βk,βk+1] to [0,1]. If we now assign a weight mk = βk+1−βk
to F˜k, and do this for every k = 1, . . . , p, the result is a random fuzzy variable that we note
(m,F˜ )MCS, whose focal elements are normalized fuzzy sets F˜k with weights mk. Weight mk
can be interpreted as the confidence given to adopting F˜k as the information provided by all
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Figure 4.3: Result of MCS method on Example 4.1 (—) and 0.5-cut (---)
the sources.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the result of applying the method to Example 4.1. The 0.5-cut is
exactly the result of Figure 4.2. The result of Equation (4.25) for each level α ∈ (0,1] is in
bold.
Note that in Equation (4.25), if we consider only the maximal coherent subsets K j,0 of
level 0 (i.e. distributions whose support intersects) and build for every level α ∈ [0,1] the set
EMCS0,α defined as
EMCS0,α =
⋃
j=1,..., f (0)
⋂
i∈K j,0
Ei,α
then we retrieve a random set whose focal elements are nested and are the α-cuts of the
possibility distribution resulting from Equation (4.24). This shows that the proposed method
is an extension of the possibilistic MCS fusion rule, where we allow maximal coherent subsets
to evolve with level α . Similarly, the method is a particular instance of MCS fusion rule in
random set theory, where a positive total correlation between α-cuts is assumed. The link
with credal sets MCS fusion rule is less clear, except if we consider random sets as 2nd order
imprecise probabilistic models, where 2nd order models are precise probabilities (i.e. the bpas)
and the 1st order model is an interval modeling our knowledge (i.e. the focal sets).
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Figure 4.4: Contour function pic extracted from Example 4.1, with fuzzy focal ele-
ments (gray lines)
4.2.2.3 Exploiting the fuzzy belief structure
From Figure 4.3, we can see that the fuzzy belief structure resulting from the MCS method is
likely to be hard to use in practice, or to be interpreted by non-experts. It is therefore desirable
to have some tools that allow to extract summarized and useful information from the whole
structure. Such tools are proposed here.
Building the contour function. Summarizing the information in a more synthetic model
such as a unique possibility distribution allow to provide an analyst or decision maker with a
simplified and more interpretable model. We propose to take the contour function pic of the
fuzzy belief structure (m,F˜ )MCS, that is
∀x ∈X , pic(x) = Pl({x}) =
p
∑
i=1
miνF˜i
(x), (4.26)
which boils down to computing the weighted arithmetic mean of the membership functions of
the fuzzy focal sets F˜i. If needed, one can then normalize this distribution pic (by computing
pi ′c(x) = pic(x)/h(pic) where h(pic) is the height of pic) and/or take its convex hull.
Figures 4.4.A and 4.4.B respectively show the contour function and its normalized and
convexified versions that can be extracted from Example 4.1, together with the fuzzy focal sets
in the background. As we can see, the result is a bimodal distribution with one mode centered
around value 8 and the other with a value of 4, this last value being the most plausible. This
is so because these areas are the only ones supported by three sources whose information are
highly (even if not totally) consistent. We can expect that the true value lies in one of these
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two areas, but it is hard to tell which one. Indeed, in this case, one should either take the
normalized convex hull of pic as the final representation of the parameter X , or find out the
reason for the conflict (if feasible).
If we consider distribution pic as the result of a fusion operator ϕ applied to distributions
pi1, . . . ,piN , then it satisfies Properties of commutativity (III), idempotence (IV), insensibility to
relative ignorance (X), strong reconciliation (IX), weak maximal plausibility (VII) and weak
zero preservation (V) (see table 4.3). It is also less sensible to small changes than other rules
and satisfy all the requirements advocated by Oussalah et al. [163] and Delmotte [55]. Also
note that the same properties, this time for table 4.2, are also satisfied if we consider that the
random set equivalent to the fuzzy belief structure (m,F˜ )MCS (see Equation (3.61)) is the re-
sult of fusing the random sets (m,F )pi1, . . . ,(m,F )piN corresponding to pi1, . . . ,piN . Moreover,
in this case, (m,F˜ )MCS also satisfy Property of total consistency (I).
Extracting subgroups of coherent sources For each threshold in (βk,βk+1], k = 1, . . . , p,
Algorithm 4 exploits the same MCS K(βk,βk+1]j of sources. Changing the value of this threshold
yields a finite collection of coverings of the set of sources. Increasing the threshold from 0 to
1, we go from the largest sets of agreeing sources (i.e. those sources for which the supports
of distributions pii intersect), to the smallest sets of agreeing sources (i.e. those for which
cores intersect). Subsets K(βk,βk+1]j can be interpreted as clusters of sources that agree up to a
confidence level βk+1.
Analyzing these clusters can give some information as to which groups of sources are
consistent, i.e. agree together with a high confidence level ( possibly using some common
evidence to supply information) and which ones are strongly conflicting with each other (and
which items of information are plausibly based on different pieces of evidence). The finite
collection of groups from Example 4.1 are summarized in the following table
Subsets Clusters Max. Conf. level
K(0,0.4] [1,2,3][2,3,4] 0.4
K(0.4,0.66] [1,2][2,3,4] 0.66
K(0.66,0.91] [1,2][2,3][4] 0.91
K(0.91,1] [1,2][3][4] 1.0
In this example, not much can be concluded from these clusters of coherent sources. Never-
theless, presenting the information in this form seems natural, and can trigger further investi-
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gation as to why some sources seems to be more conflicting with the others (such as source 4
in our example).
Measuring the gain of information An interesting piece of information to have is how
much precision has been gained by the fusion process. We consider that the overall impreci-
sion of the information provided by all the sources is equal to
IP = |pimax(1:N)|=
∫
X
pimax(1:N)(x)dx
with |pimax(1:N)| the fuzzy cardinality of pimax(1:N) . If we now consider the fuzzy belief structure
(m,F˜ )MCS resulting from the fusion process, its imprecision can be measured as
IP′ =
p
∑
k=1
mk|F˜k|
The difference GP = IP− IP′ quantifies the precision gained due to the fusion process. This
index is 0 in case of total conflict and when the sources supply the same possibility distribution.
Indeed, the MCS method increases the precision when sources are consistent with one another
but supply distinct pieces of information. In Example 4.1, we have IP = 11.195, IP′ = 5.412
and the normalized index (IP−IP′/IP) is 0.52, which indicates a reasonable gain of precision
after fusion.
Since the fusion process follows a level-wise application of the MCS method, it is natural
to investigate the level-wise counterpart of both IP and IP′. That is, we can compute, for each
threshold α ∈ (0,1]
IP(α) = |Emax(1:N),α | IP′(α) = |EMCS,α |
with Emax(1:N),α the α-cut of pimax(1:N) . These evaluations depending on α , they can be seen as
gradual numbers [95, 109]. Recall that a gradual number is formally a mapping from (0,1] to
the real line R, such as IP(α) and IP′(α). IP(α) measures the imprecision of the continuous
belief structure (m,F )pimax(1:N)
with uniform distribution on [0,1] and which assigns to each
α ∈ [0,1] the set Emax(1:N),α =
⋃
i=1,...,N Ei,α , that is IP(α) gradually evaluate the imprecision
of the belief structure resulting from the level-wise disjunction of α-cuts. It is a monotonic
gradual number, since the disjunctions of α-cuts are nested. The gradual number IP′(α)
measures the imprecision of (m,F˜ )MCS likewise. However it is generally neither continuous
nor monotone (cuts are not nested). The gradual number GP(α) = IP(α)− IP′(α) is thus a
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level-wise measure of the precision gained by applying the maximal coherent subset method.
The following equality formalize their link with their scalar counterparts IP, IP′ and GP:
IP =
1∫
0
IP(α)dα,
and likewise for IP′ and GP. Since mk|F˜k| =
∫ βk
βk−1
|EMCS,α |dα , we effectively have IP′ =∫ 1
0 IP
′(α)dα . The validity of the other equality IP =
∫ 1
0 IP(α)dα follows from the definition
of fuzzy cardinality.
Measuring the confidence in an event, in a source Once (m,F˜ )MCS has been accepted
as a good representative of the information provided by the sources, plausibility and belief
measures of an event A, given by Equations (3.62) and (3.63), provide natural upper and
lower confidence levels given by the group of sources to this event. In particular, if A = pii,
plausibility and belief can be used to evaluate the resulting upper and lower “trust” in the
information given by source i in view of all the sources.
In Example 4.1, values [Bel(pii),Pl(pii)] for sources 2 and 4 are, respectively, [0.38,1] and
[0,0.93] (using, for example, Equations (3.62)-(3.63)). We see that information provided by
source 2 is judged totally plausible by the group, and also strongly supported (source 2 is
undoubtedly the less conflicting of the four). Because one source completely disagrees with
source 4, its belief value drops to zero, but the information delivered by it is nevertheless
judged fairly plausible (since source 4 is not very conflicting with sources 2 and 3).
Although belief and plausibility functions are natural candidates to measure the overall
confidence in a source, there are cases where their informativeness will be poor. For in-
stance, if a distribution pii is in total conflict with the others, the resulting fuzzy belief structure
(m,F˜ )MCS will give the following measures for pii : [Bel(pii),Pl(pii)] = [0,1] (total ignorance).
It means that in the presence of strong conflict, the MCS method grants no confidence in indi-
vidual sources, even though no source can be individually discarded.
An alternative to reduce this imprecision is to use a fuzzy equivalent [167] of the so-called
pignistic probability [187] (see Appendix C), namely
BetPMCS(A) =
p
∑
k=1
m(F˜k)
|min(F˜k,νA)|
|F˜k|
(4.27)
with νA the membership functions of (fuzzy) event A, and |min(F˜k,νA)|/|F˜k| the degree of
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subsethood, or relative cardinality, of F˜k in A. BetPMCS(A) is zero if A is strongly conflicting
with every focal set F˜k and one if every F˜k is included in A (here, F˜k is included in A iff
ν
F˜k
(x) < νA(x)∀x ∈ R). In Example 4.1, Equation (4.27) applied to sources 2 and 4 (A = pi2
and A = pi4) respectively gives confidence 0.80 and 0.49, confirming that source 2 is more
trusted by the group than source 4.
Note that other formulas instead of |min(F˜k,νA)|/|F˜k| could have been chosen to measure
the subsethood of F˜k in A [54, 97]. One could also choose to consider the continuous random
set associating set EMCS,α to each level α ∈ [0,1] and to use the continuous extension of the
pignistic probability proposed by Smets [186], which would give yet another result. Further
research is needed to know the properties of each of these measures and the relations existing
between them, and it is presently not clear when to choose one measure rather than the others.
From our standpoint, the important criteria satisfied by these measures is that they are con-
sistent ways to measure the coherence of A with respect to the fuzzy belief structure coming
out from the MCS method (e.g., in our example, source 2 would be judged more reliable than
source 4, irrespectively of the chosen formula for the pignistic probability, and only the scalar
evaluations would change).
All these tools (building the contour function, extracting coherent subgroups, measuring
the precision gain and the resulting confidence in events) provide users and analyst with syn-
thetic and interpretable messages. That such tools should be made available is important for
future practical applications. Another important issue, not considered so far, is the ability of
the method to take additional information about the sources into account. Methodologies to
do so are proposed in the next section.
4.2.2.4 Taking additional information into account
We consider here three kind of additional information or assumptions concerning the sources
and/or the space X , that are often encountered in practice: the number of reliable sources,
numbers quantifying the reliability of sources (possibly given by methods studied in Sec-
tion 4.4), and the existence of a metric on space X .
Number of reliable sources Suppose we have information on the number r of sources that
can be expected to be reliable, or at least that some assumptions can be made about this
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Figure 4.5: Result on Example 4.1 of MCS method with number of reliable sources
r = 2
number. Given this number, we propose to adapt Equation (4.25) as follows
EMCSr,α =
⋃
j=1,..., f (α)
|K j,α |≥r
⋂
i∈K j,α
Ei,α (4.28)
with |K j,α | the number of sources inK j,α . For each level α ∈ [0,1], only those subsets counting
more then r sources are considered. This lessens the contribution of isolated sources or of
small subgroups of consistent sources, and ensures that the result will be at least as informative
as the result provided by the original method (Equation (4.25)). Figure 4.5 illustrates the fuzzy
belief structure resulting from Example 4.1 when r = 2.
Accounting for the reliability of sources Suppose that some numerical evaluation of the
reliability of each source is available. Denote λi the reliability of source i, and suppose, with-
out loss of generality, that λi ∈ [0,1], value 1 meaning that the source is fully reliable, 0
representing a useless source. There are at least two ways of taking this reliability indices
into account, the first one increasing the result imprecision by modifying (i.e. discounting)
the possibility distributions, the second one decreasing the imprecision by discarding poorly
reliable subgroups of sources:
• Discounting: discounting consists of transforming all pii,i = 1, . . . ,N into distributions
pi ′i whose imprecision increases all the more as λi is low. In other words, the lower λi is,
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the more irrelevant pii becomes. A common discounting operation is the following:
∀x ∈ R, pi ′i (x) = max(1−λi,pii(x))
Once discounted, sources are assumed to be reliable. The effect of the discounting
operation on MCS method possesses a nice interpretation. Indeed, applying the MCS
method to discounted sources means that the information modeled by pii will only be
considered for levels higher than 1− λi, since below that level, source i is present in
every MCS K j, as no information coming from it will be considered. A drawback of this
method is that if values λi are low for each sourcef, the result will be highly imprecise.
• Discarding unreliable sources: we propose to compute the overall reliability λK of a
subgroup K as
λK =⊥i∈K(λi) (4.29)
where ⊥ is a t-conorm (here considered as an aggregation operator [13]). Choosing
a particular t-conorm to aggregate reliability scores then depends on the assumed de-
pendence between sources. For example, the maximum t-conorm ⊥(x,y) = max(x,y)
corresponds to the cautious assumption that agreeing sources are dependent (i.e. use
the same information), thus the highest reliability score is not reinforced by the fact that
multiple sources agree. On the contrary, the t-conorm ⊥(x,y) = x+ y− xy (the dual
of the product t-norm) can be associated to the hypothesis that sources are independent
(reliability score increases as more sources agree together). A limit value λ can then be
fixed, such that only subsets of sources having a reliability score over this limit are kept.
Equation (4.25) then becomes
EMCSr,α =
⋃
j=1,..., f (α)
λKj,α≥λ
⋂
i∈K j,α
Ei,α . (4.30)
Remark that this method does not modify the pieces of information pii.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the result of applying the above methods (respectively dis-
counting and discarding) to Example 4.1 when reliability indices are λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.6,
λ3 = 0.8,λ4 = 0.2. For the discounting method, we consider X ∈ [1,14], and for the dis-
carding method, we consider independent sources and λ = 0.5. Figure 4.6 well illustrates the
higher imprecision that can result from applying a discounting method.
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Figure 4.6: Result of MCS method on Example 4.1 with reliability scores λ =
(0.2,0.6,0.8,0.2) and discounting method
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Figure 4.7: Result of MCS method on Example 4.1 with reliability scores λ =
(0.2,0.6,0.8,0.2) and discarding method (⊥(x,y) = x+ y− xy)
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Accounting for the metric In the original MCS method described here, if an isolated source
is totally conflicting with the others, then it will constitute a maximal coherent subset of its
own. If the notion of distance on X makes sense, this will be true whatever the distance of
the isolated source distribution from the others is. However, in some applications [163], it is
sometimes desirable to take the distance between distributions into account, with the aim of
neglecting the information lying outside a certain zone.
Let kα = max j=1,..., f (α) |K j,α | be the maximal number of consistent sources at level α .
Denote EK j,α =
⋂
i∈K j,α Ei,α . At each level α , following Oussalah et al. [163], a so-called
consensus zone can be defined as the interval:
EK,α = H
(
∪ j,|K j,α |=kα
(
EK j,α
))
= [kα ,kα ],
with H the convex hull. Now, let A = [a,a], B = [b,b] be two intervals. We define the
closenessC(A,B) between A and B as
C(A,B) = inf
a∈A,b∈B
(d(a,b))
where d(a,b) is the distance between two points a and b of the space X . Note thatC(A,B) is
not a distance (it does not satisfy triangle inequality), but is a measure of consistency between
sets A and B accounting for the metric. Indeed, it will be 0 as soon as A∩B 6= /0. Since
the proposed method emphasizes the concept of consistency, this choice appears sensible 4.
Moreover, between two thresholds βk,βk+1, the closeness C(EK j,α ,EKi,α) between any two
sets EK j,α ,EKi,α i 6= j is an increasing function of α , due to the nestedness of these sets 5.
Given the consensus zone EK,α , we can now fix a distance threshold d0 and adapt Equation
(4.25) in the following way, so that it takes account of the metric of X
EMCSd ,α =
⋃
j=1,..., f (α)
C(EKj ,α ,EK,α )≤d0
⋂
i∈K j,α
Ei,α . (4.31)
applying Equation (4.31) means that information too far away from consensus zones are re-
garded as outliers and deleted. Figure 4.8 illustrates the method on Example 4.1 when d0 = 1.
Overall, the proposed modifications allowing to take additional information into account
only slightly modify the original method (Equations (4.28), (4.30) and (4.31) remain quite
4Genuine distances between sets like the Hausdorff distance are less meaningful in our context.
5this would not be true for the Hausdorff distance.
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Figure 4.8: Result of MCS method on Example 4.1 taking metric into account with
d0 = 1
close to Equation (4.25)). It thus brings more flexibility to the method, while preserving its
computational attractiveness.
4.3 Towards a cautious conjunctive rule in random set the-
ory
We now turn to another common problem of information fusion, that is coping with dependen-
cies between sources. We here look at the specific situation where uncertainty is represented
by random sets and the dependencies between sources are badly known. Random set theory
is an attractive theory to treat such a problem, since the construction of a joint bpa allows to
model specific dependencies, while the Least-Commitment Principle (LCP, see Appendix C
for details) provides guidance allowing to adopt a cautious attitude when some information
are missing (here, information concerning the dependence between sources).
First recall that, given a random set (m,F ), its expected cardinality |C|(m,F ) is given by
|C|(m,F ) = ∑
E∈F
m(E)|E| (4.32)
and is the simplest measure of the imprecision of (m,F ). Also recall that this cardinal-
ity is equal to the one of the possibility distribution equivalent to the contour function (i.e.,
|C|(m,F ) = ∑x∈X Pl({x})).
We consider two sources 1,2, providing their information about X in terms of two random
Treating multiple sources of information 167
sets (m,F )1,(m,F )2. Combining them by the means of Dempster’s combination rule to
obtain (m,F )⊗(1:2) (the normalized version of (m,F )⊙(1:2)) is justified only when sources can
be considered as independent and reliable, that is when taking the stochastic product of m1,m2
to build the joint bpa m(1:2) and its conjunctive allocation appear reasonable.
When independence cannot be assumed and the dependence structure existing between
sources is badly known, a solution to merge random sets conjunctively is to apply the "least
commitment principle" to the merging of random sets. Such a cautious rule, denoted here ∧
(and (m,F )∧(1:2) the resulting random set), should at least satisfy the property of idempotence
(Property IV of Table 4.2)
Following the LCP, (m,F )∧(1:2) should be chosen in the set M∩(1:2) , so that it is one of the
least x-committed element, with x one of the inclusion ordering in {s, pl,q,w,v,d,dd}. Again,
we choose the s-ordering, for the same reasons as before: for its unifying characteristic, and
because it is from a theoretical standpoint the most appealing notion of inclusion in random
set theory. However, since the s-ordering is a partial ordering, the s-least committed element
in (m,F )∧(1:2) is in general not unique.
In order to avoid such incomparabilities, we propose here to define the least-committed
element (m,F )∧(1:2) as one with maximal expected cardinality. The reasons for choosing
expected cardinality is that (i) it is the most simple way to measure imprecision of random
sets and (ii) it is coherent with the s-ordering, that is a joint random set having maximum
expected cardinality will be among the s-least committed ones. From this requirement follows
the following proposition:
Proposition 4.6. Let (m,F )1 be a specialization of (m,F )2, then the result of the least com-
mitted rule ∧ is (m,F )1∧ (m,F )2 = (m,F )∧(1:2) = (m,F )1.
Proof. The result (m,F )∧(1:2) must be a specialization of both (m,F )1 and (m,F )2, by defi-
nition. The fact that (m,F )1 is a specialization of (m,F )2 implies that the set M∩(1:2) of pos-
sible solutions reduces to the specializations of (m,F )1 (since every specialization of (m,F )1
is also a specialization of (m,F )2). And the specialization of (m,F )1 that has maximal ex-
pected cardinality is (m,F )1 itself.
We tend to think that Proposition 4.6 should be satisfied by any rule tagged as cautious,
and at the very least by those based on the s-ordering. Nevertheless, Proposition 4.6 concerns
very peculiar cases, and does not provide (practical) guidelines as to how general random sets
should be cautiously merged. In order to propose such practical guidelines, we will first recall
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and then use the concept of commensurate bpas, first introduced by Dubois and Yager [101]
to relate fuzzy connectives with random set conjunctive fusion rules. In the sequel of this
section, we will allow a bpa to bear on non-distinct focal sets, that is we consider it as a
relation between ℘(X ) and [0,1] (i.e., several masses can be assigned to the same subset).
We will name a bpa whose focal elements are all distinct regular.
Definition 4.1. Let m be a bpa with focal sets A1, . . . ,An and associated weights m1, . . . ,mn. A
split of m is a bpa m′ with focal sets A′1, . . . ,A
′
n′ and associated weights m
′1, . . . ,m′n′ such that
∑
A′i=Ai
m′i = mi
In other words, a split is a new bpa where the original weight given to a focal set is sepa-
rated in smaller weights given to the same focal set, with the sum of weights given to a specific
focal element being constant.
Definition 4.2. Two bpas m1,m2, belonging to some random sets (m,F )1,(m,F )2 are said to
be equivalent if, for any subset E ⊆X Pl1(E) = Pl2(E) and Bel1(E) = Bel2(E).
And one can show [101] that two bpas are equivalent if and only if they are splits of a
common regular bpa.
Definition 4.3. Let m1, m2 be two bpas with respective focal sets {A1, . . . ,An}, {B1, . . . ,Bk}
and associated weights {m11, . . . ,mn1}, {m12, . . . ,mk2}. Then, m1 and m2 are said to be commen-
surate if k = n and there is a permutation σ of JnK such that m j1 = m
σ(i)
2 ∀i = 1, . . . ,n.
Two bpas are commensurate if their distribution of weights over focal sets can be described
by the same vector of numbers.
Algorithm 6 has been proposed by Dubois and Yager [101] to make any two (regular) bpa
commensurate, given a prescribed ranking of focal elements and by successive splitting. Once
this commensuration done, they propose a conjunctive merging rule, denoted here⊕, resulting
in a random set (m,F )⊕(1:2) ∈M∩(1:2)
The random set (m,F )⊕(1:2) resulting from Dubois and Yager’s rule then have, for k =
1, . . . ,m, masses mk⊕(1:2) = m
k
R1
= mkR2 and focal elements R
k⊕(1:2) = R
k
1∩Rk2. The whole proce-
dure is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.2. Two random sets (m,F )1,(m,F )2, their commensuration and the result of
Dubois and Yager’s rule are summarized in the following table:
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Algorithm 6: Commensuration Algorithm
Input: Random sets (m,F )1,(m,F )2 on X
Output: Two commensurate random sets (m,F )R1,(m,F )R2 respectively equivalent to
(m,F )1,(m,F )2
Choose an indexing of focal elements {A1, . . . ,An}, {B1, . . . ,Bk}, Ai ∈F1,Bi ∈F2
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
Compute αi = ∑nj=im1(Ai)
for i = 1, . . . ,k do
Compute βi = ∑kj=im2(Bi)
Compute {γ1, . . . ,γm}= {α1, . . . ,αn}∪{β1, . . . ,βk} with 1 = γ1 > .. . > γm > γm+1 = 0
for k = 1, . . . ,m do
Define mkR1 = m
k
R2
= γk− γk−1
Define Rk1 = Ai such that αi ≥ γk > αi+1
Define Rk2 = B j such that β j ≥ γk > β j+1
l mlRi R
l
1 R
l
2 R
l
1⊕2
m1 m2 1 .5 A1 B1 A1∩B1
A1 .5 B1 .6 Alg. 6 2 .1 A2 B1 A2∩B1
A2 .3 B2 .2 → 3 .2 A2 B2 A2∩B2
A3 .2 B3 .1 4 .1 A3 B3 A3∩B3
B4 .1 5 .1 A3 B4 A3∩B4
This example shows that the resulting merged random set (m,F )⊕(1:2) heavily depends on
the chosen ranking of focal sets F1 and F2. Actually, it can be shown that any conjunctively
merged bba can be produced by following this procedure.
Definition 4.4. Two commensurate generalised bpas are said to be equi-commensurate if each
of their focal sets has the same weight.
Equicommensurate bpas can be obtained in the same way as commensurate bpas are ob-
tained with Algorithm 6, by successively splitting each original bpa until all weights are equal.
Note that, provided the ordering on focal sets is the same, the result of applying Dubois and
Yager’s rule to equicommensurate bpas remains (m,F )⊕(1:2) , and is still in M∩(1:2) .
Proposition 4.7. Any merged bpa in M∩(1:2) can be reached by means of Dubois and Yager
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rule using appropriate commensurate bpas equivalent to m1 and m2 and the two appropriate
rankings of focal sets.
Proof. We assume masses (of marginal and merged bpas) are rational numbers. Let (m,F ) ∈
M∩(1:2) be the conjunctively merged bpa we want to reach by using Dubois and Yager’s rule.
Let m(Ai,B j) denote the mass allocated to Ai ∩B j in (m,F ). It is of the form k12(Ai,B j)×
10−n where k12,n are integers. By successive splitting followed by a reordering of elements
R
j
1, we can always reach m. For instance, let kR be equal to the greatest common divisor of all
values k12(Ai,B j). Then, k12(Ai,B j) = qi j× kR, for an integer qi j. Then, it suffices to re-order
elements Rk1 by a re-ordering σ such that for qi j of them, R
k
1 = Ai and R
σ(k)
2 = B j. Then,
by applying Dubois and Yager’s rule, we obtain the result m. From a practical standpoint,
restricting ourselves to rational numbers has no importance: rational numbers being dense in
reals, this means that we can always get as close as we want to any merged bpa.
Given the above definitions and results, it seems natural to derive practical guidelines of a
cautious merging rule ∧ by looking for appropriate rankings of focal sets so that the merged
bpa obtained via commensuration has maximal expected cardinality. The answer is : rankings
should be extensions of the partial ordering induced by inclusion (i.e. Ai < A j if Ai ⊂ A j ).
This is due to the following result:
Lemma 4.1. Let A,B,C,D be four sets such that A ⊆ B and C ⊆ D. Then, we have the
following inequality
|A∩D|+ |B∩C| ≤ |A∩C|+ |B∩D| (4.33)
Proof. From the assumption, the inequality |(B\A)∩C| ≤ |(B\A)∩D| holds. Then consider
the following equivalent inequalities:
|(B\A)∩C|+ |A∩C| ≤ |A∩C|+ |(B\A)∩D|
|B∩C| ≤ |A∩C|+ |(B\A)∩D|
|A∩D|+ |B∩C| ≤ |A∩C|+ |A∩D|+ |(B\A)∩D|
|A∩D|+ |B∩C| ≤ |A∩C|+ |B∩D|
hence the inequality (4.33) is true.
When using equi-commensurate bpas, masses in the formula of expected cardinality can
be factorized, and expected cardinality then becomes |C|(m,F )⊕(1:2) = mR1⊕2 ∑
l
i=1 |Ri1⊕2| =
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mR1⊕2 ∑
l
i=1 |Ri1∩Ri2|, where mR1⊕2 is the smallest mass enabling equi-commensuration. We
are now ready to prove the following proposition
Proposition 4.8. There exists a conjunctive merging rule∧ constructing a random set (m,F )∧(1:2)
by the commensuration method, where focal elements are ranked according to the partial or-
der of inclusion, with (m,F )∧(1:2) ∈M∩(1:2) minimally committed for expected cardinality.
Proof. Assume some (m,F )
(̂1:2)
∈M∩(1:2) is minimally committed for expected cardinality.
By Proposition 4.7, it can be obtained by commensuration. Let mR1,mR2 be the two equi-
commensurate bpas with n elements each derived from the two original bpas m1,m2. Suppose
that the rankings used display four focal sets Ri1,R
j
1,R
i
2,R
j
2, i < j, such that R
i
1 ⊃ R j1 and
Ri2 ⊆ R j2. By Lemma 4.1, |R j1∩R j2|+ |Ri1∩Ri2| ≤ |R j1∩Ri2|+ |Ri1∩R j2|. Hence, if we permute
focal sets Ri1,R
j
1 before applying Dubois and Yager’s merging rule, we end up with a merged
bpamR′1⊕2 such that |C|(m,F )R1⊕2 ≤ |C|(m,F )R′1⊕2 . Since any merged bpa can be reached by
sufficient splittings of m1,m2 and by inducing the proper ranking of focal sets of the resulting
bpas mR1,mR2 , there is a merged bpa (m,F )(̂1:2) ∈M∩(1:2) maximizing expected cardinality
can be reached by Dubois and Yager’s rule, using rankings of focal sets in accordance with
the inclusion ordering.
Nevertheless, ranking focal sets in accordance with the partial order induced by inclusion
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to obtain a merged random set with maximized
expected cardinality (examples are provided by Destercke et al. [66]). Still, these first results
about how to cautiously merge random sets by maximizing expected cardinality are promising
because:
• They provide first practical guidelines to cautiously and conjunctively merge random
sets with respect to the s-ordering.
• They are coherent with cautious conjunctive merging in possibility theory, that is when
(m,F )1,(m,F )2 are consonant, (m,F )∧(1:2) corresponds to the minimum merging rule
of possibility theory.
• They are coherent with q-least committed approach in the case of consonant bpas, and
consequently coherent with other cautious approaches [99, 100]. Coherence with non-
consonant cases remains to be explored.
A potential disadvantage of the proposed approach is that it does not seem fully coherent
with a pl-least committed approach [66] (and thus, with imprecise probability theory). Con-
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solidating these results and making them more attractive from a practical standpoint would
require:
• to find more constraints to add to the ordering of focal elements, so that (m,F )∧(1:2)
would be uniquely defined (possibly using results related to the contour function of
random sets [87]),
• to compare the proposed rule to other existing approaches to merge non-independent
sources in the context of random set theory [19, 61] (we have already made some first
comparisons [66], but a more thorough and axiomatical comparison is needed)
• to verify which properties does the proposed rule satisfy, as, for example, associativity.
4.4 Assessing sources quality: a general framework
Disposing of evaluations of sources reliability can be useful in many ways: to select sub-
group of sources, weight them in fusion processes or simply to send back the information to
sources. When sources give information about observable parameters or variables, subjec-
tive assessments of reliability are usually not acceptable. In this section, we propose methods
based on rational requirements allowing to evaluate sources reliability from past assessments
of variables or parameters, whose true value has been subsequently known.
The rational requirements on which are based the methods presented in this section have
first been considered by Cooke [28], who apply them to expert opinions in a probabilistic
setting. Later, they have been considered by Sandri et al.[174], also to treat expert opinions,
but in a possibilistic setting.
4.4.1 Rational requirements and general methodology
A means to objectively evaluate information delivered by sources is to center the evaluation
on past performances of the same sources. This can be done by considering so-called seed
variables. A seed variable is a variable whose exact value is not known by the source when
it provides information about it, but is either known by the analyst or will subsequently be
determined by physical experiments or other means. Here, we note a seed variable T and its
(discrete) domain T (if T is a physical variable, T will often be the discretized real line). If
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known or precisely observed, the exact value of T is noted t∗, but we allow here the value of
a seed variable to be imperfectly known (i.e. represented by an uncertainty model).
A source is then evaluated by two quantitative criteria, called here informativeness and
calibration, based on the information provided on seed variable T :
• Informativeness is a score measuring the precision of the information given by the
source on T . The more precise the source, the higher informativeness.
• Calibration is a score measuring the coherence between the information given by the
source about T and the knowledge the analyst has about T .
A good source is then a source that receives an high score, i.e., a source that is both informa-
tive and coherent with available knowledge. Following Cooke [28, Ch.9], a good evaluation
method gives scores that:
1. reward sources that are both informative and well calibrated,
2. are relevant, that is are influenced only by observations or by knowledge on seed vari-
ables,
3. are meaningful, that is are comparable, irrespectively of the nature and number of seed
variables.
In the following, we regard these rules as basic requirements that should follow evaluation
procedures. They are sensible, and do not constraint too much the evaluation procedure.
4.4.2 Evaluating sources in probability
The probabilistic method to evaluate sources is based on the use of so-called scoring rules [138],
which were originally introduced and used in subjective probability elicitation procedures.
However, Cooke [28] argues quite convincingly that, inside probability theory, they are also
well fitted to the evaluation of sources (and in particular, of experts).
Let T be the seed variable, taking its values on finite domain T . First recall that, given
two probability distributions P1 = {p1,1, . . . , p1,|T |} and P2 = {p2,1, . . . , p2,|T |}, the Kullback-
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Leibler (KL) divergence [133] (also called relative entropy6) of P2 from P1 reads
KL(P1,P2) =
|T |
∑
i=1
p1,i log
(
p1,i
p2,i
)
(4.34)
In the probabilistic setting, a source S provide information modeled in terms of a probabil-
ity distribution PS = {pS,1, . . . , pS,|T |}, where pS,i is the probability mass given to element ti
of T .
Informativeness Let PU be the uniform probability on T , that is pU,i = 1/|T | for i =
1, . . . , |T |. The informativeness In f S of source S is then computed as
In f S = KL(PS,PU).
If multiple seed variables are used, then the resulting informativeness is simply the arithmetic
mean over all informativeness scores.
Calibration If r observations of the seed variable T are available, then let ri be the number
of observations corresponding to element ti. To these observations corresponds an empirical
probability PR = {pR,1, . . . , pR,|T |}, with pR,i = ri/r. The KL-divergence KL(PR,PS) then
provides a measure of the closeness of PS, the source of information, from the empirically
built distribution PR. This divergence has value 0 if and only if PR = PS. The final calibration
scoreCalS of source S is then derived by the following statistical hypothesis test
CalS = 1−χ2|T |−1(2∗ r ∗KL(PR,PS))
with χ2|T |−1 a chi-square distribution with |T |−1 degrees of freedom. Note that this measure
is based on a convergence property of the KL divergence.
When considering multiple seed variables T1, . . . ,TM taking only one value on a real-
bounded domain, Cooke [28] proposes to model sources information on each seed variable
by the same set of inter-percentiles Pq = {pq,1, . . . , pq,B} extracted from a set of percentiles
q1, . . . ,qB+1 (typically, the 0,5,50,95 and 100 % percentiles), with pq,i = qi+1−qi. This set of
percentiles is induced by the source information for each seed variable, and even if the values
of the real line to which corresponds the percentiles q1, . . . ,qB+1 can be different for each seed
6Also sometimes quoted as KL-distance, although it does not satisfy the property of symmetry
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variables, distribution Pq will remain the same. We note IS,i, j = [qS,i, j,qS,i+1, j] the interval
corresponding to the ith inter-percentile extracted from source S information concerning the
jth seed variable Tj and QS, j = {qS,1, j, . . . ,qS,B+1, j} the set of boundary values. Once the M
values t∗1, . . . , t∗M assumed by the seed variables T1, . . . ,TM have been observed, the empirical
distribution PR = {pR,1, . . . , pR,B} is build in the following way: the value pR,i is ri/M, that is
the number of observations that are in the interval IS,i, j, j = 1, . . . ,M. Thus, for every source,
we have PS = Pq, and a different PR for each source. Note that, to compute informativeness
in such cases, the discretized uniform distribution PU is computed with the same procedure as
PR.
The following example gives a short illustration of the method:
Example 4.3. Consider two economists S1,S2 (the sources) which are asked their opinion
about the values of some portfolios in the two upcoming days (the seed variables). De-
note these (unknown) values T1,T2. Assume that the values evolve between [4500,5000].
The analyst chooses to model information given by the economists by the means of per-
centiles q1 = 0%,q2 = 5%,q3 = 50%,q4 = 95%,q5 = 100%, forming the probability Pq =
{0.05,0.45,0.45,0.05} (B = 4).
Information provided by the two economists are summarized as follows:
S1 S2
T1 QS1,1 = {4500,4700,4800,4950,5000} QS1,1 = {4500,4600,4750,4900,5000}
T2 QS1,1 = {4500,4800,4900,4950,5000} QS1,1 = {4500,4650,4750,4850,5000}
Assume now that the observations are t∗1 = 4680 and t∗2 = 4752, respectively for the
first and second days. Then, the empirical distributions built from these observations are
PR = {1.0,0,0,0} for the first economist, and PR = {0,0.5,0.5,0} for the second.
Global score The global score ScS of a source S is then computed as the product of infor-
mativeness and calibration scores
ScS = In f S CalS.
Cooke [28] also proposes to add a parameter acting as a minimal threshold of calibration, so
that sources receiving too low calibration scores receive a global score of zero, thus avoiding
the case of very precise but badly calibrated sources receiving an high global score. Since
computed scores are then used to combine the distributions coming from the different sources
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by arithmetic weighted mean, Cooke [28] also proposes some way to tune this threshold,
so that the combined final probability distribution is optimized with respect to calibration
criterium.
Within probability theory, this evaluation method is sound and well justified. However, it
has a certain number of drawbacks, among which:
• The need of at least 10 seed variables or observations for the statistical test used in
calibration to be robust and discriminative
• The propensity to confuse imprecision and variability in a single representation, as em-
phasized by Sandri et al. [174]
• The fact that, when different seed variables are considered (as in Example 4.3), no no-
tions of individual calibration exists, which can produce results where good sources are
well-calibrated only when they are uninformative (very imprecise), and badly calibrated
in the cases where they are informative. This is also illustrated by Sandri et al. [174]
These shortcomings are not imputable to the method and mainly come from the necessity
of staying within probability theory, which does not allow to use set-based representation or
calculus and, as already argued, tends to mix up imprecision and variability. The problem of
extending the method to cases where observations are themselves pervaded with uncertainty
is considered by Kraan [131].
4.4.3 Evaluating sources in uncertainty theories
We define the imprecision index IG as follows:
Definition 4.5. Let µ be a function defined on the power set℘(X ) of the finite space X and
such that:
• µ(X ) = 1 (boundary conditions)
• A⊆ B⇒ µ(A)≤ µ(B) (monotonicity)
• ∀A,B⊆X ,A∩B = /0,µ(A∪B)≥ µ(A)+ µ(B) (super-additivity)
and let mµ be its Möbius inverse (see Remark 3.1). Then, the imprecision index IGµ of µ is
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defined as the value
IGµ = ∑
E⊆X
mµ(E)|E| (4.35)
with |E| the cardinality of E (0 when E = /0).
Note that in the above definition, µ corresponds to a super-additive capacity for which the
boundary condition on the empty-set has been dropped (in possibility and random set theory,
this corresponds to unnormalized possibility distributions and to random sets with non-null
weight given to the empty set).
Given an uncertainty representation and its associated lower confidence measure, Equa-
tion ( 4.35) can be considered as a measure of its imprecision. When the representation is
a possibility distribution or a random set, the imprecision index IG respectively comes down
to compute the cardinality of the possibility distribution and the expected cardinality of the
random set.
The case where µ is a lower capacity modeling a general coherent lower probability is
studied by Abellan and Moral [3] (they consider ln |E| instead of |E| in Equation (4.35), but
most of their results remain valid with |E|). Let PS and P ′S be any two credal sets defined on
a domain X such that PS ⊆PS′ , and PS,PS′ the induced coherent lower probabilities. The
imprecision index satisfies the following properties:
1. Monotonicity: PS ⊆P ′S ⇒ IGPS ≤ IGPS′
2. Positivity: IGPS > 0
3. Bounded: IGPS ∈ [1, |X |], respectively when PS reduce to a probability on X and
ignorance on the set X .
And the same properties hold for possibility distributions and random sets, except that the
lower bound of the imprecision index is 0, which happens in case of complete conflict (i.e.,
the whole mass is given to the empty set, and µ( /0) = 1).
In the following, we consider a seed variable T taking values on T (which can be, again,
the discrete real line), for which a source has provided information. Let S be a source whose
information given on T induces a lower capacity (see Definition 3.1) µ
S
on T . We note PS
the non-empty core (or, equivalently, the credal set) induced by this capacity. We also note
mµ
S
the mass function on T given by the Möbius inverse (see Definition 3.3).
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4.4.3.1 Informativeness
Let µ
Ign
be the lower capacity representing ignorance on T , that is the capacity such that
µ
Ign
(E) = 0 for all events E ⊂ T , and µ
Ign
(T ) = 1. The Möbius inverse of µ
Ign
is noted
mµ
Ign
, and reduces to mµ
Ign
(T ) = 1 and mµ
Ign
= 0 for other events. The value IGµ
Ign
= |T |
then follows.
Since IGµ
S
is a measure of the imprecision of the information, the value IGµ
Ign
− IGµ
S
=
|T |− IGµ
S
measures the precision of the information given by source S. We then define the
informativeness of a source S for the seed variable T as the normalized index
In f S =
|T |− IGµ
S
|T |
which has value 0 if the source gives no information, and is maximal (In f S = 1) if the source
provides a single probability distribution (i.e., provides information with maximal precision).
Example 4.4. Consider a space T = {t1, t2, t3}, and two sources S1,S2, the first providing an
opinion in terms of confidence bounds over nested sets (i.e., possibility distributions), the sec-
ond providing probability bounds on each elements (i.e., imprecise probability assignments).
The respective information are summarized in the following table:
S1 S2
Set P Set P P
{t2} 0.75 {t1} 0.2 0.5
T 1 {t2} 0.3 0.6
{t3} 0 0.3
The lower capacities µ
S1
,µ
S2
induced by S1,S2 information are respectively computed by
Equation (3.13) and Equations (3.10). The next table shows the result of applying the Möbius
inverse to µ
S1
,µ
S2
Treating multiple sources of information 179
S1 S2
Set m Set m Set m Set m
{t1} 0 {t1, t3} 0 {t1} 0.2 {t1, t3} 0.2
{t2} 0.75 {t2, t3} 0 {t2} 0.3 {t2, t3} 0.2
{t3} 0 T 0.25 {t3} 0 T -0.1
{t1, t2} 0 {t1, t2} 0.2
and we get, respectively, IGµ
S1
= 1.5, IGµ
S2
= 1.4, which once normalized give In f µ
S1
=
0.5, In f µ
S2
= 0.533 . . ., from which we can conclude that S2 is slightly more informative than
S1.
4.4.3.2 Calibration
We differentiate here the case where the value of a seed variable is precisely known with the
case where it is only known with some uncertainty. Let t∗ be the value of the seed variable
when it is precisely known, and µ
T
be the lower capacity induced by the information we have
on the true value of T (coming from an imprecise observation or measurement).
Precisely known value In this case, we propose to simply measure the calibration of the
source by the upper confidence level given by the source to the value, that is
CalS = µS(t
∗)
with µS the dual upper confidence measure of µS. Indeed, µS(t
∗) measures to which degree
source S judges value t∗ plausible, hence it is a good measure of the coherence between the
source information and the observed value. It is maximal if and only if source S judges t∗
totally plausible, and only depend on this last value.
Imprecisely known value In this case, observations on T are modeled by an uncertainty
model inducing a lower capacity µ
t∗ . To measure the coherence of source S information with
observations, we propose to use the equivalent of an inclusion index, that is, to measure in
some way the proportion of µ
t∗ in µS. Let ϕ be some conjunctive fusion operator, as described
in Section 4.1.3, and µ
t∗∩S = ϕ(µ t∗,µS) be the (not forcefully coherent) lower confidence
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measure resulting from the conjunction. Then, we propose to measureCalS, the calibration of
source S, as
CalS =
IGµ
t∗∩S
IGµ
t∗
If µ
t∗,µS are induced by two corresponding credal sets PS,Pt∗ and if ϕ is Equation (4.4),
then we retrieve the inclusion index proposed by Abellan and Gomez [1]. Similarly, if µ
t∗,µS
are induced by possibility distributions pit∗,piS, and if ϕ corresponds to Equation (4.10) with
the minimum t-norm, then we retrieve an usual inclusion index between fuzzy sets (see, for
instance, Smithson [190]). Finally, if µ
t∗,µS reduce to intervals It∗, IS and ϕ is the intersection,
then we retrieve the usual inclusion index |It∗ ∩ IS|/|It∗| of It∗ in IS.
Note that the chosen fusion operator should satisfy at least some properties of Section 4.1.2.
It seems natural to require it to be both commutative (Property III) and idempotent (Prop-
erty IV), because an index of inclusion should not depend on the order of combination of
µ
t∗ ,µS and, if µ t∗ = µS, then the inclusion index (and, therefore, the calibration) should be
maximal.
One could also use similarity indices (e.g., counterparts of Jacquard index for intervals),
but the inconvenient with such indices is that they would mix up informativeness and calibra-
tion, since a source giving very imprecise but well calibrated information could obtain a very
bad score.
4.4.3.3 Global scores
Let T1, . . . ,TM be M seed variables taking their values on T1, . . . ,TM, and for which sources
S1, . . . ,SN have provided information. Let In f Si,Tj ,CalSi,Tj respectively be the informativeness
and calibration of the source i in regard with seed variable j.
For each source, we then propose to compute the global informativeness and calibration
scores, In f Si andCalSi , as the simple arithmetic means
In f Si =
1
M
M
∑
j=1
In f Si,Tj CalSi =
1
M
M
∑
j=1
CalSi,Tj
and, from these aggregated scores, to compute the global score of source i as
ScSi = In f Si CalSi.
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Note that other aggregation functions than the product can be chosen, but since methods are
designed to minimize interaction between informativeness and calibration, the use of the prod-
uct appears justified. But nothing prevents the use of other conjunctive aggregation functions,
or even of sets of such functions (in this case, global scores would become imprecise, and the
order between sources partial). The use of conjunctive operators ensures that no sources will
have an high score by having only high informativeness scores and poor calibration scores (or
the converse).
Note that the above methods can be easily extended to cases where:
• spaces T1, . . . ,TM are the real line. In this case, either one can consider discretized real
lines or the continuous counterparts of above methods (provided these last ones are easy
enough to use).
• Each source delivers information on a (different) subset of available seed variables. In
this case, global scores are only computed on the basis of those seed variables for which
a source has given information.
Above methods are general and simple enough to provide practical and useful tools in the
assessment of sources quality. The result of such methods can then be used to weight sources
in the fusion process (e.g. in a weighted mean), to modify sources information so as to take
account of their reliability (i.e., discounting operations), to select subgroups of "best" sources,
or to simply analyze the performances of sources and send a synthetic feedback to experts.
In Chapter 7, we apply the above methodologies to the result of uncertainty studies per-
formed with various computer codes simulating accidental conditions of a nuclear reactor, for
which data coming from an experimental small-scale facility were available.
4.5 Conclusions and perspectives
In this chapter, we have considered two problems: fusing information concerning a common
variable and coming from multiple sources, as well as the problem as assessing the quality of
those sources in a formal and, as much as possible, objective way.
For the first problem, we have proposed and studied basic fusion operators for clouds,
linking them to basic fusion operators proposed in other uncertainty theories (which were
shortly reviewed). This has allowed us to emphasize even more the interest of comonotonic
clouds.
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To deal with partially inconsistent information, we have considered the application of
MCS-based methods. They are theoretically sound and conceptually attractive, but are in
general computationally greedy. This is why we have studied a frame of application where
such methods remain tractable (almost linear in the number of sources), namely the one where
information is modeled by possibility distributions and MCS are applied level-wise to those
distributions.
We have also briefly addressed the problem of merging information coming from poten-
tially dependent sources, and have given first promising results that would eventually lead to
a practical cautious merging rule of random sets. This approach appears interesting, since for
the special case of possibility distributions, we retrieve the minimum conjunctive rule.
With respect to the above problems, perspectives include
• the implementation of the proposed MCS fusion rule, and its application to real-world
problems, in order to validate its practical usefulness and meaningfulness with users.
We’re currently planing to integrate it to the uncertainty treatment software (SUNSET)
developed at IRSN and to apply it to results of the OCDE research programme BE-
MUSE (see chapter 7)
• the comparison of MCS fusion rule in real-world problems with other adaptive fusion
rules of possibility theory, since we already know from Section 4.2.2.3 that it competes
well with these other rules from an axiomatic and theoretical standpoint.
• further research concerning the cautious conjunctive merging of random sets, including:
thorough comparison of the proposed rule with other similar rules [61, 19], theoreti-
cal study to check which properties of table 4.2 are satisfied by the rule (in particular
associativity), additional constraints so that the ordering of focal elements is uniquely
defined.
With respect to source quality evaluation, we have proposed a general methodology in-
spired by previous works [28, 174] and allowing to assess source quality from previous per-
formances, in a way as objective as possible. This is done by following some rules of common
sense, initially proposed by Cooke [28].
Perspectives concerning this method are mainly its implementation and use in real-world
problems. We have already partially7 implemented this method in the SUNSET software, and
have applied it to the results of the BEMUSE programme (see chapter 7), in order to evaluate
7only the probabilistic and possibilistic methods have been integrated so far
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the quality and responses of different computer codes on a particular accidental scenario.
Overall, people to whose we have presented the result of our study recognized the need and
the interest of such methods in every-day problems.
The material contained in this chapter can be found in papers [65, 72, 73]
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Chapter 5
Independence and uncertainty
“With four parameters I can fit an elephant and with five I can make him wiggle his trunk”
— John von Neumann (1903-1957)
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When assessing and representing uncertainty bearing on multiple variables, a current prac-
tice is to build and/or assess marginal representations on each single variable, and then to
combine these representations into a joint uncertainty representations defined on all variables,
taking account of potential relations between variables. This strategy have the advantage that
marginal models are often more accessible or easier to build than a direct joint model, but it
also implies that potential relationships between variables have to be taken into account.
Within classical probability theory, this is usually achieved by combining marginal prob-
ability distributions into a joint probability distribution, assuming precise dependency struc-
tures.
Notions of (in)dependence thus plays a crucial role in the construction of joint models
that will subsequently be used to manipulate uncertainty in order to make decisions and make
particular inferences. As in previous Chapters, using more expressive frameworks allow for
more flexibility, and shifting to such frameworks when also often means that we have to take
a new look at some questions, because some solutions that previously met general consensus
can be extended in more than one way. There is subsequently a need to make sense of (at least
some of) these generalizations. This is the case for the classical (formal) notion of stochastic
independence, which is often used within classical probability theory to combine marginal
distributions into a joint one.
This is why we review (Section 5.1) the main existing notions of independence in uncer-
tainty theories, and propose a tentative taxonomy aiming at unifying and interpreting those
different notions, while leaving some questions open. Again, the more general language of
credal sets will be useful to compare these various notions. We also address the question of
relating existing notions of independence to the event-tree independence notion recently pro-
posed by Shafer [179, ch.5,8], since event-trees constitute an attractive framework to define
and interpret notions of independence. Some first results are provided and discussed (Sec-
tion 5.2).
As for uncertainty representations, not all notions of independence are directly compara-
ble, in terms of generated joint structures (i.e. inclusion of one in the other) or of interpreta-
tions. However, similarly to uncertainty representations, one can use a notion of independence
to approximate another one, possibly losing some information or expressiveness, but gaining
in ease of use and in computational efficiency. This is illustrated in Section 5.3, where a notion
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of independence proper to possibility theory is used to approximate another notion classically
used in random set theory. Potential interests of such an approximation when propagating
uncertainty are then investigated.
All along this chapter, we will note X1, . . . ,XN the input variables, X1, . . . ,XN the respec-
tive spaces on which they take their values, and xi an element of Xi. For 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ ≤ N, we
denote by X(k:ℓ) := ×ℓi=kXi the Cartesian product of the k− ℓ+ 1 sets Xk, . . . ,Xℓ, and by
X(k:ℓ) := (Xk, . . . ,Xℓ) a variable that assumes values in X(k:ℓ). Similarly, x(k:ℓ) := (xk, . . . ,xℓ) ∈
X(k:ℓ) denotes an element of X(k:ℓ). Index k : k is assimilated to k (e.g., X(k:k) = Xk).
5.1 Finding our way in the jungle of independence: towards
a taxonomy
The notion of independence between variables is often associated to a (qualitative) structural
judgment asserting that two or more variables are not related in some way. For this judgment
to be useful in uncertainty treatment, it has to be interpreted and formally translated. Here, we
will adopt the name irrelevance rather than independence as a general term, as it is better fitted
to describe all judgments of absence of (some) relations between variables. We will reserve
the term independence to symmetric notions and to cases where no confusion is possible. As
for information fusion in Chapter 4, we first introduce some general notions before seeing how
they apply in the different uncertainty theories.
5.1.1 Judgment of (ir)relevance: a classification
Similarly to Walley [203], we associate (ir)relevance statements to structural judgments con-
cerning the properties of variables. A judgment of (ir)relevance is thus always epistemic, in
the sense that it is based on our current knowledge or observations, and could evolve with the
arrival of new knowledge. To differentiate (ir)relevance statements, we classify them in differ-
ent categories, built from various works concerning independence in uncertainty theories [203,
Ch.9], [144], [216], [6]. Namely, an (ir)relevance statement can be:
• Non-Informative (nInf.) or Informative (Inf.): by non-informative, we mean irrelevance
statement expressing the absence of knowledge about the relations linking variables,
leading to maximal imprecision in the joint representation (since this representation
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must encompass any potential relation). By informative, we mean irrelevance state-
ments expressing the knowledge that there is an absence of relations, leading to tighter
joint representations.
• Subjective (Sub.) or Objective (Obj.): an (ir)relevance statement is said to be Subjective
if it affects beliefs about the values that variables may jointly assume. It is saidObjective
if it describes an intrinsic property of the relations between the variables or of the process
generating their values.
• Symmetric (Sym) or Asymmetric (Asym.): Let X1 and X2 be two variables. A statement
is Symmetric when stating that X1 is irrelevant to X2 automatically implies that X2 is
irrelevant to X1 in the same sense. Such statements often allows to build easily joint
uncertainty models from (local) marginal representations and to limit considerations to
such local models. They also easily extend to any number of variables. These features
are often referred to as factorization or decompositional properties in the literature.
However, such statements do not allow to express asymmetric and directional notions of
irrelevance, which are handled by asymmetrical irrelevance statements. A statement is
asymmetrical when stating that X1 is irrelevant to X2 do not implies that X2 is irrelevant
to X1. The symmetrical counterpart is obtained when the statement is explicitly made
in both ways (and this two-way judgment having to be justified, while it is implicitly
accepted in the case of symmetric notions). Extending these statements to any number of
variables usually requires more justifications and is less straightforward, and making this
kind of statements does not automatically allow to only consider marginal local models.
Asymmetrical statements have two main origins, that we call causal and evidential:
– causal type of asymmetric irrelevance is used when one want to express that two
variables are not causally related (for example, in Bayesian networks). It can be
used, for instance, to express that a particular habit is not (one of) the cause of a
particular disease.
– evidential asymmetric irrelevance roughly express the idea that learning the value
of one variable will not change beliefs about the values that the other variable can
assume. However, such a statement does not exclude that learning the value of the
latter can change our beliefs about the former.
We first review how this classification translates in the most classical uncertainty theories:
probability theory and set theory.
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5.1.1.1 Irrelevance judgments in probability theory
Consider two variables X1,X2 that respectively assume values in X1,X2. Let PX1,PX2 be the
two unique probability distributions describing the uncertainty on these variables, and PX(1:2)
the joint probability distribution. Let w : X1→ R,z : X2→ R be two mappings, respectively
from spaces X1 and X2 to the real line R, and EP denote the expected value with respect to
P. In probability theory, all the following definitions of independence lead to the same mathe-
matical form, that is the one corresponding to classical (symmetric) stochastic independence:
1. ∀x(1:2) ∈X(1:2), pX(1:2)(x(1:2)) = pX1(x1)pX2(x2)
2. ∀A×B ∈X(1:2), PX(1:2)(X(1:2) ∈ A×B) = PX1(X1 ∈ A)PX2(X2 ∈ B)
3. ∀A×B ∈X(1:2),PX2(X2 ∈ B) > 0, PX(1:2)(X1 ∈ A|X2 ∈ B) = PX1(X1 ∈ A)
4. ∀A×B ∈X(1:2),PX1(X1 ∈ A) > 0, PX(1:2)(X2 ∈ B|X1 ∈ A) = PX2(X2 ∈ B)
5. ∀w,z, EPX(1:2) (w(X1)z(X2)) = EPX1 (w(X1))EPX2 (z(X2))
with PX(1:2)(X1 ∈ A|X2 ∈ B) the conditional probability of X1 ∈ A, knowing (only) that X2 ∈ B.
Nevertheless, each of the above definitions would be classified differently with respect to the
above proposed classification, as summarized in the following table:
Independence Type name Inf./nInf. Sub./Obj. Sym/Asym.
1, 2 Stochastic independence Inf. Obj. Sym
5 Non-correlation Inf. Sub. Sym
3 Epistemic irrelevance Inf. Sub. Asym.2→1
4 Epistemic irrelevance Inf. Sub. Asym.1→2
Table 5.1: Classification of probabilistic independence types
Where Asym.i→ j denotes epistemic irrelevance of variable Xi to variable X j. Although all
these definitions reduce to the same formal symmetrical notion, it is useful to already make
some distinctions in their interpretations, as each of these interpretations will have a different
counterpart in imprecise probability settings.
That these concepts collapse into one formal definition in classical probabilities and differs
in imprecise probabilistic settings is due to many reasons: classical probabilistic conditioning
having more than one counterpart [90], the equivalence between expectations and probabilities
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on events no longer holding [203, Ch.2], some symmetries breaking apart into asymmetric
notions.
5.1.1.2 Irrelevance judgments in set theory
In set theory, the basic notion of irrelevance is the one of non-interactivity or of logical inde-
pendence, which comes down to the following definition
Definition 5.1 (Logical independence). Consider two setsX1,X2, domains of variables X1,X2.
Then, X1,X2 are said to be logically independent if the possible joint values they can assume
(i.e. that could be observed) on X(1:2) are given by
X(1:2) = X1×X2 = {x(1:2)|x(1:2) ∈X(1:2)}
It is equivalent to state that no combination of values in those two domains are forbid-
den. Within the proposed classification, a judgment of logical independence between X1,X2 is
objective, non-informative and symmetric. Conversely, two variables will be logically depen-
dent if there exist some values x(1:2) of the Cartesian product X(1:2) that X1,X2 cannot jointly
assume.
Similarly, we can define the notions of relational irrelevance and of functional irrelevance
as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Relational irrelevance). Consider two sets X1,X2, on which variables X1,X2
assume their value. Then, X1 is relationally irrelevant to X2 if there exist no relation R :X1→
X2 from X1 to X2 other than the relation such that R(x1) = X2 for any x1 ∈X1.
X1,X2 are said to be relationally independent when both X1 and X2 are relationally irrel-
evant of each other. Notions of relational relevance and dependence follows: for example,
if X1,X2 are the ages of two different persons given in years, then the information X1 ≤ X2
induces a relational dependency between the two variables.
Definition 5.3 (Functional Irrelevance). Consider two sets X1,X2, on which variables X1,X2
assume their value. Then, X1 is functionally irrelevant to X2 if there exist no function f :
X1→X2 from X1 to X2 linking X1,X2.
and X1,X2 are said to be functionally independent when both X1 AND X2 are functionally
irrelevant to each other. X1 is said to be functionally relevant to X2 if there is a function
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f :X1→X2 linking the two, and X1,X2 are said to be functionally dependent if they are linked
by a bijective function. Contrary to logical (in)dependence, both the notions of relational
(ir)relevance and functional (ir)relevance are asymmetric. We also have the following relations
between these notions:
Logical independence⇔ Relational independence⇒ Functional independence
All these notions are objective and non-informative. Such kinds of dependencies are discussed
by Ferson and Kreinovich [105] in the case where sets are intervals of real values.
Also note that, in the above definitions, nothing prevents sets X1,X2 to be sets of prob-
abilities, and the above definitions of irrelevance (or independence) can well be applied to
credal sets (it is suggested by Couso et al. [33]). In particular, it could be interesting to study
how such dependencies could be taken into account when combining sets of probabilities
(Section 4.1.3.2).
5.1.2 (Ir)relevance in imprecise probability theories: first steps towards
a taxonomy
Since the question of interpreting and modeling irrelevance between variables is central in
uncertainty reasoning, it has been studied by many authors, often within the bounds of a par-
ticular theory, both for possibility theory [219, 6, 41, 43], random set theory [57, 216, 107, 30]
and imprecise probability theory [203, Ch.9], [33, 144]. In this work, we restrict our classifi-
cation to the main notions of irrelevance existing in imprecise probability theories, and only
to unconditional notions of irrelevance. Our study is also mainly formal, and only a minimal
amount of information is provided about interpretations. Indeed, considering conditional ir-
relevance as well as potential interpretations would require a study of its own, and is out of
the scope of the present work.
We thus consider two variables, X1,X2 assuming values in X1,X2, and PX1,PX2 the
credal sets induced by uncertainty representations on each of these variables. If credal sets
PX1,PX2 reduce to all probabilities in PX1,PX2 (i.e. ignorance on X1,X2), then we note
these credal sets IX1,IX2 .
We will also relate irrelevance notions in cases where both credal sets PX1,PX2 can be
represented by random sets (i.e., if their induced lower probability is ∞-montone). In this
case, we will note (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 the induced random sets, and for any focal set E ∈FX j ,
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we will often interpret m(E) as the probability that our knowledge on X j is modeled by the
credal set IE = {P ∈ PX |P(E) = 1}, that is the credal set representing ignorance on E. This
corresponds to the 2nd order interpretation mentioned in Section 3.5.2, where the 2nd order
level model is a precise probability, and the 1st order level model is reduced to a set. We
can now define the notions of unknown interaction, strong independence, repetition indepen-
dence, epistemic irrelevance and independence, random set independence, and possibilistic
non-interaction. All along this section, we will use a common example to illustrate them all
(the same as the one considered by Abellan and Klir [2], and similar to the one used by Couso
et al. [33]). This example, given below, has the advantage of being simple enough to illustrate
most notions in one sweep, while not being too simple, so that differences between notions
can be emphasized.
Example 5.1. Consider two variables X ,Y taking their values on (binary) spaces X = {x1,x2}
and Y = {y1,y2}. The only information we have about these variables are that p(x1)≤ p(x2)
and p(y1)≤ p(y2), generating two credal sets PX ,PY , which can be described by the follow-
ing sets of extreme points:
extPX = {(0.5,0.5);(0.5,1)} and extPY = {(0.5,0.5);(0.5,1)}
and the equivalent random sets (m,F )X ,(m,F )Y are given by
mX({x2}) = 0.5,mX({X }) = 0.5 and mY ({y2}) = 0.5,mY ({Y }) = 0.5
that are also possibility distributions, since focal sets are nested.
For convenience, in the subsequent examples, we will note Z = X ×Y , Z the associated
variable and zi j = xi× y j, i, j = 1,2 a generic element of Z . Similarly, we denote pi j =
p(xi× y j) and PZ = (p11, p12, p21, p22) joint probabilities on Z
5.1.2.1 Unknown interaction
Definition 5.4 (UI). Let PX1,PX2 be two marginal credal sets describing uncertainty on two
variables, X1,X2 assuming values in X1,X2. Then, a judgment of unknown interaction be-
tween X1,X2 is equivalent to building the joint credal set PUI,X(1:2) such that
PUI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|PX1 ∈PX1,Px2 ∈PX2}
where PX1,PX2 are respectively the marginal probabilities of PX(1:2) on X1,X2
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Unknown interaction [33] is equivalent to stating that we do not know the relationship be-
tween X1 and X2. In other word, the resulting joint structure include all possible combination
of marginal uncertainties, hence all type of possible (in)dependence between X1,X2. With re-
spect to our classification, it is a non-informative, subjective, symmetric type of independence.
Note that unknown interaction has no counterpart in classical probability theory, since even if
both marginal are precise, the joint representation resulting from an assumption of unknown
interaction is a credal set.
When credal sets can be modeled by random sets (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 , Fetz [107] shows
that unknown interaction comes down to considering the set MX(1:2) of random sets such that
(m,F )X(1:2) ∈MX(1:2) if
• A×B ∈FX(1:2) if and only if A ∈FX1,B ∈FX2
• ∀A ∈FX1, ∑B⊆FX2 mX(1:2)(A×B) = mX1(A)
• ∀B ∈FX2, ∑A⊆FX1 mX(1:2)(A×B) = mX2(B)
in this last case, unknown interaction is equivalent to assuming unknown interaction between
2nd order model (marginal bpa), and to assume that the 1st order joint model are the Cartesian
products of focal sets.
Example 5.2. The joint credal set resulting from unknown interaction between X ,Y and the
two marginal credal sets of Example 5.1 gives the credal set PUI,Z on Z that have the fol-
lowing extreme points:
extPUI,Z = {(0,0,0,1);(0,0.5,0.5,0);(0.5,0,0,0.5);(0,0.5,0,0.5);(0,0,0.5,0.5)}
Note that the uniform distribution is inside this credal set (i.e. it corresponds to the arithmetic
mean of the second and third joint probabilities)
5.1.2.2 Strong and repetition independence
Definition 5.5 (SI). Let PX1,PX2 be two marginal credal sets describing uncertainty on two
variables, X1,X2 assuming values in X1,X2. Then, a judgment of strong independence be-
tween X1,X2 is equivalent to building the joint credal set PSI,X(1:2) such that
PSI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|PX(1:2) = PX1⊗PX2, PX1 ∈PX1,PX2 ∈PX2}
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with ⊗ the classical stochastic product.
Strong independence (also called type-1 independence [203, Ch.9]) is equivalent to assum-
ing that both X1 and X2 are stochastically independent and are governed by some imprecisely
known random processes PX1 ∈ PX1 ,Px2 ∈ PX2 . With respect to our classification, strong
independence is informative, objective and symmetric.
Fetz [107] shows that, when credal sets can be modeled by random sets (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 ,
the joint credal set PSI,X(1:2) induced by a judgment of strong independence can also be ob-
tained by building the credal set
PSI,X(1:2) = {P ∈ PX(1:2)|P = ∑
A∈FX1
∑
B∈FX2
m(A)m(B)PX1,A⊗PX2,B}
such that
• ⊗ is the classical stochastic product.
• ∀A×B⊂X(1:2), PX1,A ∈ IA, PX2,B ∈ IB
• for a fixed A ∈FX1 , choose the same PX1,A for all B ∈FX2
• for a fixed B ∈FX2 , choose the same PX2,B for all A ∈FX1
which is equivalent, in a 2nd order interpretation of random sets, to assume that X1,X2 are
governed by two imprecisely known and stochastically independent random processes, whose
supports are themselves independently known with uncertainty. This means that we assume
one of the five possible probabilistic independence between the 2nd order (precise) uncertainty
models (see table 5.1), and that, at the 1st order level, we assume the existence of precise
probabilities, for which the only available information is the extent of the support (i.e., the
focal sets). This is why marginal probabilities on each focal set are forced to remain the same.
Within classical probability theory, strong independence corresponds to extensions of cases 1
and 2 of table 5.1.
The credal set PSI,X(1:2) also has a simple characterization in terms of its extreme points,
and we have:
extPSI,X(1:2)
= {PX1⊗PX2|PX1 ∈ extPX1 ,PX2 ∈ extPX2}
where extPXi is the set of extreme points of the credal set PXi , and ⊗ the stochastic prod-
uct. This computationally attractive property, which allows to easily build PSI,X(1:2) by fo-
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cusing only on extreme points, and the fact that strong independence satisfy so-called d-
separation [166, 35] explains that this notion has been studied by many authors and exten-
sively used in imprecise probabilistic extensions of popular graphical models such as naive
Bayesian classifiers [222]. See Cozman [37] for a recent and good review on graphical mod-
els and the use of independence in such models.
Example 5.3. The joint credal set resulting from strong independence between X ,Y and the
two marginal credal sets of Example 5.1 gives the credal set PSI,Z on Z that have the follow-
ing extreme points:
extPSI,Z = {(0,0,0,1);(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25);(0,0,0.5,0.5);(0,0.5,0,0.5)}
and it can be checked that all these extreme points can be found back by linear combination
of extreme points of extPUI,Z , thus we have PSI,Z ⊂PUI,Z
Definition 5.6 (RI). Let PX1 = PX2 = PX be two identical marginal credal sets describing
uncertainty on two different variables, X1,X2 assuming values in X1,X2, with X1 = X2 =
X . Then, a judgment of repetition independence between X1,X2 is equivalent to building the
joint credal set PRI,X(1:2) such that
PRI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|PX(1:2) = PX ⊗PX , PX ∈PX}
with ⊗ the classical stochastic independence.
Repetition independence (also called type-2 independence [203, Ch.9]) corresponds to the
case where X1,X2 have the same nature and can be assumed to follow an identical but impre-
cisely known random process. With respect to our classification, repetition independence is
informative, objective and symmetric. Note that this kind of independence is very popular in
classical statistics, where it corresponds to the assumption of "independently and identically"
distributed variables.
Example 5.4. The joint credal set resulting from repetition independence between X ,Y and
the two marginal credal sets of Example 5.1 gives the credal set PRI,Z on Z that have the
following extreme points:
extPRI,Z = {(0,0,0,1);(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25)}
and we have PRI,Z ⊂PSI,Z , since extPRI,Z ⊂ extPSI,Z
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5.1.2.3 Epistemic irrelevance and independence
Definition 5.7 (EIrr). Let PX1,PX2 be two marginal credal sets describing uncertainty on two
variables, X1,X2 assuming values in X1,X2. Then, judging that X1 is epistemically irrelevant
to X2 is equivalent to building the joint credal set PEIrr1→2,X(1:2) such that
PEIrr1→2,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)| ∀x(1:2) ∈X(1:2), pX(1:2)(x(1:2)) = pX1(x1)pX2(x2|x1),
PX1 ∈PX1,PX2(·|x1) ∈PX2}
with PX2(·|x1) the conditional probability on X2 given x1.
Enforcing PX2(·|x1) ∈ PX2 means that, upon learning X1 = x1, our uncertainty about X2
remain the same (is still described by PX2). Nevertheless, the particular probability assign-
ment pX2(x2|x1) is allowed to be different for different values x1 ∈X1, i.e. it is not assumed
that X2 is governed by some unique random process independent of the value assumed by X1.
This last point is essential to the notion of epistemic irrelevance, since if PX2(·|x1) is assumed
to be the same for every value x1 ∈X1, then strong independence is retrieved (as shown by
DeCooman and Miranda [50]).
With respect to our classification, epistemic irrelevance is informative and subjective. It is
also asymmetric, since assessing that X1 is epistemically irrelevant to X2 will lead to a joint
credal set different from the one obtained by assessing that X2 is epistemically irrelevant to
X1. Assessing that X1 is epistemically irrelevant to X2 do not imply any kind of knowledge
about how the value X2 could influence uncertainty on X1. The symmetric notion of epistemic
independence is defined as follow
Definition 5.8 (EInd). Two variables, X1,X2 are epistemically independent if X1 is judged
epistemically irrelevant to X2, and X2 epistemically irrelevant to X1. We denote PEInd,X(1:2)
the corresponding joint credal set.
Within classical probability theory, the notion of epistemic irrelevance and independence
are extensions of cases 3 and 4 of table 5.1. Notions of epistemic irrelevance and indepen-
dence are the most natural within Walley’s behavioral theory of imprecise probabilities [203],
while strong independence and repetition independence are more related to a Bayesian sensi-
tivity interpretation of credal sets (in which credal sets model a unique but imprecisely known
probability). This explains that epistemic irrelevance and independence have received a lot of
attention from researchers in the field of imprecise probabilities [200, 153, 38, 147].
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Example 5.5. The joint credal set resulting from assessing that Y is epistemically irrelevant to
X and built from the two marginal credal sets of Example 5.1 gives the credal set PEIrrY→X ,Z
on Z that have the following extreme points:
extPEIrrY→X ,Z ={(0,0,0,1);(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25);(0,0,0.5,0.5)
(0,0.5,0,0.5);(0.25,0.25,0,0.5);(0,0.5,0.25,0.25)}
and extreme points that are not in extPSI,Z are obtained when pY (y1|x1) 6= pY (y1|x2), but are
still in extPY . For instance, the last extreme point in extPEIrrY→X ,Z is obtained by choosing
pX(x1) = 0.5, pY (y1|x1) = 0.5 and pY (y1|x2) = 0, and cannot be expressed as a stochastic
product of extreme points of extPX ,extPY . Assessing that X is epistemically irrelevant of Y
result in the joint credal set PEIrrX→Y ,Z on Z that have the following extreme points:
extPEIrrX→Y ,Z ={(0,0,0,1);(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25);(0,0,0.5,0.5)
(0,0.5,0,0.5);(0.25,0,0.25,0.5);(0,0.25,0.5,0.25)}
and PEIrrX→Y ,Z 6= PEIrrY→X ,Z , but both includes PSI,Z .
We also have that the joint credal set PEInd,Z resulting from epistemic independence be-
tween X ,Y is such that PEInd,Z = PEIrrY→X ,Z∩PEIrrX→Y ,Z . In this specific example, we have
PSI,Z = PEInd,Z , but in general we only have PSI,Z ⊆ PEInd,Z (see Couso et al. [33] for
examples)
Epistemic irrelevance has a counterpart in random set theory, in which Dempster’s rule of
conditioning is used. Shafer [178, Ch.7.5] calls it cognitive independence (CI), and the notion
is also briefly studied by Ben Yaghlane et al. [216] under the name irrelevance. Here, we
just mention that a deeper study of this notion would involve the study of the maximal set of
joint random sets and of the associated joint credal set satisfying the constraint imposed by the
notion (i.e., factorization of upper probabilities). Such a study appears necessary if we wish
to make sense of this notion (if possible), both in random set theory and imprecise probability
theory. Also note that, contrary to the notion of epistemic irrelevance (Definition 5.7), cogni-
tive independence in random set theory is symmetric by definition, even if it intends to express
an asymmetric and evidential notion of irrelevance.
When credal sets PX1,PX2 can be modeled by random sets, another work that has to
be done is to define the constraints that have to be imposed on the joint bpas and on the
combination of focal sets so that the resulting structure is equivalent to epistemic irrelevance
of one variable to the other or of epistemic independence, as has be done by Fetz [107] for
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unknown interaction and strong independence. It would not be surprising for these constraints
to be close to the one used to retrieve strong independence with random sets, as epistemic
irrelevance and strong independence are closely related [50].
5.1.2.4 Random set independence
Definition 5.9 (RSI). Let (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 be two marginal random sets describing uncer-
tainty on two variables X1,X2 assuming values in X1,X2, and PX1,PX2 the induced credal
sets. Then, random set independence between X1,X2 is equivalent to build the joint credal set
PRSI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|∀A⊆X(1:2),PX(1:2)(A)≤ ∑
(EX1×EX2)∩A6= /0
EXi∈FXi
mX1(EX1)mX2(EX2)}
with mXi(EXi) the mass given to focal set EXi in (m,F )Xi
Random set independence [57, 207] (called evidential independence by Shafer [178, Ch.7.4])
can be seen as the counterpart to cases 1 and 2 of table 5.1 within random set theory. It is thus
totally coherent within the bounds of this theory, where it is the natural extension of stochastic
independence, since it comes down to building the joint random set (m,F )X(1:2) allocating
products of focal set masses to the Cartesian products of focal sets. It is a subjective, informa-
tive and symmetric concept of independence.
If random sets (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 are considered as 1
st order imprecise probabilistic mod-
els, it appears difficult to make sense of the joint credal set PRSI,X(1:2) . In this case, random
set independence can nevertheless be used as a convenient mathematical tool, since it can be
proved (see Fetz [107] or Couso [30]) that the credal set PRSI,X(1:2) includes the joint credal
sets obtained with assessments of epistemic irrelevance, epistemic independence and strong
independence. PRSI,X(1:2) can thus be used as an instrumental guaranteed outer approximation
of PEI,X(1:2) ,PSI,X(1:2) .
Ben Yaghlane et al. [216] have also shown that the joint credal set PRSI,X(1:2) is the unique
solution to the following set of constraints:
• ∀A×B ∈X(1:2),PX(1:2)(A×B) = PX1(A)PX2(B)
• ∀A×B ∈X(1:2),PX(1:2)(A×B) = PX1(A)PX2(B)
• PX(1:2) is an ∞-monotone capacity
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with PX1,PX2 ,PX(1:2),PX1,PX2,PX(1:2) respectively the lower and upper probabilities respec-
tively induced by (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 and by the joint credal set PX(1:2) satisfying the above
constraints. This indicates that, if one wants to express a notion of independence and restrict
its expressiveness within the bounds of random set theory (for reasons such as computational
convenience), then random set independence has to be used.
Example 5.6. The joint credal set resulting from random set independence between X ,Y and
the two marginal credal sets of Example 5.1 gives the following joint random set (m,F )Z:
mZ(z22) = 0.25 mZ(z21× z22) = 0.25
mZ(Z ) = 0.25 mZ(z12× z22) = 0.25
and the induced credal set PRSI,Z on Z have the following extreme points:
extPRSI,Z ={(0,0,0,1);(0,0,0.5,0.5);(0,0.5,0,0.5);(0.25,0,0,0.75);(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25)
(0.25,0.25,0,0.5);(0.25,0,0.25,0.5);(0,0.5,0.25,0.25);(0,0.25,0.5,0.25) }
and we have that PRSI,Z includes in joint credal sets resulting from epistemic irrelevance.
Note that even if PX1,PX2 are not induced by random sets, Definition 5.9 can be general-
ized by a proper use ofMöbius inverse (Definition 3.3) and by considering products of negative
masses and positive masses. Although the interpretation of such a joint structure has still to be
clarified, it could be advantageously used in practical application as guaranteed outer approx-
imation, provided the inclusion relation with strong independence, epistemic irrelevance and
independence still holds. Abellan and Klir [2] briefly study under which assumptions such
an extension would coincide with strong independence, but do not elaborate further on the
relationship.
Should random sets (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 be seen as 2
nd order imprecise probabilistic mod-
els, then interpreting random set independence is almost straightforward, as it corresponds to
assume one of the five possible probabilistic independence between the 2nd order (precise)
uncertainty models (see table 5.1), and to take the Cartesian product as our joint uncertainty
model at the 1st order level.
5.1.2.5 Possibilistic non-interaction
Definition 5.10 (PI). Let piX1,piX2 be two marginal possibility distributions describing uncer-
tainty on two variables X1,X2 assuming values in X1,X2. Then, possibilistic non-interaction
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between X1,X2 is equivalent to build the joint possibility distribution piPI,X(1:2) such that, for all
x(1:2) in X(1:2)
piPI,X(1:2)(x(1:2)) = min(piX1(x1),piX2(x2))
We can then associate to piPI,X(1:2) the joint credal set PPI,X(1:2) such that:
PPI,X(1:2) = {PX(1:2) ∈ PX(1:2)|∀A⊆X(1:2), PX(1:2)(A)≥ NPI,X(1:2)(A)}
with NPI,X(1:2)(A) the necessity measure of event A induced by piPI,X(1:2) . With respect to our
classification, possibilistic non-interaction is informative, symmetric and subjective.
Possibilistic non-interaction has been first introduced in the framework of possibility the-
ory by Zadeh [218], and the term non-interaction was used on the basis that, inside the Carte-
sian product of each α-cut, variables X1,X2 are judged non-interactive (i.e. logically indepen-
dent). Fetz [107] calls this notion fuzzy set independence.
Let (m,F )X1,(m,F )X2 be the two random sets induced by piX1,piX2 . Then, the joint ran-
dom set (m,F )PI,X(1:2) induced by piPI,X(1:2) can be built in the following way:
• Let {0 = γ0 < γ1 < .. . < γM} be the set of all distinct values taken by piX1,piX2 , respec-
tively on X1,X2.
• Build a joint bpa mPI,X(1:2) such that m(Eγ i,piX1 ×Eγ i,piX2 ) = γi+1−γi for all i= 0, . . . ,M−
1, with Eγ i,piXj the strong γi-cut of distribution piX j .
which well shows that piPI,X(1:2) is equivalent to assuming a complete dependence between
α-cuts, and consequently between levels of confidence. Inclusion relationships between pos-
sibilistic non-interaction and random set independence notions have been studied by Tonon
and Chen [192].
If we now compare the credal setPPI,X(1:2) with joint credal sets generated by other notions
of irrelevance, it appears that it has poor relationships with them (it generally neither includes
nor is included in any of them). This is not so surprising, since possibilistic non-interaction
was first motivated within possibility theory, which does not generalize classical probabili-
ties and is at odd with it (see Figure 3.1), thus there is no obvious reasons for possibilistic
irrelevance to generalize in some way one of the probabilistic independences summarized in
table 5.1. Similarly to random set independence, if piX1,piX2 are interpreted as 1
st imprecise
probabilistic level, making sense of possibilistic irrelevance appears difficult. Nevertheless,
given marginal credal sets PX1,PX2 induced by piX1,piX2 , the joint credal set PPI,X(1:2) is the
unique solution to the following constraints:
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• For any γi ∈ {γ0, . . . ,γM−1}, PX(1:2)(Eγ i,piX1 ×Eγ i,piX2 ) = 1− γi
• PX(1:2) is a necessity measure.
with PX(1:2) the lower probability of the joint credal set satisfying the above constraints.
If possibility distributions piX1,piX2 are interpreted as 2
nd order imprecise probabilistic
model, then the joint structure piPI,X(1:2) is equivalent to considering a complete correlation
between 2nd order (precise) models and to considering the Cartesian product at the 1st order
level.
Example 5.7. The joint credal set resulting from possibilistic non-interaction between X ,Y and
the two marginal credal sets of Example 5.1 gives the following joint possibility distribution
piZ:
piZ(z11) = piZ(z12) = piZ(z21) = 0.5 piZ(z22) = 1
the induced random set (m,F )piZ is such that
mpiZ({z22}) = 0.5 mpiZ({Z }) = 0.5
and the induced credal set PPI,Z on Z have the following extreme points:
extPPI,Z = {(0,0,0,1);(0,0,0.5,0.5);(0,0.5,0,0.5);(0.5,0,0,0.5)}
and it can be checked thatPPI,Z is neither included in nor includes other credal sets considered
up to now, except forPUI,Z (simply note that a probability assignment such that pZ(z11) = 0.5
cannot be reached by convex combination of extreme points of other credal sets, except for
PUI,Z and PPI,Z , and similarly, that the uniform distribution on Z , which is in all other
credal sets, cannot be expressed through a convex combination of elements in extPPI,Z ).
The following proposition shows that the notion of possibilistic non-interaction can be
interpreted as a non-informative irrelevance notion, where all the information that is kept is
the information on elementary elements of the Cartesian product:
Proposition 5.1. Let pi1,pi2 be two possibility distributions, Ppi1,Ppi2 the induced credal sets
and PUI,pi(1:2) the joint credal set induced from marginal credal sets Ppi1,Ppi2 and a judgment
of Unknown Interaction. Then, we have, for any x(1:2) ∈X(1:2):
PUI,pi(1:2)({x(1:2)}) = PUI,pi(1:2)(x1× x2) = min(Ppi1({x1}),Ppi2({x2})) = min(pi1(x1),pi2(x2))
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with PUI,pi(1:2),Ppi1 ,Ppi2 the upper probabilities of PUI,pi(1:2),Ppi1,Ppi2 respectively.
Proof. Consider a generic element x(1:2) ∈X(1:2), and let p′1 ∈Ppi1, p′2 ∈Ppi2 be two prob-
ability distributions such that p′1(x1) = pi1(x1) and p
′
2(x2) = pi2(x2). Now, let p
′
(1:2) be a joint
probability distributions on X(1:2) which have p
′
1, p
′
2 as marginals. By using the Frechet
bounds, we know that p′(1:2)(x1× x2) is bounded as follows
max(p′1(x1)+ p
′
2(x2)−1,0)≤ p′(1:2)(x1× x2)≤min(p′1(x1), p′2(x2))
and that these bounds can be reached by some joint distribution p′(1:2). Since p
′
1(x1), p
′
2(x2)
are upper bounds, and since a judgment of Unknown Interaction consider every possible
joint distribution built from marginals that are in Ppi1,Ppi2 , we have PUI,pi(1:2)(x1 × x2) =
min(Ppi1({x1}),Ppi2({x2})), and this finishes the proof.
This proposition shows that taking the joint possibility distribution induced by possibilistic
non-interaction is equivalent to making an unknown interaction judgment between credal sets
and then keeping only the information related to the singletons of X(1:2)
To conclude with possibilistic non-interaction and possibilistic joint models in general, it
appears that in a quantitative framework, one cannot fully model complex notions of (ir)relevance
or independence only with the language of possibility distributions. It is also the conclusion
reached by Miranda and de Cooman [147] in their study of epistemic dependence in quanti-
tative possibility theory. Nevertheless, as they notice, possibility theory and distributions are
very useful in qualitative framework, in which some important previous work studying inde-
pendence in possibility theory took place [6, 75]. It is also important to recall that, by being
the simplest model of imprecise probabilities, possibility distributions are also the most con-
venient from a computational standpoint. Hence, it is always useful to be able to provide joint
possibility distributions that are guaranteed outer-approximation of a given joint uncertainty
representation, these distributions then playing the role of first "quick and clean" approxima-
tions (see Section 5.3).
Our short walk in the jungle of independence notions in quantitative imprecise probability
theories would not be complete without mentioning Kuznetsov’s [? ] condition of indepen-
dence (KI), studied by Cozman [36]. This condition, based on lower and upper expectations
reached by random variables, mainly impose that intervals of expectations follows the rules
of interval arithmetic [152]. It is the most natural extension of case 5 in Table 5.1 inside
imprecise probabilisty theories, and we consider it as more related to non-correlation than
to independence. Cozman [36] shows that, given marginal credal sets PX1,PX2 , the most
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conservative joint credal set constructible from Kuznetsov’s independence condition, that we
note PKI,X(1:2) , includes the joint credal set built from strong independence assessment and is
included in the joint credal set built from epistemic independence. Within our classification,
Kuznetsov’s independence is informative, subjective and symmetric.
5.1.2.6 Irrelevance and independence: a general picture
We just have recalled the main notions of irrelevance and independence existing within impre-
cise probability theory. From this review, it is clear that there are many questions to be solved.
Nevertheless, we can sketch some general conclusions.
First, note that epistemic notions of irrelevance (all notions of previous section) requires
to first assume logical independence between spaces. This pre-requisite assumption of logical
independence between spaces also applies between sets of probability distributions.
Second, independence notions are useful to demonstrate the poor expressive power of
precise probabilities and classical sets. Let PX1,PX2 be two credal sets on X1,X2, then, if
they respectively reduce to precise probabilities PX1,PX2 , the following notions collapse into
the classical stochastic independence (as already suggested by table 5.1):
SI≡ EIrr≡ EInd≡ RSI≡ KI≡ CI (Cogn. Ind.)≡ RI
with repetition independence applying only when PX1 = PX2 . Similarly, if the two credal sets
reduce to IX1,IX2 , that is credal sets equivalent to sets X1,X2, the following notions collapse
into the Cartesian product X(1:2):
SI≡ EIrr≡ EInd≡ RSI≡ KI≡ CI (Cogn. Ind.)≡ UI≡ PI.
Given two marginal credal sets PX1,PX2 , Figure 5.1 summarizes the inclusion relation-
ships between the different irrelevance assessments reviewed in the previous section, with
notions RI,RSI,CI,PI applying when possible. This figure allows to compare how much each
irrelevance notion reduces the imprecision of the resulting joint uncertainty. For instance, we
can see that an assessment of epistemic independence following an assessment of strong inde-
pendence would not reduce the uncertainty. However, this does not mean that an assessment
of epistemic independence following one of strong independence would be useless, let alone
that the latter implies the former. A simple illustration is the case of a coin whose charac-
teristics are unknown: while it is reasonable to judge the results of each successive flips to
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PSI,X(1:2) ⊆PKI,X(1:2)⊆PEInd,X(1:2)⊆
{
PEIrr,X1→2
PEIrr,X2→1
}
⊆PRSI,X(1:2)⊆PCI,X(1:2)⊆PUI,X(1:2)
⊆ ⊆
PRI,X(1:2) PPI,X(1:2)
Figure 5.1: Inclusion relationships of joint models, with marginal credal sets
PX1 ,PX2
be stochastically independent (strong independence), it would be unreasonable to also judge
them epistemically independent, since it would not allow one to learn from the successive
flipping results (i.e., to know if the coin is loaded or fair). Note that there is an important
subcase on which the joint uncertainty representations resulting from Strong independence,
Kusnetsov independence, Epistemic irrelevance/independence and random set independence
all agree: whenever A ⊆X1, B ⊆X2, these five notions produce the same lower and upper
probabilities on A×B, which are
PX(1:2)(A×B) = PX1(A)PX2(B) and PX(1:2)(A×B) = PX1(A)PX2(B)
Table 5.2 summarizes how each notions of irrelevance/independence can be classified,
whether they are symmetric or not and if they are (always) expressible within a particular
uncertainty theory (i.e., imprecise probability theory, random set theory, possibility theory),
given our current knowledge. Also note that, if decompositional types of irrelevance can easily
be extended to any Cartesian product X(1:N) of N spaces, it is not the case for evidential and
non-symmetric types of irrelevance.
Besides this formal study stands the question of interpreting and using irrelevance state-
ments in practice. It appears that a given irrelevance notion can have multiple interpretations,
can fit different theories and serve different purposes. Eventually, the choice of a particular
notion should be guided by:
• Available evidence/knowledge about the variables, their relations and about the consid-
ered problem.
• The framework of application.
• The computational convenience of a particular notion.
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Irrelevance notion Inf./nInf. Obj./Sub. Sym/Asym. Expressible in
IP RS P
Logical Ind. nInf. Obj. Sym
√ √ √
Relational Irr. nInf. Obj. Asym.
√ √ √
Functional Irr. nInf. Obj. Asym.
√ √ √
Unknown Int. nInf. Sub. Sym
√ √ ×
Possibilistic non-Int. Inf./nInf. Sub. Sym
√ √ √
Cognitive ind. Inf. Sub. Asym. ?
√ ×
Random set Ind. Inf. Sub. Sym
√ √ ×
Epistemic Irr. Inf. Sub. Asym.
√
? ×
Kusnetsov Ind. Inf. Sub. Sym
√
? ×
Strong Ind. Inf. Obj. Sym
√ √ ×
Repetition Ind. Inf. Obj. Sym
√
? ×
Table 5.2: Irrelevance notions in uncertainty: a summary (?: matter of further re-
search)
For example, even if the notion of random set independence can sometimes appear conser-
vative or somewhat ad hoc, its computational convenience and the fact that it allows a simple
use of sampling techniques [117, 116] are instrumental when the computational cost of using
strong independence or epistemic independence is too high. The same arguments hold for
unknown interaction and possibilistic non-interaction, which are equipped with a full-fledged
counterpart of interval arithmetic (see, for example, Williamson and Downs [209] for proba-
bilistic arithmetic and Kaufmann and Gupta [126] for possibilistic arithmetic), making them
very efficient tools providing fast approximations.
To conclude, it is important, when making an (ir)relevance statement, to motivate this
statement, e.g., by using our knowledge of how things work, by considering available ob-
servations (frequencies) or evidences, by making experiments. . . Such a motivation requires
careful thinking, since as emphasized recently by Shafer [179, Ch.5.] (and, in a shorter way,
by Couso [30]), witnessing formal independence in the observations (i.e., stochastic product
of frequencies) does not forcefully imply independence or irrelevance in the processes gener-
ating these frequencies, similarly to the known fact that a non-null statistical correlation does
not imply a true (causal) relationship between two variables.
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5.2 Relating irrelevance notions to event-trees: first results
A quite interesting idea to motivate and interpret (ir)relevance statements is to consider them
inside event-trees. In his book, Shafer [179] uses event-trees (first instances of which probably
dates back to Huygens [120]) in order to develop a complete theory of probability and of
causal conjecture. In this work, he elaborates on the idea that probabilistic thinking should be
associated to a "story" or a protocol, associated to a particular observer, and describing how
the world works. In particular, he links (in)dependence with Reichenbach’s [172] seminal idea
of common cause.
This notion of event tree is central in the later approach developed by Shafer and Vovk [180],
where they develop a theory of (imprecise) probability based on a game-theoretic framework
and involving lower and upper expectations. Recently, de Cooman and Hermans [47, 48] have
shown that this theory can be related to Walley’s [203] behavioural approach to imprecise
probabilities, and they have introduced imprecise probability trees as a bridge between the
two. By showing that many results can be imported from one theory to the other, they make
significant progress towards the unification of the two theories. Given this relation between
the two theories, it makes sense to wonder if and how (ir)relevance statements of one theory
fits into the other theory, and if it can help in interpreting and understanding them. Partial
answers are given in this section, where we give results showing how the recent notion of
forward irrelevance [50], consisting in iterated epistemic irrelevance statements, fits into im-
precise probability trees and relates to event-tree independence. Discussions about preliminary
results for other irrelevance statements can be found in Appendix G.
5.2.1 Event-trees
An event tree is composed of situations linked together, and it represents what relevant events
may possibly happen in what particular order in the world, according to a particular subject,
i.e., an event tree shows the probability "story" viewed by this subject, and its uncertainty
about what will happens. It is formally equivalent to a rooted tree in graph theory. Here, we
restrict ourselves to trees with finite depth and width. The notions that we now introduce are
illustrated in Figure 5.2. A situation is a node in the tree. The initial situation is the root of the
tree. A terminal situation is a leaf of the tree; all other situations, including the initial one, are
called non-terminal. A path in the tree is a sequence of situations from the initial to a terminal
situation. A path goes through a situation s if s belongs to it. The set X of all possible
paths, or equivalently, of all terminal situations, is called the sample space, and is equivalent
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to spaces we considered in earlier sections and chapters. An event is modeled by any set of
terminal situations. Situations immediately following a non-terminal situation s are called
daughters of s, and the set of such daughters is denoted by D(s). The link between a situation
s and one of its daughters t is called a move from s to t. If a situation s is before a situation t in
the tree, we say that s strictly precedes t, and denote this as s< t; and if a situation s is before
or equal to a situation t, we say that s precedes t, and denote this as s ≤ t. Two situations
are called disjoint if there is no path they both belong to. A cut is a set of disjoint situations,
such that every path goes through exactly one situation in the cut. If each situation in a cut V
(strictly) precedes some situation in another cut U , then V is said to (strictly) precede U , and
we denote this as V ≤U (V <U).
t
u1
u2
u3
u4
ω
U
Figure 5.2: An event tree, with initial situation , non-terminal situations (such as
t) in grey, and terminal situations (such as ω) in black. Also depicted is a cut U =
{u1, . . . ,u4}. Observe that t < u1 and that D(t) = {u1,u2}. Also, u4 and t are disjoint,
but not u4 and ω .
5.2.2 Probability trees
Branching probabilities ps for a non-terminal situation s are non-negative numbers summing
up to one, and each of them is attached to a different move originating in s: we denote by
ps(t) the probability to go from s to its daughter t; ps is a probability mass assignment on the
set D(s). A (precise) probability tree is an event tree for which every non-terminal situation
has such branching probabilities. ps(t) = p(t|s) is interpreted as the probability to reach t,
conditional on the fact that we are in situation s, and Ps is thus a local predictive probabilistic
model for what will happen right after s. Such a tree defines a joint probabilistic model on
the sample space X such that for any x ∈X , p(x) is the product of all probabilities on the
branches of the path reaching x.
Example 5.8. We illustrate the concept of probability tree with an event-tree describing two
successive flipping of coins:
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?,?
t,?
t, t
pt,?(t,t)=1/2
t,h
pt,?(t,h)=1/2
p?,?(t,?)=1/2
h,?
h, t
ph,?(h,t)=1/4
h,h
ph,?(h,h)=3/4
p?,?(h,?)=1/2
The labels for the situations are explicit, e.g., h,? means that the first coin has landed ‘heads’,
and the second still has to be flipped. As indicated on the edges of the tree, the first flip is made
with a coin judged fair. Same coin is kept if it lands ’heads’, otherwise a biased coin is used if
it lands ’tails’. We can already note that this modeling requires to model our uncertainty with
quite strong statements, that is with precise probabilities for each coin. The joint probabilistic
model defined by the above tree is p(t, t) = 1/4, p(h, t) = 1/8, p(h,h) = 3/8, p(t,h) = 1/4
Let us now consider a non-terminal situation s and a function fs : D(s) → R affecting a
value to each daughter of s. We denote by Es( fs) = E( fs|s) = ∑t∈D(s) ps(t) fs(t) the expected
value of fs given that we are in situation s. Let us denote by L (D(s)) the set of all real-valued
functions on D(s), then, the local probabilistic model Ps can be equivalently described by
expected values Es( fs)1, with fs ∈L (D(s)) (simply note that ps(t) is retrieved when fs(t) = 1
and fs = 0 elsewhere).
If we now consider a function f : X → R on the sample space X , then the expectation
Es( f ) of f in any situation s can be calculated from local models Ps by using a rule of it-
erated expectation [179, Ch.3.], also referred as concatenation formula by de Cooman and
Hermans [47, 48]: for any situation t, we have Et( f ) = Et(E( f |D(t)), with E( f |D(t)) the
function that assumes the value Es( f ) for each s ∈D(t). If x ∈X is a terminal situation, then
we have Ex( f ) = f (x). The (conditional) probabilities of any event A ⊆X can be retrieved
by considering the indicator function 1(A) such that 1(A) (x) = 1 if x ∈ A, zero otherwise2.
Example 5.9. In the probability tree of Example 5.8, let us consider the function f such that
p(t, t) = 3, p(h, t) =−1, p(h,h) =−2, p(t,h) = 2. Expected values obtained for the different
situations are summarized below.
1Called prevision in de Finetti language [108], who used P rather than E, E being used for so-called coherent
extensions in his work
2Within probability trees, we could have limited ourselves to probabilities of events, but considering expec-
tations is necessary with credal sets and imprecise probability trees, see Appendix A
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?,?
t,?
t, t
1/2
t,h
1/2
1/2
h,?
h, t
1/4
h,h
3/4
1/2
E(hh)( f ) =−2E(ht)( f ) =−1E(th)( f ) = 2E(tt)( f ) = 3
E(h?)( f ) = −7/4E(t?)( f ) = 5/2
E(??)( f ) = 3/8
5.2.3 Imprecise probability trees
Now, an imprecise probability tree3 is simply an event tree in which to each non-terminal
situation s is associated a closed convex set Ps of branching probabilities ps, describing a
subject’s uncertainty about which move is going to be observed just after s (i.e., immediate
predictions [48]).
To an imprecise probability tree, we can associate coherent lower expectations. First of all,
for any non-terminal situation s, and for any real-valued function h on D(s), we can consider
the lower expectation Es(h) = min{EPs(h)|Ps ∈Ps} with EPs(h) the expectation of h in s
given the local probabilistic model Ps. Es
4 and Ps are equivalent local predictive models
for what is going to be observed immediately after s, these models being now allowed to be
imprecise (whereas in probability tree they are necessarily precise). We can also consider
global predictive models for imprecise probability trees: Let f be a function on the sample
space X . For every situation t, we consider the lower expectation E( f |t) conditional on t:
lower expectation of f , given that the actual path goes through t.
The global models E(·|t) can be calculated from the local models Es by backwards recur-
sion, using theConcatenation Formula [47, 48]: for any given situation t, E( f |t)=Et(E( f |D(t))),
where E( f |D(t)) is the function on D(t) that assumes the value E( f |s) in each s ∈ D(t); and
for a terminal situation x ∈ X , we have E( f |x) = f (x). Lower and upper probabilities of
events are retrieved as in the precise case, by considering lower and upper expectations of
indicator functions on events.
Example 5.10. Let us illustrate this with the same event tree as in Example 5.8, but this time
with imprecise local probabilistic models for some situations.
3Shafer [179, Ch. 12] uses the term ‘martingale tree’.
4In Walley’s work [203], similarly to de Finetti [108], lower expectations are called lower previsions and
denoted P, E standing for the so-called natural extension
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?,?
t,?
t, t
pt,?(t,t)=1/2
t,h
pt,?(t,h)=1/2
p?,?(t,?)∈[1/4,3/4]
h,?
h, t
ph,?(h,t)∈[1/4,3/4]
h,h
ph,?(h,h)∈[1/4,3/4]
p?,?(h,?)∈[1/4,3/4]
1110
11/2
[5/8, 7/8]
As indicated on the edges of the tree, the knowledge about the first coin is modelled by the
imprecise probability assignments p(h) ∈ [1/4,3/4] and p(t) ∈ [1/4,3/4]. If it lands ‘heads’, we
keep the same coin, otherwise the second flip is made with a fair coin (p(h) = p(t) = 1/2).
Also indicated are the different steps in the calculation of the lower and upper probability of
getting ‘heads’ at least once, using the Concatenation Formula.
5.2.4 Forward irrelevance in event trees
Let us briefly recall the notion of forward irrelevance, discussed in detail by De Cooman and
Miranda [50], before relating it to independence in event trees. First recall that the notion of
epistemic irrelevance for credal set is an asymmetric notion (see Section 5.1.2.3).
Now, assume that uncertainty bears on (random) variables X1, . . . ,XN , respectively assum-
ing values in X1, . . . ,XN . We assume logical independence (Section 5.1.1.2) between all
these variables, since it is a pre-requisite to express forward irrelevance. A function f defined
on X(1:N) is called X(k:ℓ)-measurable if f (x(1:N)) = f (y(1:N)) for all x(1:N) and y(1:N) in X(1:N)
such that x(k:ℓ) = y(k:ℓ), that is an X(k:ℓ)-measurable function is totally determined by the val-
ues it takes on X(k:ℓ). We denote by L (X(k:ℓ)) the set of all X(k:ℓ)-measurable functions, and
by f(k:ℓ) a generic function in this set.
We now consider the specific example where the Xk constitute a stochastic process with
"time" variable k, implying in particular that it is known in advance that the value of random
variable Xℓ will be revealed before that of Xℓ+1, where ℓ = 1,2, . . . ,N− 1. Such a specific
situation can be modeled by a special event tree (also called a standard tree [179, Ch. 2]) where
the situations (nodes) s have the general form x(1:k) ∈X(1:k), k = 0, . . . ,N. For k = 0 there is
some abuse of notation, as we let X(1:0) := {} and x(1:0) := . The sets X(1:k) constitute
special cuts of the tree, where the value of Xk is revealed (known). We have X(1:1) <X(1:2) <
· · ·< X(1:N), and this sequence of cuts is also called a standard filter [179, Ch. 2]. It is clear
that D(x(1:k)) = {x(1:k)}×Xk+1 for k = 0,1, . . . ,N− 1, that is the daughters of a situation in
cut X(1:k) are the values that Xk+1 can assume. The sample space of such a tree is X(1:N),
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and with the variable Xk there corresponds a set L (Xk) of Xk-measurable functions on this
sample space. For instance, in the standard tree of Example 5.9, functions characterising the
second coin flip are such that f (t,h) = f (h,h) and f (t, t) = f (h, t). Below is another example
of a standard tree.
Example 5.11. We see here the first two cuts of a standard tree, with X1 = {a,b} and X2 =
{α,β ,γ}.
a b
(a,α) (a,β ) (a,γ) (b,α) (b,β ) (b,γ)
X1
X(1:2)
As in the previous section, we consider that our uncertainty in each situation about what
will be observed next is described by a local credal set, or equivalently by lower expectations
of real-valued functions defined on the set of daughters of the situation. To any non-terminal
node x(1:k) (k = 0,1, . . . ,N−1) then corresponds a (coherent) local predictive lower expecta-
tion Ex(1:k) defined on L (D(x(1:k))) (in other words on L (Xk+1)). Recall that Ex(1:k) is equiv-
alent to a local credal set Px(1:k) . This local predictive model represents beliefs or knowledge
about the value of Xk+1 , given that the k previous variables X(1:k) assume the values x(1:k).
This means that to each node is attached a credal set of conditional probabilities. For instance,
in Example 5.11, to situation a would corresponds a local predictive model Ea describing our
uncertainty about which values X2 would assume on D(a) = {α,β ,γ} given that X1 = a.
For standard imprecise probability trees, the Concatenation Formula given above for de-
riving the global lower previsions E(·|x(1:ℓ)) on L (X(1:N)) from the local models Ex(1:k)
completely coincides with the formulae for Marginal Extension, derived by Miranda and De
Cooman [148]. Recall that this formula allows to build, from assessments of (local) credal sets
of conditional probabilities, joint uncertainty models. However, using Marginal Extension in
general requires to assess as many credal sets as there are nodes in the tree, and this number
can increase exponentially with the number of variables.
A way to reduce the number of needed assessments is to use an assessment of forward
irrelevance, meaning that for 1≤ k≤N−1, uncertainty about the value of the ‘future’ random
variable Xk+1 won’t be changed by learning new information about the values of the ’past’
random variables X(1:k): the past random variables X1, . . . ,Xk are epistemically irrelevant to the
212 Independence and uncertainty
future random variable Xk+1, for 1≤ k ≤ N−1. This is expressed by the following condition
involving the local models: for all 0≤ k≤N−1, any function fk+1 in L (Xk+1), and all x(1:k)
in X(1:k):
Ex(1:k)( fk+1) = E( fk+1|x(1:k)) = Ek+1( fk+1), (5.1)
where Ek+1 is the so-called marginal lower prevision on L (Xk+1), and is equivalent to spec-
ifying a marginal credal set Pk+1, which expresses the uncertainty about the value of Xk+1,
irrespective of the values assumed by the other random variables. Equation (5.1) indicates that
our belief about the value assumed by Xk+1 do not depend on the values x(1:k) observed for
variables X1, . . . ,Xk. Invoking the Concatenation Formula now leads to a very specific way
of combining the marginal lower expectations E1, . . . , EN into a joint lower expectation, re-
flecting the assessment of forward irrelevance. This joint lower prevision, called the forward
irrelevant product, is studied in detail by De Cooman and Miranda [50], who also use it to
prove very general laws of large numbers [49].
We now proceed to show that forward irrelevance is exactly the same thing as Shafer’s
notion of event-tree independence, when applied to standard imprecise probability trees. In
Shafer’s [179] terminology, a situation s influences a variable X if there is at least one situation
t ∈D(s) such that uncertainty about the value of X modifies when moving from s to t; when we
adapt this definition to imprecise probability trees this means that E( f |s) 6= E( f |t), where f is
some function whose value depends on (and only on) the outcome of X . Two variables X and
Y are called event-tree independent if there is no situation that influences both of them [179,
Ch.8].
In a standard imprecise probability tree, a situation x(1:k) influences a variable Xm if there is
at least one situation x(1:k+1) inD(x(1:k)) and one function fm ∈L (Xm) such that E( fm|x(1:k)) 6=
E( fm|x(1:k+1)). Note that in a standard imprecise probability tree, the only situations x(1:k) that
can influence Xm are such that k < m, since in all other situations, the value of Xm has already
been revealed ‘for some time’. In addition, it is easy to check that Xm is always influenced
by any situation x(1:m−1) in the cut X(1:m−1) right before the value of Xm is revealed (i.e. the
value of Xm is no longer uncertain).
Proposition 5.2. Let X1, . . . , XN be N random variables. Then there is forward irrelevance,
or in other words, the random variables X(1:k) are epistemically irrelevant to Xk+1 for 1 ≤
k ≤ N− 1 if and only if the random variables X1, . . . , XN are event-tree independent in the
corresponding standard imprecise probability tree.
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Proof. We deal with the ‘only if’ part first. Suppose the random variables X(1:N) are forward
irrelevant. Consider any Xk and function fk ∈ L (Xk), where 1 ≤ k ≤ N. Then it follows
from the forward irrelevance condition (5.1) and the Concatenation Formula that Ek( fk) =
Ex(1:k−1)( fk) = E( fk|x(1:k−1)) for all x(1:k−1) in X(1:k−1). Applying the Concatenation Formula
again leads to E( fk|x(1:k−2)) = Ex(1:k−2)(E( fk|x(1:k−2), ·)) = Ex(1:k−2)(Ek( fk)) = Ek( fk), and if
we continue the backwards recursion, we see that
Ek( fk) = E( fk|x(1:k−1)) = E( fk|x(1:k−2)) = · · ·= E( fk|x(1:2)) = E( fk|x1) = E( fk|).
This implies that the only situations that (may) influence Xk are the ones in the cutX(1:k−1) im-
mediately before Xk is revealed. Therefore, no situation can influence more than one variable,
and there is event-tree independence.
Next, we turn to the ‘if’ part. Assume that all variables are event-tree independent in
the standard tree. This implies that no variable Xk can be influenced by a situation x(1:ℓ)
corresponding to a time ℓ < k−1 (If Xk were influenced by such a situation, then we know that
this situation also always influences Xℓ+1, and ℓ+1< k, thus we end up with a contradiction).
So for all x(1:k−1) ∈X(1:k−1) and all fk ∈L (Xk):
E( fk|x(1:k−1)) = E( fk|x(1:k−2)) = · · ·= E( fk|x(1:2)) = E( fk|x1) = E( fk|).
Now of course E( fk|) = E( fk) = Ek( fk), where Ek is the marginal lower expectation for Xk,
and it follows from the Concatenation Formula that E( fk|x(1:k−1)) = Ex(1:k−1)( fk). This shows
that (5.1) is satisfied, so indeed there is forward irrelevance.
5.2.5 Usefulness and meaningfulness of the result
The above result is a first step towards a unification of independence notions used in Wal-
ley’s [203] behavioral theory with independence notion in event-trees, these last ones being
central in the recent theory developed by Shafer and Vovk [180]. It is of course desirable to
extend it to other structural judgments [203, Ch.9] about variables and to more general sit-
uations. Some preliminary ideas concerning other independence notions (such as epistemic
independence) can be found in Appendix G. Also, there is quite a number of interesting things
(both practically and theoretically) to say about this result, despite its somewhat preliminary
nature.
First, assume we want to consider a theory of uncertain (random) processes, where prob-
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abilities are no longer necessarily precise. Since the concept of independence in classical
random processes has many counterparts when allowing imprecision, it is natural to wonder
what is the most useful and meaningful of them? There are a number of reasons to prefer
the asymmetric notion of epistemic irrelevance, and its generalization to multiple variables
(forward irrelevance), rather than the symmetric notion of epistemic independence. Some of
these reasons, that we find compelling, are the following:
• When a notion that is (more or less, as shows table 5.1) automatically symmetrical,
breaks apart into two asymmetrical counterparts when using a more powerful language,
symmetry becomes something that has to be justified: it can’t be imposed without giving
it another thought.
• An assessment of epistemic independence is stronger, and leads to higher values of
lower expectations and to a smaller joint uncertainty. This means that epistemic inde-
pendence leads to make stronger commitments about what could happen, and these may
be unwarranted when it is only epistemic irrelevance that one want to model.
• Joint credal sets, lower probabilities and expectations based on an epistemic irrelevance
assessment are generally speaking straightforward to calculate, as the discussion of the
Concatenation Formula in Section 5.2.4 testifies (See also other related works [47, 49]).
But calculating joint lower previsions from marginals based on an epistemic indepen-
dence assessment is quite often a very complicated matter [203, Ch. 9.3.2].
• Finally, in a random process, it is known that the value of Xk will be available before the
value of Xk+1. Stating that Xk is epistemically independent of Xk+1 amounts to judging
that (i) getting to know the value of Xk won’t change his beliefs about Xk+1 [forward
irrelevance]; and (ii) getting to know the value of Xk+1 won’t change his beliefs about
Xk [backward irrelevance]. Since we always know Xk before Xk+1 (ii) is either counter-
factual (since there is no longer any kind of uncertainty concerning the value of Xk when
learning the value of Xk+1) or useless. In this case, we think it is much more natural in
such situations context to let go of (ii) and therefore to resort to epistemic (forward)
irrelevance.
Note that similar arguments hold for strong independence and repetition independence, which
are also symmetric and induce lower expectations higher than epistemic independence.
Second, this result, together with the concatenation formula, make the use of epistemic in-
dependence in practical applications easier, by allowing for local computations. It could even
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be a step towards the use of such independence notions in credal networks, since, as argued
by Shafer [179, Ch.16], Bayes nets can be seen as economical representations of probability
trees.
Third, results given by de Cooman and Miranda [50] relating forward irrelevance to strong
and repetition independence allow to also express these two notions in standard imprecise
probability trees, by adding suitable constraints on the local credal sets in each situation. It has
to be noted that computing lower and upper expectations would then become more difficult,
since local computations could no longer be used (see Appendix G).
5.3 A consonant approximation of consonant and indepen-
dent random sets
Section 5.1 and Figure 5.1 indicate that it can be difficult to compare some notions of irrele-
vance and to interpret all of them in a single framework. However, in some cases, it can be
useful to be able to approximate one notion by the other (e.g., for computational convenience,
or because one wants to work within a particular framework or theory). In particular, it is
always useful to be able to approximate a given joint uncertainty model by a joint possibility
distribution, for the reason that possibility distributions are the simplest imprecise probabilistic
models, and are thus easier to manipulate. Here, we consider the case where marginal uncer-
tainty is described by possibility distributions, and where we assume random set independence
between them.
Let pii be a possibility distribution describing uncertainty on variable Xi, i = 1, . . . ,N, and
denote the equivalent consonant random set by (m,F )pii . Let α1 = 1 > α2 > .. . > αM >
αM+1 = 0 be the collection of distinct values taken by distributions pii, i = 1, . . . ,N (or, in the
case of continuous distributions on the real line, the collection of chosen discretization levels).
Then, (m,F )pii is given, for j = 1, . . . ,M, by Ei, j = Ai,α jm(Ei, j) = α j−α j+1 = mi, j
with Ei, j the α j-cut of pii. Each marginal random set thus have M focal elements. The joint
random set (m,F )RSI,X(1:N) resulting from an assessment of random set independence then has
MN focal sets, an exponentially growing number that can quickly become intractable in prac-
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tice. As shown by the following proposition, it is possible to outer approximate (m,F )RSI,X(1:N)
by a joint possibility distribution pi ′X(1:N) which only have M focal sets, that is a number inde-
pendent of the input space dimensions.
Proposition 5.3. The most specific non-interactive possibility distribution pi ′X(1:N) inducing a
random set (m,F )pi ′X(1:N)
outer approximating (m,F )RSI,X(1:N) (in the sense of s-inclusion) and
whose focal sets are in {×Ni=1Ei, j| j = 1, . . . ,M} is such that, for any x(1:N) ∈X(1:N),
pi ′X(1:N)(x(1:N)) = mini=1,...,N
{(−1)N+1(pii(xi)−1)N +1} (5.2)
Proof. See appendix D
This proposition extends to the general case a result given by Dubois and Prade [89]
for the 2-dimensional case. It shows that if one transforms each distribution pii into pi ′i =
(−1)N+1(pii−1)N +1 and then builds a joint model with an assumption of possibilistic non-
interaction, then the result is a guaranteed outer approximation of (m,F )RSI,X(1:N) . This has
the practically important advantage to go from exponential to constant complexity in the num-
ber of input dimensions. Of course, such a drastic reduction is not without cost, and for a
particular distribution pii, Equation (5.2) will converge to 1 if pii(xi) > 0 as N increases, and is
0 if pi(xi)i = 0. This means that, as N increases, the outer-approximation converges towards
the Cartesian product of supports of distributions pii. It is thus legitimate to wonder about
(i) the speed of convergence of non-null values to 1 and (ii) the usefulness of the proposed
outer-approximation when compared to other quick and cheap methods providing outer ap-
proximations, such as the use of probabilistic arithmetic [209] when propagating uncertainty?
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 give ideas about the rate of convergence, by drawing the evolution
of possibility degree values versus the number of dimensions (Figure 5.3), and by sketching
the evolution of a triangular possibility distribution on the real line, with center 0 and support
[−1,1] (Figure 5.4). We can see that, if the loss of information is important (and thus the
approximation likely to be gross), part of this information remain, even for high dimensions.
Let us now investigate if this outer approximation can be useful in some ways. In par-
ticular, we compare the propagation of the proposed outer approximation pi ′X(1:N) with the
propagation of tightest classical p-boxes [F ,F ]i outer-approximating pii using probabilistic
arithmetic. Recall that probabilistic arithmetic [209] allows to apply the four basic operations
{+,−,×,÷} with an assumption of unknown interaction to p-boxes in a very efficient way.
Given two real-valued variables X ,Y and some (classical) p-boxes [F ,F ]X , [F ,F ]Y describing
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of distributions degree (α) versus input space dimension (N)
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Figure 5.4: Evolution of a triangular possibility distribution for different input space
dimensions (1,2,3,4,5,10,15,20)
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our uncertainty on them, result of applying each arithmetic operations read, for any z ∈ R:
FX+Y (z) = sup
x,y∈R
x+y=z
{max(FX(x)+FY (y)−1,0)}
FX+Y (z) = inf
x,y∈R
x+y=z
{min(FX(x)+FY (y),1)}
FX−Y (z) = sup
x,y∈R
x+y=z
{max(FX(x)+FY (−y),0)}
FX−Y (z) = inf
x,y∈R
x+y=z
{min(FX(x)+1−FY (−y),1)}
FX×Y (z) = sup
x,y∈R
x×y=z
{max(FX(x)+FY (y)−1,0)}
FX×Y (z) = inf
x,y∈R
x×y=z
{min(FX(x)+FY (y),1)}
FX÷Y (z) = sup
x,y∈R
x×y=z
{max(FX(x)+FY (1/y),0)}
FX÷Y (z) = inf
x,y∈R
x×y=z
{min(FX(x)+1−FY (1/y),1)}
and, provided the model T through which uncertainty has to be propagated is expressible by a
combination of arithmetic operations, above equations can be applied for each such operations.
A comparison of both approaches is given by Example 5.12. It can be seen on this example
that when the model T contains no repeated variable (i.e. can be reduced to an analytical form
where each variable appears once), then both methods provide comparable results. However,
it is not the case when there are repeated variables, and/or when extrema are not forcefully
on boundaries of Cartesian product (non-isotone models), and when propagation of the focal
sets of the outer approximation of Proposition 5.3 is done exactly (and not by using fuzzy
arithmetic). Also note that, when T is not expressible analytically, propagating pi ′X(1:N) can be
used and still requires to propagate exactly M focal sets, while in this latter case the coun-
terpart of probabilistic arithmetic requires to solve linear systems, and present an increased
computational complexity.
Example 5.12. In this example, we consider two simple models, with variables that are as-
sumed to be random set independent and whose uncertainty is described by possibility distri-
butions. For the two of them, we compare the result of applying extension principle (i.e. exact
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propagation of the focal sets) to the outer approximation of Proposition 5.3 with the result that
would give the application of probabilistic arithmetic.
Let us first consider the simple model Y = A+B−C, with variables A,B,C positive real-
valued variables represented by the same possibility distribution, summarized in the following
table (together with the result of Tranformation (5.2):
piA,piB,piC ⇒(5.2) pi ′A,pi ′B,pi ′C
Masses (m) Focal Sets Transf. masses (m′)
0.1 [1,2] 0.01
0.7 [0.5,3] 0.511
0.2 [0.1,5] 0.488
and Figure 5.5 show the two p-boxes resulting from probabilistic arithmetic applied to
p-boxes derived from original distributions pi and from extension principle applied to trans-
formed distributions pi ′. Although neither of them is contained in the other, there is no great
differences between the two, and since both outer-approximate the exact propagation and re-
quires comparable computational effort, they can be used conjointly, as their conjunction pro-
vide a tighter bounds of the exact result. Note that, with such simple models, exact propagation
is often feasible.
Y
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0.2
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Prob. arithmetic
Poss. outer. app.
Figure 5.5: Comparison of probabilistic arithmetic and outer approximation of
Proposition 5.3
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Cases where the proposed outer approximation is likely to be more useful is those where (i)
repeated variables occur and/or (ii) extrema are not reached on bounds of Cartesian products,
but remains relatively easy to locate. To exemplify this, let us consider the following model:
Y = T (X(1:2)) = (X
2
1+X
2
2 )/(2X1+1)(X32−1.9) with X1,X2 assuming values on the real line R. The
table below summarizes both marginal Models on X1,X2, the joint possibility distribution
resulting from the Transformation (5.2) and the result after (exact) propagation of this joint
distribution through T .
piX1 piX2 pi
′
X(1:2)
pi ′Y
mX1 FX1 mX2 FX2 m
′
X(1:2)
F ′X(1:2) F
′
Y
[1,2]× [2,3] 0.01 [0.1036,0.2732]
0.1 [1,2] 0.5 [2,3] [0.5,3]× [2,3] 0.24 T [0.1013,0.3484]
0.7 [0.5,3] 0.4 [2,5] ⇒(5.2) [0.5,3]× [2,5] 0.39 ⇒ [0.0395,0.3484]
0.2 [0.1,5.1] 0.1 [2,10] [0.1,5.1]× [2,5] 0.17 [0.0368,0.5478]
[0.1,5.1]× [2,10] 0.19 [0.0113,0.5478]
We see that the result is a distribution whose support is the interval [0.0113,0.5478], while
an application of probabilistic arithmetic would provide the interval [0.007,2.7868] as the
core of the resulting p-box5, and [0.0003,17.08] as its support. It shows that in situations
where probabilistic arithmetic performs poorly, the proposed outer approximation can provide
a much better result, and can therefore be of real usefulness.
5.4 Conclusions and perspectives
In this chapter, we have studied irrelevance notions in uncertainty theories. The notion of
irrelevance or independence is important in many aspects of uncertainty treatment, both the-
oretically and practically. As we have seen in our review, it is also a very complex notion,
since even for unconditional irrelevance, there are many possible extensions and interpreta-
tions of the classical notions of logical independence for sets and stochastic independence for
5Here, the core is the interval corresponding to the set of all possible dirac measures inside the p-box, that is,
given a p-box [F ,F ], it is the interval [x,y] such that x= infr∈R {F(r)|F(r) = 1} and y= supr∈R {F(r)|F(r) = 0}
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probability distributions. And, of course, there are even more when considering conditional
independence. Making a whole and unified picture of all these notions and interpreting all of
them inside a common framework appears difficult. Nevertheless, links and relations do exist,
and many of them remain to be clarified.
Often, in probability theory, different interpretations resulted in the same formal joint rep-
resentations, thus making the question of interpretation appearing as less essential (at least
in practical applications). It is no longer the case here, and the question of interpretation be-
comes essential, even for practical applications where two different interpretations will give
two different results. Moreover, it can be difficult to decide what notion of independence is
the most fitted to a particular situation, and we are only able to give some guidelines about the
choice of a particular notion.
A very interesting theoretical frame to study independence notions is the one of event-trees.
Our first results demonstrate that there are close links between the notion of independence
regarded as the most meaningful by Walley [203] and the notion of event-tree independence
developed by Shafer [179].
We have also shown how some notions of irrelevance can be approximated by other ones,
by concentrating on the specific question of outer-approximating random set independence by
possibilistic non-interaction. This allows to lower the complexity of joint uncertainty struc-
tures and to facilitate their subsequent manipulations. The proposed outer approximation ap-
pears particularly interesting when few variables are uncertain and when the model is complex
enough (i.e. non-monotonic, presence of repeated variable in the analytical formula). In any
cases, it provides a way to compute a quick and rough guaranteed outer approximation.
Our perspectives regarding the study of independence are mainly theoretical, eventually
resulting in results of practical importance. They include:
• Answering question marks in Table 5.2, either positively by providing a suitable inter-
pretation, as well as a formal way to express it, or negatively by showing that a given
notion makes poor sense in a given theory.
• Pursuing our study relating structural judgments of imprecise probability theory to event
trees. In particular, the notions of permutability and of epistemic independence appears
interesting to study (see Appendix G for some first ideas).
The material contained in this chapter can be found in paper [63]
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Chapter 6
Decision Making
“Real stupidity beats artificial intelligence, every time”
— Terry Pratchett (1948–?)
Uncertainty treatment and, more generally, plausible reasoning are rather impersonal and
theoretical processes. Although they can involve some choices (of a particular theory, of a
specific fusion rule, . . . ), these choices should be guided primarily by rationality requirements,
and not by personal preferences.
In this chapter, we are concerned with a far less impersonal matter: decision making. Let
a be an action that we can apply to a situation (e.g., going out for a picnic, buying a car, taking
one particular direction, . . . ), freely chosen from a set A of feasible actions. The problem
of decision making consists in choosing, within A, an optimal or best course of action with
respect to some criterion, given our current knowledge of the situation.
Although the problem of decision making is not related, per se, to the problem of un-
certainty treatment, the two problematics are closely related: sooner or later, available infor-
mation is used to make a decision and select a course of action. Roughly speaking, we see
decision making as the step where we stop to manipulate information in order to make a de-
cision (In this sense, we’re close in spirit to the TBM model proposed by Smets [189], which
differentiate credal and pignistic levels).
So, even if this work is not devoted to decision making (itself a wide and vivid area of
research), it is useful to study practical problems related to it, because of the close link be-
tween decision making, uncertainty treatment and risk analysis. Here, we will work within a
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restricted frame, since we assume:
i that the result of an action a depends of the value assumed by a variable X on X , which
is only known with uncertainty.
ii that to any action a can be associated a real-valued and precise gain (or utility) ua :X →R
that is a mapping from X to R, and ua(x) reflects the interest of choosing a when X
assume value x ∈X .
iii that only crisp actions can be chosen, that is we do not consider randomized actions (i.e.,
convex mixtures of actions)
iv that we are in a static environment, that is we do not consider dynamical problems involv-
ing the choice of sequences of actions.
v that the choice of an action a does not modify uncertainty on X , i.e., we assume so-called
act-state independence.
If there is no uncertainty about the (single) value assumed by X , then the set of optimal
actions is simply given by
opt(A) := argmax
a∈A
(ua)
However, the value of X is often only known with some uncertainty, and in this case, choosing
an optimal action, even in our restricted framework, is more difficult.
6.1 Decision making in uncertainty theories
Roughly speaking, defining optimal actions is equivalent to inducing some preferences be-
tween these actions, that is, an action a1 is in the set of optimal actions if there is no other
action a2 preferred to a1. This is equivalent to define a partial pre-order relation ≥ between
the actions, and to say that a1 is preferred to a2 if and only if a1≥ a2. However, there are many
ways to define this partial pre-order in uncertainty. Here, we restrict ourselves with a short
review, and refer to given references (and to references therein) for ampler discussions. It is
sensible to first remove those actions whose gains are point-wise dominated by other actions,
since whatever the value assumed by X , those actions will give less utility than the one(s)
they’re dominated by. Following Troffaes [195], we denote opt≥A the set of actions such that
opt≥(A) := {a ∈ A| 6 ∃c ∈ A,uc ≥ ua} (6.1)
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6.1.1 Classical expected utility
Provided uncertainty can be modeled by precise probabilities and the use of (linear) utility
scale is accepted, optimal decisions are often chosen accordingly to principle of expected
utility. While first suggestions to use expected utility in games can be traced back to Huygens,
its every-day use in statistics and decision theory is mainly due to the works of Von Neumann
and Morgenstern [201] and of Savage [175], who justified the use and uniqueness of expected
utility as a means of selecting optimal decisions with very different assumptions and sets of
axioms. Let PX be the probability distribution modeling uncertainty of X , and EPX (ua) the
expectation of ua with respect to PX . Then, the set of optimal decisions in A is defined as
optPX (A) := arg max
a∈opt≥(A)
EPX (ua) (6.2)
However, when uncertainty on X cannot be properly modeled by a unique probability distri-
bution, the use of expected utility to choose an optimal action is usually not satisfactory, as
shows the following example
Example 6.1. We use the example given by Troffaes [195]: let X be the outcome of a coin toss
(X = {h, t}). All that can be said about the probability of getting heads is that it lays between
0.28 and 0.7. Let us consider the following set of actions A = {a1, . . . ,a6} and the associated
utilities summarized below
Utility Heads Tails
ua1 4 0
ua2 0 4
ua3 3 2
ua4
1/2 3
ua5
47/20 47/20
ua6
41/10 −3/10
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and as none of these actions is dominated by another one, opt≥(A) = A, and we have
optPX =

{a2} if pX(h) < 2/5
{a2,a3} if pX(h) = 2/5
{a3} if 2/5 < pX(h) < 2/3
{a1a3} if pX(h) = 2/3
{a1} if pX(h) > 2/3
which shows that using maximized expected utility (by choosing a precise probability fitting
available information) is not very robust and can lead to different conclusions. Indeed, there
is no obvious reason to restrict the potential choice to one optimal action, until we are forced
to act. In other words, we do not have to enforce the (pre)-order on possible actions to be
complete.
Note that there is no problem with (6.2) when information is sufficient to describe uncer-
tainty on X by a single probability PX . This is why extensions of (6.2) to uncertainty theories
generalizing probability theory (at least formally) should satisfy (6.2) when reduced to precise
probabilities. All extensions considered in the next sections satisfy this condition.
6.1.2 Decision making in imprecise probability theory
Recently, Troffaes [195] has provided a nice theoretical and short review of (most of) the
existing extensions of (6.2) in imprecise probability theory. Another short and good review,
more computationally oriented, is provided by Utkin and Augustin [198].
We now consider that uncertainty on X is modeled by a credal set PX instead of a single
probability. We denote EPX (ua) = minP∈PX (EP(ua)) the lower expectation of ua given PX ,
and EPX (ua) the upper expectation defined likewise (replacing min by max). Equation (6.2)
can be extended in two main ways: either by relaxing the completeness of the order between
actions, meaning that we end up with a set of optimal and incomparable actions, or by adjust-
ing (6.2), so that the (pre)-order is still complete but now depends on both the lower and upper
expectations. We first recall two solutions belonging to the second trend, before shifting to
those belonging to the first one (i.e. relaxing completeness). In the latter case, most derived
criteria consist in pair-wise comparisons of actions. It is therefore useful to recall that (6.2)
can be seen as the result of pair-wise comparison of acts, that is a is preferred to c, or a≥PX c
whenever EPX (ua)≥ EPX (uc), or equivalently when EPX (ua−uc)≥ 0.
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Γ-maximin [114] and Γ-maximax A straightforward way to extend (6.2) is simply to re-
place the usual expectation by the lower or the upper expectation of utilities. In the case of the
lower expectation E, this gives the so-called Γ-maximin criterion
optEX (A) := max
a∈opt≥(A)
EPX (ua) (6.3)
which corresponds to a worst-case analysis, that is we assume the worst case, and pick the least
worst among them. Use of Γ-maximin can be justified by a principle of cautiousness in risk
analysis, or in games where you know that the opponent is assumed to choose the probability
in PX so that the reward is minimal. In Example 6.1, optEX =a5.
Conversely, replacing the expectation with the upper expectation E gives the Γ-maximax
criterion
optEX (A) := arg maxa∈opt≥(A)
EPX (ua) (6.4)
corresponding this time to a best-case analysis, or to an optimistic view, in which we hope to
get the maximal reward. Using Γ-maximax in Example 6.1 results in optEX =a2.
Hurwicz’s criterion [122] This criterion was originally considered for cases of complete
ignorance, and consisted in selecting optimal actions by considering a weighted average of
the worst and best rewards, with the worst reward receiving a weight α , and the best a weight
1−α , with α considered as a pessimism index. Given a weight α , the extension of Hurwicz
criterion when uncertainty is modeled by PX reads
optHα (A) := arg max
a∈opt≥(A)
αEPX (ua)+(1−α)EPX (ua) (6.5)
and Γ-maximin, Γ-maximax criteria are respectively retrieved by taking α = 1 and α = 0. In
Example 6.1, only actions a2,a3,a5 can be found optimal with Hurwicz’s criteria for different
values α .
Maximality We now drop the assumption that the (pre)-order on actions must be complete,
i.e., we allow optimal actions to be a set of incomparable actions. The first extension, initially
considered by Walley [203, ch.3.], consists in considering that a>E cwhenever EPX (a−c)>
0, that is, in Walley’s term, we are ready to pay a (strictly) positive price to exchange action a
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with c. This induces a partial order >E on the actions, and theMaximality criterion reads
opt>E (A) := {a ∈ opt≥(A)| 6 ∃c ∈ opt≥(A) EPX (uc−ua) > 0} (6.6)
and this criterion, apart from its behavioral interpretation, can also be seen as a robust ver-
sion of (6.2) on PX . In Example 6.1, the solution with Maximality criterion is opt>E =
{a1,a2,a3,a5}.
Interval Dominance Another robust version of (6.2) that gives another partial order >IE ,
such that a>IE cwhenever EPX (ua)≥ EPX (uc), in other words, interval [EPX (ua),EPX (ua)]
is on the right hand-side of [EPX (uc),EPX (uc)]. Interval dominance then follows as
opt>IE
(A) := {a ∈ opt≥(A)| 6 ∃c ∈ opt≥(A) EPX (uc)≥ EPX (ua)} (6.7)
Since the partial order >E refines >IE , Interval dominance criterion usually results in larger
sets than maximality, and in Example 6.1 gives opt>IE = {a1,a2,a3,a5,a6}
E-admissibility this criterion corresponds to the most straightforward robustification of (6.2),
and is given by
optPX (A) :=
⋃
P∈PX
optP(A) (6.8)
and in E-admissibility applied to Example 6.1 yields optPX = {a1,a2,a3}
Currently, there is no consensus among which criterion is the "best" choice. In our opinion,
that such an absolute best choice exists is dubious, and a criterion should be chosen with
respect to the properties we want it to satisfy. For further discussions about properties verified
by the criteria given above, we refer to Troffaes [195], Utkin and Augustin [198] and Jaffray
and Jeleva [122].
6.1.3 Decision making in random set theory
Let PX be now a credal set induced by a random set (m,F )X modeling uncertainty on X ,
and denote BetPX the pignistic probability derived from (m,F )X (see Appendix C). Inside
the TBM, Smets [187, 185] justifies axiomatically the use of the pignistic probability BetPX
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as a means to determine an optimal action. We define the Pignistic criterion as
optBetPX (A) := arg max
a∈opt≥(A)
EBetPX (ua) (6.9)
then follows. In Example 6.1, the pignistic probability is BetPX(h) = 0.49,BetPX(t) = 0.51,
and optBetPX = a3.
Note that, since BetPX comes down to taking the gravity center of PX , it can be applied
(in principle) to any credal set PX , and not only to those whose lower probability is an ∞-
monotone capacity. Also, since BetPX ∈PX , we have that the optimal action chosen through
pignistic criterion is also E-admissible, and the following implications between criterion hold:
pignistic Γ-maximax Γ-maximin
E-admissibility Maximality
Interval dominance
with A→ B means that if an act a is in the set of optimal acts in the sense of A, then it is also
in the set of optimal acts in the sense of B.
6.2 Practical computations of lower/upper expectations: the
case of p-boxes
As seen above, determining a set of optimal actions in imprecise probability theory often
necessitates the computations of lower/upper expectations of various utilities. When X is
finite, determining optimal actions with respect to above criteria usually involves solving a
finite collection of linear programs, and thus remain feasible, even if the number of linear
programs to solve can be pretty high (Utkin and Augustin [198] provide efficient algorithm
for various criteria).
Things get more complex when X is not finite (e.g., the real line), since one would then
have to solve an infinite collection of linear programs, which is not feasible in practice. It is
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then useful to consider particular cases, for which simplified solutions can be found. Even-
tually, such solutions could suggest some ways to derive more efficient solutions for more
general cases. In this work, we consider the special case where the model is a usual p-box
defined over the real-line R, and the utility ua for which we want to compute lower/upper
expectation is a continuous real function1.
6.2.1 General problem statement and proposed solutions
Let [F ,F ] be a p-box on R, describing our uncertainty about a variable X (here a closed
interval on R, and let ua be the utility associated to action a. Computing the lower and upper
expectations of ua, with respect to [F ,F ], amounts to solving
E [F ,F ](ua) = inf
F≤F≤F
∫
R
ua(x)dF(x) E [F ,F ](ua) = sup
F≤F≤F
∫
R
ua(x)dF(x) (6.10)
that is, to find, inside P[F ,F ], "optimal" distributions F reaching the infinimum and supremum
of
∫
Rua(x)dF(x), respectively for the lower and upper expectations. There are at least two
general ways to find solutions to (6.10), that we explore here: the use of linear programming
and random sets.
Numerically solving (6.10) by linear programming can be done by approximating the
(searched) cumulative distribution function F by a set of N points F(xi), i = 1, ...,N, by
translating (6.10) into the corresponding linear programming problem with N optimization
variables and with constraints equivalent to those constraining F (i.e. F ≤ F ≤ F). Those
linear programming problems are of the form
E∗
[F ,F ]
(ua) = inf
N
∑
k=1
ua(xk)zk or E
∗
[F ,F ](ua)=sup
N
∑
k=1
ua(xk)zk
subject to
zi ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,N,
N
∑
k=1
zk = 1,
i
∑
k=1
zk ≤ F(xi),
i
∑
k=1
zk ≥ F(xi), i = 1, ...,N.
where the zk are the optimization variables, and objective functions E∗(ua) (E
∗
(ua)) are re-
1With respect to usual Euclidean topology
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spectively approximations of the lower (upper) expectation. Note that, when N is large, solv-
ing this linear program can be computationally greedy, and not very efficient. Indeed, the
optimization problems have N variables and 3N+1 constraints. On the other hand, by taking
a small value of N, we run the risk of obtaining bad approximations of the exact solution.
Using random sets, we know from Section 3.4 and Appendix F that, provided ua is con-
tinuous, we can safely consider the continuous random set (m,F )[F ,F ] whose bpa m is a
uniform law on the unit interval [0,1] and whose focal elements corresponds to the map-
ping that associates to each value α ∈ [0,1] the interval [xα ,yα ] = [F−1(α),F−1(α)] where
F
−1
(α) = sup{x ∈ R|F(x) < α} and F−1(α) = inf{x ∈ R|F(x) > α}. For easiness of no-
tation, we denote by Γ[F ,F ],α this interval. Given this correspondence between p-boxes and
random sets, we can rewrite (6.10) into
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫ 1
0
inf
x∈Γ[F ,F ],α
ua(x) dα, (6.11)
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫ 1
0
sup
x∈Γ[F ,F ],α
ua(x) dα. (6.12)
Again, finding an analytical solution to this integral is, in general, not feasible, but the
solution can easily be (outer or inner) approximated by considering a finite number 0≤ α1 <
.. . <αM ≤ 1 of levels αi and solving the discretized version of Equations (6.11), (6.12). In the
latter case, the main difficulty is to find infimum and supremum of ua in intervals Γ[F ,F ],αi . As
in linear programming, computational effort increase with the number of discretization levels,
but taking too few of them could lead to high approximation errors, and so would the choice
of poor heuristics to detect extrema in the case of complex function ua.
Note that the cumulative distribution F reaching infinimum or supremum depends of the
form of ua, meaning that, if ua is known to follow some behavior, it is possible to find the
analytical form of the searched cumulative distribution F , eventually leading to more efficient
numerical methods to approximate solutions of (6.10). The simplest examples (for which
solutions are well known) of such typical cases are monotone functions.
Let ua be such a monotone function non-decreasing (non-increasing) in R, then the well
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known result [204]:
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫
R
ua(x)dF(x)
(
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫
R
ua(x)dF(x)
)
,
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫
R
ua(x)dF(x)
(
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫
R
ua(x)dF(x)
)
,
follows. Using equations (6.11),(6.12), we get
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫ 1
0
ua(xα)dα
(
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫ 1
0
ua(yα)dα
)
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫ 1
0
ua(yα)dα
(
E [F ,F ](ua) =
∫ 1
0
ua(xα)dα
)
and (lower/upper) expectations are totally determined by extreme values of the mappings.
6.2.2 Unimodal ua
We now consider a slightly more complex case, where ua has one maximum on R in point a ∈
R. Although still simple, this case can happen in practice (see example given by Utkin [197]),
and will be instrumental to show (some of) the interests of considering jointly linear program-
ming and random set solutions. Situation where ua has one minimum is similar, due to the
duality between upper/lower expectations (i.e., E(ua) =−E(−ua)).
Proposition 6.1. If the function ua has a single maximum at point a ∈ R, then the upper and
lower expectations of ua(X) on [F ,F ] are
E [F ,F ](ua) =
a∫
−∞
ua(x)dF +ua(a)
[
F(a)−F(a)]+ ∞∫
a
ua(x)dF , (6.13)
E [F ,F ](ua) =
F
−1
(α)∫
−∞
ua(x)dF +
∞∫
F−1(α)
ua(x)dF , (6.14)
or, equivalently
E [F ,F ](ua) =
F(a)∫
0
ua(yα)dα +[F(a)−F(a)]ua(a)+
1∫
F(a)
ua(xα)dα (6.15)
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E [F ,F ](ua) =
α∫
0
ua(xα)dα +
1∫
α
ua(yα)dα, (6.16)
where α is one of the solutions of the equation
ua
(
F
−1
(α)
)
= ua
(
F−1(α)
)
. (6.17)
Proof using linear programming (sketch). We assume that functions ua,F ,F are differen-
tiable in R. Then the following primal and dual optimization problems can be written for
computing the lower expectation of the function ua:
Primal problem:
Minimize v =
∫ ∞
−∞ ua (x)ρ (x)dx
subject to
ρ (x)≥ 0,∫ ∞−∞ ρ (x)dx = 1,
−∫ x−∞ ρ (x)dx≥−F (x) ,∫ x
−∞ ρ (x)dx≥ F (x) .
Dual problem:
Max. w = c0 +
∫ ∞
−∞
(−c(t)F (t)+d (t)F (t))dt
subject to
c0 +
∫ ∞
x (−c(t)+d (t))dt ≤ ua (x) ,c0 ∈ R,
c(x)≥ 0, d (x)≥ 0.
The proof of equations (6.13)-(6.14) and (6.17) then follows in three main steps:
1. We propose a feasible solution of the primal problem.
2. We then consider the feasible solution of the dual problem corresponding to the one
proposed for the primal problem.
3. We show that the two solutions coincide and, therefore, according to the basic duality
theorem of linear programming, these solutions are optimal ones.
And proving the third point mainly comes down to showing that there are two points a′,a′′
such that a′ ≤ a ≤ a′′, that is from each side of the maximum, satisfying the following two
equations:
F
(
a′
)
= F
(
a′′
)
. (6.18)
and
ua
(
a′′
)
= ua
(
a′
)
. (6.19)
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The first corresponding to the feasible solution of primal problem, and the second to the dual.
These two conditions in turns lead to exhibit the existence and the role of the level α in (6.17).
The full proof is provided in Appendix D
Proof using random sets. Let us now consider equations (6.12)-(6.11). Looking first at equa-
tion (6.12), we see that for values α ∈ [0,1] lower than α∗ = F(a), the supremum of ua on
Γ[F ,F ],α is ua(yα), since ua is increasing between [∞,a]. For values α between α∗ = F(a) and
α∗ = F(a), the supremum of ua on Γ[F ,F ],α is ua(a). And for values grater than α
∗ = F(a), we
can make the same reasoning as for the increasing part of ua (except that it is now decreasing).
Finally, this gives us the following formula:
E [F ,F ](ua) =
F(a)∫
0
ua(yα)dα +
F(a)∫
F(a)
ua(a)dα +
1∫
F(a)
ua(xα)dα (6.20)
which is equivalent to (6.15). Let us now turn to the lower expectation. For values of α before
α∗ and after α∗, finding the infinimum is again not a problem (it is respectively ua(xα) and
ua(yα)). Between α∗ and α∗, since we know that ua is increasing before x = a and decreasing
after, infinimum is either h(xα) or h(yα). This gives us equation
E [F ,F ](ua) =
F(a)∫
0
ua(xα)dα +
F(a)∫
F(a)
min(ua(xα),ua(yα))dγ +
1∫
F(a)
ua(yα))dγ (6.21)
and by using results from the first equation or the fact that both xα ,yα are non-decreasing
functions of α , we know that there is a level α such that ua
(
F
−1
(α)
)
= ua
(
F−1(α)
)
, and
for which the above equation simplify in equation (6.17).
Of course, both proofs lead to similar formulas and, in applications, would lead to the
same exact lower and upper expectations. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that each view
suggests a different way to approximate the exact solution. Namely, the proof involving linear
programming suggested to us a more analytical and explicit solution, where the main difficulty
is to find the level α satisfying Equation (6.18). If an analytical solution is not available, then
the solution is generally approximated by scanning a larger or smaller range of possible values
for α (see Utkin [197] for an example).
On the other hand, the proof is shorter in the case of random set, but analytical results are
more difficult to derive. Compared to the linear programming view, equations (6.15),(6.16),(6.21)
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Figure 6.1: ua with one maximum in a, illustration of cumulative distributions F
reaching upper expected value E [F ,F ](ua) (left) and lower expected value E [F ,F ](ua)
(right)
suggest numerical methods based on a discretization of the unit interval [0,1] rather than a
heuristic search of the level α satisfying equation (6.18). Note that in the worst case, two
evaluations are needed at each of the discretized levels (using equation (6.21)).
Figure 6.1 provides an illustration of the shape of distributions functions on which lower
and upper expectations are reached. It shows that the lower expectation E [F ,F ](ua) is obtained
with a distribution having an horizontal jump avoiding the higher values of ua, while the upper
expectation E [F ,F ](ua) is reached by concentrating probability mass on the maximum a
6.2.3 Many extrema
We now consider another univariate case, far more general this time, where ua has alternate
local maximum at points ai and minimum at points bi, i = 1,2, ..., such that
b0 < a1 < b1 < a2 < b2 < ... (6.22)
Proposition 6.2. If local maxima (ai) and minima (bi) of the function ua satisfy condition
(6.22), then the optimal distribution F for computing the lower unconditional expectation
E [F ,F ](ua) is vertical (has "jumps") at points bi, i = 1, .... of the size
min
(
F (bi) ,αi+1
)−max(F (bi) ,αi) .
Between jumps indexed i−1 and i, the optimal probability distribution function F is of the
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Figure 6.2: ua with alternate extrema, illustration of cumulative distributions F reach-
ing lower expected value E [F ,F ](ua)
form:
F (x) =

F (x) , x< a′
α, a′ ≤ x≤ a′′
F (x) , a′′ < x
,
where α is the root of the equation
ua
(
max
(
F
−1
(α) ,bi−1
))
= ua
(
min
(
F−1 (α) ,bi
))
in interval
[
F (ai) ,F (ai)
]
,
a′ = max
(
F−1 (α) ,bi−1
)
, a′′ = min
(
F−1 (α) ,bi
)
.
The upper expectation E [F ,F ](ua) can be found from the dual relation E [F ,F ](ua)=−E [F ,F ](−ua).
Proofs are a bit more complex than for Proposition 6.1, but follows similar reasonings, and
are omitted here. Sketches are provided by Utkin and Destercke [199].
Figure 6.2 illustrates Proposition 6.2. The solution again consists in concentrating prob-
ability masses on lower values of ua, while avoiding the higher ones. Other situations also
considered by Utkin and Destercke [199] (multivariate case with different assumptions of in-
dependence, conditional expectations) tends to suggest that this result can be generalized in
most cases and could be used in very general situations.
Further works on this topic include the design and implementation of algorithms derived
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from the studied situations, the exploration of other and more general cases, the extensions
of presented results to other practical representations such as possibility distributions, clouds,
imprecise probability assignments, . . . .
6.3 Decision in industrial risk analysis
Decision making in industrial risk analysis and in safety studies is usually a bit different from
the problem stated above. First, the aim of such studies is not to take optimal, but rather safe
actions. In such problems, variable X will in general assume values on the real line and the
decision will generally depends on the probability of exceeding a threshold, that is on the
(possibly imprecise) evaluation of P((−∞,x∗]), with x∗ the threshold. With this respect, two
main kind of studies and associated decision can be taken:
• Prospective studies: we call prospective those studies where nothing has been done so
far, and the decision maker wants to know for which value x∗ the probability P([x∗,∞))
of exceeding this threshold will be below a certain level 1− α (typical values are
0.1,0.001, . . .), that is for which value x∗ do we have at least P([−∞,x∗)) = α . Sys-
tems are then dimensioned with respect to that x∗, so that the associated risk is judged
acceptable. For example, X can characterize the water level of a river, and x∗ is then
used to dimension a dam ensuring that no flood will occur. In terms of behavior, it
means that the decision maker wants to (or has to) buy a gamble at a fixed price α , and
the decision consists in determining for which value x∗ this price appears acceptable.
• Retrospective studies: we call retrospective those studies where the situation is fixed,
and the decision maker wants to assess the probability that X do not exceed some critical
levels x∗, in order to know if some action has to be undertaken to lower this probability.
In this case, x∗ is fixed and the study consists in checking that P((−∞,x∗]) is above
some level α . If it is not, then some action should be done to increase P((−∞,x∗]). For
example, x∗ can be a critical temperature in a nuclear reactor core, and the corresponding
action could be to activate some coolant system or not. In terms of behavior, it means
that the decision maker is somewhat forced to buy the gamble 1((−∞,x∗]) for a price α ,
and wants to keep this price acceptable.
Decision making for industrial risk analysis and safety studies is somewhat reversed com-
pared to the classical definition of decision making, since the problem is not to determine the
action that would give us the highest "reward" but rather to check that the minimal reward
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will be at least α , or to act in order to reach this minimal level. Note that here, "reward"
is usually inversely proportional to spent money, since the higher the decision maker safety
requirements2 (the higher α), the more money will be spent.
The material contained in this chapter can be found in paper [199].
2Or, equivalently, the more risk-adverse he is
Chapter 7
Illustrative applications
“As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are
certain, they do not refer to reality”
—Albert Einstein (1879–1955)
In this chapter, we detail two illustrative applications using some of the methods studied
previously. The first one (Section 7.1) applies information evaluation methodologies and basic
fusion operators to the results of uncertainty studies performed with nuclear compute codes,
and the second (Section 7.2) proposes and illustrates on a case study a numerical method of
hybrid propagation allowing to propagate uncertainty in an efficient way while coping with
numerical accuracy.
7.1 Information evaluation and fusion applied to nuclear
computer codes
In this section, we apply methods developed in Section 4.4 to evaluate and fuse information
coming from multiple sources. They are applied to results of uncertainty studies achieved
with nuclear computer codes. All computations have been done with the SUNSET software
developed at the IRSN, in which the methods have been implemented.
Only probabilistic and possibilistic approaches will be used here, since this is sufficient to
illustrate the benefits of allowing some imprecision in uncertainty representations.
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7.1.1 Introduction to the problem
Evaluating nuclear power plant performance during transient conditions is a very important
issue in thermal-hydraulic research since nuclear energy was used to produce electricity. Ac-
cross the years, a huge amount of experimental data has been produced from very simple
loops and from Integral Test Facilities. A lot of computer codes have also been developed
and made available to the nuclear community in order to simulate variables of interest during
transient conditions. It is important to evaluate the predicting reliability of such codes by com-
paring their results to experimental data obtained from small scale facilities. Past years have
witnessed an increasing interest in the combination of such codes with uncertainty analysis,
allowing for a more realistic modeling of the parameter knowledge, and thus helpful to make
better previsions. Nevertheless, practitioners often find it difficult to compare and to analyze
the final results of such uncertainty analyses, as well as to assess the agreement level of such
results with experimental data. This is why we have applied methods from section 4.4 to
the results of the BEMUSE (Best Estimate Methods - Uncertainty and Sensitivity Evaluation)
programme [160] performed by the NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency).
Our study focuses here on the results of the first step of the programme, in which ten
participants from nine organisations were brought together in order to compare their respective
uncertainty analysis with experimental data coming from the experiment L2-5 performed on
the loss-of-fluid test (LOFT) facility. Although most participants (9 out of 10) used similar
methodologies to complete their uncertainty evaluations, their results were quite different, due
to the fact that different codes were used and that the number, models and physical nature of
inputs were different for each participant.
Since a nuclear reactor generates internal heat, this heat has to be removed by a coolant
system. A loss-of-coolant accident happens when the flow of coolant is reduced (in our case,
by the simulation of a guillotine rupture of an inlet pipe). When such an accident happens,
emergency systems are designed to stop the fission process. Nevertheless, even after such
a stop, significant amount of heat may still be generated due to radioactive decay, and this
heat can cause important damage to the facility, resulting in catastrophic consequences for the
reactor, its facility and vicinity. Safety systems thus have to ensure that parameters such as
pressure and temperature remain below critical levels.
The ten participants of the BEMUSE programme, as well as the code they used and their
organization are summarized in table 7.1. In the first step of BEMUSE programme, the L2-5
experiment has been chosen to apply uncertainty methodologies on a large break loss-of-
coolant accident (LB-LOCA transient) performed on an integral test facility. The L2-5 ex-
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Used code Participants
ATHLET GRS, NRI2
CATHARE CEA, IRSN
MARS KAERI
RELAP5 KINS, NRI1, UNIPI, UPC
TRACE PSI
Table 7.1: Participants of BEMUSE programme and used codes
periment has been completed on 16 June 1982 in the LOFT facility at INEL (Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory). This facility simulated the major components and the system re-
sponses of a commercial PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) during a loss-of-coolant accident
(LOCA). The core was a semi-scale one with an active height of 1.70m. The experimental as-
sembly included five major subsystems which were instrumented with measurement devices.
As an output of their uncertainty analysis, each participant had to provide lower bounds,
reference values and upper bounds for four scalar output parameters as well as the time trends
of two output parameters (maximum cladding temperature and upper plenum pressure). For
each of these output parameters, experimental values are available (thus, they can be taken as
so-called seed variables to assess sources predictive quality). Here, we have only considered
the four scalar output parameters. These four scalar output parameters are:
1. The first Peak Cladding Temperature (1PCT) during the blowdown phase
2. The second Peak Cladding Temperature (2PCT) during the reflood phase
3. The Time of accumulator injection (Tin j)
4. The Time of complete quenching (Tq)
Table 7.2 summarizes the values given by the participants for the lower bounds, reference
calculation and upper bounds for each output. Obtained experimental values are also recalled.
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1PCT (Kfl) 2PCT (Kfl) Tin j (s) Tq (s)
Low Ref Up Low Ref Up Low Ref Up Low Ref Up
CEA 919 1107 1255 674 993 1176 14.8 16.2 16.8 30 69.7 98
GRS 969 1058 1107 955 1143 1171 14 15.6 17.6 62.9 80.5 103.3
IRSN 872 1069 1233 805 1014 1152 15.8 16.8 17.3 41.9 50 120
KAERI 759 1040 1217 598 1024 1197 12.7 13.5 16.6 60.9 73.2 100
KINS 626 1063 1097 608 1068 1108 13.1 13.8 13.8 47.7 66.9 100
NRI1 913 1058 1208 845 1012 1167 13.7 14.7 17.7 51.5 66.9 87.5
NRI2 903 1041 1165 628 970 1177 12.8 15.3 17.8 47.4 62.7 82.6
PSI 961 1026 1100 887 972 1014 15.2 15.6 16.2 55.1 78.5 88.4
UNIPI 992 1099 1197 708 944 1118 8.0 16.0 23.5 41.4 62.0 81.5
UPC 1103 1177 1249 989 1157 1222 12 13.5 16.5 56.5 63.5 66.5
Exp. Val. 1062 1077 16.8 64.9
Table 7.2: Scalar output values by participants (Exp. Val. : Experimental value)
7.1.2 Modeling the information
The lower and upper given by the participants were respectively the lowest and highest values
obtained for 156 runs of their computer codes. According to order statistics [27], we consid-
ered, as a first approximation, these values as the 1% and 99% percentiles. So, the Low and
Up provide, for each participant and each variable, the two percentiles q2 = 1% and q4 = 99%.
Given a particular output, let us call qmin and qmax the minimal and maximal values of the
lower and upper bounds of this output, taken over all participants. Then, for each output, we
take [ql,qu] as the interval [qmin,qmax] increased by 2% (e.g. for 1PCT, qmin = 626 (KINS),
qmax = 1255 (CEA) and [ql,qu] = [620,1261]). Note that, for a given output, the interval
[ql,qu] is common to all participants, to make sure that their informativeness scores will be
comparable. According to this information, we take the following models:
Probabilistic model: Since the reference values Re f are often close to the middle of
interval [Low,Up], and as nominal values are often associated to the median of the distribution,
we have chosen to take, for each participant and output, the following distribution : (q1 =
0%,q2 = 1%,q3 = 50%,q4 = 99%,q5 = 100%) = (ql,Low,Re f ,Up,qu). For example, the
distribution corresponding to the information given by NRI1 for the 2PCT is (q1 = 592,q2 =
845,q3 = 1012,q4 = 1167,q5 = 1228). The only exception to this rule is the distribution of
KINS for Tin j, since concentrating 50% of the probability mass on a single value would make
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Figure 7.1: Probability (right) and possibility (left) dist. of NRI1 for the 2PCT
no sense. Thus, the distribution of KINS for Tin j is (q1 = 0% = 7.8,q2 = 1% = 13.1,q2 =
99% = 13.8,q4 = 100% = 23.7).
Possibilistic model: The interval [ql,qu] common to each source is considered as contain-
ing with certainty the true unknown value. The interval [Low,Up] provides for each source
a 98% confidence interval, while it is natural to consider the nominal value Re f as the most
plausible one. For each source, the possibility distribution that fits this information is s.t.
pi(ql) = 0,pi(Low) = 0.02,pi(Re f ) = 1,pi(Upp) = 0.02,pi(qu) = 0 (with linear interpolation
between each points). When taken as an imprecise probabilistic model, this possibility distri-
bution dominates the chosen probabilistic model (see [11]). Figure 7.1 illustrates both models
built from the information of NRI2 concerning the second PCT.
7.1.3 Evaluating the sources
For the evaluation steps, the four scalar parameters were considered as seed variables, as their
(precise) experimental values are known. Evaluation is performed according to the methodolo-
gies described in Section 4.4, with the uncertainty models given above. Table 7.3 summarizes
the obtained informativeness, calibration and global scores for both approaches.
The results shown in Table 7.3 confirms that the two methodologies, being based on the
same rational requirements, gives comparable results, the few noticeable differences (e.g.,
informativeness scores of KINS, Calibration scores of GRS and NRI2) being explainable by
the formal differences existing between the two methodologies (see Section 4.4, Sandri et
al. [174] and Destercke and Chojnacki [62] for ampler discussions)
Also, one of the reasons why at least 10 seed variables should be used within probabilis-
tic methodology is illustrated by our results, where only 4 seed variables were used. Indeed,
the probabilistic approach results in six different calibration scores, and have a reduced dis-
criminative power when compared to the possibilistic approach, for which each source have
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Prob. approach Poss. approach
Inf. Cal. Global Inf. Cal. Global
CEA 8 (0.77) 5 (0.16) 6 (0.12) 8 (0.71) 6 (0.55) 7 (0.40)
GRS 4 (1.23) 1 (0.98) 1 (1.21) 3 (0.84) 7 (0.52) 6 (0.44)
IRSN 5 (0.98) 2 (0.75) 2 (0.73) 6 (0.73) 1 (0.83) 1 (0.60)
KAERI 9 (0.68) 5 (0.16) 7 (0.11) 9 (0.70) 8 (0.48) 8 (0.34)
KINS 3 (1.29) 5 (0.16) 5 (0.21) 7 (0.72) 3 (0.67) 3 (0.49)
NRI1 7 (0.79) 2 (0.75) 3 (0.59) 5 (0.75) 5 (0.63) 4 (0.47)
NRI2 6 (0.79) 8 (0.13) 8 (0.10) 4 (0.78) 2 (0.72) 2 (0.56)
PSI 1 (1.6) 10 (0.004) 10 (0.008) 1 (0.88) 10 (0.25) 10 (0.22)
UNIPI 10 (0.53) 2 (0.75) 4 (0.4) 10 (0.69) 4 (0.67) 5 (0.46)
UPC 2 (1.44) 9 (0.02) 9 (0.025) 2 (0.87) 9 (0.28) 9 (0.24)
Table 7.3: Results of sources evaluation (Inf.: informativeness ; Cal.: Calibration) by
ranks (values)
received a different calibration score (note that this remains true for all imprecise probability
theories).
Such comments are useful to highlight formal advantages or deficiencies of the methods,
but are of little use to the analyst, to decision makers or to participants. On the contrary, the
following observations concerning the results were found interesting by various researchers in
the field of nuclear safety:
• Ranking with respect to the used code: the ranking of the participants is poorly cor-
related with the particular code used to achieve the computations. This indicates and
confirms the importance of user-influence on the final results, irrespectively of the used
code.
• Coherence with informal observations: in BEMUSE reports [160], it was observed
that only UPC and PSI bounds did not envelop the PCT experimental values (respec-
tively for the first and second PCT), one of the reason given to explain this was the very
narrow uncertainty band considered by both UPC and PSI. Results give formal justifi-
cation to such informal observations, since UPC and PSI both obtain the worst and best
rankings respectively for calibration and informativeness.
• Code evaluation/validation: an important issue and a recurrent problem when model-
ing physical phenomena with complex computer codes is the validation of the results
Illustrative applications 245
Figure 7.2: Application of probabilistic aggregation
provided by those codes [196]. Proposed methods can be used to achieve such a valida-
tion. Note that recent propositions done by Ferson et al. [106] can also be considered.
7.1.4 Merging the information supplied by the sources
We now apply the fusion operators introduced in Section 4.1.3 to the second PCT. Interests and
defects of each operator are illustrated, as well as how they can help to analyze the information
and the relations between sources (here, the participants of the BEMUSE programme).
Probabilistic aggregation Figure 7.2 shows the result of aggregating the probability distri-
butions of some participants. Each arithmetic mean is used with the associated weights, except
when specified so on the figure (i.e. all sources with equal weights).
As we see, grouping participants by used codes (left figure) gives poorly calibrated results.
CATHARE and RELAP5 users tend to underestimate the experimental value, while ATHLET
users tend to overestimate it. Few can be said about the agreement between code users.
The right figure shows how the scores given to each participant can be used to improve
the aggregated distribution, both in term of precision and of quality. Interestingly enough, the
best distributions are the one in which all sources are taken into account with their associated
scores, and the one considering the four common participants being in the five best scored
sources of each approach. Both these two distributions are slightly narrower and more centered
around the experimental value than the two others. This shows that using the scores in the
aggregation is useful and that the two approaches can help each other in the selection of the
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Figure 7.3: Application of possibilistic aggregation : disjunction (left) and weighted
mean (right)
best sources. Here again, an eventual conflict between sources is hardly visible. The fact that
the arithmetic mean tends to average the resulting distribution is shown in the right figure,
in which resulting distributions, although different, remain close to each others. Indeed, we
can see here that taking the average is not very discriminative, especially in our case where
information given by sources are similar.
Possibilistic aggregation Figure 7.3 shows the result of applying the disjunctive operator
(i.e. maximum) and the usual compromise operator (i.e. weighted arithmetic mean) to the set
of all sources (taking smaller sets of sources do not bring any really useful extra information in
these two cases). As expected, the result of the disjunction is quite imprecise and the arithmetic
mean averages the contribution of all participants, resulting in a smooth distribution which has
a peak around 1000 K.
Some interesting (and surprising) facts can be said about these distributions. The fact that,
in the distribution resulting from the disjunction, more peaks are below rather than above
the experimental value indicates that most sources tends to underestimate it. This is somewhat
confirmed by the distribution resulting from the arithmetic mean, whose peak is slightly below
the experimental value.
A more surprising characteristic is the relatively low possibility degree around the experi-
mental value that exhibits the distribution resulting from the disjunction. Indeed, the possibil-
ity degree of the experimental value is around 0.8, which is low if we compare it to possibility
degrees of values surrounding the experimental value. This drop comes from the fact that the
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Figure 7.4: Application of possibilistic aggregation : conjunction (minimum)
reference value of most participant is not very close from experimental data (this is not the
case for the first PCT) and that KINS, whose reference value is the closest to the experimental
value, also gives a very low upper bound (in fact, the lowest outside of PSI, the only participant
having an upper bound lower than the experimental value).
Figure 7.4 shows the result of applying the conjunctive operator (i.e. minimum) to various
subgroups of participants. The eventual conflict among each subgroup is here directly visible.
For instance, we see that, concerning the second PCT, the information given by both users
of CATHARE code are coherent, while the information given by ATHLET users are more
conflicting. The higher conflict shown by RELAP5 users is not surprising, since they are
more numerous.
The right figure shows that the information given by all sources concerning the second
PCT is highly conflicting (conflict ∼ 0.9), and thus that the resulting conjunction, although
very precise, is judged to be highly unreliable. Inversely, limiting ourselves to the most highly
scored participants (either only by possibilistic approach or by both approaches) results in
distributions that are reliable (conflict only∼ 0.2). We see that using conjunction with only the
most reliable sources results in a distribution well balanced between precision and reliability.
Note that the MCS method (see Section 4.2.2) was not applied to the above data and
possibility distributions for two main reasons, a bad and a good one:
• the bad one is that we have not found the time yet to implement the MCS method inside
the SUNSET software and
• the good one is that, since information provided by the 10 sources display an high con-
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sistency (removing only PSI from the group of all sources in Figure 7.4 would remove
most of the conflict), we believe that applying the MCS to such data would not bring
much more interesting information.
7.2 Hybrid propagation with numerical accuracy
In practice, when propagating uncertainty representations through a deterministic model, an
exact propagation can rarely be achieved, except in problems involving only simple models
and/or uncertainty representations. This difficulty has many sources: a single run of com-
plex computer codes can take hours to complete (if not days or weeks); interval analysis or
set propagation with non-linear models often involve the use of complex algorithms [123];
complexity of uncertainty representations often increase exponentially with the number of in-
put dimensions (a problem often known as the curse of dimensionality, a term first coined by
Bellman [14]).
It is thus important, when possible, to propose numerical methods allowing to reduce
and optimize the number of required computations, and when doing so, to control the gen-
erated numerical error. Here, we propose such a numerical improvement for a popular uncer-
tainty propagation method: the so-called hybrid propagation [9, 12]. The proposed numerical
method, called RaFu (for Random/Fuzzy) and implemented in the SUNSET software, relies
on the fact that the final desired result is often known before the propagation happens, and that
computing only this final result often allows some simplifications.
7.2.1 RaFu method: efficiency in numerical hybrid propagation
We consider that uncertainty bearing on variables X(1:N), each assuming values on the real line
R, (we use the same notation as in the beginning of Chapter 51) has to be propagated through
a deterministic and functional model T : X(1:N) → Y from X(1:N), the input space, to Y , the
output space.
Given variables X(1:N), Hybrid propagation [9, 12] proposes to differentiate variables tainted
with aleatory uncertainty (stemming from natural variability) from variables tainted with epis-
temic uncertainty (stemming from a lack of knowledge).
1X1, . . . ,XN are the input variables, X1, . . . ,XN the input spaces and xi an element of Xi. For 1≤ k≤ ℓ≤ N,
note X(k:ℓ) := ×ℓi=kXi, X(k:ℓ) := (Xk, . . . ,Xℓ) a variable assuming values in X(k:ℓ), and x(k:ℓ) := (xk, . . . ,xℓ) ∈
X(k:ℓ) an element of X(k:ℓ)
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7.2.1.1 Usual Hybrid method
Without loss of generality, let variables X(1:k) be tainted with aleatory uncertainty, and vari-
ables X(k+1:N) with epistemic uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty on the first is modeled by
means of probability distributions P1, . . . ,Pk, while epistemic uncertainty on the second is
modeled by means of convex possibility distributions pik+1, . . . ,piN .
A joint uncertainty model is then built as follows:
• (in)dependencies between variables X(1:k) are supposed fully known, and modeled through
a joint probability distribution P(1:k).
• Possibilistic non-interaction is assumed between variables X(k+1:N), leading to a joint
possibility distribution piPI,(k+1:N).
• Joint uncertainty model is the fuzzy random variable (m,F˜ )H,(1:N) (see Section 3.5.2),
with mH,(1:N)(piPI,x(1:k),(k+1:N)) = p(1:k)(x(1:k)) and piPI,x(1:k),(k+1:N) ∈ F˜H,(1:N) the possi-
bility distribution such that, for i = 1, . . . ,k, pii(xi) = 1 and zero elsewhere on Xi, and
possibilistic non-interaction is assumed between pi1, . . . ,piN
Hybrid propagation then consists in propagating (m,F˜ )H,(1:N) through the model T , to
obtain the fuzzy random variable (m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)). In practice, making an analytical and exact
propagation of (m,F˜ )H,(1:N) will be impossible in most cases, and in practice, (m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N))
is often numerically approximated by a methodology similar to the following one [12]:
1. Generate MP samples x(1:k)1, . . . ,x(1:k)MP
of P(1:k) by a sampling procedure (e.g. Monte-
Carlo, LHS, . . . )
2. For each value (x(1:k))i, i= 1, . . . ,MP, consider the possibility distribution piT,i, given by
the propagation of piPI,(x(1:k))i,(k+1:N) through T
3. since we have
piT,iα = T (piPI,(x(1:k))i,(k+1:N)α
) (7.1)
with piPI,(x(1:k))i,(k+1:N)α
the α-cut of piPI,(x(1:k))i,(k+1:N)α
, approximate piT,i by computing
(7.1) for a finite collection α1 < .. . < αMpi of Mpi α-cuts, building piT,i
4. give a mass of 1/MP to each distribution piT,i, i = 1, . . . ,MP
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the result is a fuzzy random variable (̂m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)) approximating (m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)), with
a uniform bpa distributed over distributions piT,i, i = 1, . . . ,MP. The sampling procedure is
summarized by Figure 7.5.
0
1
FX1(x1)
x1
Variable X1
. . .
Aleatory uncertainty : k random variables
0
1
FXk(xk)
xk
Variable Xk
0
1
α
α cut of Xk+1
Variable Xk+1
. . .
Epistemic uncertainty : N− k fuzzy variables
0
1
α
α cut of XN
Variable XN
Figure 7.5: Sampling of variables X(1:k) and X(k+1:N) in hybrid numerical propaga-
tion.
As for the fuzzy random variable resulting from the fusion process of Section 4.2, infor-
mation conveyed by (̂m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)) and the associated representation are hard to handle in
practice by a decision maker (particularly if he is not familiar with uncertainty representa-
tions). Thus, in order to improve understanding, (̂m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)) has to be post-processed in
some ways.
In this work, we will restrict ourselves to post-processings concerning cumulative func-
tions evaluating the uncertainty of trespassing thresholds, since they are the most useful infor-
mation in risk analysis studies. First recall that a fuzzy random variable (see Section 3.5.2)
can be interpreted as a collection of nested credal sets Pα , with α ∈ [0,1], and Pα ⊆Pβ for
any pair of values such that α ≥ β .
Within the hybrid method, the fuzzy random variable has MP trapezoidal (discrete) fuzzy
focal sets with equal weights, and for each value α , Pα is induced by the random set having
the MP corresponding α-cuts as focal elements, each having equal weight, as pictured in
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Figure 7.6. To simplify notations, we denote by PTα the credal set corresponding to level α
of (m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)). For each level α ∈ [0,1], the credal set PTα induces a p-box, denoted
[F ,F ]Tα . Note that for any pair of values such that α ≥ β , FTα < FTβ and FTα > FTβ .
0
1
piT,i
α1
α2
piT,iα1
Figure 7.6: Random fuzzy variable.
Baudrit et al. [12] and Ferson and Ginzburg [102] have proposed two different post-
processings based on p-boxes [F ,F ]Tα .
Baudrit et al. [12] post-processing, called homogeneous post-processing, consists in sum-
marizing the information contained in (m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)) by a single pair [F ,F ]TE of averaged
cumulative distributions such that
FTE =
∫ 1
0
FTαdα ; FTE =
∫ 1
0
FTαdα
note that [F ,F ]TE is equivalent to the p-box induced by the fuzzy random variable when inter-
preted as a 1st order uncertainty representation (see Section 3.5.2).
Ferson and Ginzburg [102] propose to keep only some relevant values of confidence levels
α and to retain the p-boxes corresponding to those levels. For example, considering [F ,F ]T0
and [F ,F ]T1 comes down to only look at the most pessimistic and most optimistic p-boxes.
7.2.1.2 The RaFu method: more numerical efficiency through pre-processing
Two potential defects of the above methodology are the following:
1. Required number of computation: building (̂m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)) can be computationally too
expensive. Consider the common choicesMP = 100 andMpi = 21 (α = {0,0.05, . . . ,1})
for MP,Mpi . Building (̂m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)) then requires 2100 computations. If it is reason-
able when T can be quickly evaluated, 2100 computations is often unaffordable when
dealing with complex computer codes.
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Figure 7.7: Illustration of sample matrix
2. Controlling the error/rate of convergence: as numerical approximation means numerical
error, it is desirable to have some means to control the error. Up to now, poor attention
has been given to such questions when using the hybrid method.
It is therefore desirable to design methods allowing both to reduce the number of required
computations to apply the hybrid method and to control or evaluate the numerical error re-
sulting from the numerical propagation. The RaFu method intends to improve these two
aspects, mainly by replacing the classical post-processing step by a pre-processing. Since,
in practice, a decision maker (DM) will only be interested in some features of the structure
(̂m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)), the RaFu method consists in asking to this decision maker (DM), under the
form of a triplet (γS,γE ,γA) of parameters, what specific feature of (̂m,F˜ )T (H,(1:N)) he is in-
terested in, and which degree of numerical accuracy does he want to reach. An optimized
sampling strategy of distributions P(1:k) and of α-cuts of pik+1, . . . ,piN is then derived to satisfy
the DM’s choice with a minimal amount of computations. This sampling strategy will take the
shape of a sample matrix countingM samples, as summarized in Figure 7.7.
Statistical parameter γS : this parameter encompasses two kind of information, contained
in two sub-parameters γSi,γSo respectively related to information on input and output variables:
• γSi: concerns information related to the joint distribution P(1:k); It can be, for example,
assessment of copulas [158] linking some of the variables or rank correlations [121]
between some variables, or simply stochastic independence between all variables
• γSo: concerns information about the statistical value of interest for the DM. For ex-
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ample the probability of exceeding a certain threshold value y∗, the entire cumulative
distributions, or other statistical quantities such as the mean, the variance, . . .
In other words, γS specify how samples will be drawn from distributions P1, . . . ,Pk (γSi), and
what is the awaited form of the final result (γSo).
Epistemic parameter γE : this parameter is related to epistemic uncertainty and to the DM
behavior with respect to this uncertainty. It determines how α-cuts or values from pik+1, . . . ,piN
have to be sampled. Typical choices for γE are:
Choice 1 . Fixed α ∈ [0,1]: for every sample x(1:k)i , i= 1, . . . ,M of P1, . . . ,Pk, take piPI,(k+1:N)α
as the sample on pik+1, . . . ,piN , with α a fixed value. This corresponds to fix a
confidence level 1−α concerning epistemic uncertainty.
Choice 2 . Vector α = (α1, . . . ,αJ) of values: duplicate every sample x(1:k)i , i= 1, . . . ,M/J of
P1, . . . ,Pk J times and associate the sampled cut piPI,(k+1:N)α j
to the jth duplication.
Numerical approximation method described in Section 7.2.1.1 corresponds to this
choice (with J the number of discretized levels).
Choice 3 . Partially randomized value α: for every sample x(1:k)i , i = 1, . . . ,M of P1, . . . ,Pk,
sample a random value αi from a uniform law on [0,1] and take piPI,(k+1:N)αi
as
sample on pik+1, . . . ,piN . As we will see, this is equivalent to averaging over all
α-cuts.
Choice 4 . Totally randomized value α: for every sample x(1:k)i , i = 1, . . . ,M of P1, . . . ,Pk,
sample N− k random values αi,k+1, . . . ,αi,N from independent uniform laws on
[0,1], and samples pik+1,αi,k+1 , . . . ,piN,αi,N from possibility distributions. This is
equivalent to assume random set independence between pik+1, . . . ,piN .
Thus, these two parameters γE ,γS settle which kind of information will be sampled from
distributions P1, . . . ,Pk,pik+1, . . . ,piN , as well as the (in)dependency assumptions between them.
7.2.1.3 Integration of numerical error
Numerical Accuracy parameter γA : One of the interest of using Monte-Carlo sampling
technique or one of its variant (e.g. importance sampling, MCMC, Latin HyperCube Sam-
pling) is that they often comes with convergence theorems that are handy to control or bound
approximation errors. Parameter γA is related to this numerical error, and has a direct effect on
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the number M of samples (or, equivalently, computations) required by a specific application.
It can take two different forms: either the DM specifies a numerical accuracy to be reached,
and the number of required samples is deduced from it, or the DM provides a maximal number
of samples (often limited by available ressources), and the numerical accuracy reachable with
this number of samples is then deduced.
We only recall here convergence results related to the use of order statistics [27] when
evaluating percentiles of cumulated distribution. Let us note Xq the q percentile of a random
variable X . From a sample of size M, the use of order statistics consists in considering the
ordered values x(1) ≤ . . .≤ x(M) drawn from the random variable X . If theM values are drawn
randomly and independently, the following equation
P(X(K) < Xq) =
M
∑
i=K
(
i
M
)
qi(1−q)M−i (7.2)
holds. This is equivalent to saying that the random variable FX(X(K)) follows a beta law of
parameters K andM−K+1. The main interest of this result is that FX(X(K)) does not depend
of X distribution, therefore it allows to know the number M of samples required to derive
a confidence interval for X bounding a given percentile (q) with a given numerical accuracy
without knowing neither the values X(i) nor the distribution of X . For example, if a DMwants a
conservative upper bound of the 95% percentile that covers it with a confidence of at least 95%,
then, by using equation (7.2), it is straightforward to determine that at least 59 computations
will be required, since if we draw 58 samples, P(X(58) < X95) = (0.95)
58 = 5.1% (i.e. a
confidence of 94.9 %), while if 59 samples are drawn, P(X(59) <X95) = (0.95)
59 = 4.8%. This
is particularly interesting in risk analysis involving costly computer codes (see, for example,
the BEMUSE programme [160]).
Note that results from order statistics to pre-determine the number of required samples
cannot be used in the cases where the DM specifies a confidence interval with a minimal
width, or if the statistical quantity of interest is not a percentile but another value (e.g. the
mean or variance). In this case, a first propagation has to be done, with a prescribed number
ofM samples from which will be estimated a first confidence interval. Number of propagated
samples can then be increased, accordingly to the DM (dis)satisfaction. Note that integrating
numerical accuracy add yet another kind of imprecision, deriving from the use of numerical
approximation methods. Figure 7.8 illustrates the whole procedure by a flowchart.
The RaFu method is based on the same theoretical assumptions as the original hybrid
method, and in this respect does not bring much novelty. However, it tries to solve some of its
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Figure 7.8: RaFu method : flowchart (# samples: number of samples).
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practical shortcomings, i.e., reducing its computational cost, making it more "user-friendly"
(an important feature in applications) and integrating the notion of numerical approximation
error, an important aspect of safety studies involving complex computer codes.
7.2.1.4 Links with existing post-processing
As indicate the two following propositions, it is possible to express both Baudrit et al. [12]
and Ferson and Ginzburg [102] post-processing methods by suitable choice of the triplet
(γS,γE ,γA).
Proposition 7.1. The result of the post-treatment giving [F ,F ]TE can be interpreted as the
following choices over γS,γE:
• γS = F(x) ;∀x ∈ R (entire cumulative distribution)
• γE = randomized α for each sample.
Proof. Let us consider, for a value y ∈ R, the lower probability PTE ([−∞,y]) = FTE (y) asso-
ciated to Baudrit et al.’s post-treatment. Since this lower probability corresponds to the lower
expectation of the indicator function 1([−∞,y]) of the event [−∞,y], it is given by the following
formula:
PTE ([−∞,y]) =
1∫
κ=0
1∫
α1=0
. . .
1∫
αk=0
1(T (F−1X1 (α1),...,F
−1
Xk
(αk),piPI,(k+1:N)κ )⊂[−∞,y])
dκdα1 . . .dαk (7.3)
where distributions P1, . . . ,Pk are assumed to be independent, without loss of generality. This
holds for every y ∈R, and since making a Monte-Carlo sampling with parameters of Proposi-
tion 7.1 is equivalent to a numerical evaluation of Integral (7.3), this finishes the proof for the
lower distribution FTE . The proof for the upper one is similar (inclusion in indicator function
become a non-empty intersection).
Proposition 7.2. Given a fixed κ , the result of the post-treatment giving [F ,F ]κ can be inter-
preted as the following choices over γS,γE:
• γS = F(x) ;∀x (whole cumulative distribution)
• γE = κ
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Proof. We follow a reasoning similar to the one used in the previous proof, except that the
integral to evaluate becomes
Pκ([−∞,y]) =
1∫
α1=0
. . .
1∫
αk=0
1(T (F−1X1 (α1),...,F
−1
Xk
(αk),piPI,(k+1:N)κ )⊂[−∞,y])
dα1 . . .dαk
Similarly, it can be checked that random set independence assumption is retrieved when
every sample is taken randomly in the RaFu method. Pre-processing DM choices rather than
post-processing it allows to gain a factor proportional to Mpi (the number of discretized α-
cuts) in the number of required computations when only some lower and upper cumulative
distributions have to be estimated, while keeping the same numerical quality in the final ap-
proximation. Of course, some information is lost in the process, but if this information is not
relevant for the DM, there are no obvious reasons to keep it, particularly when the number and
costs of computations become important issue.
7.2.2 Case-study
We apply the RaFu method on a simplified model used by EDF (French integrated energy
operator) to compute the overflowing height for a river dike [139]. Although this model is
quite simple, it provides a realistic industrial application in which we can distinguish between
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. This model approximates the overflowing height H of a
river and depends on six parameters which are summarized in table 7.4. It reads
H =
 Q
Ks
√
Zu−Zd
L
B
 35 (7.4)
7.2.3 Modeling uncertainty sources
We assume the river width (B) is constant on all the length of the river (L). Both this width
and length are assumed to be well known (i.e. no uncertainty on these parameters).
The value of the river flow rate (Q) depends on a huge number of physical phenomena
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Symbol Name
Q River flow rate
B River width
Ks Strickler coefficient
Zu Upriver water level
Zd Downriver water level
L River length
Table 7.4: Summary of parameters used in equation (7.4)
(e.g. climatic and meteorologic conditions, period of the year, . . . ) that are highly variable
over time and/or space. The flow rate value can therefore be interpreted as an aleatory value
due to the natural variability of various physical phenomena. As a lot of measurements are
usually available for river flow rates, it is possible to fit the data to a probability law modeling
this variability. Experience has shown that this variability can be well represented by classical
lognormal or Gumbel laws.
Water levels Zu and Zd depend on sedimentary conditions that are peculiar to the con-
sidered river bed. Due to various reasons, these sedimentary conditions are usually not well
known, but are not the consequence of some physical variability or of some random event
(since we consider a specific river). The uncertainty of the water levels being due to a lack of
information, it is therefore of epistemic nature, and should be modeled by a fuzzy variable.
Similarly, the Strickler coefficientKs is a model parameter used instead of a physical model
to describe the dependance between the flow velocity and the slope of the river. It is also
specific to the considered river bed, and the complexity of the river nature makes it difficult
to estimate with precision. In our context, the uncertainty linked to such a non-measurable
parameter should be modeled by a fuzzy variable as well. Table 7.5 gives the chosen models
for our application (considered values and uncertainties are typical values). As an example,
figure 7.9 illustrates the distribution modeling the epistemic uncertainty on Ks.
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Figure 7.9: Triangular fuzzy number modeling Ks
Variable Unit Model
Q m3s−1 Lognormal law (m = 7.04 and σ = 0.6)
Zu m Triangular fuzzy number (54,55,56)
Zd m Triangular fuzzy number (49,50,51)
Ks Triangular fuzzy number (15,30,45)
Table 7.5: Uncertainty models
7.2.4 RaFu method application
Figure 7.10 shows the results of three applications of the RaFu method, each with 1000 sam-
ples. In these applications, the parameter γS2 was the whole cumulative distribution(s) (i.e.
γS = {F(x)∀x}), while the various γE corresponded to Ferson’s post-treatment for α = {0,1}
and to Baudrit et al.’s post-treatment (i.e. γE = random α in each sample). For sake of clarity,
numerical accuracy is not considered in this figure.
Let us note that, because fuzzy variables (epistemic uncertainty) are modeled by means
of triangular fuzzy numbers, taking γE = {α = 1} comes down to suppress this epistemic
uncertainty, thus the result is a classical unique cumulative distribution (we consider that both
Zu,Zd,Ks are precisely known).
Had we built the whole random fuzzy variable to get these five curves, p× 1000 inter-
val computations would have been necessary to reach the same numerical accuracy, where p
would have been the chosen number of discretized α-cuts.
Figure 7.11 illustrates how numerical accuracy can influence the result. This figure shows
the 95 % confidence interval (i.e. this interval covers the true value with a 95 % confidence)
2Here, only one variable is of aleatory nature, therefore there is no need to specify dependencies
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[F ,F ]0
[F ,F ]TE
[F ,F ]1
Figure 7.10: Result of Rafu Method with 1000 samples
for the 95 % percentile evaluation and for the three chosen values of γE . Since for γE = {α =
0}, intervals reduce to single values, we have five series of 1000 values (corresponding to
lower/upper bounds of γE := α = {1,0,TE}). Using order statistics and equation (7.2), we
have that the lower and upper bounds of the 95 % numerical confidence interval respectively
correspond to the 936th and 964th sorted values. Best estimates are given by the 950th sorted
value. Among other things, this figure shows us that the numerical approximation effect is not
negligible, even for a relatively high number of computations (here, 1000), and thus should be
taken into account in the analysis.
The material contained in this chapter can be found in papers [23, 24, 62].
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γE = {α = 1}
γE = {α = av.}
γE = {α = 0}
4.3
4.1 4.7
3.7 5.8
3.5 3.9 5.5 6.2
3.1 7.6
2.9 3.3 7.2 8.2
Numerical accuracy 95% confidence bounds
95 % percentile best estimates bounds
Figure 7.11: Evaluation of the 95% percentile
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Chapter 8
Conclusions, perspectives and open
problems
“Knowledge would be fatal, it is the uncertainty that charms one. A mist makes things beau-
tiful.”
—Oscar Wilde (1854–1900)
In this work, we have studied various aspects of uncertainty treatment, focusing on the
double objective of progressing towards a more unified handling of uncertainty and of propos-
ing tractable solutions for practical problems, by advantageously using the specific features of
the different theories considered here.
The main conclusion from Chapter 3, in which we studied practical uncertainty represen-
tations, is that generalized p-boxes are interesting uncertainty representations constituting the
missing links between these other popular and practical uncertainty models that are possibility
distributions, p-boxes and clouds. The fact that they can be interpreted as pairs of lower/upper
confidence bounds over collection of nested sets make them attractive for elicitation processes
(this still has to be confirmed by experiments), and the fact that they constitute special cases
of random sets, while generalizing possibility distributions, let us think that they can be a
good compromise between the two, being more tractable than the former and more expres-
sive than the latter. Within this perspective, works to do concerns the practical handling of
generalized p-boxes. We have started such a work by studying the propagation and fusion
of generalized p-boxes, respectively in Chapter 3 and Chapters 4. On-going works concerns
the problem of conditioning on generalized p-boxes, marginalization of generalized p-boxes,
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and computation of expectation with generalized p-boxes (in this last case, results from Chap-
ter 6 can probably be extended). Another work that remains to be done is to study to which
extend results concerning p-boxes can be extended to generalized p-boxes (e.g., the use of
copulas [158], of probabilistic arithmetic [209]).
From Chapter 4, we can conclude some guidelines about the use of fusion operators: con-
junctive and disjunctive operators should respectively be used when information is consistent
and totally inconsistent, while non-adaptive compromise operators should be used with cau-
tion. Adaptive fusion operators, and particularly the use of maximal coherent subsets (MCS),
appears to us as the best solution to deal with partial inconsistency in the information and
to reconciliate sources, at least theoretically. Nevertheless, this approach can quickly lead to
computational difficulties, and there is a great need for efficient algorithms to apply it, espe-
cially when there are numerous sources. We have studied in details a framework where such
efficient algorithms are available, where information is modeled by quasi-concave possibility
distributions on the real line, and where MCSmethodology is applied level-wise. The question
of taking account of eventual dependencies between sources1 when merging their information
is still open, and although propositions exist here and there, they still have to be better axioma-
tized and studied thoroughly. We have given some first results related to the study of a cautious
fusion rule in random set theory maximizing expected cardinality, and which is coherent with
cautious possibilistic fusion rules. Further (and on-going) research is needed to characterize
this rule, its drawbacks and advantages.
When past assessments of sources are available, we have also proposed a general method
to evaluate the quality of the information provided by sources. This method has been applied,
within the framework of probability and possibility theory, to the results of a benchmark of
nuclear computer codes in Chapter 7.
Conclusions from Chapter 5 is that allowing imprecision in uncertainty representations
makes the issue of interpretation essential when using independence notions, both from a the-
oretical and practical standpoint. Concerning this issue, many problems remains to be solved
in both directions, since nowadays, the use of a particular independence notion is mainly dic-
tated by practical convenience (i.e., strong independence in credal nets, random set indepen-
dence in Monte-Carlo sampling). As indicates our first results, Shafer’s recent theory [179]
based event-trees is an attractive framework to study and motivate notions of independence,
both theoretically and practically (since the use of backward propagation makes computations
easier).
1Note that some solutions have been proposed in the probabilistic setting [124], but they appear again too
precise, since dependencies between sources are unlikely to be known with such precision
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By studying how the notion random set independence could be outer-approximated by the
notion of possibilistic non-interaction, we have explored the usefulness of approximating one
notion of independence by another one. Similar studies for other notions of independence
could be useful in the practical handling of uncertainty.
Concerning the problem of decision making, briefly studied in Chapter 6, we have pro-
posed first results eventually leading to practical algorithms allowing to compute lower and
upper expectations of continuous (utility) functions when the uncertainty on a variable are
described by p-boxes. On-going works include the formalization of such algorithms, and the
consideration of mixed strategies (i.e., randomized actions).
Some examples of applications have been given in Chapter 7, one of them concerning the
treatment of the outputs of multiple computer codes, and the other one the practical propaga-
tion of uncertainty by the so-called hybrid method. As this method can be computationally
greedy, we have proposed a particular sampling method, called the RaFu method and devel-
oped in the IRSN software SUNSET, allowing the number of required computations. This
computational reduction is achieved by pre-processing rather than by post-processing some of
the decision maker choices.
However, to make propagation of imprecise uncertainty models through complex models
affordable and attractive to industrial users, next research efforts should focus on the use of
surface responses in combination with imprecise uncertainty models, or in the extension of
efficient simulation technics like MCMC techniques to such models.
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Appendix A
Uncertainty theories: a short introduction
We give here a short introduction to uncertainty theories used in this work. Further details and
discussions can be found in the references (and in the references therein).
A.1 Probability theory: a short introduction
Probability theory is surely the oldest theory allowing to model uncertainty about which values
a variable X assume in X . The theory of probability dates back to Jacob Bernoulli and its
ars conjenctandi [17], and we refer to the first chapters of de Finetti’s [108], Shafer’s [179] or
Walley’s [203] for recent reviews of the history of probability and its interpretations.
A probability mass p on a finite space X is a non-negative mapping p : X → [0,1] such
that ∑x∈X p(x) = 1. In the sequel, we will note PX the set of all probability masses on X
A subset A ⊆X of space X is called an event, and given p, the probability measure P
of the event A is P(A) = ∑x∈A p(x). This measure evaluates the likelihood that event A will
happen.
Given a real-valued function f : X → R and the probability mass p on X , the expected
value E( f ) of f is E( f ) = ∑x∈X p(x) f (x). We will note L (X ) the set of all such functions.
Remark that the probability P(A) of an event A corresponds to the expectation of the indicator
function of A, denoted 1(A) , which is such that it takes values one on elements x ∈ A, and zero
on elements x ∈ Ac, with Ac the complement of A.
Probability masses can be characterized both in terms of probability measures on event, or
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of expected values of functions in L (X ). In terms of events, a probability measure verify
the two following axioms:
∀A,B⊂X , P(A∪B) = P(A)+P(B)−P(A∩B) Additivity (A.1)
∀A⊂X , P(A) = 1−P(Ac) Duality (A.2)
which, in terms of expected values, read:
∀ f ,g ∈L (X ), E( f +g) = E( f )+E(g) Additivity (A.3)
∀ f ∈L (X ), E( f ) =−E(− f ) Duality (A.4)
and, in probability theory, the two languages have the same expressiveness, i.e. it does not
matter whether we speak in terms of probabilities of events or in terms of expected values of
functions in L (X ).
Similarly, a probability density p defined on the real line R is totally defined by its cumu-
lative distribution F : R→ [0,1], defined as
∀x ∈ R, F(x) =
∫ x
−∞
p(x)dx
provided F is right-continuous, or that we restrict ourselves to so-called σ -additive distribu-
tions (see Miranda et al. [149] for a exhaustive discussion of this topic).
In his work on subjective probability [108], de Finetti privileges the language of expected
values, and use the terms prevision for E( f ). In his theory, the value E( f ) is associated to the
fair price at which a given subject would buy or sell the game f to someone, such that f (x)1
is returned if the value of variable X turns out to be x. In this theory, provided the subject
can be forced at any moment to buy or sell the game at the given price, then De Finetti shows
that for the subject to be coherent (i.e., not engage himself in a sure loss, or in a so-called
Dutch-book), E( f ) must obey the laws of probability.
Although of major importance, many authors in the recent years have pinpointed argu-
ments converging to the conclusion that probability masses cannot adequately account for all
kind of uncertainty, and are likely to be too precise in a number of cases, eventually leading to
make too strong commitments when making previsions and taking decisions.
There are many examples where uncertainty cannot be faithfully modeled by a precise
1 f (x) can be a gain or a loss
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probability:
• confronted to a game f (x), it seems natural that a subject could be allowed to give
different prices at which he is ready to buy or sell it, allowing some imprecision in his
expected gain.
• when eliciting information from an expert, this information rarely corresponds to a sin-
gle possible probability distribution, and except for the will to model uncertainty by a
single probability, there are no reasons to force one to choose one distribution rather
than another.
• a similar argument holds when only few samples or observations are available.
• when building a joint uncertainty model from marginal ones, it is often unlikely that
this joint model will be faithfully modeled by a joint probability mass, even if marginal
models are themselves probabilities, simply because dependencies structures are usually
not so well known.
• it is counterintuitive to take the same model for two (quite) different states of knowledge,
namely ignorance and the fact that we know that everything is equi-probable.
for other arguments, see, for example, Walley [203]. Of course, there are numerous cases
where usual probability theory will do the job. But there are also numerous cases in which it
will not, and these are the cases that interest us.
A.2 Imprecise probability theory
Instead of considering single probabilities as model of uncertainty, imprecise probability the-
ory takes closed convex sets of probabilities as their basic uncertainty models. Such sets are
often called credal sets [136], and that is the name we will adopt here. Thus, uncertainty on
X is characterized by a credal set PX which is a closed convex set of probability distributions
on X
This approach is very close to robust statistics [119] and share many similarities with it,
but a great difference between the two approaches is that, in robust statistics, the existence
of a precise but imprecisely known probability PT is assumed, while in imprecise probability
theory, credal sets are the basic uncertainty representation, and the existence of an underlying
precise probability is not forcefully assumed.
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Where, for an event A ⊆X , a precise probability induced a precise probability measure,
a credal set PX induces lower P(A) and upper P(A) probability measures defined as:
P(A) = inf
p∈PX
P(A) and P(A) = sup
p∈PX
P(A)
and the lower probability measure satisfy the following properties:
∀A,B⊂X , P(A∪B)≤ P(A)+P(B) Sub-Additivity (A.5)
∀A⊂X , P(A) = 1−P(Ac) Duality (A.6)
and the difference P(A)−P(A) reflects the imprecision of the available information.
Now, given a function f in L (X ), a credal set PX also induces lower and upper expec-
tations defined as
E( f ) = inf
p∈PX
Ep( f ) and E( f ) = sup
p∈PX
Ep( f )
with Ep the expectation of f given the probability mass p. And we have
∀ f ,g ∈L (X ), E( f +g)≤ E( f )+E(g) Additivity (A.7)
∀ f ∈L (X ), E( f ) =−E(− f ) Duality (A.8)
Note that, thanks to the duality property, one can focus entirely on lower probabilities or ex-
pectations, since once they are defined respectively for all events or all functions in L (X ),
upper probabilities and upper expectations immediately follow. Similarly to the case of pre-
cise probabilities, lower and upper probabilities of an event A correspond to lower and upper
expectations of the indicator function 1(A)
But, contrary to precise probabilities, the two languages are not equivalent: any credal set
can be characterized by its lower expectations of functions in L (X ), but it is not, in general,
possible to characterize a credal set only by its lower probability on events.
Inversely, we can start with functions g that are in a subset K of L (X ), and some lower
bounds L(g) of their corresponding expectation E(g). We can then consider the set PL of
probability masses p ∈ PX compatible with these lower bounds, that is
PL = {p ∈ PX |∀g ∈K ,L(g)≤ Ep(g)}
lower bounds are called consistent if PL 6= /0 and coherent or tight if we have EPL(g) = L(g)
for any g ∈K (usually, we have only EPL(g)≥ L(g)).
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In walley’s [203] behavioral theory, consistency is called avoiding sure loss, tightness is
also called coherence, and lower/upper expectations are called lower/upper previsions. Note
that in this theory, and as recalled above, speaking in terms of expectations rather than prob-
abilities is not merely a matter of choice, since credal sets generally cannot be characterized
by their lower/upper probabilities alone. In the same line of thought as De Finetti [108], Wal-
ley considers that the lower prevision E( f ) represents the maximal price at which a subject is
ready to buy the game f , while the upper prevision E( f ) represents the minimal price at which
he is ready to sell it. When both prices coincide for every game on L (X ), usual probabilities
are retrieved.
A.3 Random set theory
Random set theory allows to model uncertainty of X by the means of a formal model that is a
mapping m :℘(X )→ [0,1] from the power set of X to the unit interval, such that
∀A⊆X , 0≤ m(A) (A.9)
∑
A∈℘(X )
m(A) = 1 (A.10)
i.e., the mapping m is normalized and non-negative, and we call it a basic probability assign-
ment (bpa). Another name often found in the literature is the Dempster-Shafer model. It is
common to call subsets receiving positive mass focal elements. In general, we will denote F
the set of focal elements, and (m,F ) a whole random set.
As a model of uncertainty coping with imprecision, random sets were first introduced
by Dempster [57], who linked them to lower and upper probabilities generated by imprecise
observations. The same formal model was then considered by Shafer [178] in his theory
of evidence, which does not refer to an underlying precise probability distribution but deals
with degree of beliefs, and in which random sets are called belief functions. This model
was then extensively taken over by Smets [189] in its Transferable Belief Model (TBM). See
Molchanov [151] for a recent theoretical account concerning random sets.
A.3.1 Shafer’s belief functions and Smet’s TBM
In Shafer’s theory of evidence [178], the mass m(E) attributed to E quantifies our belief that
the actual value of X lies in the set E, and nowhere else. Now, given an event A, belief Bel(A),
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plausibility Pl(A) and commonality Q(A) measures are defined as:
Bel(A) = ∑
E,E⊆A
m(E) (Belief).
Pl(A) = 1−Bel(Ac) = ∑
E,E∩A 6= /0
m(E) (Plausibility).
Q(A) = ∑
E,E⊇A
m(E) (Commonality).
Belief and plausibility measures respectively provide upper and lower confidence degree in
the fact that event A will happen (or is true), since the belief measure quantifies the mass
of belief that surely supports A, while plausibility measure quantifies the mass of belief that
could supports A. Commonality measure quantifies the mass that could freely support any
part of A. It can be argued that commonality measure gives an image of the imprecision of m,
since the higher the masses given to broad subsets, the higher the commonality measure.
And it can be checked that the belief measure induced by a random set has the following
property:
∀n ∈ N> 0,∀ Collection A = {A1, . . . ,An},Ai ⊆X , Bel(
⋃
Ai∈A
Ai)≥ ∑
I⊆A
(−1)|I|+1Bel(
⋂
Ai∈I
Ai)
Following Shafer’s idea that m quantifies beliefs, Smets introduce the so-called Transfer-
able Belief Model. The two main features of this model are that:
• It differentiate the credal state, where beliefs are held and possibly changed, from the
pignistic2 state, in which the so-called pignistic probability (see Appendix C) is used to
make a decision based on beliefs
• It allows for an open world assumption, that it is a non-null mass m( /0)> 0 can be given
to the empty set, assuming that the true state of the world is possibly somewhere outside
the considered universe X .
A.3.2 Dempster’s random sets
Let PY be a probability distribution on a space Y . Then, Dempster interpret a random set as
a so-called multi-valued mapping Γ : Y →℘(X ) from the space Y to another space X . In
2From Latin Pignus, to decide
Uncertainty theories: a short introduction 273
Dempster’s view, Γ represents the imprecise observation onX of some instance of a (random)
variable Y assuming values in Y and having P as probability measure.
For all event A⊆X , we can define A∗= {y ∈ Y |Γ(y)∩A 6= /0} and A∗= {y ∈ Y |Γ(y)⊆ A}.
For any such event A, we can then define lower P∗ and upper P∗ probabilities such that
P∗(A) = PY (A∗)≤ P(A)≤ P∗Y (A) = P(A∗)
In Dempster’s view, random sets are explicitly referring to the imprecise observation of some
variable Y .
Dempster’s random sets and Shafer’s basic probability assignments are related in the fol-
lowing way: for any subset E ⊆X let us define the mass m(E) as
mE = PY ({y ∈ Y |Γ(y) = E})
then, the belief and plausibility measures derived from this bpa are equal to the lower and
upper probabilities defined above. Nevertheless, an important potential difference is that,
in Dempster’s view, the mass PY (y) is not forcefully allowed to distribute "freely" among
elements of the set Γ(y), and is usually constrained to be allocated to one and only one element
of Γ(y).
A.3.3 Random sets as credal sets
A bpa m and the associated belief measure Bel can also be related to a credal set PBel , since
the belief measure Bel can be viewed as a coherent lower probability, and we have
PBel = {P ∈ PX |∀A⊆X , Bel(A)≤ P(A)≤ Pl(A)}
And it can be proved that PBel is the convex hull of all probability distributions compatible
with a multi-valued mapping Γ inducing a lower probability P= Bel. Nevertheless, if PY (y) is
constrained to be allocated to one and only one element of Γ(y), there can be slight differences
between the two models [146, 34] (but these differences are not relevant in our work). Also
note that, in the case where the mass given to the empty set is non-null, then the resulting
credal-set is empty (i.e. induced probabilistic bounds are not consistent)
Above interpretations and use of random set formalism are the most widely use in uncer-
tainty treatment, and we refer to Smets [183] for a review of other interpretations.
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A.4 Possibility theory
The first proposal to replace probability theory with a theory formally equivalent to possi-
bility theory in order to deal with uncertainty probably dates back to Shackle [177] with the
introduction of potential surprise distributions (equivalent to 1−pi) in economy. It was later
considered by Zadeh [219] and developed by Dubois and Prade [85].
The basic tool of possibility theory are possibility distributions. Given a variable X assum-
ing values in X , a possibility distribution is a mapping pi : X → [0,1] from the space X to
the unit interval, quantifying the uncertainty about X .
Several set-functions can be defined from a possibility distribution pi [79], namely the
possibility, necessity and sufficiency measures:
Π(A) = sup
x∈A
pi(x) (Possibility measures).
N(A) = 1−Π(Ac) (Necessity measures).
∆(A) = inf
x∈A
pi(x) (Sufficiency measures).
The possibility degree of an event A evaluates the extent to which this event is plausible,
i.e., consistent with the available. Necessity degrees express the certainty of events, by duality.
In this context, distribution pi is potential (in the spirit of Shackle’s), i.e. pi(x) = 1 does not
guarantee the existence of x. Their characteristic property are: N(A∩B) = min(N(A),N(B))
and Π(A∪B) = max(Π(A),Π(B)) for any pair of events A,B of X .
On the contrary ∆(A) measures the extent to which all states of the world where A occurs
are plausible. Sufficency (or guaranteed possibility) distributions [79] generally denoted by
δ , are understood as degree of empirical support and obey an opposite convention: δ (x) = 1
guarantees (= is sufficient for) the existence of x.
It can be shown (already in [178]) that a necessity measure N is induced by a random set
whose focal elements are nested, that is form a complete ordering with respect to inclusion. If
we let 0 = α0 < α1 < .. . < αM be the distinct values of pi on X , then pi is equivalent to the
random set having, for i = 1, . . . ,M, the following focal sets Ei with masses m(Ei): Ei = {x ∈X |pi(x)≥ αi}=m(Ei) = αi−αi−1
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and the same amount of information is then contained in this random set and in the distribution
pi(x) = Pl({x}). The open-world assumption then comes down to allow pi < 1, and m( /0) =
1− supx∈X pi(x).
It is then easy to see that a possibility distribution pi induce a particular credal set Ppi [92,
46], which is non-empty if and only if pi(x) = 1 for at least one x ∈X . The credal set Ppi is
defined as:
Ppi = {P ∈ PX |∀A⊆X , N(A)≤ P(A)≤Π(A)}
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Some notions of order theory
In this appendix, we introduce few notions of order theory that are needed in this work. See
Davey and Priestley [39] for an extended introduction to the subject.
Consider some space X and a (binary) relation ≤ on this space. Let us first define some
properties that the binary relation can satisfy:
• The relation ≤ is reflexive if, for any element x ∈X , we have
x≤ x (Reflexivity) (B.1)
• The relation ≤ is antisymmetric if, for any pair of elements x,y ∈X , we have
(x≤ y and y≤ x)⇒ x = y (Antisymmetry) (B.2)
• The relation ≤ is transitive if, for any triplet of elements x,y,z ∈X , we have
(x≤ y and y≤ z)⇒ x≤ z (Transitivity) (B.3)
• The relation ≤ is complete if, for any pair of elements x,y ∈X , we have
x≤ y or y≤ x (Completeness) (B.4)
Order relations are then characterized by the properties they satisfy. First, all of them
satisfy the properties of reflexivity and of transitivity.
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A relation that satisfy only reflexivity and transitivity is called a partial pre-order, also
called partial quasiorder. Inside a partial pre-order, two elements are said to be:
• incomparable if ¬(x≤ y or y≤ x), with ¬ the logical negation
• equivalent if (x≤ y and y≤ x) but y 6= x
A complete pre-order, also called pre-order or quasiorder is a relation satisfying the prop-
erties of reflexivity, transitivity and completeness. This means that every pairs of elements can
be compared, but that there remain some elements that are judged equivalent.
A partial order is a relation satisfying the properties of reflexivity, transitivity and asym-
metry. This means that there are non equivalent and distinct elements, but that some elements
are incomparable.
Finally, an linear order, also called total order, simple order, or simply chain or order, is a
relation satisfying the four properties of reflexivity, transitivity, completeness and asymmetry.
The best known examples of this notion are probably the set of real numbers or of natural
numbers equipped with the natural order on numbers (any number is comparable to another
one, and if a number is both lower and upper than another one, then they are equal).
Given a partial (pre-)order ≤ on X , a linear extension ≤L of ≤ on X is a total order
such that, whenever x≤ y for two elements x,y ∈X , it also holds that x≤L y. In other words,
a linear extension is a linear order that is consistent with the original partial (pre-)order ≤,
making incomparable elements comparable and arbitrating equivalences.
Appendix C
Random sets: inclusion, least commitment
principle, pignistic probability
We recall here some results related to the random set formalism and to the TBM interpretation
of this formalism. In particular, we recall the various notions of inclusion existing within
this theory, and what is behind the so-called Least-commitment principle (LCP) and pignistic
probability (BetP).
C.1 Inclusion relations between random sets
There exist many notions of inclusions between random sets, based on different measures
and/or notions. here, we recall the principal ones, and we refer to Denoeux for additional
notions. Each inclusion notion gives rise to a corresponding partial order between random sets.
The pl−,q− and s-orderings were introduced by Dubois and Prade [84], while Denoeux [61]
recently introduced other orderings (w− and v−orderings) based on Smets [184] canonical
decomposition.
Let us first recall the notions of specialization, as well as Smets canonical decomposition
of belief functions.
Consider an arbitrary indexing of subsets Ei of ℘(X ), i = 1, . . . , |℘(X )|. Given two
random sets (m,F )1,(m,F )2 defined on X , let m1,m2 be |℘(X )|×1 vectors of weights,
where the ith element of m j is the mass m(Ei) of subset Ei in (m,F ) j. Then, (m,F )2 is a
specialization of (m,F )1 if, given them1,m2, there exist a℘(X )×℘(X ) stochastic matrix
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S such that
m2 = S ·m1
with Si j the element in the ith line and jth column of S, and Si j > 0 if and only if Ei ⊂ E j. In
short, (m,F )2 is a specialization of (m,F )1 if the masses of (m,F )1 "flow downs" to subsets
of (m,F )2 (i.e., m1(E) is reallocated among subsets of E in m2).
Let (m,F ) be a random set such that m(X ) > 0 (so-called non-dogmatic bpa). Then,
Smets canonical decomposition [184] consists in affecting to every subset A ⊆ X a weight
w(A) with w ∈ [0,∞) and such that w can be obtained from commonality measure in the
following way:
w(A) = ∏
B⊇A
Q(B)(−1)
|B\A|+1
We can now define the following partial orders based on different extensions of set inclu-
sions:
• pl-ordering: (m,F )2 ⊑Pl (m,F )1 if and only if, for all subset E ⊆X , Pl(m,F )2(E)≤
Pl(m,F )1(E)
• q-ordering: (m,F )2 ⊑Q (m,F )1 if and only if, for all subset E ⊆ X , Q(m,F )2(E) ≤
Q(m,F )1(E)
• s-ordering: (m,F )2 ⊑s (m,F )1 if and only if (m,F )2 is a specialization of (m,F )1
• w-ordering: (m,F )2 ⊑w (m,F )1 if and only if, for all subset E ⊆X , Q(m,F )2(E) ≤
Q(m,F )1(E)
and each relation ⊑x with x ∈ {w,s, pl,q} induce a partial order on random sets. Also note
that (m,F )2 ⊑Pl (m,F )1 is equivalent to P(m,F )2 ⊆ P(m,F )1 , with P(m,F )i the credal set
induced by (m,F )i. Note that some inclusion notions are stronger than others, and, given two
random sets (m,F )1,(m,F )2, we have the following relations
(m,F )2 ⊑w (m,F )1⇒ (m,F )2 ⊑s (m,F )1⇒
 (m,F )2 ⊑Pl (m,F )1(m,F )2 ⊑Q (m,F )1
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Denoeux [61] (to which we refer for ampler discussion) considers additional orderings tagged
by the letters v,d,dd and they complete the above picture in the following way:
(m,F )2 ⊑v (m,F )1⇒(m,F )2 ⊑dd (m,F )1
(m,F )2 ⊑w (m,F )1⇒ (m,F )2 ⊑d (m,F )1
⇒(m,F )2 ⊑s (m,F )1⇒
(m,F )2 ⊑Pl (m,F )1(m,F )2 ⊑Q (m,F )1
C.2 Least-commitment principle (LCP)
The least-commitment principle can be informally stated as the motto "one should never pre-
suppose more belief than justified by evidence".
In terms of random sets, it is translated by the fact that, when a set of constraints do
not allow to identify a unique random set, but rather a set M of compatible random sets,
then one should select the least-committed random set with respect to one of the ordering
⊑x, x ∈ {w,s, pl,q}.
In general, there are multiple least-committed random sets, since the above orderings are
partial. Note that, the stronger the ordering notion, the more incompatibilities it generates, and
the larger the set of potential least-committed random sets.
C.3 Pignistic probability BetP
As briefly recalled in Appendix A, the Transferable Belief Model (TBM) has two levels: a
credal one, in which beliefs are entertained, and a pignistic one, in which a decision is taken
based on beliefs. Based on a set of rational requirements [187], Smets justify the use of the
so-called pignistic probability to determine this decision. The pignistic probability BetP is
defined as follow:
Definition C.1. Let (m,F ) be a random set defined on X . The pignistic probability of an
element x ∈X is then defined as:
BetP(x) = ∑
E∈F ,x∈E
1
|E|
m(E)
1−m( /0)
And it can be checked that BetP(x) is a probability mass on X . It comes down to dis-
tribute, for each focal element E, m(E) uniformly among elements of E and to normalize the
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obtained distribution. Actually, it is the probability mass equivalent to the gravity center of
the credal set P(m,F ) induced by the corresponding normalized random set, and it is also
equivalent to the Shapley value [181] in game theory.
Appendix D
Proofs
This appendix contains longer proofs not essentials to the understanding of te whole manuscript.
D.1 Proofs of Section 3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.4. From the nested sets A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ An = X we can build a par-
tition s.t. G1 = A1,G2 = A2 \A1, . . . ,Gn = An \An−1. Once we have a finite partition, ev-
ery possible set B ⊆ X can be approximated from above and from below by pairs of sets
B∗ ⊆ B∗ [165]:
B∗ =
⋃
{Gi,Gi∩B 6= /0}
B∗ =
⋃
{Gi,Gi ⊆ B}
made of a finite union of the partition elements intersecting or contained in this set B. Then
P(B) = P(B∗),P(B) = P(B∗), so we only have to care about unions of elements Gi in the se-
quel. Especially, for each event B ⊂ Gi for some i, it is clear that P(B) = 0 = Bel(B) and
P(B) = P(Gi) = Pl(B). So, to prove Proposition 3.4, we have to show that lower probabilities
given by a generalized p-box [F ,F ] and by the corresponding random set built through algo-
rithm 3 coincide on every possible union of elements Gi. We will first concentrate on unions
of conscutive elements Gi, and then to any union of such elements.
Union of consecutive elements Gi Let us first consider union of consecutive elements⋃ j
k=iGk (when k = 1, we retrieve the sets A j). Finding P(
⋃ j
k=iGk) is equivalent to computing
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the minimum of ∑
j
k=iP(Gk) under the constraints
i = 1, . . . ,n αi ≤ P(Ai) =
i
∑
k=1
P(Gk)≤ βi (D.1)
which reads
α j ≤ P(Ai−1)+
j
∑
k=i
P(Gk)≤ β j (D.2)
so ∑
j
k=iP(Gk)≥max(0,α j−βi−1). This lower bound is optimal, since it is always reachable:
• if α j > βi−1, take P s.t. P(Ai−1) = βi−1, P(
⋃ j
k=iGk) = α j−βi−1, P(
⋃n
k= j+1Gk) = 1−α j.
• If α j ≤ βi−1, take P s.t. P(Ai−1) = βi−1, P(
⋃ j
k=iGk) = 0, P(
⋃n
k= j+1Ek) = 1−βi−1.
And we can see, by looking at Algorithm 3, that Bel(
⋃ j
k=iGk) = max(0,α j−βi−1): focal
elements of Bel are subsets of
⋃ j
k=iGk if βi−1 < α j only.
Union of non-consecutive elements Now, let us consider a union A of non-consecutive el-
ements s.t. A = (
⋃i+l
k=iGk ∪
⋃ j
k=i+l+mGk) with m > 1. As in the previous case, we must
compute min
(
∑
i+l
k=iP(Gk)+∑
j
k=i+l+mP(Gk)
)
to find the lower probability on P(A). An ob-
vious lower bound is given by
min
( i+l
∑
k=i
P(Gk)+
j
∑
k=i+l+m
P(Gk)
)
≥min
( i+l
∑
k=i
P(Gk)
)
+min
( j
∑
k=i+l+m
P(Gk)
)
(D.3)
and, by the result obtained for consecutive elements, this lower bound is equal to
max(0,αi+l−βi−1)+max(0,α j−βi+l+m−1) = Bel(A) (D.4)
Consider the two following cases and the probability assignments showing that bounds are
attained:
• αi+l < βi−1, α j < βi+l+m−1 and probability masses P(Ai−1) = βi−1,
P(
⋃i+l
k=iGk) = αi+l−βi−1, P(
⋃i+l+m−1
k=i+l+1 Gk) = βi+l+m−1−αi+l ,
P(
⋃ j
k=i+l+mGk) = α j−βi+l+m−1 and P(
⋃n
k= j+1Gk) = 1−α j
• αi+l > βi−1, α j > βi+l+m−1 and probability masses P(Ai−1) = βi−1, P(
⋃i+l
k=iGk) = 0,
P(
⋃i+l+m−1
k=i+l+1 Gk) = α j−β i−1, P(
⋃ j
k=i+l+mEk) = 0 and P(
⋃n
k= j+1Gk) = 1−α j
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A same line of thought can be followed for the two remaining cases. As in the consecutive
case, the lower bound is reachable without violating any of the restrictions associated to the
generalized p-box. We have P(A) = Bel(A) and the extension of this result to any number n
of "discontinuities" in the sequence of Gk is straightforward.
The proof is complete, since for every possible union A of elements Gk, we have P(A) =
Bel(A)
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Let X be a finite set and define a ranking of their elements xi < x j
if and only if i < j. Given this ranking, and to prove Proposition 3.5, we start from a set L
with, for i = 1, . . . ,n, initial bounds ui, li. We then apply successively Equations (3.27) and
(3.25), with the aim of expressing bounds u′′i , l
′′
i of the set L
′′ in terms of initial bounds ui, li.
Expressions for (li− l′′i ) and (u′′i −ui) then follows. The positiveness of these two differences
is sufficient to prove inclusion between credal setsPL andPL′′ To shorten the proof, we focus
on lower bounds (proof for upper bounds is similar).
Let us consider the p-box [F ,F ]
′
built from a given reachable non-empty set L of probabil-
ity intervals, given, for i = 1, . . . ,n, by equations
P(Ai) = α
′
i = max( ∑
x j∈Ai
l j,1− ∑
x j /∈Ai
u j)
P(Ai) = β
′
i = min( ∑
x j∈Ai
u j,1− ∑
x j /∈Ai
l j)
with P,P the lower and upper probabilities PL. Now, given these bounds, we can compute
the set L′′ of probability intervals s.t.
l′′i = P
′(xi) = max(0,α ′i −β ′i−1) (D.5)
with P′ the lower probability of P
[F ,F ]
′ . When expressed in term of values li,ui of the original
set L, l′′i is given by
l′′i = max(0, ∑
x j∈Ai
l j− ∑
x j∈Ai−1
u j, ∑
x j∈Ai
l j + ∑
x j∈Aci−1
l j−1,
1− ∑
x j∈Aci
u j− ∑
x j∈Ai−1
u j, ∑
x j∈Aci−1
l j− ∑
x j∈Aci
u j)
and, given that the set L is consistent (Equation 3.8) and tight (Equations 3.9), we have that
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l′′i ≤ li. To get Equation (3.27) giving (li− l′′i ), simply note that:
li− ∑
x j∈Ai
l j =− ∑
x j∈Ai−1
l j
Aci ∪Ai−1 = X \ xi
li− ∑
x j∈Aci−1
l j =− ∑
x j∈Aci
l j
The same procedure can be followed for the bounds u′′i , and we have PL ⊆ PL′′ . The
set L′′ is tight (since PL ⊆PL′′) and consistent (by construction, the new bounds [l′′i ,u′′i ] are
reached by one distribution in the p-box [F ,F ], and this distribution is also in PL′′ , thus set
L′′ is tight, or reachable)
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Proof of proposition 3.6 follows the same line of thought as the
proof of Proposition 3.5.
Let us consider an original generalized p-box [F ,F ] with bounds αi,βi on sets Ai. The set
L′ of probability intervals corresponding to this generalized p-box is given by equations
P(xi) = l
′
i = max(0,αi−βi−1)
P(xi) = u
′
i = βi−αi−1,
where P,P are the lower and upper probabilities of P[F ,F ]. From the set L
′, we can get the
lower bound F ′′ of [F ,F ]′′ by using equations
P′(Ai) = α ′′i = max( ∑
xi∈Ai
l′i ,1− ∑
xi /∈Ai
u′i)
with P′ the lower probability of PL′ . In terms of the original p-box bounds αi,βi, this gives
us
α ′′i = max(
i
∑
j=1
α j−
i−1
∑
j=1
β j,1+
n−1
∑
j=i
α j−
n
∑
j=i+1
β j)
α ′′i = max(
i
∑
j=1
α j−
i−1
∑
j=1
β j,αi +
n−1
∑
j=i+1
α j−
n−1
∑
j=i+1
β j)
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Given that ∀ j, α j ≤ β j by definition of a generalized p-box, we have α ′′i ≤ αi and Equation
(3.29) follows. The same procedure can again be done for the upper bound to check that
β ′′i ≥ βi, and we get P[F ,F ] ⊆P[F ,F ]′′ .
Proof of Proposition 3.7. To prove this proposition, we must first recall a result given by De
Campos et al. [42]: given two sets of probability intervals L and L′ defined on a space X and
the induced credal sets PL and PL′ , the conjunction PL∩L′ = PL∩PL′ of these two sets can
be modeled by the set (L∩L′) of probability intervals that is such that for every element x of
X ,
l(L∩L′)(x) = max(lL(x), lL′(x)) and u(L∩L′)(x) = min(uL(x),uL′(x))
and these formulas extend directly to the conjunction of any number of set of probability
intervals on X (due to the associativity and commutativity of operators max and min).
To prove Proposition 3.7, we will show, by using the above conjunction, that PL =⋂
σ∈Σσ PL′′σ . Since, by Proposition 3.5 and for any σ ∈ Σσ , PL ⊂ P[F ,F ]′σ ⊂ PL′′σ , show-
ing this equality is sufficient to prove the whole proposition.
Let us note that the above inclusion relationships alone ensure us that
PL ⊆⋂σ∈Σσ P[F ,F ]′σ ⊆⋂σ∈Σσ PL′′σ . So, all we have to show is that the inclusion relationship
is in fact an equality.
Since we know that both PL and
⋂
σ∈Σσ PL′′σ can be modeled by set of probability inter-
vals, we will show that the lower bounds l on every element x in these two sets coincide (and
the proof for upper bounds is similar).
For all x in X , lL′′Σ(x) = maxσ∈Σσ{lL′′σ (x)}, with L′′Σ the set of probability intervals corre-
sponding to
⋂
σ∈Σσ PL′′σ and L
′′
σ the set of probability intervals corresponding to a particular
permutation σ . We must now show that, for all x in X , lL′′Σ(x) = lL(x).
From Proposition 3.7, we already know that, for any permutation σ and for all x in X , we
have lL′′σ (x)≤ lL(x). So we must now show that, for a given x in X , there is one permutation
σ such that lL′′σ (x) = lL(x). Let us consider a permutation placing the given element at the
front. If x is the first element xσ(1), then Equation (3.27) has value 0 for this element, and we
thus have lL′′σ (x) = lL(x). Since if we consider every possible ranking, every element x of X
will be first in at least one of these rankings, this completes the proof.
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D.2 Proofs of Section 3.3
To proof Proposition 3.13, we first state a short Lemma allowing us to emphasize the mecha-
nism behind the proof of the latter proposition.
Lemma D.1. Let (F1,F2),(G1,G2) be two pairs of sets such that F1 ⊂ F2, G1 ⊂ G2, G1 * F2
and G1∩F1 6= /0. Let also piF ,piG be two possibility distributions such that the corresponding
random sets are defined by mass assignments mF(F1) = mG(G2) = λ , mF(F2) = mG(G1) =
1−λ . Then, the lower probability of the non-empty credal set P = PpiF ∩PpiG is not 2−
monotone.
Note that in the above lemma, [1−piG,piF ] is a not a cloud, since the inequality piG+piF ≥ 1
does not hold, even if by construction, P = PpiF ∩PpiG is not empty. Non-emptiness of
P = PpiF ∩PpiG comes from piF(x) = piG(x) = 1 for an element x∈G1∩F1, thus min(piG,piF)
is normalized (see Section 3.3.2.2). Example 3.8 and Proposition 3.13 shows that this situation
described in Lemma D.1 also occurs in non-comonotonic clouds.
Proof of Lemma D.1. To prove LemmaD.1, we first recall a useful result by Chateauneuf [21]
concerning the intersection of credal sets induced by random sets. This result is then applied
to the possibility distributions defined in Lemma D.1 to prove that the associated lower prob-
ability is not 2-monotone. The main idea is to exhibit two events such that 2-monotonicity is
not satisfied for them. Consider the set M of matrices M of the form
G1 G2
F1 m11 m12
F2 m21 m22
(D.6)
where
m11 +m12 = m22 +m12 = λ
m21 +m22 = m21 +m11 = 1−λ
∑mi j = 1
Each such matrix is a normalized (i.e. such that m( /0) = 0) joint mass distribution for the
random sets induced from possibility distributions piF ,piG, viewed as marginal belief functions.
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Following Chateauneuf [21], the lower probability P induced by the credal set P = PpiF ∩
PpiG has, for any event E ⊆X , value
P(E) = min
M∈M ∑
(Fi∩G j)⊂E
mi j (D.7)
Now consider the four events F1,G1,F1∩G1,F1∪G1. Studying the relations between sets
and the constraints on the values mi j, we can see that
P(F1) = λ
P(G1) = 1−λ
P(F1∩G1) = 0.
For F1∩G1, just consider the matrix m12 = λ ,m21 = 1−λ . To show that the lower probability
is not even 2−monotone, it is enough to show that P(F1∪G1) < 1. To achieve this, consider
the following mass distribution
m11 = min(λ ,1−λ )
m12 = λ −m11
m21 = 1−λ −m11
m22 = min(λ ,1−λ )
it can be checked that the matrix corresponding to this distribution is in the set M , and yields
P(F1∪G1) = m12 +m11 +m21
= m11 +λ −m11 +1−λ −m11
= 1−m11 = 1−min(λ ,1−λ )
= max(1−λ ,λ ) < 1
since (F2∩G2)* (F1∪G1) (due to the fact that G1 * F2). Then the inequality
P(F1∪G1)+P(F1∩G1) < P(F1)+P(G1) (D.8)
holds, which ends the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 3.13. To prove Proposition 3.13, we again use the result by Chateauneuf
[21] as in the proof of Lemma D.1, that is we exhibit a pair of events for which 2-monotonicity
fails. Chateauneuf results are clearly applicable to clouds, since possibility distributions are
equivalent to nested random sets. Consider a finite cloud described by the general Equation
(3.35) and the following matrix Q of weights qi j
Cγ1
c · · · Cγ jc · Cγi+1c · · · CγM c
Bγ0 q11 . . . q1 j · q1(i+1) . . . q1M
...
...
. . .
...
...
Bγ j−1 q j1 . . . qjj · qj(i+1) . . . q jM
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
Bγi q(i+1)1 . . . q(i+1)j · q(i+1)(i+1) . . . q(i+1)M
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
BγM−1 qM1 . . . qM j · qM(i+1) . . . qMM
Respectively call Bel1 and Bel2 the belief functions equivalent to the possibility distribu-
tions respectively generated by the collections of sets {Bγi|i = 0, . . . ,M−1} and {Cγic|i = 1, . . . ,M}.
From Equation (3.17), m1(Bγi) = γi+1− γi for i = 0, . . . ,m− 1, and m2(Cγ jc) = γ j− γ j−1 for
j = 1, . . . ,M. As in the proof of Lemma D.1, we consider every possible joint random set such
that m( /0) = 0 built from the two marginal belief functions Bel1,Bel2.
Following Chateauneuf, let Q be the set of matrices Q s.t.
qi· =
M
∑
j=1
qi j = γi− γi−1
q· j =
M
∑
i=1
qi j = γ j− γ j−1
If i, j s.t. Bγ i ∩Ccγ j = /0 then qi j = 0
and the lower probability of the credal set P[pi,δ ] on event E is such that
P(E) = min
Q∈Q ∑
(Bγi∩Cγ j c)⊂E
qi j. (D.9)
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Now, by hypothesis, there are at least two overlapping sets Bγi,Cγ j i > j that are not in-
cluded in each other (i.e. Bγi∩Cγ j 6∈ {Bγi,Cγ j , /0}). Let us consider the four events Bγi,Cγ jc,Bγi∩
Cγ j
c,Bγi ∪Cγ jc. Considering Equation (D.9), the matrix Q and the relations between sets, in-
clusions BγM ⊂ . . .⊂ Bγ0 ,Cγ0c ⊂ . . .⊂CγM c and, for i = 0, . . . ,M,Cγi ⊂ Bγi imply:
P(Bγi) = 1− γi
P(Cγ j
c) = γ j
P(Bγi ∩Ccγ j) = 0
for the last result, just consider the mass distribution qkk = γk−1− γk for k = 1, . . . ,M.
Next, consider event Bγi ∪Cγ jc (which is different from X by hypothesis). Suppose all
masses are such that qkk = γk−1−γk, except for masses (in boldface in the matrix) q j j,q(i+1)(i+1).
Then, Cγ j
c ⊂ Cγi+1c, Bγi ⊂ Bγ j−1 , Cγ jc * Bγ j−1 by definition of a cloud and Bγi ∩Cγ jc 6= /0 by
hypothesis. Finally, using Lemma D.1, consider the mass distribution
q(i+1) j = min(γi+1− γi,γ j− γ j−1)
q(i+1)(i+1) = γi+1− γi−q(i+1) j
q j j = γ j− γ j−1−q(i+1) j
q j(i+1) = min(γi+1− γi,γ j− γ j−1.)
It always gives a matrix in the set Q. By considering every subset of Bγi ∪Cγ jc, we thus get
the following inequality
P(Bγi ∪Cγ jc)≤ γ j−1 +1− γi+1 +max(γi+1− γi,γ j− γ j−1). (D.10)
And, similarly to what was found in Lemma D.1, we get
P(Bγi ∪Cγ jc)+P(Bγi ∩Cγ jc) < P(Bγi)+P(Cγ jc), (D.11)
which shows that the lower probability is not 2−monotone.
Proof of Proposition 3.14. First, we know that the random set given in Proposition 3.14 is
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equivalent to  E j = Bγ j−1 \Cγ j = Bγ j \Cγ jm(E j) = γ j− γ j−1 (D.12)
Now, if we consider the matrix given in the proof of Proposition 3.13, this random set comes
down, for i= 1, . . . ,M to assign masses qii = γi−γi−1. Since this is a legal assignment, we are
sure that for all events E ⊆X , the belief function of this random set is such that Bel(E) ≥
P(E), where P is the lower probability induced by the cloud. The proof of Proposition 3.13
shows that this inclusion is strict for clouds satisfying the latter proposition (since the lower
probability induced by such clouds is not 2-monotone).
Proof of Proposition 3.16. We build a sequence of outer and inner approximations of the con-
tinuous random set that converge to the belief measure of the continuous random set, while
the corresponding clouds of which they are inner approximations themselves converge to the
uniformly continuous cloud.
First, consider a finite collection of equidistant levels αi s.t. 0 = α0 < α1 < .. . < αn = 1
(αi−1−αi = 1/n∀i = 1, . . . ,n). Then, consider the following discrete non-comonotonic clouds
[δ n,pin], [δ n,pin] that are respectively outer and inner approximations of the cloud [pi,δ ]: for
every value r in R, do the following transformation
pi(r) = α with α ∈ [αi−1,αi] then pin(r) = αi and pin(r) = αi−1
δ (r) = α ′ with α ′ ∈ [α j−1,α j] then δ n(r) = α j−1 and δ n(r) = α j
This construction is illustrated in Figure D.1 for the particular case when both pi and δ are
unimodal. In this particular case, for i = 1, . . . ,n
{x ∈ R|pi(x)≥ α}= [x(αi−1),y(αi−1)] with α ∈ [αi−1,αi]
{x ∈ R|δ (x) > α}= [u(αi),v(αi)] with α ∈ [αi−1,αi]
{x ∈ R|pi(x)≥ α}= [x(αi),y(αi)]α ∈ [αi−1,αi]
{x ∈ R|δ (x) > α}= [u(αi−1),v(αi−1)]α ∈ [αi−1,αi]
Given the above transformations, P(pin)⊂P(pi)⊂P(pin), and limn→∞ P(pin) = P(pi)
and also limn→∞ P(pin)=P(pi). Similarly,P(1−δ n)⊂P(1−δ )⊂P(1−δ n), limn→∞ P(1−
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Figure D.1: Inner and outer approximations of a non-comonotonic clouds
δ n) = P(1−δ ) and limn→∞ P(1−δ n) = P(1−δ ). Since the set of probabilities induced by
the cloud [pi,δ ] isP(pi)∩P(1−δ ), it is clear that the two credal setsP(pin)∩P(1−δ n) and
P(pin)∩P(1− δ n), are respectively inner and outer approximations of P(pi)∩P(1− δ ).
Moreover:
lim
n→∞P(pin)∩P(1−δ n) = P(pi)∩P(1−δ )
and
lim
n→∞P(pin)∩P(1−δ n) = P(pi)∩P(1−δ ).
The random sets that are inner approximations (by proposition 3.14) of the finite clouds
[δ n,pin] and [δ n,pin] converge to the continuous random set defined by the Lebesgue measure
on the unit interval α ∈ [0,1] and the multimapping α −→ Eα such that
Eα = {r ∈ R|(pi(r)≥ α)∧ (δ (r) < α)}. (D.13)
In the limit, it follows that this continuous random set is an inner approximation of the contin-
uous cloud.
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D.3 Proofs of Section 5.3
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Note that the bpa of each (m,F )pii form the same vector of masses
(mi,1, . . . ,mi,M), and to simplify notations, we will refer to masses only by their index, and
m j := mi, j for some i. To prove Proposition 5.3, we’re first going to express the value that
should assume, on elements x(1:N) of X(1:N), a possibility distribution outer-approximating
(m,F )RSI,X(1:N) . We’re going to express it in terms of masses m j, j = 1, . . . ,M, and then we
will show that this expression is equivalent to the distribution pi ′X(1:N) given by Equation (5.2).
Let us express the value of the outer approximation in terms of masses mi, j. First, note that
focal sets of (m,F )RSI,X(1:N) have the general form ×Ni=1Ei, ji , with mass ∏
N
i=1m ji .
For a given value j ∈ JMK, the focal sets of (m,F )RSI,X(1:N) that are included in ×Ni=1Ei, j
but not in ×Ni=1Ei, j−1 are, for k = 1, . . . ,N,
{
⊗
i⊂JNK
|I|=k
Ei, j×
⊗
i⊂JNK
|I|=n−k
Ei, ji| ji < j}
with
⊗
standing for cartesian product, and |I| for the cardinality of I. Note that for a fixed
value k, there are
(
N
k
)
different subset of JNK having cardinality k. Following Dubois and
Prade [89], we can define a mass function defined on focal sets that are cartesian products of
the type ×Ni=1Ei, j (i.e., α j-cuts of distributions pii) by
m∗(×Ni=1Ei, j) =
N
∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
mk, j ∑
j1,..., jn−k< j
m j1 . . .m jn−k
and, as all the vectors of weights are the same, we can reduce the polynomial∑ j1,..., jn−k< jm j1 . . .m jn−k
and get
m∗(×Ni=1Ei, j) =
N
∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
mk, j
(
∑
l< j
ml
)N−k
this mass function sums up to one, corresponds to a possibility distribution, and outer-approximates
(m,F )RSI,X(1:N) . Now, let us consider (as done by Dubois and Prade [89]) an element x(1:N) ∈
(×Ni=1Ei, j) \ (×Ni=1Ei, j−1) (recall that Ei, j ⊆ Ei, j−1 for any i ∈ JNK and j ∈ {2, . . . ,M}), that
is an element x(1:N) that is in the cartesian product of α j-cuts, but not α j−1-cuts. Note that
only these elements have to be considered, since the outer-approximation is consonant with
focal sets of the type ×Ni=1Ei, j. Given the outer-approximating mass m∗ given above on sets
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×Ni=1Ei, j, we have
pi ′X(1:N)(x(1:N)) = ∑
i≥ j
m∗(×Nk=1Ek,i)
= ∑
i≥ j
(
N
∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
mi ∑
j1,..., jn−k<i
m j1 . . .m jn−k
)
= ∑
i≥ j
 N∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
mi
(
∑
l<i
ml
)N−k= α ′j
the equality from the second to the third line being again obtained by reducing the polynomial
∑
j1,..., jn−k<i
m j1 . . .m jn−k .
Given our choice of x(1:N), we also have that mini=1,...,N(pii(xi)) = α j. What we want
to check is that, if by applying Equation (5.2), we have mini=1,...,N(pi ′i (xi)) = α
′
j? To an-
swer this, first remark that pii(xi) = α j = ∑
i≥ j
mi, and that Equation (5.2) can be rewritten
(−1)N+1( ∑
i≥ j
mi−1)N +1. Checking that mini=1,...,N(pi ′i (xi)) = α ′j then amounts to prove the
following equality:
∑
i≥ j
 N∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
mi
(
∑
l<i
ml
)N−k=(−1)N+1(∑
i≥ j
mi−1)N +1 (D.14)
checking N = 1 is trivial, and N = 2 has been originally checked by Dubois and Prade [89].
We now prove its validity for any N. First, note that(
∑
l≤i
ml
)N
=
(
m j +∑
l<i
ml
)N
=
N
∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
(mi)
k
(
∑
l<i
ml
)N−k
=
(
∑
l<i
ml
)N
+
N
∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
(mi)
k
(
∑
l<i
ml
)N−k
and
N
∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
(mi)
k
(
∑
l<i
ml
)N−k
=
(
∑
l≤i
ml
)N
−
(
∑
l<i
ml
)N
if we now denoteCi := ∑
l≤i
ml the cumulation of massesm1, . . . ,mi, the first member of equation
(D.14) can be rewritten
∑
i≥ j
(∑
l≤i
ml
)N
−
(
∑
l<i
ml
)N= ∑
i≥ j
((Ci)
n− (Ci−1)n) = (CM)n− (C j−1)n
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and, likewise, the second member can be rewritten
(−1)N+1(
(
∑
i≥ j
mi
)
−1)N +1 = (−1)N+1(−∑
i< j
mi)
N +1 = (−1)N+1(−1)N(C j−1)N +1
= (−1)2N+1(C j−1)N +1 = (CM)N− (C j−1)N
sinceCM = 1 by definition. This finishes our proof.
D.4 Proofs of Section 6.2
Full Proof of Proposition 6.1 using linear programming. We assume that functions ua,F ,F
are differentiable in R. Then the following primal and dual optimization problems can be
written for computing the lower expectation of the function ua:
Primal problem:
Minimize v =
∫ ∞
−∞ ua (x)ρ (x)dx
subject to
ρ (x)≥ 0,∫ ∞−∞ ρ (x)dx = 1,
−∫ x−∞ ρ (x)dx≥−F (x) ,∫ x
−∞ ρ (x)dx≥ F (x) .
Dual problem:
Max. w = c0 +
∫ ∞
−∞
(−c(t)F (t)+d (t)F (t))dt
subject to
c0 +
∫ ∞
x (−c(t)+d (t))dt ≤ ua (x) ,c0 ∈ R,
c(x)≥ 0, d (x)≥ 0.
The proof of equations (6.13)-(6.14) and (6.17) then follows in three main steps:
1. We propose a feasible solution of the primal problem.
2. We then consider the feasible solution of the dual problem corresponding to the one
proposed for the primal problem.
3. We show that the two solutions coincide and, therefore, according to the basic duality
theorem of linear programming, these solutions are optimal ones.
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First, we consider the primal problem. Let a′ and a′′ be real values. We can check that the
function
ρ (x) =

dF (x)/dx, x< a′
0, a′ ≤ x≤ a′′
dF (x)/dx, a′′ < x
is a feasible solution to the primal problem if the following conditions are respected:∫ ∞
−∞
ρ (x)dx = 1,
which, given the above solution, can be rewritten
∫ a′
−∞
dF +
∫ ∞
a′′
dF = 1,
which is equivalent to the equality
F
(
a′
)
= F
(
a′′
)
. (D.15)
We now interest ourselves in the dual problem. Let us first consider the sole constraint
c0 +
∫ ∞
x
(−c(t)+d (t))dt ≤ ua (x) , (D.16)
which is the equivalent of the primal constraint ρ (x) ≥ 0. We then consider the following
feasible solution to the dual problem as c0 = ua (∞),
c(x) =
 h′ (x) , x< a′0, x≥ a′ d (x) =
 0, x< a′′−ua′ (x) , x≥ a′′ .
The inequalities c(x)≥ 0 and d (x)≥ 0 are valid provided we have the inequalities a′ ≤ a≤ a′′
(i.e. interval [a′,a′′] encompasses maximum of ua). By integrating c(x) and d (x), we get the
increasing function
C (x) =−
∫ ∞
x
c(t)dt =
 ua (x)−ua (a′) , x< a′0, x≥ a′
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and the decreasing function
D(x) =
∫ ∞
x
d (t)dt =
 ua (a′′)−ua (∞) , x< a′′
ua (x)−ua (∞) , x≥ a′′
.
Let us rewrite condition (D.16) as follows:
c0 +C (x)+D(x)≤ ua (x) . (D.17)
If x< a′, equation (D.17) reads
c0 +ua (x)−ua
(
a′
)
+ua
(
a′′
)−ua (∞) = ua (x) .
Hence
ua
(
a′′
)
= ua
(
a′
)
. (D.18)
If a′ < x < a′′, we have c0 +ua (a′′)−ua (∞) ≤ h(x) which means that for all x ∈ (a′,a′′) we
have h(a′′)(= ua (a′))≤ h(x) (i.e. ua (a′′) and a′ are the minimal values of the function ua (x)
in interval x ∈ (a′,a′′).) If x≥ a′′, then we get the trivial equality c0+ua (x)−ua (∞) = ua (x).
The two proposed solutions are valid if and only if equation (D.15) is valid for the primal
problem and equation (D.18) is valid for the dual problem. In order to do it, let us consider
the function
ϕ (α) = ua
(
F
−1
(α)
)
−ua
(
F−1 (α)
)
,
which, being a substraction of two continuous functions (by supposition), is continuous. Since
the function ua has its maximum at point x= a, then, by taking α =F (a), we get the inequality
ϕ (γ) = ua
(
F
−1
(F (a))
)
−ua (a)≤ 0
and, by taking γ = F (a), we get the inequality
ϕ (γ) = ua (a)−ua
(
F−1
(
F (a)
))≥ 0.
Consequently, there exists γ in the interval
(
F (a) ,F (a)
)
such that ϕ (γ) = 0 (since ϕ is con-
tinuous). Therefore, there exist a′ = F−1 (γ) and a′′ = F−1 (γ) (hence, equality (D.15) holds)
such that equality ua (a′) = ua (a′′) in (D.18) is valid. We find the values of the objective
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functions
vmin =
∫ a′
0
ua (x)dF +
∫ ∞
a′′
ua (x)dF ,
wmax = c0 +
∫ ∞
0
(−c(t)F (t)+d (t)F (t))dt.
and, by using integration by parts together with equations (D.15)-(D.18), we can show that
equality wmax = vmin holds, with γ the particular solution of equation (6.17) for which opti-
mum is reached, as was to be proved.
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Appendix E
Remarks on Nested-Disjoint clouds
Some of the non-monotonic clouds violating conditions of Proposition 3.13 correspond to the
case where, for any pair of events {Bγi,Cγ j |i, j = 1, . . . ,n}, we have Bγi ∩Cγ j ∈ {Bγi,Cγ j , /0},
with at least one pair Bγi,Cγ j of non-empty sets such that Bγi ∩Cγ j = /0. In other words,
∀i, j,Bγi andCγ j are either nested or disjoint. They can be called nested-disjoint clouds and
they are fully described by the existence of three indices j > k ≥ l s.t.
the sets {Bγi|i< j}∪{Cγi|i≤ k} form a nested sequence (E.1)
Cγi ∩Bγ j = /0 ∀i k ≥ i≥ l (E.2)
Cγi = /0 ∀i> k andCγi 6= /0 ∀i≤ k (E.3)
Bγi ∩Cγ f = Bγi orCγ f i> k, f < l. (E.4)
and these four statements induce the fact that (Cγl ∪Bγ j) ⊂ Bγ j−1 , since we know that Bγ j ⊂
Bγ j−1 ,Cγl ∩Bγ j = /0 (Statement (E.2)) and Cγl ∩Bγ j−1 ∈ {Cγl ,Bγ j−1} (Statement (E.1)). Given
these facts, Cγl ∩ Bγ j−1 = Cγl , otherwise we end up with a contradiction. The structure of
this particular case is summarized by Figure E.1 (where only the most important sets are
represented).
We have strong reasons to think that these particular clouds, although not generalized p-
boxes, can still be represented by random sets. A first reason is that we can associate to the
sets Bγ1, . . . ,Bγ j a possibility distribution (i.e. they are nested and are associated to lower
probability bounds), while the sets {Bγi|i< j}∪{Cγi|i≤ k} form a nested sequence and can
thus be associated to a generalized p-box. The nested-disjoint clouds could then be seen as a
convex mixture of two random sets, thus giving again a random set. Secondly, this conjecture
is reinforced by the following simple example: Let us consider a cloud whose cuts are such
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that Bγ2,Bγ1 ,Cγ2 with Bγ2 ⊂ Bγ1 , Cγ2 ⊂ Bγ1 and Cγ1 ∩Bγ2 = /0, together with the two weights
γ2 > γ1. This cloud is nested-disjoint, and the belief function such that m(Bγ2) = 1− γ2,
m(Bγ1) = γ2− γ1 andm(Cγ1c) = γ1 models the same credal set as this cloud (since the presence
ofCγ1 only induces a bound over its upper probability).
Finally, it should be noted that, in the case of continuous clouds, this subclass does not
exist, since when distribution δ is such that supx∈X δ (x) > 0 and δ ,pi are not comonotonic,
we can always exhibit two cuts that are overlapping.
BγM
Bγ j
Cγk
Cγl
Bγ j−1
Cγl−1 Bγl−1 Bγ0
Figure E.1: Structure of a nested-disjoint cloud
Appendix F
Generalized p-boxes on complete chain
In this appendix, we study the notion of generalized p-boxes defined on a totally ordered
space X (i.e., a complete chain), and where X is not necessarily finite. Such spaces are
quite general, since they encompass in one sweep all finite spaces on which a total order is
defined, as well as product spaces Rd , provided these last ones are equipped with a total order
between elements. Note that, in order to be as general as possible, and to be coherent with
Walley’s [203] approach, we also consider finitely additive probabilities, which was not the
case previously.
The discussed results are part of an on-going work with Enrique Miranda and Matthias
Troffaes [150]. As we shall see, many of the results concerning generalized p-boxes on pre-
ordered finite spaces (see Section 3.2) extends more or less straightforwardly to the case of
(not necessarily finite) totally ordered spaces, but some of them do not extend so easily. Most
proofs are omitted, and we limit ourselves to main notions and results.
As before, we denote by L (X ) the set of all bounded and real-valued functions f on X .
Let E be the lower expectation of some credal set. Then, a lower expectation E defined on a
lattice of gambles K ⊆L (X ) is called n-monotone when if for all p ∈ JNK, p ≤ n, and all
f , f1, . . . , fp in K :
∑
I⊆{1,...,p}
(−1)|I|E
(
f ∧
∧
i∈I
fi
)
≥ 0. (F.1)
With ∧ the point-wise minimum. A lower expectation which is n-monotone for all n ∈ JNK is
called completely monotone, and is the counterpart of ∞-monotone capacities.
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F.1 Characterization of generalized p-boxes
As said before, X ,≤ is here an order complete chain, and we take x< y as a brief notation for
x≤ y and x 6≥ y. So ≤ is transitive, reflexive, and anti-symmetric, and for any two elements x,
y ∈X we have either x< y, x = y, or x> y. For simplicity, we assume that X has a smallest
element 0X and a largest element 1X .
We will use the same notation for an event A and its indicator function 1(A) . This means
that, in the following, E(A) will denote the lower expectation of 1(A) .
F.1.1 Definition
With the term distribution function, we shall refer to any function F :X → [0,1]which is non-
decreasing (with respect to ≤) and satisfies moreover F(1X ) = 1. F(x) provides information
about the cumulative probability on the interval [0X ,x]. Note that we need not to impose
F(0X ) = 0. Also note that distribution functions are not assumed to be right-continuous.
Given a distribution F on X and a value x ∈ X , we note F(x+) the right-limit F(x+) =
inf{F(y),y> x} and F(x−) the left-limit F(x−) = sup{F(y),y< x}1.
Definition F.1. A generalized probability box, or generalized p-box, is a pair [F ,F ] of dis-
tribution functions from X to [0,1], satisfying F(1X ) = F(1X ) = 1 and F ≤ F . If X is a
closed interval on R, then we call the pair [F ,F ] a p-box.
Similarly to its definition on other spaces, a generalized p-box is interpreted as lower and
upper probabilities P[F ,F ] on the set of events
K = {[0X ,x]|x ∈X }∪{(y,1X ]|y ∈X }
by
P[F ,F ]([0X ,x]) := F(x) and P[F ,F ]((y,1X ]) = 1−F(y). (F.2)
for classical p-boxes, it was already mentioned by Walley [203, Section 4.6.6] and proved
by Troffaes [193, p. 93, Thm. 3.59] that P[F ,F ] is a coherent lower probability. The proof
extends easily to the present case, and thus P[F ,F ] is a coherent lower probability on X , and
1Or, equivalently, F(x+) = limy→x
y>x
(F(x)) and F(x−) = limy→x
y<x
(F(x))
Generalized p-boxes on complete chain 305
corresponds to the lower envelope of a credal set P[F ,F ], which is here the set of all finitely
additive probabilities satisfying constraints (F.2).
Given a generalized p-box, we can consider the set of distribution functions that lie be-
tween F and F ,
Φ(F ,F) = {F |F ≤ F ≤ F}.
We can easily express the lower expectation E [F ,F ] in terms of Φ(F ,F): E [F ,F ] is the lower
envelope of the lower expectations of the cdfs F that lie between F and F :
E [F ,F ]( f ) = inf
F∈Φ(F ,F)
EF( f ) (F.3)
for all functions f on X . A similar result for p-boxes in the unit interval can be found in [203,
Section 4.6.6].
We now study and characterize this lower expectation E [F ,F ]. In order to do so, we will
first study it on a restricted and useful set H of indicator functions, that is the field of events
generated by K , and will then extend the results to any kind of event and then to any function
in L X .
F.1.2 The Field H
The field of events H generated by the domain K of p-boxes corresponds to events of the
type
[0X ,x1]∪ (x2,x3]∪·· ·∪ (x2n,x2n+1]
for x1 < x2 < x3 < · · · < x2n+1 in X (if n is 0 we simply take this expression to be [0X ,x1])
and
(x2,x3]∪·· ·∪ (x2n,x2n+1]
for x2 < x3 < · · ·< x2n+1 in X . Clearly, these events form a field: the union and intersection
of any two events in H is again in H , and the complement of any event in H also is again
in H .
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In the case of a precise cdf F2, PF has a unique extension to a probability charge on H .
Proposition F.1. EF restricted to H is a probability charge. Moreover, for any A∈H which
contains 0X , that is A = [0X ,x1]∪ (x2,x3]∪·· ·∪ (x2n,x2n+1], it holds that
EF(A) = F(x1)+
n
∑
k=1
(F(x2k+1)−F(x2k)) (F.4)
and for any A ∈H which does not contain 0X , that is A = (x2,x3]∪·· ·∪ (x2n,x2n+1],
EF(A) =
n
∑
k=1
(F(x2k+1)−F(x2k))
This proposition can be extended to p-boxes in the following way
Proposition F.2. For any A ∈ H which contains 0X , that is A = [0X ,x1]∪ (x2,x3]∪ ·· · ∪
(x2n,x2n+1], it holds that
E [F ,F ](A) = F(x1)+
n
∑
k=1
max{0,F(x2k+1)−F(x2k)} (F.5)
and for any A ∈H which does not contain 0X , that is A = (x2,x3]∪·· ·∪ (x2n,x2n+1],
E [F ,F ](A) =
n
∑
k=1
max{0,F(x2k+1)−F(x2k)} (F.6)
Among other things, this proposition shows that Remark 3.2 can be extended to the case
where X is an infinite totally ordered space. Next results show that p-boxes on totally ordered
spaces induce a completely monotone lower expectation (see Equation (F.1)), thus somewhat
extending Proposition 3.4 (since on finite spaces, there is a duality between ∞-monotonicity
and the fact of being a random set).
F.2 The lower expectation of p-boxes: A Choquet Integral
Representation
As shown in [149], the lower expectation EF of a (precise) distribution function F on [0,1] is
completely monotone. Generalizing this result to distribution functions on a totally ordered
2A precise cdf is such that F = F =: F
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space X is straightforward. However, given this, and Eq. (F.3), we cannot establish the
complete monotonicity of EF ,F , because the lower envelope of a set of completely monotone
lower expectation is not necessarily completely monotone. Next results indicate that such an
envelope is indeed completely monotone in the case of generalized p-boxes.
Let PH
[F ,F ]
denote the restriction of E [F ,F ] to H (That is, to the lower probabilities induced
by [F ,F ] of events in H ). Note that we have already derived closed form expressions for
PH
[F ,F ]
in Proposition F.2.
Theorem F.3. PH
[F ,F ]
is a completely monotone coherent lower probability.
And the inner measure PH
[F ,F ]∗
of PH
[F ,F ]
, defined as
PH
[F ,F ]∗(A) = supC∈H ,C⊆A
PH
[F ,F ]
(C), (F.7)
coincides with E [F ,F ] on all events [203, Cor. 3.1.9, p. 127]. It allows us moreover to charac-
terise the lower expectation on all function on L X , as is shown in the following theorem:
Theorem F.4. The lower expectation E [F ,F ] of P[F ,F ] to all functions in L X is given by the
Choquet integral (C)
∫ ·dPH
[F ,F ]∗
and is completely monotone as well.
This theorem confirm that generalized p-boxes on totally ordered spaces continue to be
completely monotone, as they are for finite totally (pre-)ordered spaces. As the above expres-
sion is not very manageable, it is desirable to dispose of more manageable ones. Nevertheless,
the use of an equivalent random set is not possible anymore, since the duality between random
set representation and complete monotonicity do not longer forcefully hold on infinite spaces.
In order to give more manageable expressions, we will consider the upper limit topology on
X which is the topology generated by the base
τ := {(x,y] : x,y ∈X ,x< y}∪{[0X ,x] : x ∈X }.
As we have indicated (Proposition F.3), PF ,F is a completely monotone (and therefore coher-
ent) lower probability on the field H generated by τ . For any function f on X , let us define
its lower oscillation as the gamble
osc( f )(d) := sup
C∈τ : d∈C
inf
x∈C
f (x). (F.8)
which comes down to consider the supremum of all lower semi-continuous functions domi-
nated by f (recall that a function g dominates another function f if f ≤ g).
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Given a subset A of X , it follows from Eq. (F.8) that the lower oscillation of 1(A) is the
indicator function of the set
B := {d ∈ A : ∃C ∈ τ s.t. d ∈C ⊆ A}=
⋃
C∈τ : C⊆A
C = int(A) = osc(1(A) ); (F.9)
note that B is the union of the elements of the base τ that are included in A, and is therefore
the topological interior of A in the upper limit topology. The following Lemma then follows:
Lemma F.1. For any subset A of X , E(A) = E(B), where B = int(A) is given by Eq. (F.9).
What this result tells us is that the natural extension of a generalized p-box is characterised
by its restriction to lower semi-continuous gambles (and, in the case of events, to the restriction
to open sets). It allows us to rewrite the Choquet integral of Theorem F.4 as
E( f ) = infosc( f )+
∫ suposc( f )
infosc( f )
E({osc( f )≥ x})dx = E(osc( f )), (F.10)
an expression which is indeed more manageable.
Above results also allow us to determine the expression of the lower expectation E on the
subsets of X which are open in the upper limit topology. Before that, we need to introduce
some preliminary notions. Let B be an open subset of X , and let us show that B is a union of
pairwise disjoint open intervals of X . Recall that by open we are referring here to the upper
limit topology, so the subinterval (a,b] is also open for any a,b in X such that a≤ b.
Definition F.2. [176] A set S is called full if [a,b] ⊆ S for any a ≤ b in S. Given a set B and
an element x of B, the full component C(x,B) of x in B is the largest full set S which satisfies
x ∈ S⊆ B.
The full components {C(x,A) : x ∈ A} of a set A⊆X form a partition of A [176, 4.4(a)].
This partition has a countable number of elements in the particular case where X = [0,1], but
not necessarily in general (since, contrary to the case whereX is the real line, we can consider
the set (a,a]). The following Lemma shows that if A is open, each of these full components is
an open interval.
Lemma F.2. Let B be a subset of X . If B is open, so are its full components.
This allow us to state the following lemma, showing that the lower expectation E is additive
on full components.
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Lemma F.3. Let B be an arbitrary subset of X , and let (Bλ )λ∈Λ be the full components of B.
Then E(∪λ∈ΛBλ ) = ∑λ∈ΛE(Bλ ).
Note that this lemma extends to totally ordered spaces the part of Remark 3.2 stating that
the lower probability of disjoint unions of consecutive elements was the sum of the lower
probabilities of every such union.
All these results allow us to deduce that the lower expectation E is characterised by the
value it takes on the full components of the open sets. From Lemma F.2, these full components
are open intervals of X , and are therefore of the form [0X ,x],(x,y], [0X ,x) or (x,y), for x≤ y
in X . It follows from Proposition F.2 that E([0X ,x]) = F(x) and E((x,y]) = max{0,F(y)−
F(x)} for any y≤ x inX . On the other hand, we deduce from Theorem F.4 and Equation (F.7)
that
E([0X ,x)) = F(x−) and E(x,y) = max{0,F(y−)−F(x)} (F.11)
for any x≤ y in X .
F.3 Approximating lower expectation by limits of p-boxes
Now that we have studied and characterized the lower expectation induced by a p-box on
totally ordered spaces, we give an expression allowing to approximate the lower expectation
by limits of discrete p-boxes. This approach is quite close to the one considered in chapter 6
using linear programming for computing lower expectations of p-boxes defined on the real
line. Nevertheless, there are at least three important differences between the two approaches:
the space here is more general, we consider finitely additive probabilities, and no continuity
assumptions are made about functions f . Consider a p-box [F ,F ] on X . Let (Fn)n,(Fn)n be
increasing and decreasing sequences of cdfs converging point-wise to F and F , respectively.
For ease of notation, denote by Pn the lower probability associated with [F ,F ]n, that is,
Pn =P
H
[F ,F ]n
, andPn the induced credal set, and let En be the lower expectation corresponding
to Pn. Since Fn ≤ F and Fn ≥ F , it follows that Φ(F ,F) ⊆ Φ(Fn,Fn) (or, equivalently,
P[F ,F ] ⊆Pn, and Eq. (F.3) implies that En ≤ E. Moreover, the same argument implies that
En ≤ En+1 for any n ∈ JNK, so limnEn = supnEn ≤ E. The following proposition shows that
the converse holds too:
Proposition F.5. E( f ) = limnEn( f ) for any gamble f .
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Next, we use this Proposition to establish an expression for the lower expectation of a
generalised p-box in terms of discrete generalized p-boxes. For any natural number n≥ 1, and
i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}, define the sets An1 := F
−1 (
[0, 1
n
]
)
,Ani := F
−1 (
( i−1
n
, i
n
]
)
,Bn1 := F
−1 ([0, 1
n
]
)
and
Bni := F
−1 (( i−1
n
, i
n
]
)
. Clearly, both {An1, . . . ,Ann} and {Bn1, . . . ,Bnn} are partitions of X . Define
Fn and Fn by
Fn(x) =
i
n
if x ∈ Ani , Fn(x) =
 i−1n if x ∈ Bni and x 6= 1X ,1 if x = 1X . (F.12)
Lemma F.4. The following statements hold for all x ∈X :
(i) For any n ∈ JNK, Fn and Fn are cdfs, Fn(x)≤ F(x), and F(x)≤ Fn(x).
(ii) limnFn(x) = F(x) and limnFn(x) = F(x).
(iii) (F2n)n, (F2n)n are increasing and decreasing sequences of cdfs such that F(x)= limnF2n(x)
and F(x) = limnF2n(x).
If we can find a simple expression for the lower expectations induced by Pn for our partic-
ular choice of Fn and Fn, then we also have a simple expression for E [F ,F ] via Proposition F.5.
To derive such a simple expression, we consider G1, . . . , Gn and G1, . . . , Gn defined by
Gi(x) =
1 if Fn(x)≥ in0 otherwise Gi(x) =
1 if Fn(x)≥ in0 otherwise
and the following proposition holds
Proposition F.6. For each n ∈ JNK, En = 1n ∑ni=1EGi,Gi .
Hence, all we need to characterise the lower expectation induced by [F ,F ]n is to determine
the lower expectation induced by a degenerate p-box, i.e. one where the lower and upper cdfs
only assume the values 0 and 1. Note that a degenerate p-box (G,G) is uniquely determined
by
I(G,G) =
{
x ∈X : G(x) < G(x)}= {x ∈X : G(x) = 0 and G(x) = 1} .
as G(x) = G(x) = 0 on the left of this interval, and G(x) = G(x) = 1 on the right of it. The
following proposition characterize the lower expectation EG,G induced by such degenerate
p-boxes:
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Proposition F.7. Let (G,G) be a degenerate p-box, and f ∈L (X ). If 0X 6∈ I(G,G),
(i) If I(G,G) = (a,b) then EG,G( f ) = infz∈(a,b] f (z).
(ii) If I(G,G) = (a,b] then EG,G( f ) = limy >→b infz∈(a,y] f (z).
(iii) If I(G,G) = [a,b) then EG,G( f ) = limx <→a infz∈(x,b] f (z).
(iv) If I(G,G) = [a,b] then EG,G( f ) = limx <→a limy >→b infz∈(x,y] f (z).
On the other hand, if 0X ∈ I(G,G), then
(a) If I(G,G) = [0X ,b) then EG,G( f ) = infz∈[0X ,b] f (z).
(b) If I(G,G) = [0X ,b] then EG,G( f ) = limy >→b infz∈[0X ,y] f (z).
Concluding, if we consider now the lower expectattion E ′n of (F2n,F2n) as defined in
Eq. (F.12), it follows from Proposition F.5 and Lemma F.4 that (E ′n)n is an increasing se-
quence of functionals that converges point-wise to the lower expectation E of [F ,F ]. By
Proposition F.6, E ′n can be calculated as a convex combination of natural extensions of degen-
erate p-boxes, whose expressions follow from Proposition F.7.
We thus end up with expressions allowing to compute the lower expectation of any gen-
eralized p-box defined on totally ordered spaces as a combination of lower expectations of
degenerate generalized p-boxes, this last lower expectations being easier to compute. Among
other things, these results also show that extending results found on finite spaces is far from
being always trivial, not to say impossible, as show the next section.
F.4 Relating random sets with p-boxes on the unit interval
In the case of generalized p-boxes defined on finite (pre-)ordered spaces, Proposition 3.4 in-
dicates that they are equivalent to special kinds of random sets. This extends relatoins already
hinted by Ferson et al. [104] for p-boxes defined on the discretized real line.
Here, we study the extensions of such results to p-boxes defined on the (continuous) unit
interval [0,1] on the real. Note that, up to a transformation, this is equivalent to study p-boxes
defined on any closed interval of the real line. Relating random sets to such p-boxes is easier
than relating random sets to generalized p-boxes defined on a totally ordered space X , due
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to some properties: for instance, the number of full components of any open set B is always
countable (which is not the case on X , see Definition F.2); and, using the Borel σ -field on
[0,1], we can establish a link between these p-boxes and random sets, while considering fields
of measurable sets on X would require many mathematical subtleties not forcefully desirable
for a first study.
Coherently with previous notations, we denote by L ([0,1]) the set of bounded real-valued
functions on [0,1]. Given F and F , let us define their pseudo-inverses by
L(α) := sup{x ∈ [0,1]|F(x) < α}
U(α) := inf{x ∈ [0,1]|F(x) > α}
for all α ∈ [0,1]. These are non-decreasing maps from [0,1] to [0,1]. Because F ≤ F , it
follows that L ≤U . Let Γ : [0,1]→℘([0,1]) be the multi-valued mapping given by Γ(α) =
[L(α),U(α)], with [L(α),U(α)] a closed interval whose lowest and highest elements are re-
spectively L(α) andU(α). Define, for each α ∈ [0,1], the lower prevision Q
α
on L ([0,1]) as
follows:
Q
α
( f ) = inf{ f (x)|x ∈ Γ(α)};
i.e., Q
α
is the lower expectation relative to I, the credal sets modeling ignorance on the set
Γ(α). Any such lower expectation is coherent and completely monotone, as was shown in
[51, Theorem 10]. For any function f , we define the lower expectation Q
[F ,F ]
on f by
Q
[F ,F ]
( f ) =
∫ 1
0
Q
α
( f )dα∗.
which is a Lebesgue inner integral. Q
[F ,F ]
is a coherent lower expectation, induced by the
random set defined by Γ. Now, the question we want to investigate in this section is to which
extend the random set defined by Γ is related to the p-box [F ,F ], that is what are the relation-
ships between the lower expectations Q
[F ,F ]
and E.
Our results show that, in general, lower expectations Q
[F ,F ]
and E do not coincide, conse-
quently Proposition 3.4 do not in general fully extend to more general cases, and there is no
longer one-to-one correspondence between p-boxes and specific random sets. However, we
will show that the relation between p-boxes and random sets continue to hold for particular
cases of practical interest.
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F.4.1 Lower expectation on general functions
Let us first introduce some notations. Given a distribution function F , let F˜ be the mapping
given by F˜(x) =F(x+) = inf{F(y) : y> x} for any x∈ [0,1), F˜(1) = 1. In other words, F˜(x) is
the right-continuous approximation of F . Note that the functionals L,U defined above do not
change if we replace F ,F by their right-continuous approximations F˜ , F˜ , and as a consequence
Q
F˜ ,F˜
( f ) = Q
F ,F
( f ) for any function f in L ([0,1]).
For any precise p-box described by a distribution function F , we will denote Q
F
and, for
any α ∈ [0,1], Q
α,F
the particular lower expectations Q
[F ,F ]
and Q
α
induced by F . Similarly,
we will denote LF andUF the mappings L andU induced by F , and ΓF the associated multi-
valued mapping.
Our next proposition shows that the lower expectations Q
[F ,F ]
( f ) and P[F ,F ]( f ) do not
coincide on all functions:
Proposition F.8. The lower previsions Q
[F ,F ]
and P[F ,F ] coincide on the class K of events if
and only if F and F are right-continuous.
Proof. First consider a precise p-box F . Given the definition of lower expectations Q
F
and
Q
α,F
,
Q
α,F
([0,x]) = 1⇔UF(α)≤ x⇔ F(y) > α ∀y> x;
from this, we can deduce that [0,F(x+))⊆{α :Q
α,F
([0,x])= 1}⊆ [0,F(x+)], whenceQ
F
([0,x])=
F(x+) (whereas PF([0,x]) = F(x)). Similarly,
Q
α,F
((x,1]) = 1⇔ LF(α) > x⇔∃y> x s.t. F(y) < α,
whence (F(x+),1] ⊆ {α : Q
α,F
((x,1]) = 1} ⊆ [F(x+),1] and consequently Q
F
((x,1]) = 1−
F(x+) (whereas PF((x,1]) = 1−F(x)). We deduce from this that the coherent lower expecta-
tion Q
F
coincides with PF on K if and only if F is right-continuous. An equivalent reasoning
can be separately used on F and F when the p-box is not reduced to a precise one.
This show that Q
[F ,F ]
and P[F ,F ] do not coincide in general, and thus that the two models
are not equivalent. The next example show that this is still true even if we consider only
right-continuous distribution functions F .
Example F.1. Let us consider the distribution function F on [0,1] given by F(x) = x for all
x, and let A be the set of the irrational numbers on [0,1]. It follows from the definition of
314 Generalized p-boxes on complete chain
LF and UF that LF(α) = UF(α) = α for all α in [0,1], whence Γ(α) = {α} for all α and
consequently Q
α
(A) = IA(α). Hence, Q[F ,F ](A) =
∫ 1
0 Adα∗ = 1.
On the other hand, it follows from Theorem F.4 that EF(A) = sup{PF(C) :C⊆ A,C ∈H }.
But since the only element of H which is included in A is the empty set, we deduce that
EF(A) = 0. 
F.4.2 Lower expectation on continuous functions
We now proceed to demonstrate that the lower expectation given by our random set expression
coincide with E when the function f is continuous. For this, we shall first state that any (pre-
cise) distribution function has a unique expectation when considering continuous functions.
A similar result in the case of distribution functions on the unit interval was established in
[149, Section 3.3] (where it is also shown that, when considering non-continuous functions,
the lower and upper expectations induced by a precise distribution function do not forcefully
coincide).
Let f be a continuous function on [0,1], i.e., a function such that f (d−) = f (d) = f (d+)
for any d ∈ [0,1]. Let on the other hand F be a cdf, and let E be the dual upper expectation of
E, given by E( f ) = −E(− f ) for all functions f . Then E is the upper envelope of the set of
expectations given F to all functions, and E( f ) = E( f ) if and only if expectation of F to f is
unique. We have the following proposition:
Proposition F.9. Let F be a precise distribution function and let f be a continuous gamble.
Then E( f ) = E( f ).
Using this Proposition, we are going to prove that Q
[F ,F ]
coincides with E on continuous
gambles. We will first relate the functional Q
[F ,F ]
to the functional that we can define for each
of the distribution functions F that belong to Φ(F ,F). Let F be such a distribution function,
we then have the two following lemmas:
Lemma F.5. Q
α
( f ) = infF∈Φ(F ,F)Qα,F( f ) for any α ∈ [0,1] and any f ∈L ([0,1]).
Lemma F.6. Let F˜ be the right-continuous approximation of F. Their expectations to contin-
uous functions f in L [0,1] coincide, that is EF( f ) = E F˜( f ) for any continuous functions f
in L [0,1].
These two lemmas together allow us to state the following theorem:
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Theorem F.10. For any continuous function f on [0,1], E( f ) = Q
F ,F
( f ).
Proof. For any continuous function f ,
E( f ) = inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
EF( f ) = inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
E F˜( f ) = inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
Q
F˜
( f ),
where the second equality follows from Lemma F.6 and the third from the fact that Q
F˜
is the
expectation induced by PF (from Proposition F.8), which is unique for continuous functions
(Proposition F.9). Since Q
F˜ ,F˜
( f ) = Q
F ,F
( f ) for any function f on [0,1],
inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
Q
F˜
( f ) = inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
Q
F
( f ) = inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
∫ 1
0
Q
α,F
( f )dα
≥
∫ 1
0
inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
Q
α,F
( f )dα =
∫ 1
0
Q
α
( f )dα = Q
F ,F
( f ),
where the one but last equality follows from Lemma F.5. Hence, E( f ) ≥ Q
F ,F
( f ) for any
continuous function f .
By Proposition F.8, Q
F˜ ,F˜
is an extension of P
F˜ ,F˜
to events in K , and therefore dominates
E
F˜ ,F˜
on all functions. But Lemma F.6 implies that
EF ,F( f ) = inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
EF( f ) = inf
F∈φ(F ,F)
E F˜( f ) = inf
F∈φ(F˜ ,F˜)
EF( f ) = E F˜ ,F˜( f )
for any continuous function f . Here, the third equality follows from the fact that given F ∈
φ(F˜ , F˜), there exists some F ′ ∈ φ(F ,F) such that F˜ = F˜ ′, which implies that EF = EF ′ = E F˜ ′
on continuous functions. We deduce that
EF ,F( f ) = E F˜ ,F˜( f )≤ QF˜ ,F˜( f ) = QF ,F( f )
for any continuous function f , and consequently we have the equality.
Consequently, we can safely use the random set induced by Γ to compute lower expecta-
tions induced by [F ,F ] on continuous functions. Recall that Example F.1 indicates that this
equality between Q
[F ,F ]
and E does not extend in general to all gambles. Nevertheless, the
case where expectations have to be computed for continuous functions is general enough to
be of practical interest.
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F.5 Conclusions
In this appendix, we have mainly explored an extension of generalized p-boxes presented in
Section 3.2, that is the case where generalized p-boxes are defined on totally ordered spaces
that are no longer necessarily finite. This setting encompass in one sweep both generalized
p-boxes on such spaces, p-boxes defined on the real line and on product spaces of the real line
(provided elements are totally ordered).
We have shown that many of the results from Section 3.2, but not all, could be extended to
this more general case, however not without introducing many mathematical subtleties.
In particular, generalized p-boxes on totally ordered spaces remain completely monotone,
and this allows to give a closed and manageable form of the lower expectation induced by
such a p-box in term of a Choquet integral. We have also shown that the correspondence with
random sets do not hold anymore in general, thus demonstrating that one has to be cautious
when extending results to more general cases. However, the correspondence still holds when
computing lower expectations of continuous functions.
Other interesting results are those showing that a generalized p-box on totally ordered
spaces is totally characterized by the values it takes on the open sets of the upper-limit topol-
ogy, and that lower expectations induced by a generalized p-box can be approximated by limits
of degenerate p-boxes.
There are still a few open problems and future lines of research steaming from this study;
one would be the study, for generalized p-boxes defined on totally ordered spaces, of the prop-
erties we have established in Section F.4. A number of complications arise in that case because
of the topological structure within X . A more general open problem would be the connec-
tion of generalized p-boxes with other uncertainty models, like clouds. In particular, they
could be useful model when linguistic assessments are both positive and negative assessments
(see [45]). A first step, which perhaps would not be too difficult to do, would be to extend our
results to completely (pre-)ordered spaces, that is to drop the property of asymmetry on the
relation on X .
Appendix G
(Ir)relevance statements, structural
judgments and event trees
In Section 5.2.4, we studied how the notion of forward irrelevance could be related to the
notion of independence in event-trees. We saw that, for particular event-trees (i.e., standard
ones) the two notions were equivalent.
As discussed in Section 5.2.4, forward irrelevance statements are likely to be the most
useful and sensible type of independence to use in a number of situations, particularly those
involving uncertain processes. However, other statements of independence, or even of struc-
tural properties of the uncertainty about variables, are likely to be more useful in some other
situations. This is why we now briefly discuss two related matters:
• How some results relating forward irrelevance with other notions of independence,
namely strong and repetition independence, translate in event trees.
• How the symmetric notion of epistemic independence, discussed by Walley [203, Ch.9]
could be set into event trees as well.
G.1 Forward irrelevance, strong independence and repeti-
tion independence
Recall that we consider variables X1, . . . ,XN assuming values on X1, . . . ,XN , and that vari-
ables Xk are indexed following a "time" index k (i.e., they form a process), that is, the value of
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Xk is always known before.
By using the marginal extension [148], it is possible to build a joint model P(1:N) by
combining local credal sets Px(1:k) = {P(·|x(1:k))} defined on X‖+∞ and for all k = 0, . . . ,N−
1, x(1:k) ∈ X(1:k), with some abuse of notations for x(1:0), meaning that nothing has been
observed yet. These credal sets are equivalent to local uncertainty models concerning the value
of Xk+1, knowing that X(1:k) = x(1:k). A statement of forward irrelevance allow to reduce the
number of local credal sets to assess, since it comes down to consider that Px(1:k) = Pk+1, for
any x(1:k) ∈X(1:k) and for all k= 0, . . . ,N−1. In other words, our local predictive model about
the value of Xk+1 do not depend of values of variables X(1:k). In the corresponding standard
event tree, this means that our local models Px(1:k) attached to situation x(1:k) do not depend
on the situation we have reached in the tree.
Since we have equivalence between independence in standard event trees and forward
irrelevance of variables X1, . . . ,XN , we can use the results relating forward irrelevance to strong
and repetition independence [50] to discuss these two notions inside standard event trees.
First, strong independence between marginal credal sets P1, . . . ,PN can be obtained by
choosing, for each k= 1, . . . ,N−1 the same probability P(·|x(1:k)) inPk for all x(1:k) inX(1:k),
that is by assuming, in addition to forward irrelevance, a functional dependence between the
sets Px(1:k) . The following example shows that this added constraints on credal sets Pk indeed
lead to tighter results.
Example G.1. Again, we illustrate the concept of strong independence with an event-tree
describing two successive flipping of coins. We consider two successive flips of different
coins. The first coin is known to be fair, andP1 reduces to probability P(h) = 1/2,P(t) = 1/2,
while nothing is known about the second coin, which could have two identical sides, and P2
is such that P(h) ∈ [0,1]. Now, consider the function such that f (t,h) = f (h, t) = 0.6 and
f (t, t) = f (h,h) = −0.4. On the tree is also indicated the lower expectations of this function
obtained by assuming strong independence between the two flips.
?,?
t,?
t, t
pt,?(t,t)∈[0,1]
t,h
pt,?(t,h)∈[0,1]
p?,?(t,?)=1/2
h,?
h, t
ph,?(h,t)∈[0,1]
h,h
ph,?(h,h)∈[0,1]
p?,?(h,?)=1/2
E(hh)( f ) =−0.4E(ht)( f ) = 0.6E(th)( f ) = 0.6E(tt)( f ) =−0.4
E(h?)( f ) = 0.6E(t?)( f ) =−0.4
E(??)( f ) = 0.1
The fact that strong independence lead to a tighter uncertainty is clearly visible in the
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example, since E(??)( f ) = 0.1, while simple forward irrelevance would have lead to E(??)( f ) =
−0.4. This is due to the fact that strong independence enforce ph,?(h, t) = pt,?(t, t).
This also shows that assuming strong independence generally imply that backward recur-
sion and local computations cannot be used any longer to computer lower expectations. This
means that computing with an assumption of strong independence becomes more complex
than computing with an assumption of epistemic independence, since one has to consider
lower expectations generated by every possible combinations of extreme points in credal sets
P1, . . . ,PN .
Second, when X1 = . . . = XN = X and P1 = . . . = PN = P , repetition independence
is obtained by choosing the same probability P(·) and P(·|x(1:k)) in P for all x(1:k) in X(1:k)
and all 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. As for strong independence, local computations cannot be used to
computing lower expectations with an assumption of repetition independence, nevertheless an
assumption of repetition independence requires less computational effort than one of strong
independence, since one only has to consider one computation per extreme points of P .
G.2 Towards a characterization of epistemic independence
in event-trees
We now examine, on the simple example of two successive coin flipping, how notions of
epistemic independence, the symmetric counterpart of epistemic irrelevance, could be related
to specific event-trees. Note that materials presented in this section are still very preliminary.
Let us consider two variables X1,X2 assuming values in X1,X2. Given a joint uncertainty
model on these two variables, an assessment of epistemic independence can be translated by
the fact that E( f1|x2) = E( f1) and E( f2|x1) = E( f2) for any x1 ∈X1 and x2 ∈X2, with fi an
Xi-measurable function, and E the lower expectations associated to situations in an event-tree.
Now, to make sense of the notion of epistemic independence in event trees, we need to
build trees such that the values of X1,X2 can be observed in any possible ordering. In our small
example, we will also need to use the notion of weak independence [179, Chapter 8]: two vari-
ables in a tree are weakly independent if there is no move that influences them both1, i.e., if for
any situation s outside the initial one, we have either Es( f1) = Em(s)( f1) or Es( f2) = Em(s)( f2)
for any functions f1, f2, and with m(s) the mother of s, that is the situation immediately pre-
1But different moves originating from one situation can influence different variables
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ceding s.
Example G.2. Let us consider the following event tree, describing two successive flips of two
coins, and allowing for the two flips to be observed in any possible ordering. Labels are
again explicit enough. Moves for which both variables X1,X2 could be influenced have been
numbered (other moves can only influence one variable, since the value of the other is already
known). Also pictured are the cuts where the value of a particular variable is revealed.
?,?
t,?
t,t t,h
1
h,?
h,t h,h
2
?,t
t,t h,t
3
?,h
t,h h,h
4
X1
X2
The following table summarizes under which conditions variables X1 (first flip), X2 (second
flip) are influenced by each move (Moves 1, 2, 3, 4 being the only ones for which both variables
can be influenced):
Infl. 1 2 3 4
X1 Always Always E?,t( f1) 6= E( f1) E?,h( f1) 6= E( f1)
X2 Et,?( f2) 6= E( f2) E?,h( f2) 6= E( f2) Always Always
Note that X1,X2 are weakly independent in the above tree if and only if inequalities of the
above table turn into equalities. It can be seen that this is equivalent to epistemic independence
between X1,X2
The above example suggest that, when considering variables X1, . . . ,XN assuming values in
X1, . . . ,XN , epistemic independence could be related to weak independence in an event tree
where d() = X(1:N), and where, at each step of the tree the value of a variable Xi is known,
and the daughter of a situation consist of the cartesian products of all spaces of variables whose
value is not yet known.
However, using such trees to characterize epistemic independence do not look very ap-
pealing at first sight, for various reasons:
• It is not obvious which form the immediate predictive model P1, bearing on X(1:N),
should have in order to ensure epistemic independence of X1, . . . ,XN .
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• As emphasized by Shafer [179], the notion of weak independence is rather unstable,
compared to the stronger notion of independence.
• Built trees do not appear very "intuitive" at first sight, and poorly related to the standard
trees used to characterize forward irrelevance.
However, Shafer [179] also mentions that it is possible to transform a tree so that weak
independence between two variables become classical independence (i.e., not influenced by
the same situation). It seems possible to do something likewise in our case, and this would
lead to the following tree:
?
Xσ = {1,2}
t,?
t,t t,h
h,?
h,t h,h
Xσ = {2,1}
?,t
t,t h,t
?,h
t,h h,h
That is, a tree where we have introduced an additional variable Xσ , that we will call
the sorting variable, and which would determine in which order are revealed the variables
X1, . . . ,XN . Such a variable do not increase the final dimension of the final space, but would
allow to relate more easily epistemic independence to local predictive models. Note that each
subtree after the sorting variable would be equivalent to a standard tree where the order of ob-
servation is determined by the value of Xσ . This suggests that epistemic independence would
be equivalent to forward irrelevance in each of these sub-trees.
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ABSTRACT
It often happens that the value of some parameters or variables of a system are imperfectly
known, either because of the variability of the modelled phenomena, or because the avail-
able information is imprecise or incomplete. Classical probability theory is usually used to
treat these uncertainties. However, recent years have witnessed the appearance of arguments
pointing to the conclusion that classical probabilities are inadequate to handle imprecise or
incomplete information. Other frameworks have thus been proposed to address this problem:
the three main are probability sets, random sets and possibility theory. There are many open
questions concerning uncertainty treatment within these frameworks. More precisely, it is
necessary to build bridges between these three frameworks to advance toward a unified han-
dling of uncertainty. Also, there is a need of practical methods to treat information, as using
these framerowks can be computationally costly. In this work, we propose some answers to
these two needs for a set of commonly encountered problems. In particular, we focus on the
problems of:
• Uncertainty representation
• Fusion and evluation of multiple source information
• Independence modelling
The aim being to give tools (both of theoretical and practical nature) to treat uncertainty. Some
tools are then applied to some problems related to nuclear safety issues.
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resentation, information fusion, nuclear safety, independence
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RESUME (français)
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